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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis considers how local authority social workers go about assessing 
the suitability of lesbians and gay men to foster or adopt children. It also 
asks how far a stated lesbian or gay sexuality is problematic within this 
process. A constructionist approach to social enquiry is used, data being 
generated by interviews with social workers, as well as a case study of a 
lesbian couple’s adoption application. Dorothy Smith’s ‘institutional 
ethnography’ is also employed to examine the ‘relations of ruling’ that 
structure such assessments (Smith, 1987). 
 
A continuum of assessment models is proposed in order to show the 
dominance of ‘on merit’ approaches which prioritise child care skills over 
sexuality issues. The thesis demonstrates the presence of arguments about 
the supposed ‘risks’ to children posed by lesbians or gay men. The notion 
of ‘discrimination’ in assessments is analysed, as are attempts by some 
social workers to challenge discrimination, and it is argued that small-scale 
anti-discriminatory measures are inadequate. 
 
Constructions of the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ are discussed in relation 
to the ‘good carer of children’, and the thesis proposes the dominance of 
two versions: the ‘good lesbian’ and the ‘maternal gay man’. The thesis 
argues that the ‘on merit: prioritisation of child care skills’ model relies upon 
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heteronormative ideas, and the case study looks at contested meanings 
given to the category ‘lesbian’ which are also gendered and raced. 
 
The thesis sees ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ as categories of knowledge, and social 
work assessment as a ‘making sense’ activity in which versions of these are 
produced. Such everyday practices are problematised in the thesis, and 
discourse, (black) feminist and queer theories are used to analyse how the 
assessment is a site for the production of knowledges about sexuality.  
 
Key Words: Lesbians, Gay Men, Adoption, Fostering, Social Work, 
Assessment, Homosexuality. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Mapping the Debate about Lesbian and Gay Fostering 
and Adoption 
 
 
 
In 1997, Bromley council, one of the London boroughs, announced that it was to 
ban lesbian or gay couples, and single parents, from being considered as 
potential adopters (Waugh 1997). The council felt that gay and single people did 
not make 'normal' or 'natural' parents, and council leader Michael Tickner 
commented, "Most of the children that come up for adoption have had a bad 
experience. We feel that such children should be placed in as normal and natural 
a home as possible and not have to deal with the stress of being in the care of a 
homosexual or a single person." (quoted in Waugh 1997:2). 
 
Further, in a recent survey1 conducted by the television programme 'Panorama' 
(BBC 'Panorama' 1997), respondents were asked a series of questions regarding 
their attitudes towards issues of lesbian and gay 'rights' in various aspects of 
social policy and law. Whilst 64% supported the acceptability of a lesbian or gay 
man serving in the armed forces, and 71% supported the principle of equality for 
lesbians and gay men in pension rights, inheritance and tenancy agreements, 
                                                           
1 The survey was conducted over the telephone by the National Opinion Poll from 17-19 October 
1997, with 977 respondents. 
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some 64% were against lesbians and gay men having 'equal parenting and 
adoption rights'. The programme suggested that lesbians and gay men having 
'rights' to foster or adopt children was by far the most controversial area covered 
by their survey, and claimed that the general public were "more opposed to 
parenting and adoption rights than to any other item on the gay rights agenda." 
(BBC 'Panorama' 1997).  
 
It seems, then, that opposition to lesbian and gay fostering and adoption is 
widespread, even amongst those who otherwise recognize the need for 'equality' 
based upon sexuality in other areas. This despite the fact that lesbian and gay 
parents continue to hold strong popular cultural fascinations (see BBC ‘Esther’ 
1996; BBC Radio 4 1994; Brennan 1994; Gysin & Chalmers 1998; McRobbie 
1991; Powell 1998; Weese & Wolff 1995). Why should this be the case? Why is 
the notion of lesbians and gay men looking after, and parenting, children seen as 
the final taboo, something which is culturally unacceptable even to those who 
support lesbian and gay 'equality' agendas in other areas of public and social 
life? 
 
I argue that these are 'familiar fears' for two main reasons; first, they draw upon a 
familial discourse which constructs 'the lesbian' and 'the gay man', albeit in very 
different ways, as outside of kinship, family and the parenting of children (Smith 
1994). Second, my title also refers to the familiarity of the arguments made 
against lesbian and gay adoption and fostering. These everyday or 
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'commonsense' understandings of what lesbians and gay men are, and their 
attendant implications for children, pervade social work practice as much as any 
other area of social life and they were familiar both to me and to the social 
workers that I interviewed. 
 
This thesis attempts to answer why lesbian and gay parenting is so feared via an 
investigation of the acceptability, or not, of lesbians and gay men as foster or 
adoptive carers, but it is specifically a piece of empirical research which 
considers how a cohort of social workers went about assessing lesbians or gay 
men who applied to three local authority fostering and adoption units.  
 
Placing the Debate about Lesbian and Gay Fostering and Adoption  
 
One of the prime reasons for conducting this research was that, apart from just 
two existing 'overview' studies of lesbian and gay adoption and fostering 
(Ricketts 1991; Skeates & Jabri 1988), none had considered social work practice 
with such applicants. Further, apart from my own earlier work on the perspective 
of applicants themselves (Hicks 1993, 1996; Hicks & McDermott 1999), no 
research had investigated how social workers went about assessing applicants 
who were lesbian or gay. This seemed to me to be a substantial gap in social 
work research knowledge, and especially in an area of practice regarded as 
politically sensitive yet dominated by 'commonsense' views about lesbian and 
gay parenting. 
 4 
 
It is one of the purposes of this thesis to investigate such 'commonsense' views, 
but it remains the case that most adopters and foster carers are heterosexual 
white couples, usually married (Campion 1995; Triseliotis et al. 1995, 1997). 
There is still reluctance on the part of fostering and adoption agencies to place 
children with lesbians or gay men (Campion 1995; Martin 1993; Ricketts 1991; 
Sandland 1993; Sullivan 1995; Triseliotis et al. 1995, 1997), and so I wanted to 
consider why this was still the case. This does not mean that all local authorities 
reject lesbian or gay applicants, however, and there certainly are examples of 
successful placements reported here and elsewhere (Hicks & McDermott 1999). 
But it is my contention that current social work practice, law and guidance 
concerning fostering and adoption are unlikely to encourage lesbian and gay 
applicants. 
 
Foster care involves the temporary placement of children with substitute carers, 
though it may sometimes be on a long-term basis. It comes in many forms 
(Triseliotis et al. 1995), but all foster carers must be formally assessed by an 
approved agency (Department of Health2 1991). Within local authorities, it is 
social workers that carry out such assessments, and, although a formal fostering 
panel is not required to make the final decision to approve applicants, many 
authorities do have such panels. Adoption involves the permanent placement of 
children with new carers, and the court must grant an adoption order. Adoptive 
                                                           
2 Hereafter referred to as DoH. 
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applicants have to be similarly assessed, but their final approval by a formal 
adoption panel is also mandatory (Triseliotis et al. 1997). In both cases, social 
workers carry out such assessments, part of which involves an in-depth 'home 
study' usually, though not always, based upon guidelines set out in the 'Form F' 
(BAAF 1991; Campion 1995:47; Triseliotis et al. 1997:150). It is this aspect of the 
assessment of lesbian and gay applicants that is considered in this thesis. 
 
This process is problematic for lesbians and gay men for many reasons, not least 
because they are positioned as 'unusual', different from the heterosexual 'norm', 
or, in Bromley's words not 'natural'. Such ideas are bolstered in existing law and 
guidance on fostering and adoption, which relies upon both the 'tacit acceptance' 
of gay and lesbian carers and the idea that they should be used only as a 'last 
resort' (Hicks 1996). Tacit acceptance, I argue, allows for lesbians and gay men 
to be approved and used as adopters or foster carers but only where the model 
of sexuality used is one in which it remains a 'private and discreet' matter, as 
opposed to one of political and social significance. A lesbian or gay sexuality is 
here unstated and this is opposed to any notion of 'gay rights' in applying to be 
considered. Linked to this is the notion of a last resort, whereby lesbians and gay 
men should be used only in exceptional circumstances, where all other 
preferable options have failed and often where the children are 'hard to place' 
(Triseliotis et al. 1997:9) because they are disabled, older, or have particular 
needs due to learning, behavioural or emotional difficulties. 
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When the consultation paper on foster placements was published following the 
1989 Children Act (DoH 1990), it stated that "...authorities and those interested in 
becoming foster parents must understand that an authority's duty is, 
unequivocally and unambiguously, to find and approve the most suitable foster 
parents for children who need family placement. It would be wrong arbitrarily to 
exclude any particular groups of people from consideration. But the chosen way 
of life of some adults may mean that they would not be able to provide a suitable 
environment for the care and nurture of a child. No one has a 'right' to be a foster 
parent. 'Equal rights' and 'gay rights' policies have no place in fostering services." 
(DoH 1990: para. 16). This was a clear statement that the notion that lesbians 
and gay men ought to have the 'right' to be considered as potential carers was an 
inappropriate one, and signalled the acceptability of the a priori rejection of all 
lesbian and gay applicants by agencies. 
 
Following much criticism of the "gay rights" sentence in paragraph sixteen by 
lesbian and gay groups3 as well as organisations representing adoption and 
fostering generally, this reference was removed but the "chosen way of life" part 
remained in what became the Children Act 1989 guidance on family placements 
(DoH 1991: 25). I argue that this is a model of tacit acceptance because it does 
not rule out all lesbian or gay foster carers, but allows for some to be approved in 
exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless lesbian and gay fostering is not to be 
                                                           
3  Paragraph 16 was the original reason for the formation in Manchester of the Positive Parenting 
Campaign, a group that continues in existence to this day, and one which has been instrumental 
in getting local authorities to take lesbian and gay adoption and fostering seriously, has provided 
training and staged national events concerned with this issue. 
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encouraged under this model and cases are to be dealt with on an individual 
basis only. Further, the wording of what became paragraph 3.14 of the guidance 
(DoH 1991: 25) does allow for lesbians and gay men to be rejected on the basis 
of their sexuality alone if an authority so wishes, as I will show in chapter six of 
the thesis. 
 
The tacit acceptance position was further reiterated in the publication of the 
consultation document on the review of adoption law (DoH/Welsh Office 1992). 
With regard to adoption by 'unmarried couples and single people', the document 
had the following to say: 
 
...we feel that the security and stability which adopted children need 
are still more likely to be provided by parents who have made a 
publicly recognised commitment to their relationship and who have 
legal responsibilities towards each other...The fact that two people 
are married to each other is not of course in itself a sufficient guide 
to the likely stability of their relationship...We do not propose any 
changes to the law relating to single applicants, including lesbians 
and gay men. There are examples of extremely successful 
adoptions, particularly of older children and children with 
disabilities, by single adopters...We have suggested above that an 
unmarried couple should not be allowed to adopt jointly...We do not 
feel that this is necessarily incompatible with allowing a single 
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person who has a partner to adopt. We recommend that, where 
assessing a single applicant, agencies should have a duty to 
assess any other person who is likely to act in a parental capacity 
towards the adopted child." (DoH/Welsh Office 1992:49-50). 
 
Immediately following the publication of the consultation document, government 
ministers and especially the then Junior Health Minister, Tim Yeo, insisted that 
married couples were the best placement for all children. Yeo noted that "...the 
vast majority of children benefit from having two loving parents of opposite sexes 
and adoption agencies should make strenuous efforts to find such couples." 
(Yeo, reported in Marchant 1992:1). He also repeated the arguments used 
previously in relation to fostering, saying, "...Equal rights and gay rights have no 
place whatsoever in adoption work" (Community Care 1993:2), and "...There is 
no room for political correctness or ideology in fostering [sic]...Children's rights 
not gay rights must drive the policy." (Linehan 1993:5).  
 
This was reinforced with the eventual publication of the white paper on adoption 
(DoH et al. 1993), which again suggested that social work assessments ought to 
be based upon 'commonsense' rather than 'ideology' (DoH et al. 1993:8). The 
white paper clearly argued for "a strong presumption in favour of adoption by 
married couples", with the proviso that there might be "a small number of other 
exceptional circumstances where adoption by a single person may be sensible..." 
(DoH et al. 1993:9). This was reiterated in guidance on adoption by the Social 
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Services Inspectorate, which confirmed the view that most children are best 
placed with a married couple because "such a structure offers the best chance 
for successful development into adulthood through a stable and enduring 
relationship with two parents." (Social Services Inspectorate 1996:3). Once 
again, this also backed up the notion that lesbians and gay men should be used 
only as a last resort. 
 
Thus current law and guidance on fostering and adoption practice does allow for 
lesbians and gay men to be considered, though only as a 'single person with a 
partner' in the case of adoption. However, lesbians and gay men remain open to 
a priori rejection, or to being viewed as 'second-class' carers likely to be more 
rigorously assessed or expected to take 'hard to place' children (Campion 
1995:60; Ricketts 1991; Sandland 1993:329). 
 
Whilst there are examples of lesbians and gay men being rejected outright by 
local authorities on the basis of their sexuality alone, it is those who are accepted 
into the assessment process that I wanted to investigate in this thesis. It is a 
central argument of the thesis that the assessment itself is crucial since, apart 
from making written and verbal recommendations to fostering or adoption panels 
about the suitability of lesbian or gay applicants, I argue that it is also a process 
within which the social workers constructed versions of the categories 'lesbian' or 
'gay' via their talk and text. It is my argument that straightforward or 
'commonsense' understandings of the assessment process imagine that 'lesbian' 
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or 'gay' have unproblematic and fixed meanings, and that it is the job of the social 
worker merely to assess applicants' skills and attitudes, to test these against 
obvious 'child care abilities', and to describe these in their final report.  
 
Instead this thesis argues that the categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' by no means 
have fixed or obvious meanings amongst social workers, and that, during the 
process of assessment, the social workers made actively constructed versions of 
these categories. Thus the assessment itself is a 'making sense' activity, as is all 
social work in my view, and it is my argument that assessment reports present 
particular versions of 'lesbian' or 'gay' to panels. This thesis investigates what 
those particular versions are, and why these prevail within adoption and fostering 
practice. 
 
I am arguing, then, that the assessment is a crucial site for the construction of 
meanings attaching to concepts like 'lesbian', 'gay' or indeed 'the good enough 
carer of children', and it is unlikely that the assessment will lose such status in 
the near future, since it is also bound up with notions of consideration of 'risk' 
(Parton et al. 1997). Further, both the adoption white paper and the consultation 
document on national standards in foster care have stressed the central 
importance of a thorough assessment of all applicants (DoH et al. 1993:2; Social 
Services Inspectorate 1996; UK Joint Working Party on Foster Care 1998:21). I 
therefore wanted to investigate this assessment process because I was 
interested to find out how the social workers went about making decisions as to 
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the suitability of lesbians and gay men to adopt or foster children. Crucially, I 
argue that this is about making sense of the categories 'lesbian' or 'gay'. 
 
The assessment is key to the operations of power that are inherent in social 
work-ing via a social work discourse which creates knowledge about such 
categories. Various writers have argued that such social work knowledge is a 
social product, and that it therefore also operates a 'regime of truth' which 
organizes what can and cannot be said (Foucault 1972; Philp 1979; Rojek et al. 
1988; Smith 1987). For the purposes of this thesis, then, I was interested to 
investigate the operations of power within social work assessments (Triseliotis et 
al. 1995:79), in order to analyse how, in fact, 'lesbian' and 'gay' are constructed in 
and through a discourse made up of institutional practices, talk and text.  
 
By this I do not mean that lesbian and gay subjects who apply to be considered 
as potential adopters or fosterers do not 'exist', but I do argue that the categories 
'lesbian' and 'gay' are always only discursive constructions, whether they be used 
by those of us who go under such categorisations (Seidman 1997; Wiegman 
1994) or by social workers making assessments. Thus the assessment process 
makes discursive reconstructions or representations of 'lesbian' or 'gay' but 
specifically within what Dorothy Smith has termed the social 'relations of ruling' 
(Smith 1987). These dictate certain versions as more acceptable, or compatible 
with, 'the good carer' I argue. Relatedly, queer theory has argued that the labels 
'lesbian' and 'gay' are not the property of individuals, but rather categories of 
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knowing (Sedgwick 1990; Seidman 1996b, 1997), and this is a position which I 
support in the thesis. Once a person describing themselves as lesbian or gay 
applies to be considered by a fostering and adoption unit, the meanings ascribed 
to those categories become open to any number of further reconstructions by the 
social workers. I argue, therefore, that social work assessment reports are a 
series of knowledge-claims and the 'lesbian' or 'gay' applicant is ultimately known 
only through this textual version presented to a panel. 
 
Crucially, this thesis is complicated by the fact that I am considering what I argue 
are two socially constructed activities, sexuality and social work (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966; Burr 1995). Neither of these is self-evident or obvious, but both 
have to be 'made sense of' and can, therefore, be understood in a number of 
different ways. Relatedly, they are both 'making sense' activities I argue, and by 
this I mean that the 'doing' of both social work and sexuality involves making 
knowledge-claims about the social world and about categories used to divide it 
up. 'Lesbian', 'gay', 'risk', 'good enough carer of children' and so on are all 
examples of such knowledge-claims, and these exist in many different and 
contradictory versions. 
 
Investigating Social Work 
 
This thesis takes what I consider to be an innovative approach to researching 
social work practice, and I argue this because the thesis pays close 
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phenomenological attention to social work-ing, that is the practices of social 
workers as interpreting activities. Whilst these are practices as recounted to me 
in interviews, nevertheless my concern was to investigate what the social 
workers did when, and how they made sense of, assessing lesbians and gay 
men. I was therefore, and indeed remain, concerned with the process of 
assessment, and what was going on at the 'micro' level of social work practice. 
 
This is in opposition to an approach which I have not taken, that might be called 
the 'macro' level. This would have involved a large-scale survey of all local 
authorities to look at their stated policies concerning lesbian and gay adoption 
and fostering, and the numbers of lesbian or gay carers approved by each. I 
explain in chapter two why I did not choose to examine 'policies' of all local 
authorities, but in particular I wanted to pay close analytic attention to the 
assessment process. Even where an authority accepts lesbian or gay applicants, 
and where an assessment has a positive outcome in terms of approval, this does 
not mean that it is unproblematic for lesbians and gay men. Further, where an 
authority has a stated public position of equal opportunities, 'discriminatory' 
practices still occur, and this is at least partly because social work-ing is not hide 
bound by the existence of 'policies', important though these are (Rhodes 1992). 
For this reason I also chose not to investigate social work via case files and/or 
statistics concerning the numbers of lesbian or gay applicants. 
 
I also felt that asking about numbers of approved lesbian or gay carers would tell 
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me very little, other than that such numbers are small. What I have wanted to 
avoid, and would still argue against, is the view that there are 'good' local 
authorities that approve lesbians and gay men, and 'bad' ones that do not. Of 
course this does occur sometimes, as in the case of Bromley (Waugh 1997), but 
what this does not get to grips with is how social workers make sense of lesbian 
and gay applicants, whether their employers are supposedly progressive or not. 
For it is also a central argument of this thesis that the heterosexual or 
'heteronormative' (Warner 1993b:xxi) structures the prevailing 'relations of ruling' 
in fostering and adoption practice, and that lesbian or gay applicants must 
therefore be represented in certain key ways by the social workers if they are to 
be approved by panels. 
 
‘Pomo’/Discourse and Social Work 
 
The straightforward or commonsense approach to the idea of social work 
assessment has been elsewhere termed 'professional idealism' by Mark Philp, 
who argued that social workers have been seen as free, autonomous individuals 
merely holding sets of 'values' (Philp 1979:84). Instead, he argued that social 
work values and skills are not individual acts, but rather take place within a 
socially determined context. Thus social work knowledge is a particular social 
construct which operates as a 'discourse', which he defines as a set of rules or 
organizing principles governing the form of that knowledge (Philp, 1979:87). 
Social work knowledge is therefore a social product and it has a framework that 
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governs what can and cannot be said (Philp 1979:85). This is the discourse of 
social work, which is subject to conflict and the prevalence of dominant interests: 
 
...it is necessary to locate social work within the general discourse 
of truth and power and to show the way in which this both produces 
a particular form of knowledge and, at the same time, limits social 
workers to it. (Philp 1979:89). 
 
In particular, Philp argues that it is a central task of social work knowledge to 
create the notion of a 'subject' (Philp, 1979:91). Thus, for the purposes of this 
thesis, I use Philp's analysis to understand that social workers actually create 
lesbian and gay subjects through their interpretations of such categories and 
through their practices, but that these are specific versions of 'the lesbian' or 'the 
gay man' often limited to what is already understood within, and acceptable to, 
social work knowledge. If the lesbian or gay man cannot be understood to fit with 
the concept of 'the good carer of children' as it is constructed by social work, then 
they will be rejected as foster or adoptive applicants. 
 
These ideas have been further developed around the concept of social work 
discourse and postmodernism (Howe 1994, 1996; Pardeck et al. 1994a, 1994b; 
Parton 1994a, 1994b, 1996a, 1996b; Parton & Marshall 1998; Parton et al. 1997; 
Rojek et al. 1988; Williams 1996). Here it is important to emphasize that social 
work discourse is both constraining and enabling of social workers, and that 
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social work itself is at the "axis of control and opposition" (Rojek et al. 1988:117, 
1989:8). Social work discourse does not constrain all social workers merely to 
reproduce prevailing and dominant ideas about lesbians and gay men, but 
nevertheless all versions of such categories have consequential effects, and this 
point is centrally developed in the thesis. 
 
A series of claims about 'postmodern' social work have been made which I 
summarise here as figure 1.1: 
 
'Postmodern' claims about Social Work 
 
• the role of language in forming human 'selves' is crucial (Howe 1994:521, 1996:86).       
• social work in the 'postmodern' can be characterized by pluralism of theories and practices, 
the importance of participation, a concern with the operations of power, and social work as a 
performative activity concerned with risk and surveillance (Howe 1994; Parton 1994a:109). 
• social work is, and always has been, contested and ambiguous (Parton 1994a:95). 
• the role of language within social work is not neutral, indeed it constitutes the operations of 
power (Parton & Marshall 1998:244; Rojek et al. 1988:7).                             
• social work has a set of 'received ideas', a key example of which is the prevalence of 
psychoanalytic terminology, but these are not simply accepted by all but are the site of 
struggles (Rojek et al. 1988:11) 
• 'received ideas' constitute social work agency norms (Rojek et al. 1988:37). 
• applying discourse analysis to social work allows for recognition of its changing nature, that 
the 'needs' of clients are actually constructed via discourse, that social work knowledge can 
be questioned, and that social work is power relations whereby the social worker can act as 
disciplinarian or surveillance agent (Rojek et al. 1988). 
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• all social work concepts, such as 'child abuse', are socially constructed phenomena which 
must be socially organized and achieved in each and every context (Parton et al. 1997:70-2). 
• social work in the postmodern is characterised by change, complexity, difference and plurality 
(Parton & Marshall 1998:241). 
• deconstruction of social work discourses, especially dominant ones, is crucial (Parton & 
Marshall 1998:247). 
• the subjectivity of social work's 'subjects' is precarious and reconstituted in discourses 
(Parton & Marshall 1998:247). 
• social work needs to work with 'difference', otherwise it tends to freeze identities as fixed 
(Williams 1996:76). 
Figure 1.1 
 
'Postmodernism' actually subsumes under it a whole series of sometimes 
contradictory claims, some of which have also been made previously by other 
theorists, notably feminist claims concerning the status of knowledge (Stanley 
1990b; Waters 1996). However, here there seem to be two sets of claims as to 
the 'postmodern' in relation to social work. First is a series of claims about 
applying what is argued to be the condition of 'postmodernity' (Smart 1993, 1996) 
to the present state of social work (Howe 1994; Parton 1994a). Here social work 
under modernity is characterised in fixed and oversimplified ways (Clarke 1996), 
and the notion of the postmodern is used to read present social work activities 
such as concerns about participation, care management or the assessment of 
risk. This version of the postmodern I find unhelpful as it presents all previous 
social work as uncomplicated, non-contradictory and concerned with single 
agendas, none of which I support.  
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However, the second version of postmodern social work is one that concerns 
itself with the analysis of discourse, and this is an approach that I have found 
helpful for the purposes of this thesis. Here, claims that social work has a form of 
'knowledge', subject to conflicts and the operations of dominant interests, are 
pertinent (Philp 1979). For this thesis attempts to analyse how social work 
assessments are the operation of social work discourses, in which I argue that 
'received ideas' about sexuality and prevailing views, or 'doxa', are dominant, and 
that these produce or achieve phenomena such as conceptualizations of 
'lesbian', 'gay', 'the good carer', and even 'black', 'Asian', 'Hindu', 'man' or 
'woman', as I shall be discussing in later chapters (Parton et al. 1997:72; Rojek et 
al. 1988:8,143). 
 
Central to such analyses, and indeed to my own in this thesis, is the role of 
language, which I argue is not a neutral descriptor, but instead an active 
constructor of meanings and concepts (Derrida 1976; Howe 1994:521; Rojek et 
al. 1988:244; Weedon 1987). It is through language that lesbians and gay men 
are understood and represented by social workers, and I argue that social 
workers’ use of language is always implicated in the power/knowledge nexus 
(Foucault 1980) via their talk and text. Thus the thesis centrally sees social work 
as a making sense activity, and tries to make sense of these interpretations, a 
process that has been called 'reflexivity' (Pardeck et al. 1994a:118). 
 
 19 
In contrast, much existing research on, and indeed teaching about, social work 
adopts a model in which the concepts, ideas and skills employed by social 
workers are seen as politically and ethically neutral. It is as though there is 
something called 'social work knowledge or competency' which social workers 
have simply to acquire. Social workers are assumed to have a series of skills and 
attitudes, classically being 'non-judgemental', treating 'the individual', or 
'empowering' them (Rojek et al. 1988), which they acquire and then use to solve 
the problems of others. This relates directly to the 'commonsense' view of social 
work assessment, and I argue against this in the thesis because I do not accept 
that social workers ever simply describe fostering and adoptive applicants' 'skills, 
personalities, characters, and abilities' in their reports. Instead I investigate the 
precariousness of the categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' and how these are 
reconstituted in discourses (Parton & Marshall 1998:247). 
 
I have been arguing so far that I accept some of the claims that have been 
termed 'postmodern', but the term glosses a whole range of sometimes 
contradictory theoretical stances and it certainly does not 'sum up' the position I 
have taken in the thesis. I want to go on to consider how I have also used 
analyses variously termed feminist, queer, black and/or postcolonial via an 
examination of how the thesis centrally investigates 'sexuality' as it intersects 
with 'social work'. 
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Investigating Sexuality 
 
Researching 'sexuality' is complicated by the fact that it too is an interpretation, a 
construct which acquires a series of different and changing meanings (Bristow 
1997; Parker & Gagnon 1995). Indeed thinking "...sociologically about something 
as commonplace and complex as 'sex and sexuality' provides a wide canvas of 
possibilities of approach and interpretation." (Hawkes 1996:145). I wish to begin 
by making a series of claims about my own view of 'sexuality' which are central to 
the arguments of the thesis. These claims are equally applicable to the concept 
of 'social work' in my view:  
 
 
Discovering Sexuality: 
 
• it is both material and discursive. 
• it can only be known through interpretive processes. 
• it is organizationally, discursively and practically achieved. 
• it is gendered, raced, classed... 
• it is contested, problematic, irreducible to essentials, and far from agreed. 
• it can be known as many different knowledge-claims or theories.                           
• it is governed by discourse, and therefore implicated in the operations of power, definitions of 
'truth', and specifications of what counts as knowledge ('what can be said'). 
• it is practised. 
• it can be formulated into a series of categories that are both regulatory and 
naming/confirming.                                                                                                 
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• it is institutionalized in ways which construct and repeat conventionally gendered and raced 
power dynamics.                                                                                          
• it is defined through processes of normalizing which require constant performance or 
reiteration.                                                                                                        
• it operates conventional binaries in order to keep 'others' marginal, and to maintain the 
centrality of heterosexuality. 
• attempting to understand it involves the production of knowledge; therefore all attempts to 
understand it - including that which makes up this thesis - can be disputed. 
 
Figure 1.2 
 
As figure 1.2 shows, 'sexuality' is a difficult issue to research because it is so 
difficult to locate: 
 
Whatever sexuality might mean for the individual, it functions as a 
social code, normative framework, principle of social organization 
or simply put, a way of defining, regulating, and organizing bodies, 
selves, and populations which produce identities, solidarities, and 
relations of domination. (Seidman 1997:212). 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I was interested to examine how 'lesbian' and 
'gay' function as representations made by the social workers, but how, then, to 
investigate such representations of sexualities? As I have said, the thesis pays 
close attention to the social workers' talk (to me in interviews, to each other, to 
lesbian and gay applicants, and to adoption and fostering panels) and text (their 
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written assessment reports, and also other documents that I have used in 
chapter six), but there is a danger, here, of seeing the 'representation' of 
sexuality as all, but this is not the case. As Beverley Skeggs notes: 
 
Sexuality is at least: a form of institutional organization (as in 
heterosexuality); a regulative (public/internal) discourse; a 
linguistic unity; a representation; a practice/behaviour; an 
identity; a desire; a form of citizenship. (Skeggs 1997:119). 
 
Crucially, therefore, I was not only interested in how the social workers 
represented lesbians and gay men. I also wanted to consider the assumptive 
heterosexuality that informs most social work-ing with regard to fostering and 
adoption; that is, how heterosexuality is institutionally organized into social work 
practices. Indeed, against assertions that queer theory, for example, has tended 
to abandon institutional analysis (Seidman 1997:156), it is my view that it can be 
used to examine how heterosexuality is promoted through a range of state 
practices (Duggan 1998), which include both examples of the law discussed 
earlier and the operations of social work agencies examined herein. Thus the 
thesis investigates social work practices as they are implicated in and 
constructed through the heterosexual 'relations of ruling', in order to show how 
these institute particular forms of working with lesbians and gay men. 
 
Queer theory has been important in asserting that heterosexuality has functioned 
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only in relation to a reliance upon, yet a continual need to deny or make 'other', 
'homosexuality' and the categories lesbian and gay (Sedgwick 1990:10; Seidman 
1997:132; Warner 1993b). Further, it has argued for a largely Foucauldian 
version of 'knowledge' (Halperin 1995; Seidman 1997) in which such categories 
are practices of knowing. Here, Steven Seidman's account suggests that, within 
discourse, rules are authorised for generating and validating knowledge, and that 
the practices of knowing become institutionalised. Institutional agents, such as 
social workers, are validated with 'expertise' and institutional authority, and 
certain social practices are accorded legitimacy by their connection to dominant 
knowledges (Seidman 1997:27-8).  
 
This is a helpful way of conceptualising the knowledge about lesbians and gay 
men produced by the social workers in and through their assessment practices. 
In the thesis I argue that assessments depend upon a set of 'rules' or institutional 
norms, and that these also dictate the kinds of practices expected of the social 
workers when assessing lesbians and gay men. I argue therefore that this 
produces particular kinds of knowledge about lesbians and gay men, with certain 
versions being institutionally sanctioned. Social workers are given 'expertise' to 
carry out such assessments, but this is not so straightforward as it may appear. 
In the case of assessments of lesbians and gay men, the legitimacy of social 
work as a professional practice is often called into question because merely 
considering lesbians and gay men as the potential carers of children does not 
connect with dominant knowledges about them, as some newspaper reporting 
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clearly demonstrates (Sunday Express 1990). 
 
Queer theory has also helped to shift analytic focus onto heterosexuality as a 
socially and politically organizing principle (Seidman 1997; Stein & Plummer 
1996), and to maintain that 'lesbian' and 'gay' are not fixed identities but 'ways of 
knowing' as I argued earlier. This problematisation of the concept of 'identity' is 
also central to the thesis, since I argue for the complicated interactions of identity 
components, and that 'lesbian' and 'gay' are not just known through claims about 
sexuality, but also they are absolutely gendered and raced4. Gendered 
understandings of lesbian and gay are analysed in chapter five of the thesis, and 
in chapter six I use a case study of a lesbian couple, one Asian woman and one 
white woman, in order to consider the intersecting dynamics of race and sexuality 
(Dhairyam 1994). This is specifically a consideration of the dynamics involved in 
the assessment of black lesbians or gay men, since, if I were to be analysing just 
race, then this would need to address how white people are as much raced as 
anyone else (Dyer 1997; Helen 1992). 'Queer' is a contestation of the notion of a 
unified 'homosexual' identity (Seidman 1996b:11), and the thesis applies this to 
gender and race, as well as sexuality. 
 
By implication, then, the thesis is also an investigation of heterosexuality; that is, 
how heterosexuality is normalized into being central to the notion of the 'good 
carer' via social work practices, or via social work-ing. Although I argue that 
                                                           
4 Although I have not analyzed disability as a category in this thesis, it is also clear that it too 
intersects with sexuality in complex ways (Shakespeare et al. 1996). 
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heterosexuality is invisiblised, largely absent from analysis, when thinking about 
who is able to meet children's needs, it is my view that focusing on lesbian and 
gay carer applicants can also help to spotlight the assumptions of heterosexuality 
in action. Heterosexuality, then, is located within social work practices via its 
material institutionalization, but also via its representations (Skeggs 1997:118). 
By this, I mean that heterosexuality is not only the assumed norm of fostering 
and adoption but it is also used to serve regulatory functions with respect to 
those lesbians and gay men who apply. This not least because I argue that 
lesbians and gay men are usually held to a heterosexual standard or 'norm' and 
this is used to make the final decision about whether they are approved, or not, 
as carers. 
 
In examining sexuality, then, I have taken an approach that sees this as always 
intersecting with, and indeed understood through, the dynamics of gender and 
race (Afshar & Maynard 1994; Mercer 1994). My argument is not only that white 
lesbians and gay men are as much gendered and raced beings as any other 
(Card 1998; Dyer 1997; Ferguson 1998; Helen 1993), but that the social workers' 
constructions of the categories 'lesbian' or 'gay' were very much driven by 
anxieties about gender and race, as I show in chapters five and six. I have 
therefore used feminist and black analyses in the thesis, and indeed am critical of 
versions of 'queer' or 'postmodernism' which ignore gender and race.  
 
'Feminism' also glosses a whole diversity of approaches (Barrett & Phillips 1992; 
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Bell & Klein 1996; Clough 1994; Evans 1995; Evans 1997; Kemp & Squires 
1997; Meyers 1997; Mirza 1997a; Mohanty et al. 1991; Nicholson 1990; Stanley 
& Wise 1993; Weedon 1987), but I support the view that it analyses 'gender' via a 
knowledge-base which relies upon the category 'women' as separate from the 
category 'men' (Stanley 1997b:12; Stanley & Wise, 1993). This does not have to 
mean, however, that feminism is 'essentialist' or 'fixes identities', indeed it has a 
long history of understanding that the category 'women' is socially constructed, 
fractured and complicated (Stanley 1990b). Nevertheless, the categories 'women' 
and 'men', as much as 'lesbian' or 'gay', remain forceful ways of carving up the 
social world and I have therefore analysed how the social workers were as much 
concerned with gender as sexuality as, I argue, the terms of sexuality are 
gendered terms. I see 'women' and 'men', then, as discursive constructions as 
well as having material effects, such as being 'discriminated against' because of 
gender.  
 
An adequate feminism, however, must also accept what Liz Stanley terms the 
"epistemological ramifications of difference" (Stanley 1997b:1), and this does not 
just mean 'adding in...' black and lesbian women to feminist analyses, but rather 
understanding that feminist knowledge, as much as any other, is implicated in the 
politics of its own production (Mirza 1997b; Mohanty et al. 1991; Stanley & Wise 
1990,1993). That is because feminism is a theory of knowledge: 
 
Feminism sees new knowledge, sees 'coming to know' in a different 
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way, as having its origin within such ontological problematics and 
the practical inquiries that arise from them. It has articulated 
ontological difference as the site of epistemological distinction: a 
feminist theory of knowledge linked to a feminist way of knowing, 
and this in turn linked back to a feminist way of theorising being. 
(Stanley, 1997b:4). 
 
Much like claims made variously under the term 'postmodernism', there have 
been debates amongst feminists about the usefulness of the postmodern 
(Ahmed 1996; Bell 1993; Bell & Klein 1996; Doan 1994; Elam 1994; Flax 1997; 
Mirza 1997b; Nicholson 1990; Riley 1988; Waters 1996; Weedon 1987). As with 
all theoretical positions outlined so far, including 'postmodernism', 'discourse', 
'queer' and 'feminism', I have chosen instead to analyse the knowledge-claims 
being made rather than call myself a 'postmodern queer pro-feminist etc...' For I 
argue that some of the claims made by 'postmodern feminists' are useful, 
certainly to the project of this thesis, but that I do not accept them all and retain 
the suspicions of others who are 'anti-postmodern'. Further, some of the 
'postmodern' claims have been in existence within feminism for some time 
(Stanley 1990b, 1992b) - the 'nothing new' phenomenon - whilst others are 
antithetical to a feminist project (Ahmed 1996), and some versions of 'feminism' 
suggested by the 'postmoderns' I do not accept (Bell 1993; Weedon 1987). Like 
Stanley (1992b:6), I align myself with some of the ideas now called 'postmodern', 
yet I also recognise others as having long histories within feminism and lesbian 
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and gay theories, for example.  
 
Claims accepted by me, and useful for this thesis are as follows: 
 
'Postmodern' Feminisms 
 
• categories such as 'lesbian' or 'woman' are necessary but also perform regulatory functions 
(Butler 1990; Wiegman 1994). 
• globalising, white and universalizing tendencies of feminism must be disrupted (Clough 1994; 
Spivak 1995; Trinh 1995). 
• the category 'woman' is always displaced, disrupted, hybrid (Anzaldua 1987; Elam 1994; 
Riley 1988). 
• 'woman' is discursively and historically constructed, yet necessary to feminism (Flax 1997; 
Riley 1988). 
• the representation of 'women' will never be decided but constantly deferred into new 
meanings (Elam 1994). 
• 'women' simultaneously refers to real historical people and to their constructions in ideology 
(Elam 1994). 
• feminism questions science and knowledge, and also the idea that language transparently 
describes the 'real' (Flax 1997; Weedon 1987). 
• feminism questions dominant discourses, including those within itself, and the 'epistemic 
violence' done in the name of 'truth' (Mirza 1997a; Spivak 1995). 
• feminism is about difference (Mirza 1997b).                                                         
• the 'objects' of feminism are discursive, and therefore feminism must study their effects as 
knowledges, rather than simply labelling them 'non-feminist myths' (Bell 1993). 
• feminism must focus on how, where and by whom knowledge is produced (Weedon 1987). 
Figure 1.3 
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In particular, Vikki Bell's claim that we should not simply label ideas, which are 
non-feminist, as 'myths' is one that I have used elsewhere in the thesis. As I have 
noted, chapter four considers 'commonsense' constructions of risk supposedly 
presented by lesbian and gay carers to children, and so I have used Dorothy 
Smith's work (Smith 1987) in order to understand such 'everyday' notions as 
institutional knowledges linked to institutional practices. Bell claims that all ideas 
are a "complex web of interlocking knowledges" (Bell 1993:88), and she argues: 
 
To discount these with the blanket term 'myths' or 'male ideology' is 
to ignore the ways in which these various ways of talking interrelate 
and conflict, and the institutional and power relations they deploy 
and inform. To ignore this complexity misses the opportunity to 
expose these interconnections, to investigate historical tactics and 
mechanisms, and to use the points of conflict to question the wider 
issue of making truth claims....Thus it is not simply that these ways 
of talking[...]are myths, that they are wrong, but that they constitute 
knowledges, often institutionalised as truths with practices informed 
by and informing them. (Bell 1993:88). 
 
However, as I have earlier noted, this thesis retains an insistence on the 
categories 'women' and 'men' in order to analyse gender, whilst accepting that 
such categories are always constituted within discourse. Within the discourse of 
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social work, as within any other, such categories also have material effects 
(Clough 1994) and it is such effects that I also analyse. Relatedly, whilst I argue 
that all identity categories are forms of knowledge discursively produced, 
categories such as 'lesbian', 'woman', 'black', 'gay' and so on retain 
epistemological and ontological significance for those who use them. A feminism, 
or indeed postmodernism or queer theory, which simply dismisses such claims 
as 'essentialist' is unhelpful (Brodribb 1992; Fuss 1989; Hartsock 1987a; Stanley 
1990b; Waters 1996), for such categories have always been, and remain, 
internally fractured but with important uses for political identifications and actions. 
This is what has been termed the 'strategic essentialism' (Spivak 1987) or 
'necessary fiction' of identities (Sinfield 1998). 
 
Feminism(s) cannot deny the material socially constructed realities of gender 
(Stanley 1992b:241), and therefore my analysis does not just consider how 
gendered, raced and sexualized identities are representations, but also their 
effects in social work practices and institutional regulations. Where postmodern 
discourse disregards gender (Di Stefano 1990), where it refuses to name men's 
actions which are dominating, violent, or situations in which men clearly hold far 
more institutional powers than women (Brodribb 1992; Thompson 1996), and 
where it retains 'hetero-reality' as a centrally organizing force (Klein 1996), then it 
is antithetical to feminism I argue. Thus the thesis uses claims from feminism, 
postmodernism and queer theory in ways which refuse to remove gender and 
race from the analysis of sexuality categories. 
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Can Gender be Separated from Sexuality? 
 
There have been various attempts to separate out the analysis of gender from 
sexuality (Rubin 1993; Sedgwick 1990), and indeed 'lesbian theory' from 'feminist 
theory' (Calhoun 1997, 1998; Ingraham 1996; Martin 1998; Stein 1998). Gayle 
Rubin argued that it is essential to separate gender from sexuality, partly 
because the system of sexual oppression "is not reducible to, or understandable 
in terms of, class, race, ethnicity, or gender" (Rubin 1993:22), but also because 
she argued against a feminist analysis of sexuality: 
 
I want to challenge the assumption that feminism is or should be 
the privileged site of a theory of sexuality. Feminism is a theory of 
gender oppression. To assume automatically that this makes it the 
theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, 
on the on hand, and erotic desire, on the other. (Rubin 1993:32). 
 
The work of Cheshire Calhoun, however, has argued for the separation of 
lesbian theory from feminist theory (Calhoun 1997, 1998). She suggests that 
available analyses of heterosexuality (Rich 1980; Wittig 1992) were actually 
analyses of 'patriarchy', lacking attention to the specifically lesbian relation to 
heterosexuality: 
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To the extent that feminist theory lacks a concept of heterosexuals 
and nonheterosexuals as members of different sexuality classes 
and thus of heterosexuality as a political structure separable from 
patriarchy, feminist theory must treat lesbian oppression as a 
special case of patriarchal oppression and remain blind to the 
irreducibly lesbian nature of lesbian lives. (Calhoun 1997:201). 
 
Calhoun went on to argue that 'patriarchy' and heterosexual dominance are two 
discrete systems, and that, for lesbian women, being 'not heterosexual' has 
penalties, such as being denied the chance to adopt in ways that heterosexual 
women are not (Calhoun 1997:204). Lesbians and gay men, she says, are 
displaced within the heterosexual sex/gender system, so that they have no 
legitimate place there. Again she uses the parenting example - being denied 
adoption, being denied child 'custody' or residence - to show that lesbians and 
gay men are "family outlaws" (Calhoun 1998:228-30). 
 
Calhoun therefore argues that heterosexuality has a fundamental status absent 
from analysis in some feminist theory: 
 
Social practices, norms, and institutions are designed to meet the 
heterosexual system’s need to produce sex/gender dimorphism - 
masculine males and feminine females - so that desire can then be 
heterosexualized. (Calhoun 1997:214). 
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Whilst this thesis supports the view that separate attention should be paid to 'the 
heterosexual system', since clearly I analyse how lesbian and gay subjects are 
constituted within the heterosexual 'relations of ruling' and, further, investigate 
how processes of heterosexualisation are at work in social work assessments, I 
do not do this by removing the analysis of gender relations. Like others (Card 
1998; Ferguson 1998; Frye 1983; Stanley & Wise 1979), I analyse, for example, 
how the category 'lesbian' is a particularly threatening form of 'women'. Further, I 
investigate how lesbians and gay men are both understood absolutely within the 
existing discourse of gender, and that part of the oppression experienced by 
them as adoption or fostering applicants is due to their being perceived as 'not 
proper women or men.' Indeed I do not support the view that anything is currently 
'un-gender', since it is a defining presence in all discourses. 
 
 
Race-ing Sexuality 
 
This thesis also takes seriously claims made by black and/or 'postcolonial' 
feminists, lesbians and gay men (Amos & Parmar 1984; Anthias & Yuval-Davis 
1992; Anzaldua 1987; Beam 1986b; Bhattacharyya 1998; Brah 1996; Carby 
1982; Collins 1990; Lorde 1984; Lugones & Spelman 1983; Mason-John 1995; 
McClintock 1995; Mercer 1994; Mirza 1997a; Mohanty 1988, 1991; Spivak 1995; 
Trinh 1995). This is because I argue that 'lesbian' and 'gay' are also raced 
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constructions, and I specifically wanted to investigate what happens when black 
lesbians or gay men apply to fostering and adoption units. Partly this was 
because previous research had found little evidence of openly lesbian or gay 
black carers (Skeates & Jabri 1988), but also because I wanted to show how 
race, gender and sexuality intersect in complex ways. 
 
Claims made by black and/or postcolonial feminists include the following: 
 
Black Feminisms 
 
• the 'epistemic violence' of claims to knowledge has positioned 'colonial' women as 'Other', the 
'marginal subaltern' (Spivak 1995). 
• race and gender are often pitted against each other, as though oppression comes in 
separate, monolithic forms (Trinh 1995). 
• the 'third world woman' has been reproduced as a fixed monolithic subject by some feminist 
texts (Mohanty 1988:61).                                                                              
• Western feminism has constructed implicitly consensual priorities that are ethnocentric and 
privileged, and this is a powerful discursive practice (Bhattacharyya 1998; Mirza 1997b; 
Mohanty 1988:63). 
• such universalising feminisms explain 'third world women' only through gender and not race 
or class, and they are never allowed to rise above mere 'object status'; this has political 
effects, such as some forms of feminism being seen as imperialistic (Mohanty 1988:66). 
• black women felt forced to choose between race or gender within feminism, and want 
feminism to acknowledge race (Amos & Parmar 1984; Carby 1982; Lugones & Spelman 
1983). 
• black women cannot be simply grafted onto existing feminism, but feminism itself must 
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change (Bhattacharyya 1998; Carby 1982). 
• black women have 'different ways of knowing' and therefore produce different kinds of 
knowledge (Collins 1990). 
• black feminism has exposed 'whiteness' as a universalizing discourse (Mirza 1997b). 
• black feminism is about racialised and gendered subjects, but not an homogeneous 'black 
women' (Mirza 1997b; Mohanty 1991).                                                       
• on the 'borders' fixed identities can be challenged via notions of hybridity, mixing, the 
forbidden, the queer, the 'mestiza', and identity be understood as a process, a becoming 
(Anzaldua 1987; Mirza 1997b). 
Figure 1.4 
 
As with earlier claims labelled 'postmodern', 'feminist' and 'queer', here it is 
argued that "...the category of woman is constructed in a variety of political 
contexts that often exist simultaneously and overlaid on top of one another" 
(Mohanty 1988:73). This is an important point, for chapter six analyses how 
categories such as 'Asian', 'Hindu' and 'lesbian' can be constructed as being 
diametrically opposed when simplistic views of 'identity categories' are employed 
in social work assessments. 
 
The Contribution of the Thesis 
 
My research makes an original contribution to knowledge on the topic of lesbian 
and gay fostering and adoption for a number of reasons. First, the empirical data 
is itself original, in so much as I have not come across any other research which 
investigates in any depth how social workers go about such assessments. 
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Existing research, including my own, gives some attention to the point of view of 
applicants themselves (Hicks 1993, 1996; Hicks & McDermott 1999; Ricketts 
1991; Skeates & Jabri 1988) or to 'policy statements' made by local authorities 
(Skeates & Jabri 1988), but none has considered how lesbians and gay men are 
assessed within the 'Form F' process.  
 
Second, examining the assessment process in this way, as a 'making sense 
activity', is also original, for little attention has been paid to how social workers 
reproduce social categories via such processes. The thesis considers how far it 
is possible to say that lesbians and gay men are 'discriminated against' within 
assessment, but also problematises this notion by asking what exactly might 
constitute a 'non-discriminatory' approach; again, a question rarely asked or 
answered.  
 
Third, I approach the categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' as problematic, and see these 
as discursive constructions, as forms of knowledge, which can be investigated for 
their effects as they are constructed and used by the social workers. I examine 
how these relate to another social construction crucial to adoption and fostering 
practice, the 'good enough carer of children', and suggest that only certain 
versions of 'lesbian' or 'gay' can be made compatible with this. Further, I also 
analyse how discourses of gender and race are also crucial to such categories 
and to decisions made about the suitability of lesbian and gay applicants. I argue 
that, when a final assessment report is presented to an adoption or fostering 
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panel, then at that point the 'lesbian' or 'gay man' exists only as a discursive 
construction. Panels do not 'know' such applicants except as how social workers 
represent them via talk and text. 
 
This research sits alongside only two other previous studies (Ricketts 1991; 
Skeates & Jabri 1988), both very different in approach, and therefore makes only 
one contribution to an area little investigated. For this reason, I think it important 
to outline what this research is not, for it cannot answer all questions about 
adoption and fostering by lesbians and gay men. I have not considered the views 
and practices of child care social workers who work in area children and families 
teams and who are partly responsible for decisions about where to place 
children. Nor have I considered what happens when lesbian or gay carers are 
involved in court cases and/or contested hearings involving birth parents. 
 
I have not considered recruitment practices in any depth, nor placement 
decisions or outcomes, because I have focused upon the assessment process, 
usually to the point at which a panel decides whether to approve the carers or 
not. Nevertheless I have not been able to give significant attention to the 
workings or decision-makings of panels. Nor have I researched in an authority 
prepared to make a public statement that it will not consider lesbian and gay 
applicants. 
 
Finally, this research is not a "how to" guide to the assessment of lesbians and 
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gay men, and I have not considered national statistics concerning the numbers of 
lesbian or gay applications and approvals. I have not researched 'public' or policy 
statements made by local authorities on this issue, and have preferred to avoid 
the approach of 'good vs. bad' agencies. 
 
The Research Questions 
 
The thesis addresses itself to the following questions: 
 
• how do social workers assess lesbian or gay adoption or fostering applicants? 
• what models of assessment are used and why? 
• do particular 'ways of assessing' dominate? 
• what approach do agencies take to such assessments? 
• how do social workers themselves prepare for, feel about and handle such 
assessments? 
• what areas of knowledge do they draw upon? 
• what areas of questioning are used with lesbian and gay applicants and why? 
• how do social workers handle issues of a lesbian or gay sexuality in 
assessment? 
• how do social workers handle the question of lesbians and gay men 'coming 
out'? 
• do agencies operate any policies specific to this issue? 
• how do social workers present their assessment reports to panels? 
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• what is 'discriminatory' assessment practice with lesbians and gay men, and 
what is not? 
• do particular versions of 'lesbian' or 'gay' prevail? 
• do social workers recognise a series of 'commonsense' 'myths' about lesbian 
and gay parenting? 
• what ideas about sexuality prevail, and what about gender and race? 
 
An Outline of the Thesis 
 
Following on from this chapter, I present a review of the existing research 
literature relating to the adoption and fostering of children by lesbians and gay 
men. Because such research is scarce, however, I also consider studies of 
lesbian mothers, gay fathers, and the children of lesbians and gay men, all of 
which include children from previous relationships and those born by methods of 
alternative and self-insemination (Saffron 1994). Chapter three examines the 
thesis’ methodology, and here I examine my own claims-making via an 
investigation of epistemological, methodological and indeed grammatological 
issues (Derrida 1976). Chapter three also explains why I chose to use both a 
series of interviews with a cohort of social workers and a case study of a lesbian 
couple's application to be considered as adopters for the purposes of the thesis. 
 
Chapters four to six present my analysis of the data generated thereby. In 
chapter four I begin to analyse how the social workers went about assessing 
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lesbians and gay men. Here I propose a continuum of assessment responses 
and consider what I argue is the dominance of the 'on merit: prioritizing child 
care' model. I examine what I consider to be key features which impact upon the 
social workers' abilities to conduct 'fairer' assessments, before using Dorothy 
Smith's work (Smith 1987) in order to analyse 'commonsense' understandings of 
'risks' supposedly presented to children by lesbian and gay carers and central to 
the discussions I had with the social workers. Next I examine whether it is 
possible to say that assessments of lesbians and gay men are 'discriminatory' 
and, crucially, analyse what this means in practice. At the end of chapter four, I 
look at the notion of 'anti-oppressive practice' with lesbians and gay men, paying 
attention to those social workers who I argue were attempting to promote 
'equality' measures with lesbian and gay applicants. 
 
In chapter five, I turn my attention to the gendered nature of understandings of 
the categories 'lesbian' and 'gay.' As I have argued, I do not believe that sexuality 
can be understood apart from gender, but I was nevertheless surprised by how 
much 'gender anxiety', as I term it, was generated in my interviews. Here, in 
separate sections, I analyse how the social workers made sense of lesbian and 
then gay applicants, and I use a feminist analysis to propose that certain versions 
of 'lesbian' and 'gay', particularly in gendered terms, predominated amongst 
applicants who were successful in gaining approval as adoptive or foster carers.  
 
Chapter six presents my case study of Nita and Clare, a lesbian couple who 
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applied to be considered as adopters. I follow their 'story' through the 
assessment, successful approval by adoption panel, and then subsequent 
rejection as the potential carers of a sibling group of Asian girls by another local 
authority. Chapter six investigates the dynamics involved in the assessment of a 
black and a white lesbian, with the intersecting aspects of religion, race, ethnicity, 
gender and sexuality being key. I argue that the operation of fixed and 
'discriminatory' racial values by the social workers were used to mask what I 
argue was a case of anti-lesbian rejection. 
 
Finally, in chapter seven I provide my conclusions to the thesis. I summarize the 
arguments made throughout, and then address any methodological weaknesses 
of the research. I propose a series of areas for future research, before 
suggesting a model of multiple activisms as a way forward and a way to 
intervene in the construction of knowledges surrounding the lesbian and gay 
adoptive and foster carer. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Reviewing the Literature 
 
In this chapter I consider the existing research relating to the fostering and 
adoption of children by lesbians or gay men. Research which deals with this 
issue is scarce (Brown 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Ricketts 1991; Ricketts & 
Achtenberg 1987, 1990; Skeates & Jabri 1988), and so I will address some 
related areas: studies of lesbian mothers, studies of gay fathers, and studies of 
children living with gay or lesbian carers. My justification for considering these 
related areas is that debates around the acceptability of lesbian or gay carers 
centre on the construction of knowledge-claims about lesbian/gay parents and 
their children, as much as about fostering and adoption specifically. Within each 
section, I will consider the major studies in detail, before going on to draw out the 
general themes emerging from the research. Finally, I will address knowledge 
produced by the existing studies, in order to consider how my own research 
questions are informed by the literature presented herein. 
 
Empirical Studies of Fostering and Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men: 
 
The pioneering work of Jane Skeates & Dorian Jabri (1988) in Britain was to 
consider the experiences of lesbian and gay applicants to the fostering and 
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adoption process, and the response of local authorities to such applications. At 
base, their study argues for the fair treatment of lesbian and gay applicants from 
the position of a right of entitlement (1988:7). This means that lesbian and gay 
applicants should not be subject to a priori disqualification from the fostering and 
adoption process, but should be assessed, like anyone else, on the basis of their 
ability to provide good child care (1988:7). Skeates & Jabri argue that this 
constitutes a lesbian and gay 'right', and one that does not contradict the rights of 
children (1988:8). 
 
Their study is based upon two research aspects: first, interviews with thirteen 
lesbians and gay men who had been through the fostering and adoption process 
(specifically, three male couples, two female couples, a single man, and two 
single women); and, second, profiles of policy information requested from six 
inner-London boroughs. Skeates & Jabri note that it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from their small interview sample, and that only one person was from 
outside London (1988:28). Of their sample group, three people had applied to a 
local authority as a 'single person' and had not been out as gay or lesbian, while 
the remaining ten had applied as openly lesbian or gay people (1988:31). In 
relation to the profiles of the London boroughs (1988:60-70), I believe their 
research is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the boroughs concerned 
are all inner-London, and all had reputations at the time of the study for 
progressive, anti-discriminatory policies. Second, requesting policy information 
on paper from the boroughs allows them to present what I term 'practice in 
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theory'; that is, what they might like to achieve with lesbian and gay applicants 
rather than what was practised. Third, to focus on policy rather than social work 
practice does not present a picture of how social workers were dealing with 
lesbians and gay men in the boroughs concerned.  
 
Skeates & Jabri provide a comprehensive list of what they term 'myths' about 
lesbians and gay men, which they argue have informed social work practice 
(1988:20/1). These include notions that lesbians and gay men are deviant, 
unable to provide proper gender role models to children, likely to sexually abuse 
children (more so for gay men), likely to bring their children up to be lesbian or 
gay, and not 'naturally' able to parent (1988:20/1). Skeates & Jabri question 
these assumptions, and make the following points: in relation to gender role 
modeling, they ask why fixed roles are held to be so important, and make the 
points that heterosexuals also provide diverse gender roles at times and that 
children also learn about gender from outside of the home (1988:21). They 
suggest that lesbians and gay men do not bring up their children to be lesbian or 
gay, and that sexuality is no indicator of good or bad parenting ability 
(1988:22/3). They also point out statistics from the Metropolitan Police which 
show that 96% of sexual abuse is perpetrated by heterosexual men, and yet gay 
men are still held to be more of a sexual risk (1988:23). They make the point that 
social work agencies need to question their use of such 'stereotypes', and also 
the construction of the 'ideal family model', in order to benefit the whole process 
of social work assessment (1988:24/5). 
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There are a number of themes that emerge from their interviews with lesbian and 
gay applicants, and they note that the assessment process is 'doubly 
discriminatory' for lesbians or gay men who are also black and/or disabled 
(1988:28/58). Their research found that social workers assumed applicants to be 
heterosexual unless told otherwise, and that, if the applicant was not out as 
lesbian or gay, then sexuality was not discussed at all (1988:31/36). One social 
worker made comments to indicate that there were suspicions that the applicant 
was gay, but he was never asked (1988:32). 
 
For gay men, the 'corruption' response was common. There were concerns about 
why gay men would want to care for boys (1988:42), and suggestions that they 
had ulterior, sexual motives (1988:45). A single gay man, who was not out, felt 
that his social worker was worried that he would sexually abuse a child 
(1988:32). Interestingly, a lesbian respondent reported that her social worker had 
said that lesbians were the safest placement for children (1988:40). 
 
Most of the respondents felt that it was important to be out to a local authority, 
and many felt that social workers would be more likely to respond positively to 
honesty (1988:33/37). Nevertheless, the responses of the local authorities 
concerned varied. One authority said that lesbians and gay men were covered by 
their policy of equal opportunities and that applicants would be considered on 
their merits (1988:47). Others said that they were unsure how to deal with such 
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applications (1988:42), that they had never assessed a gay couple before 
(1988:43), or refused to respond to such applicants (1988:45). 
 
With regard to the process of assessment, two respondents reported that the 
experience was positive, but this was where the social worker either had gay 
friends (1988:40) and/or an understanding of lesbian and gay issues (1988:44). 
One gay couple felt that their social worker was misinformed about the issues, 
and higher management further scrutinized their application when they came to 
the attention of panel (1988:38). Another gay couple reported that their social 
worker expected them to have traditional gender role divisions within their home 
(1988:38). A lesbian couple said that their assessment was initially good, but 
when a second worker became involved she did not approve of their application, 
and did not want it to go to panel. They felt she had little knowledge of lesbian 
issues (1988:47/49). 
 
Most applicants felt that the whole process was too long (1988:37), but it is very 
difficult to say whether this has anything to do with issues of sexuality. A gay 
couple reported further delay to their application when the borough concerned 
found out that they had been recommended for approval by a social worker. 
Their application was further scrutinized and the borough was unsure about how 
to handle the issues (1988:38). One woman noted that she had been approved 
for adoption by a borough, had children placed with her, and had been asked to 
run training groups for potential applicants. When she later came out as a 
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lesbian, she was withdrawn from the training courses (1988:34). 
 
Skeates & Jabri (1988) provide the following conclusions regarding their 
interviews with lesbian and gay applicants. They suggest that those who were 
out as lesbian or gay received less favourable responses from local authorities 
(1988:49). They also believe that those who were out experienced more delay in 
the process of assessment, and that all lesbian and gay applicants face tougher 
questioning and scrutiny than heterosexual ones (1988:50). They also found that, 
where lesbians or gay men had children placed with them, they were more likely 
to be disabled children, or those termed 'hard to place' because of particular 
needs: 
 
The most recurring reason for the allocation of a disabled child with 
a Lesbian or Gay parent is the belief that a child with for example, a 
learning disability, will not understand its parent's sexuality and will 
therefore not be influenced or corrupted by it. Moreover, there is 
also the belief that a child with a disability, like all people with 
disabilities, does not have sexual needs/sexuality, and could not 
therefore possibly grow up to become Lesbian or Gay. (Skeates & 
Jabri, 1988:57). 
 
The second aspect of the Skeates & Jabri study was to request policy 
information regarding lesbian and gay potential carers from six inner-London 
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boroughs, namely Hackney, Hammersmith & Fulham, Haringey, Lewisham, 
Lambeth and Camden (1988: 60-70). All of these boroughs reported that they 
had policies of equal opportunity that would not discriminate against lesbians and 
gay men, and that all applicants would be assessed on their merits as potential 
carers. Most also noted the need for training on issues of sexuality for their social 
work staff. Only three case examples are mentioned; a lesbian foster carer in 
Hammersmith & Fulham (1988:63), an application by a lesbian couple in 
Haringey (1988:65), and an approved lesbian carer, who had a disabled child 
placed with her, in Lambeth (1988:68). 
 
Skeates & Jabri recognized the need for more detailed research to examine the 
social work practices of local authorities in relation to lesbian and gay carers 
(1988:74), and they were concerned that the implementation of Section 28 of the 
Local Government Act 1988 (Gooding 1992:290) might cause a number of local 
authorities to backtrack on their commitment to lesbians and gay men. 
 
The research of Wendell Ricketts (1991), and Ricketts & Roberta Achtenberg 
(1987, 1990), has documented findings relating to fostering and adoption by 
lesbians and gay men in North America. Their research is noteworthy for its use 
of the case study method (Yin 1984), in particular the Boston Foster Care Case 
(Ricketts 1991:67; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:99, 1990:98), and is based upon 
interviews with lesbian and gay carers, young lesbians and gay men in care, and 
heterosexual young people living with lesbian or gay parents (Ricketts & 
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Achtenberg 1990:85). They suggest that there are hidden numbers of lesbian 
and gay carers who have not come out to social work agencies (Ricketts & 
Achtenberg 1990:84), and that some social workers prefer to ignore issues of 
sexuality in assessments (Ricketts 1991:1; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:89, 
1990:84). This poses a number of problems, however, for social work agencies, 
as increasing numbers of lesbian or gay carers are coming out (Ricketts & 
Achtenberg 1987:93, 1990:87).  
 
In terms of the social work assessment of lesbians and gay men, Ricketts & 
Achtenberg contend that "...homosexual applicants are scrutinized more carefully 
and are held to a higher standard than are their heterosexual counterparts" 
(Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:104), and report that assessments of lesbians or 
gay men were more thorough and rigorous (Ricketts 1991:10; Ricketts & 
Achtenberg 1990:98). Social workers often operated with a narrow concept of the 
'family' in assessments (Ricketts 1991:8), and, for lesbians or gay men, sexuality 
came to dominate the inquiry to the exclusion of all other issues (Ricketts 
1991:119). Like Skeates & Jabri (1988), Ricketts' (1991) research argues for a 
right of entitlement to assessment for lesbians and gay men. 
 
Also like Skeates & Jabri (1988), they report a number of stereotypical views or 
'myths' about lesbians and gay men held by social workers (Ricketts 1991:47/8; 
Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:113), all of which are refuted by existing research 
(Ricketts 1991:49). In particular, they found concerns regarding lesbians' and gay 
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men's abilities to provide gender role models, which betray anxieties that the 
traditional gender system might break down. For example, Ricketts & Achtenberg 
(1990) report that a "...county-appointed lawyer suggested that [a] four-year-old 
would do better in a 'normal' family; later he asked whether two 'strong women' 
would be able 'to raise a little girl to be appropriately submissive'." (1990:111). 
Ricketts & Achtenberg also report that lesbians and gay men who do have 
children placed with them are often asked to care for 'hard to place' children 
(1990:104). They found that many lesbian or gay applicants felt they had to 
educate their social worker about lesbian and gay issues (Ricketts & Achtenberg 
1987:90, 1990:85/105), and they suggest that social work training should 
address such concerns (Ricketts 1991:3; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:107, 
1990:113). 
 
The case study reported in their research is that of two foster carers in Boston, 
Massachusetts (Ricketts 1991:67; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:99, 1990:98). The 
case involved a gay couple, David Jean and Donald Babets, who were approved 
to foster, and had two children placed with them. Following exposure of their 
story in the local press, however, the children were removed from their care, and 
a review of fostering policy instigated. The research reports that the men's 
assessment was twice the usual length, and that the policy review resulted in 
potential lesbian or gay carers being used only as a 'last resort' (Ricketts 
1991:76; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:102, 1990:99). Ricketts & Achtenberg 
(1987:104, 1990:100) suggest that this case reveals that those lesbians or gay 
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men approved often possess special skills (both men worked in social care 
professions), that media attention distorts the potential for adequate policy 
consideration, and that lesbian and gay community opposition to such 
discrimination is important. 
 
The work of Helen Cosis Brown (1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1998) is not 
empirically based, but she does consider how sexuality can be assessed by 
social workers in fostering and adoption. She notes that social workers often 
experience feelings of great responsibility when assessing people who will 
become the carers of children (1991:11), and when those potential carers are 
also gay or lesbian, workers feel there is an added 'spotlight' on their work. Many 
do not accept that lesbians or gay men should be assessed, but feel that they 
cannot say this for fear of contradicting policies of equal opportunity (1991:11). 
Others have assessed and recommended lesbian or gay carers, only to find that 
their managers will not back such a recommendation (1991:11). It is Brown's 
contention that opposing 'gay rights' to notions that 'children need normal 
families' is unhelpful (1991:11), and she suggests that the proper assessment of 
lesbian or gay applicants, based upon children's rights to good placements that 
meet their needs, is the way forward. In this way, social workers need to avoid 
using either negative/discriminatory or positive/over-liberal stereotypes of 
lesbians and gay men (1990:8, 1991:15). 
 
Brown notes that social workers need to take seriously the existing research 
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knowledge about children who live with lesbian or gay carers (1991:14, 
1992b:214), as this addresses stereotypical concerns about the likely effects 
upon children. In contrast to what she terms an 'over-liberal' response (1992a:32) 
in assessments, where sexuality may not be discussed because this might not be 
'politically correct', Brown advocates that sexuality needs to be firmly on the 
agenda in all assessments (1992a:30). This means that, in assessing lesbians 
and gay men, social workers need to consider and cover particular issues that do 
not relate to heterosexuals (1990:19, 1991:16). These include the lesbian or gay 
applicants’ experiences of their sexuality, their family reactions to this, how they 
feel about being lesbian or gay, their experiences of homophobia, their 
relationships, how they will help a child to understand their carers are 
lesbian/gay, and how they will relate such information to other adults in the child's 
life (at school, for example) (1991:16). She argues that carers need a clear sense 
of their own sexuality and sexual boundaries in order to be able to help children 
in their care (Brown 1992a:33).  
 
In order to be able to carry out such assessments with confidence, social workers 
need to ask themselves what knowledge, what values, and what skills they 
have/need in relation to lesbian or gay potential carers (Brown 1992a:31). Brown 
suggests that this should be addressed in the training of workers (1990:8), and 
gives the example of how attitudes towards single carers as fosterers or adopters 
have moved on in social work theory and practice (Brown 1992a:31). Brown also 
notes that social workers frequently raise the issue of the potential objections of 
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birth parents to such placements, and she suggests that they need to address 
this, rather than it becoming an excuse for the justification of discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men (Brown 1990:21, 1991:16). She notes that, where 
lesbians and gay men have been properly assessed as able to provide good 
child care, then social workers can feel confident in addressing birth parents' 
concerns. Some birth parents will support such placements, some will come to 
change their views over time, and the views of some will be overridden in 
placement decisions (Brown 1991:16). Where a birth parent objects to placement 
with lesbian or gay carers, the social worker will have to make a decision whether 
to offer another placement, to withdraw the placement on the grounds that it is 
adequate, or to overrule the parents' wishes in favour of the child's needs (Brown 
1990:21). 
 
General Themes Emerging from Existing Research on Lesbian & Gay 
Fostering and Adoption: 
  
Existing research suggests that social work theory remains largely discriminatory 
and pathologising in relation to lesbians and gay men (Brown 1992b:202), and 
that many lesbians and gay men who approach social work agencies are fearful 
of the power that social workers have to reject their applications (Romans 1991). 
Social work agencies are likely to operate a number of 'stereotypical' views about 
lesbians and gay men (Skeates & Jabri 1988:24). With regard to lesbian and gay 
applicants to the fostering and adoption process specifically, social work 
 54 
agencies may have no policy on how to respond (Sullivan 1995; Taylor 
1993:111), or may not know how to respond to such enquiries (Skeates & Jabri 
1988:42/3; Smart 1991:17). Many social work agencies simply refuse to respond 
to lesbian or gay enquirers (Clarke 1991:17; Skeates & Jabri 1988:45). 
 
Brown (1992a:30) reports that many social workers find it difficult to discuss 
issues of sexuality in an open manner. This may be due to a number of reported 
factors: general ignorance on the part of many social workers about lesbian and 
gay issues (Eaton 1986:6; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:105; Romans 1991:15), 
the operation of homophobic values (Appleby & Anastas 1998: 33; Martin 
1993:132; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:88; Wisniewski & Toomey 1987:455), 
personal opposition to lesbian and gay fostering or adoption (Brown 1991:11; 
Martin 1993:141), and the holding of 'discriminatory' and 'stereotypical' beliefs 
about lesbians and gay men generally (Brown 1992b:214; Ricketts & Achtenberg 
1990:113; Skeates & Jabri 1988:20/1). The implications of such findings have 
been that the issues of sexuality have often been ignored in assessment 
(Ricketts 1991:1; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:84), that the true number of 
lesbian and gay carers remains hidden (Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:89), and 
that lesbian and gay applicants frequently report that they find themselves in the 
position of having to 'educate' their social worker about lesbian and gay issues 
(Martin 1993:170; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1987:90, 1990:85/105). 
 
Much of the existing research has considered the effects of the social work 
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assessment, or home study, upon lesbian and gay applicants. Although a 
number of lesbians and gay men report positive experiences of assessment 
(Skeates & Jabri 1988:40/44), these are largely outweighed by negative 
examples. For those lesbian and gay applicants who are not disqualified from 
assessment at the initial point of contact with an agency, the process is reported 
to be more thorough (Ricketts 1991:10) and searching (Ricketts & Achtenberg 
1990:104; Skeates & Jabri 1988:38/50) than for heterosexual applicants. Ricketts 
(1991) notes that "...when open lesbians and gay men have succeeded in 
becoming foster parents, they have done so only after being thoroughly and 
rigorously evaluated...even more extensively than other applicants." (Ricketts 
1991:10).  
 
Research studies also point to the frequently narrow and discriminatory 
conceptions of 'family' operated within social work. Social workers and their 
agencies, particularly when looking to place children, often promote an ideal 
'nuclear family' model (Clarke 1991:16; Romans 1991:14; Skeates & Jabri 
1988:24/5; Taylor 1993:109; Whitehouse 1985:21), bolstered by the adoption 
review (DoH et al. 1993:9). The promotion of this ideal heterosexual family as a 
social work value is found in the work of Whitfield (1991), who argues that a 
mother and a father model is based upon nature and biological norms, and 
provides correct gender role modeling to children (1991:16). This is also reported 
in Tissier: "...The mother and father model is still the ideal and one should take 
pains to ensure it is provided for young children" (1993:8). Examples of existing 
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research instead argue for flexibility in the conception of 'family' (Benkov 1994; 
Ricketts 1991:8; Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:84). 
 
Another theme that emerges from existing research is that of the notion of 'rights' 
in foster and adoptive care. Brown has noted the construction of what she terms 
a limiting “dichotomy” (1991:11) which opposes 'gay rights' to the notion that 
'children need normal families'. The notion that no adult has an automatic 'right' 
to foster or adopt a child (Brown 1991:13; Ricketts 1991:13) is an important one, 
since all applicants, whatever their sexuality, must be subject to the scrutiny of 
assessment. However, the notion of adult rights as always inappropriate in 
fostering and adoption has been used to suggest that 'gay rights' have no place 
(DoH 1990). Instead, the 'right' to be considered is proposed in existing research 
in opposition to a priori disqualification of all lesbians and gay men (Ricketts 
1991:13; Skeates & Jabri 1988:7). Existing research argues that lesbian and gay 
'rights' do not necessarily contradict those of children, and that lesbians and gay 
men who have been assessed and approved as carers are able to meet 
children's needs (Benkov 1994:74/95; Skeates & Jabri 1988:8). 
 
Research has shown that increasing numbers of lesbian and gay applicants wish 
to be 'out' to social work services (Martin 1993:119; Ricketts & Achtenberg 
1987:93, 1990:87), and that this should be encouraged (Skeates & Jabri 1988:7). 
Nevertheless, this will largely depend upon the legal position and the declared 
attitudes of the social work agency faced by the applicant (Martin 1993:132; 
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Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:88). Most lesbian and gay applicants believe it is 
important for them to be out during the process of assessment (Skeates & Jabri 
1988:33/37), yet the study by Skeates & Jabri reported that those applicants who 
were out received less favourable and much slower responses from local 
authorities (Skeates & Jabri 1988:49). 
 
Social workers are reported to hold a number of 'stereotypical' views about 
lesbians and gay men (Skeates & Jabri 1988:18), and about the likely effects 
upon children of living with lesbian and gay carers (Ricketts 1991:49-61). These 
beliefs about children's experiences are discussed later, but are refuted by all 
existing research (Ricketts 1991:49). The expectation that children require 
traditional male and female gender role modeling at home (Whitfield 1991) is also 
reported in existing studies of social work attitudes. Concerns that lesbians are 
either too 'masculine' (Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:111) or unable to provide 
male role models to children, and vice versa for gay men, have been found in the 
expectations of assessing social workers (Skeates & Jabri 1988:38). 
 
Research to date has shown that those lesbian and gay carers who are approved 
may not have any children placed with them (Brown 1990:22). Where they do, 
lesbians and gay men are frequently asked to care for disabled or 'hard to place' 
children (Martin 1993:142/144; Skeates & Jabri 1988:56/7), those with 'special 
needs' (Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:104), or those who are black and of minority 
race (Barret & Robinson 1990:63). 
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Lesbian Mother Studies5: 
 
Gillian Hanscombe & Jackie Forster's (1981) research is notable for being one of 
the earliest studies of lesbian motherhood in Britain6, and is based upon informal 
interviews with a number of lesbians with children (1981:11). 
Hanscombe & Forster (1981) report that lesbian mothers are often tested against 
the heterosexual 'nuclear family' (1981:17), and that the equation of motherhood 
with heterosexuality does not allow for the lesbian mother's existence 
(1981:39/44). Their study raises the issue of the lack of legal protection for 
lesbian families (1981:69), and in particular the concerns of the court regarding 
'proper' gender role modeling for children (1981:73/78). 
 
In an important section of their work, Hanscombe & Forster review research on 
children who live with lesbians, in order to dispel common anxieties. They found 
that the children that they spoke to were open in their attitudes to their mothers 
(1981:133), and they refer to a number of other studies as follows: Golombok et 
al. (1983) found no differences in the sex role or gender identity development of 
the children of lesbian mothers (1981:86-7); Hooker (1958, reported in 
Hanscombe & Forster 1981:146), and Green (1978), and Kirkpatrick et al. (1981) 
                                                           
5  The most recent publications on lesbian mothers in Britain are those of Gillian A. Dunne 
(Dunne 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). Although I am aware of these, I have not considered them here as 
they were published as the final draft of this thesis was being prepared. 
6  Although  lesbian motherhood had been addressed earlier, especially in North America. See, 
for example, chapter five of Del Martin & Phyllis Lyon's (1972) Lesbian/Woman (Toronto: Bantam 
Books). 
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found no differences in the children's development (1981:146-7). Hanscombe & 
Forster found no evidence of child molestation by lesbian mothers or gay fathers, 
and they note that this is a largely heterosexual phenomenon (1981:148). 
 
The work of Ellen Lewin (1993) has researched lesbian mothers within North 
America. One of the most important features of her work is that, contrary to many 
of the other studies, she argues for the similarities of experience that exist across 
both lesbian and heterosexual motherhood (1993:3). Lewin is careful not to 
equate 'mother' with 'woman', in the sense that 'motherhood' is often viewed as 
the more acceptable state of 'womanhood' (1993:3), and she notes that the 
lesbian mother must negotiate her identity within an existing gender system 
which does not recognize her (1993:15-16). 
 
Lewin's study considered the processes of coming out (1993:20) and of divorce 
(1993:29) for lesbians previously married. She finds similarities of experience 
concerning divorce when compared with a group of heterosexual single mothers 
(1993:34), but notes that both coming out and divorce represented a move 
towards increased autonomy and independence for the lesbian mothers 
(1993:45). Those lesbian mothers who had been previously married, and had 
since come out and divorced, felt more fully 'themselves', but their status had 
been lowered in the eyes of the societal gender system (1993:46). In particular, 
Lewin notes contradictions inherent within the 'lesbian/mother' identity. Those 
lesbians who had chosen to become mothers had acquired a more conventional 
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status ('mother'), in contrast to their lesbian status. Motherhood, however, 
required more careful planning for lesbians than for heterosexual women, and so 
was viewed as somehow less 'natural' (1993:74). 'Lesbian/mother' therefore 
contains both resistant and conventional elements, and Lewin argues that it 
constitutes a 'dual identity' (1993:16). 
 
Lewin's thesis is that there exists some overlap of experience between 
heterosexual and lesbian mothers, and she argues that, while there are some 
differences between them, lesbian mothers are ordinary mothers who share 
similarities with other mothers, and who often share in the same system of 
meaning of 'motherhood' (1993:181-2). She therefore argues that lesbian 
mothers remodel the existing culture of motherhood from within that system 
(1993:183), and that the concepts of 'woman' and 'mother' are thereby expanded 
(1993:191). Lesbian mothers also exist within chosen families, and they were 
able to adapt their networks to include both biological and non-biological kin 
relations (1993:76). 
 
The work of Pat Romans (1990, 1991, 1992) is based upon researching the life 
histories of a sample of forty-eight lesbian mothers, using in-depth, guided 
interviews (1990:30/60). Romans too argues for the 'dual identity' of the 
'lesbian/mother' (1990:1, 1991:14, 1992:98), and takes a symbolic interactionist 
approach in her analysis of the self as an interaction between the "socially 
produced meanings" of 'lesbian' and 'mother' (Romans 1990:4). Thus these two 
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'core identities' might be viewed as incompatible (1991:14), especially when the 
socially constructed meanings of 'lesbian' (Kitzinger 1987) and 'mother' (Rich 
1976; Richardson 1993) are considered, and Romans' (1990) work was to 
consider how far such identities were managed and integrated. 
 
Romans constructs a continuum (1990:67) in order to represent the women's 
primary identifications. At one extreme is M5 (primarily identifying as 'mother'), in 
the middle is an 'integrated' identity, and at the other extreme is L5 (primarily 
identifying as 'lesbian'). Her sample could be placed at various points along such 
a continuum, and she then began to categorize the women (1990:161, 1992:101) 
as follows: for 'concealers' (1992:101), the motherhood role was central and the 
lesbian role might be hidden (for example, remaining within a marriage); for 
'confronters' (1992:102), the lesbian role was central and they were out in all 
aspects of their lives; for 'compromisers' (1992:102), the lesbian role was 
important, but compromises were made and they were not always openly lesbian 
(for example, where they feared that this might have negative consequences for 
their children) (1992:103); for 'co-ordinators' (1992:103), the identities of both 
lesbian and mother were successfully negotiated and integrated, and they felt at 
ease. Of her sample, Romans found that one fifth could be termed 'co-
ordinators', and that the majority were 'compromisers' (1992:102-3). She found 
that those who had come out as lesbian before becoming a mother had coped 
better than those who had been a mother first (Romans 1990:186). 
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Just over one fifth of Romans' sample had experienced contact with social work 
agencies (1990:129). She found that lesbian mothers expressed serious 
concerns about the statutory powers held by social workers to make decisions 
about their children's futures (1991:14), and also about the construction of the 
'ideal heterosexual family' by social work (1990:131, 1991:14, 1992:99). Lesbian 
families were tested against such a heterosexual standard, whilst a background 
of legislative measures such as Section 28 attempts to invalidate them (1991:14, 
1992:99). The lesbian mothers in her sample reported concerns that social work 
assessments focused wholly upon their sexuality rather than on parenting issues 
(1991:14), and some felt they had been discriminated against. In one example, a 
six-year lesbian relationship was described as "ambiguous" by a social worker 
(Romans 1990:130). For these reasons, Romans recommends that social 
workers examine their own attitudes regarding lesbian mothers (1991:15), and 
that, in the area of fostering and adoption, local authorities should consider how 
they are to assess lesbian applicants whose needs are different from those of 
heterosexuals (1991:15, 1992:106). 
 
The work of the Rights of Women Lesbian Custody Group (hereafter RWLCG 
1986; and see also Rights of Women 1984, and the later revised Harne & Rights 
of Women 1997) was based upon a survey of thirty-six lesbian mothers, and 
focuses in particular upon their experiences of the court system in relation to 
custody (now called 'residence') decisions. The study found that lesbian mothers 
involved in court cases were subject to intense scrutiny regarding their sexuality 
 63 
to the exclusion of factors to do with their ability to provide adequate care 
(1986:120).  
 
Their study found that 45% of lesbian mothers had lost custody of their children 
(RWLCG 1986:144), a figure which is now slowly decreasing (Beresford 1994). 
RWLCG also found that the preparation of court welfare reports was based upon 
prejudiced views of lesbians (1986:147). Within the legal arena, many lesbian 
mothers felt that they had to prove that they were the 'ideal mother', rather than a 
good mother (1986:169). Two women reported that local authorities had applied 
for care orders on their children because they regarded lesbianism as detrimental 
to the child's welfare (1986:158-9). Like other studies, RWLCG suggests that 
much of this is based upon 'myths' relating to lesbians, and the possible effects 
upon the psychosexual development of their children (1986:125-133). Once 
more, this often betrays anxieties that the gender system will not be upheld 
(RWLCG 1986:132-3). 
 
In relation to contact with social work services, the RWLCG study reports that 
agencies are as prejudiced as the rest of society with regard to fostering and 
adoption (RWLCG 1986:85). They note that lesbian potential carers may have to 
hide their sexuality, or that some agencies might consider lesbians on an 
individual merit basis (1986:86-7). Single female carers were often allocated 
older, 'hard to place' children (1986:85). The study suggests that much social 
work training is based upon traditional notions of family and childcare (1986:52), 
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and that it should be overhauled to educate social workers about lesbian mothers 
(1986:185). It also recommends that local authority policy regarding fostering and 
adoption be reformed to include lesbians as the potential carers of children 
(1986:185). Overall the study found "...discrimination against lesbian mothers at 
all institutional levels, including the courts, welfare officers, and the legal 
profession, as well as teachers and social services, and the medical profession." 
(RWLCG 1986:170). 
 
General Themes Emerging from Lesbian Mother Studies: 
 
Research suggests that lesbian mothers are often viewed as involved in the 
social negotiation of self (Lewin 1993:14/15; Romans 1990:1/4, 1991:14, 
1992:98). This represents a symbolic interactionist interpretation (Plummer 1991, 
1995:20; Romans 1990:4), which suggests that the lesbian mother has to 
negotiate her 'dual identity' from a position between what may be viewed as 
socially diametric poles, 'mother' and 'lesbian' (Romans 1990:67). Thus in a 
general sense the 'lesbian mother' is regarded as a "theoretically impossible 
category" (Lewin & Lyons 1982:250), since the institution of motherhood, rather 
than its actual practice (Rich 1976), is viewed as a heterosexual phenomenon.  
 
There is some important information to be found in existing research regarding 
the possible 'effects' of lesbian motherhood upon the children. Green & Bozett 
(1991) report that, in comparison with their heterosexual counterparts, lesbian 
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mothers are often more child-centred, but that they exhibit no particular 
differences in child rearing practices or maternal attitudes (1991:204). They also 
note that lesbian mothers are more concerned to provide positive male role 
models for their children, that they develop positive coping strategies, are more 
likely to work and be independent. Significantly, they also report that lesbian 
mothers are likely to have lower incomes (Green & Bozett 1991:204). Saphira’s 
study also found no differences in child rearing practices (Saphira 1984:77), and 
McCandlish found that lesbian mothers were effective parents (McCandlish 
1987:24). 
 
Hanscombe & Forster found no differences in the child development of children 
of lesbian mothers from that of the children of heterosexuals (1981:86/7,146-8). 
Children of lesbian mothers had open attitudes to sexuality, love and parenting 
(1981:133), and none had experienced sexual molestation (Hanscombe & 
Forster 1981:147). McCandlish also found that such children formed healthy 
attachments to both lesbian carers, and that they exhibited healthy gender 
identity and normal psychological development (McCandlish 1987:30-31). The 
Rights of Women Lesbian Custody Group report that existing studies found few 
differences in the parenting style of lesbian mothers in comparison with 
heterosexuals, and many similarities (RWLCG 1986:129). They found no 
evidence of significant differences in the development of sexuality, gender 
identity or gender-typed behaviour for the children of lesbian mothers (RWLCG 
1986:130-133), and note that such children did not experience sexual abuse 
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(RWLCG 1986:124) or trauma due to social stigmatization (1986:134). 
 
One of the most significant debates to emerge from the research on lesbian 
mothers to date is that which considers how far the lesbian mother is similar to or 
different from her heterosexual counterpart. It is the research of Lewin (1993), 
and Lewin & Lyons (1982), which particularly argues for similarities of experience 
amongst both lesbian and heterosexual mothers (Lewin 1993:3). Pollack (1987), 
however, provides an interesting critique of such comparisons. She notes that 
the use of the heterosexual mother model as a norm by which to test the lesbian 
mother is a 'courtroom strategy' (Pollack 1987:316), but one which results in the 
promotion of that heterosexual model as preferable (1987:320).  
 
This is also taken up by Polikoff (1987:326), who reports that lesbian mothers 
frequently have to prove their 'normality' in court, that is their approximation of 
the heterosexual mother model (1987:325). Polikoff argues instead for the 
dissimilarities between lesbian and heterosexual mother experiences (1987:327), 
and she suggests that lesbian mothers have more in common with, and more to 
gain from alliances with, lesbians without children, rather than with other 
mothers. Allen & Harne (1988) find that the lesbian mother is distinguished from 
others by virtue of the fact that she poses a challenge to the male order and 
gender system, something which heterosexual mothers do not (1988:181), and 
this is echoed by RWLCG (1986:29) and is often raised in popular accounts of 
lesbian parenting (BBC 'Esther' 1996; BBC Radio 4 1994).  
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DiLapi (1989) reports on what she terms the hegemony of the traditional family 
within social work (DiLapi 1989:118). Research reports that social work actively 
constructs the notion of an ideal heterosexual family model against which to test 
lesbian forms (Burke 1993:222; Hanscombe & Forster 1981:17; Romans 
1991:14/131). Lesbian mother families are seen as threatening because they 
challenge accepted notions of 'the family' (DiLapi 1989:113; Romans 1992:99; 
Saffron 1986:3), and Romans (1991, 1992) notes that legislation such as Section 
28 is a response to, and attempt to invalidate, such family forms (Romans 
1991:14, 1992:99). DiLapi (1989) has suggested that the 'lesbian mother' is 
interesting as a concept, because this points to a contradiction within the 
interplay between both compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1980) and compulsory 
motherhood (Rich 1976) for women in society. 
 
Saphira (1984) reports that she found two lesbians had openly adopted, but that 
this is difficult for lesbians generally (1984:21). Lewin (1993) found that some 
lesbians had to hide their sexuality from social workers (1993:62), and that those 
who were successful in fostering or adoption assessments often had 'hard to 
place' children in their care (1993:49-50/71), and this is echoed in RWLCG 
(1986:85-87). DiLapi (1989) also notes that lesbians may be barred from 
consideration for fostering or adoption (DiLapi 1989:114), but where they are 
accepted, there is evidence of discriminatory practices within the social work 
assessment process from existing research. Green (1987) found that the 
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assessment process for lesbians is likely to be more lengthy (1987:194). Lesbian 
applicants will have to face the homophobia of adoption agencies, and for this 
reason may choose to 'pass' as a 'single woman' (Green 1987:194). Romans 
found that lesbians who are out in assessments do have different needs from 
heterosexual applicants, and that these should be considered by social workers 
(1991:15, 1992:106). 
 
Romans (1992) has noted that lesbian mothers present a challenge to dominant 
notions of the gender order (1992:99), and this is evidenced in particular 
concerns about the gender development of the children of such mothers. Burke 
(1993) reports that her social worker was fixated on the fact that her son might 
not receive enough male role modeling in his life (1993:213), and on whether she 
and her partner felt threatened by men as lesbians (1993:215). Benkov (1994) 
also notes stereotypical views of lesbian couples as 'butch and femme', and 
anxiety about how a child's gender development will be affected (1994:219). 
Such concern about gender roles is also noted by Saffron (1986:32-3/35/86), and 
in particular the worries expressed by the courts about whether boys will receive 
correct gender messages from lesbian parents (Hanscombe & Forster 
1981:73/78; RWLCG 1986:29/132; Saphira 1984:57-8). For example, in one 
case GvG (1977), it was noted: 
 
 ...adolescent boys require increasingly the influence of a father 
rather than a mother...Mr. G is concerned that she [Ms. G.] will be 
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associating with friends in the radical feminist organization...and he 
is alarmed at the influence members of this group may have on his 
growing sons without any male  counterbalance. (GvG, 1977; 
reported in Saphira 1984:58). 
 
Gay Father Studies: 
 
At present, there has been far less research attention paid to gay fathers than to 
lesbian mothers7. The research of Frederick W. Bozett (1981, 1985, 1987d, 
1989b, 1990) has been largely to consider the identity of the gay father. His work 
is based upon interviews with gay men who were formerly married and had 
children (Bozett 1981:553). Like Romans (1990), Bozett's thesis is that gay 
fathers find themselves occupying a 'dual identity' (Bozett 1981:552), and one 
which incorporates extremes of social acceptance (Bozett 1985:330). As a 
'father', their identity is positively sanctioned but as a 'gay man' it is negatively so. 
Bozett suggests that the gay father must resolve this conflict in a move towards 
an integrated identity (Bozett 1985:331). His research found that gay fathers 
typically achieve this via a 'career' (Bozett 1985:330, 1987d:4), which is likely to 
consist of a number of phases. These are that the man will typically understand 
himself to be heterosexual at first and will have relationships with women, 
although he may always experience sexual feelings in relation to men. He will 
                                                           
7  Two new studies of gay fathers are currently being carried out; one by Fiona Tasker in the 
Department of Psychology at Birkbeck College London, and one by Gill Dunne in the Gender 
Institute at the London School of Economics. 
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then marry and occupy the identity of 'husband', followed by that of 'father' when 
children are born. As the man begins to act upon his homosexual feelings, he 
may begin to explore this aspect of his identity, and his marital relationship will go 
through changes usually leading to separation and divorce. In the final phase, he 
will adopt the identity of 'gay man', but is likely to maintain contact with his 
children (Bozett 1985:330).  
 
This 'career' leads to the gay father achieving an integrated identity, and this 
involves the process of positive or integrative sanctioning (Bozett 1981:559; 
Green & Bozett 1991:199). This means that he must come out of the 'double 
closet' (Bozett 1985:337), telling heterosexual people that he is gay, and gay 
people that he is a father. Bozett makes the point that the 'gay world' is not 
particularly accepting of parenthood and children, and that this poses difficulties 
for the newly emerging 'gay' identity of the father (Bozett 1987d:10). By 
implication, the world of parenthood is assumed to be heterosexual and is not 
accepting of his gayness. In Bozett's research, most of the gay fathers had 
separated from their former female partners, leading to divorce (Bozett 1987d:9). 
He notes a number of options open to these men demonstrated in his findings: 
some remained a 'married man' and kept their homosexuality hidden, some 
divorced but continued contact with children, some came out as 'gay' but 
remained with their female partner and children, and some had no more contact 
with children (Bozett 1985:327), and this is directly comparable with Romans' 
typology of lesbian mothers (Romans 1990:161, 1992:101-3).  
 71 
 
Bozett (1989b) also discusses the findings of other research on gay fathers. 
Scallen (1981; reported in Bozett 1987d:15) found that gay fathers were more 
paternally nurturing, less paternally traditional, more positive about the father 
role, and less concerned with the role of economic provider than a sample group 
of heterosexual fathers. Miller (1979a, 1979b; reported in Bozett 1989b:143) 
found that gay fathers moved along a continuum of relative covertness or 
openness, but that their gayness was compatible with effective fathering. Turner 
et al. (1985; reported in Bozett 1989b:144) found that sexual orientation was not 
the most important factor in gay fathers' relationships with their children, and that 
they tried harder than a sample group of heterosexual fathers to create a stable 
home life and positive relationships with their children.  
 
Bozett (1989b) provides a summary of findings in relation to gay fathers, which 
are that they are not more 'masculine' than other gay men, that most experience 
good reactions from their children to their gay identity, that their sexuality is 
compatible with effective parenting, that their gayness does not create long term 
problems for their children, that sexual orientation is of little importance to their 
father/child relationships, that they try harder than heterosexual fathers to provide 
stable homes and positive relationships, and that they make efforts to provide 
their children with opposite sex-role models (Bozett 1989b:152-154). Indeed 
Green & Bozett (1991) note the absence of pathological findings in research on 
gay fathers (Green & Bozett 1991:213). 
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Bozett's research notes that professionals, such as social workers, should 
examine their own attitudes and values regarding fathers who are gay (Bozett 
1985:342, 1987d:16, 1990:115), and that the various 'myths' surrounding them 
need to be challenged within education that such professionals receive. In 
particular, professionals should note that research has not found sexuality to be 
related to nurturing ability (Bozett 1985:343), and that the exclusion of gay men 
from consideration for foster or adoptive care on such grounds is discriminatory. 
Bozett makes recommendations for further research, which include the need for 
longitudinal studies of gay father families, and broader samples which are not 
solely based upon white, middle class, well-educated, urban, divorced and self-
identified gay fathers (Bozett 1987d:19). 
 
More recently, the research of Robert Barret and Bryan Robinson (1990) has 
acknowledged that gay fathers include foster or adoptive carers, gay men who 
enter into alternative insemination arrangements, and gay step-fathers, as well 
as those gay men previously married (Barret & Robinson 1990:62). In that sense, 
their research sample is broader at base, and they use a case study approach in 
presenting their findings. Like Bozett, Barret & Robinson acknowledge the 'dual 
role' of gay fatherhood (1990:xiii), and that previous research has found that 
homosexuality has little impact upon a child's sexual identity (1990:6). 
 
In an important section of their research, Barret & Robinson examine how far any 
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of the existing 'myths' about gay fathers were true for those in their sample 
(1990:27-46). In contrast to the belief that gay fathers come from disturbed 
parental backgrounds, they found that most came from intact parental homes, 
and had experienced good heterosexual models and relationships with their 
parents. Children were also important to the gay fathers in their study (1990:35). 
They examined whether gay fathers were more 'masculine' than other gay men, 
but found this was not true. Sex role behaviour and sexual identity were found to 
be unrelated (1990:38). They also examined the 'myth' that gay fathers will 
transmit their homosexuality to their children, like a form of 'contamination'. Most 
of the children of the gay fathers in their sample were heterosexual, and 94% of 
lesbians and gay men they interviewed had heterosexual parents (1990:40). 
 
The view that the children of gay fathers would experience high levels of stigma 
and ridicule was also tested. Barret & Robinson report that some of the children 
did experience teasing by peers, but that this was rarely a major issue as gay 
fathers had prepared their children for this and helped them to cope with teasing 
(1990:41). They found no evidence of sexual abuse or molestation of children by 
gay fathers (the 'corruption myth', that all gay men are likely to sexually abuse), 
and report that most sexual abuse of children is perpetrated by heterosexual men 
(Barret & Robinson 1990:42). In contrast to the notions that gay fathers are trying 
to hide their sexuality, or trying to 'cure' themselves of it, they found that the gay 
dads in their sample had an authentic desire to parent and have a family 
(1990:44/5). Like Bozett (1985, 1987d), Barret & Robinson (1990) suggest that 
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practitioners need to examine such 'myths'/values for themselves if they are to 
work with gay men as carers of children. 
 
In relation to fostering and adoption by gay men in particular, Barret & Robinson 
report that suspicions about gay men and children generally may prevent their 
acceptance by professionals. During the process of social work assessment, gay 
men's sexuality often becomes the most pressing concern of the worker to the 
exclusion of all other factors (1990:63), and they also report that gay men who 
have children placed with them were likely to get older boys who were disabled, 
hard-to-place, and/or of minority race (1990:63). 
 
The children interviewed by Barret & Robinson were well adjusted, and they had 
not experienced sexual abuse (1990:80). The children frequently had to cope 
with issues to do with their parents' divorce, where the gay father was formerly 
married, and had to go through a process of adjustment to this (1990:82). They 
also had to cope with their fathers' coming out as gay, but this did not create 
long-term problems. Adjustment to divorce was sometimes difficult for the 
children, but this could not be attributed to the father's gayness (1990:82). Like 
Bozett (1987c), Barret & Robinson argue for further research on gay fathers to 
incorporate longitudinal studies, developmental outcomes for children, and the 
need to find samples that are less white, middle class and self-identified 
(1990:147-57). Nevertheless this may be difficult given the sensitive nature of 
such research, and that samples are hard to reach (Barret & Robinson 
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1990:149). 
 
General Themes Emerging from Gay Father Studies: 
 
A number of general findings emerge from the existing studies of gay fathers, as 
follows. Gay fathers are reported to occupy the position of a 'dual identity' or 'dual 
role' (Barret & Robinson 1990:xiii; Bozett 1981:552, 1985:330, 1987d:3; Green & 
Bozett 1991:200; Jones 1986:144). Thus gay fathers have "...two identities that 
are at the opposite extremes of social acceptance: Homosexuality at the negative 
extreme and fatherhood at the positive." (Bozett 1985:330). The research argues, 
from a symbolic interactionist perspective (Plummer 1995:20; Romans 1990:4), 
that many gay fathers believe their dual identities to be initially incompatible, but 
that these are eventually reconciled in following a typical 'career' (Bozett 
1985:327/30, 1987d:4, 1989b:140; Green & Bozett 1991:199).  
 
Research reports that there is a general and widespread prejudice against gay 
men with children (Barret & Robinson 1990:63; Bozett 1985:344), based upon 
notions that they pose a sexual threat to children and also that gay men qua men 
are not their 'natural' carers (Benkov 1994:110). It is therefore recommended that 
professional workers examine their own attitudes and values regarding gay men 
caring for children (Barret & Robinson 1990:47; Bozett 1985:342, 1987d:16). 
 
One of the most important findings of the existing research is that sexuality per 
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se is not related to nurturing ability (Barret & Robinson 1990:6; Beam 1986c:156; 
Bigner & Jacobsen 1989a, 1989b; Bozett 1985:343, 1987d:15, 1989b:154; Green 
& Bozett 1991:198; Jones 1986:147; Miller 1979a, 1979b; Scallen 1981; Turner 
et al. 1985). Thus being gay is no a priori indicator of poor parenting skills, or of 
potential damage to children. Robinson & Skeen (1982) also report that gay 
fathers are no more and no less 'masculine' than other gay men (1982:1059), 
and that fatherhood is not linked to 'masculinity'. Bigner & Jacobsen (1989a, 
1989b) found that gay fathers were better communicators with, provided more 
stimulation for, were more responsive to the needs of, provided more activities 
for, and acted more as a 'counsellor' to their children than a sample group of 
heterosexual fathers (1989a:180/181). Their reasons for wanting children were 
often similar to those of the heterosexual fathers (1989b:169), but they were 
likely to present less traditional male sex-role models (1989a:184). Bigner & 
Jacobsen also report the pressures that many gay fathers feel to be 'super-dad', 
in order to compensate for the wider disapproval they experience (1989a:181). 
 
Empirical Studies of Children Living with Lesbian Mothers: 
 
The most extensive research to date on the children of lesbian mothers has been 
carried out by Fiona Tasker and Susan Golombok (Golombok et al. 1983; 
Golombok & Tasker 1994, 1996; Tasker & Golombok 1991, 1995, 1997). An 
early study by Golombok et al. (1983) found that lesbian mothers made more 
efforts to promote contact with fathers for their children than a sample of 
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heterosexual mothers (1983:557-8). The lesbian mothers generally expressed no 
preference as to whether they wished their children to become gay or straight, 
but where they did they preferred heterosexual development (1983:561). The 
study found that the children of lesbian mothers exhibited gender-specific play 
and activities, with some non gender-specific (1983:561), and that their 
psychosexual and gender identity development was the same as those with 
heterosexual mothers (1983:562). The children had good peer relationships 
(1983:567), and their sexual orientation was usually heterosexual (1983:564). 
They concluded that there were no real differences in the development of the 
children of lesbian families from those in heterosexual ones (1983:568), and 
indeed the likelihood of psychiatric problems was more common in the 
heterosexual parent group (1983:570). In a further report (Tasker & Golombok 
1991), the authors found that children of lesbian mothers exhibited usual 
psychiatric outcomes, sex-role and peer group behaviour (1991:185). They 
concluded that maternal homosexuality had "no observable effects on children" 
(Tasker & Golombok 1991:186), and did not influence their well-being. 
 
A series of follow-up studies are reported in their book, Growing Up in a Lesbian 
Family: Effects on Child Development (Tasker & Golombok 1997). The children 
of lesbian mothers had been around ten years of age when the study began in 
1976, but were also seen in 1991, when they were aged around twenty-five years 
(Tasker & Golombok 1997:1). In summary, the young adults from the lesbian 
mother families were more likely to have thought about their sexuality, and the 
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possibility of a same-sex relationship, than those from the heterosexual mother 
families, but they were no more likely to have become lesbian or gay (Tasker & 
Golombok 1997:45). They reported significantly better relationships with their 
mother's new female partner than did those from the comparison group whose 
heterosexual mothers also had new partners (1997:53), and there were no 
differences in their relationships with their mothers (1997:54).  
 
The young adults from the lesbian mother families were also significantly more 
positive about their 'family identity' than the others (1997:65), and, although more 
likely to recall having been teased about being lesbian or gay themselves, they 
were no more likely to have been, or remember having been, ostracized by peers 
(1997:87-88). They were more positive about lesbians and gay men as a group, 
and more likely to have lesbian or gay friends (1997:98-99), and there were no 
differences in the two groups' abilities to form, and quality of, adult sexual 
relationships (1997:129). The young adults from the lesbian mother families were 
no more likely to have experienced mental health problems, anxiety or 
depression (1997:135). Indeed the study concludes: 
 
...the findings from the present study show that young people 
brought up by a lesbian mother do well in adulthood and have good 
relationships with their family, friends, and partners. In policy 
decisions about who should and should not be allowed to raise 
children, negative outcomes for children should not be assumed on 
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the basis of a mother's sexual orientation. (Tasker & Golombok 
1997:155). 
 
Green (1978) studied children raised by transsexual and lesbian parents, and 
found that they showed gender-typical and heterosexually-oriented behaviour 
(1978:693). He concluded that the children of lesbian parents exhibit typical 
psychosexual and sexual identity development, and that this is no different to that 
shown by children of heterosexuals (1978:695-6). In a follow-up study (Green et 
al. 1986) of sixty lesbian mothers and their children, those children were 
statistically unremarkable as compared to those raised by heterosexual mothers 
(see Rivera 1987:212). 
 
Kirkpatrick et al. (1981) found that child pathology is not related to mothers' 
sexuality (1981:547). They report that the lesbian mothers in their study were 
keener to provide male figures for their children than the heterosexual mothers 
(1981:549), but that there is no difference in the gender development of the 
children in either group (1981:551). Kirkpatrick (1987) also found that there are 
no damaging consequences for children with lesbian mothers (1987:207), and 
she argues that professionals need to note this (1987:210). 
 
Charlotte Patterson’s work has argued for differences that exist between the 
children of lesbian and heterosexual parents (Patterson 1992, 1995). Children of 
lesbians were more likely to see themselves, and be seen by others, as lovable, 
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affectionate and protective of younger children, and sometimes scored better on 
ratings of ‘well-being’ than the children of heterosexuals (Patterson 1992:1032). 
She argues for research which does not concern itself solely with heterosexist 
concerns about the children of lesbian parents, and which does not always 
compare them with a heterosexual standard. Instead “...the time has come for 
child development researchers to address a broader range of issues in this area” 
(Patterson 1992:1038), which should include examining the diversity and 
differences that exist between and among gay and lesbian families (Patterson 
1992, 1995). 
 
To summarize further studies, research shows that the children of lesbian 
mothers exhibited usual gender-typed play (Green & Bozett 1991:208; Hoeffer 
1981:539; Hotvedt & Mandel 1982:283; Nungesser 1980:185), that they showed 
no differences in sex-role behaviour (Green & Bozett 1991:208; Hoeffer 
1981:542; Steckel 1987:78), that they had good peer friendships (Benkov 
1994:64; Green & Bozett 1991:207; Hoeffer 1981:543; Hotvedt & Mandel 
1982:282; King & Pattison 1991:296) and that they exhibited no differences in 
their psychosexual development from the children of heterosexual mothers 
(Benkov 1994:62; Cramer 1986:504; Gantz 1983:xix; Green & Bozett 1991:207). 
Lesbian mothers in these studies were more likely to provide male role models 
for their children (Hoeffer 1981:538; Nungesser 1980:183), and were less likely 
to have a preference for the sexuality of their children (Nungesser 1980:183). 
They were less concerned to provide gender-typed toys (Hoeffer 1981:541) and 
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more likely to promote non-traditional career and life choice concepts for their 
children (Green & Bozett 1991:209; Hotvedt & Mandel 1982:283). Boys were 
more likely to be aggressive, for example, in heterosexual homes (Steckel 
1987:78), and girls in lesbian homes chose less traditionally gender-typed 
careers (Green & Bozett 1991:209). Lesbian mothers also instilled positive self-
images in their children (Green & Bozett 1991:209; Steckel 1987:81). 
 
Lesbian mothers did not differ from heterosexual mothers in their self-concept or 
maternal attitudes (Mucklow & Phelan 1979:881), and those who were open with 
their children about their sexuality from the start experienced fewer problems 
(Pennington 1987:63) Indeed Pennington (1987) notes that lesbian mothers, like 
the gay fathers reported in Bigner & Jacobsen (1989a:181), sometimes felt that 
they had to over-compensate, to be 'super-mum' in order to counter wider 
disapproval (Pennington 1987:65). 
 
Children of Gay Fathers: 
 
There is far less existing research on children who live with gay fathers (Green & 
Bozett 1991:206). What does exist shows that such children have positive 
relationships with their fathers (Green & Bozett 1991:206), that gay fathers were 
protective of their children, especially in shielding them from social stigma (Bozett 
1987a:45), and that most of the children of gay fathers grow up to be 
heterosexual (Bozett 1987a:47). 
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A study by Bailey et al. (1995) considered the sexual orientation of adult sons of 
gay fathers and found that, of those whose sexuality could be rated with 
confidence, 9% were nonheterosexual and 91% heterosexual (Bailey et al. 
1995:126). They therefore argued that “sexual orientation was not positively 
correlated with the amount of time that sons lived with their [gay] fathers.” (Bailey 
et al. 1995:128). 
 
Issues for Children of Lesbians or Gay Men: 
 
Reports from children with gay or lesbian parents show that they experience 
loving and affectionate homes (Mason-John 1991:8), and that they are proud of 
their parents (Wakeling & Bradstock 1995:57). There is evidence, particularly in 
Gantz (1983), that such children may experience emotional problems where their 
parents have been through a previous divorce (Gantz 1983:59), but this is due to 
the divorce process and not their parents' sexuality.  
 
Children who have gay or lesbian carers do experience teasing or stigmatization 
by peers (Benkov 1994:186; Saffron 1996; Wakeling & Bradstock 1995), and it is 
important not to deny this. What is important, however, is how such homophobia 
is challenged, and how parents help children to cope with this (Benkov 
1994:193/4). Most children experience some form of teasing, not least those who 
do not conform to gender-type (Sedgwick 1991), and lesbian or gay carers have 
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usually prepared their children for such problems. Such teasing is often 
exaggerated, however (Benkov 1994:64), and used as a reason to suggest that 
lesbian or gay parenting is wrong. Benkov (1994:64) makes the point that it is 
homophobia that should be challenged, rather than suggestions of removing 
children from their carers being made. Many children of lesbians or gay men 
therefore report that they learn 'who to tell' amongst their peer group (Benkov 
1994:201; Gantz 1983:12; Green & Bozett 1991:206; Saffron 1996:176; 
Wakeling & Bradstock 1995:57). Some were concerned that peers would think 
that they were also gay (Bozett 1987b:40; Pennington 1987:64), but this seems 
to relate to assumptions that girl children of lesbians, and boy children of gay 
men, will become so.   
 
To summarize, then, the overriding point of all such existing research is that a 
carer or parent's sexuality is not the determining factor in a child's health or well-
being (Green & Bozett 1991:206; King 1995; Saffron 1996). Children of lesbians 
or gay men are no more likely to have emotional problems, adopt opposite sex-
typed behaviour, or become gay, than the children of heterosexuals (Saffron 
1996; Riddle 1978:49). Indeed Riddle (1978) makes the point that gay or lesbian 
people can offer positive role models to children of less traditional sex-roles 
(1978:51), and she notes that children are not simply 'empty vessels' whose 
psychosexual and emotional development is solely determined by parents 
(1978:53). In fact, most lesbian or gay people have heterosexual carers/parents 
(King & Pattison 1991:296). There is no evidence of child sexual abuse by gay or 
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lesbian carers in the existing research (Benkov 1994:68; Hotvedt & Mandel 
1982:282; King 1995; King & Pattison 1991:296), or of neglect (Hotvedt & 
Mandel 1982:282) or pathology (Green & Bozett 1991:207; Steckel 1987:78). 
 
Cramer (1986) argues that professionals should take account of such research 
knowledge (1986:506), as do Brown (1991:14, 1992b:214), and Tasker and 
Golombok (1997:155). The raison d'être of such research can be problematic, 
however (Pollack 1987). Benkov (1994) suggests that the research addresses 
itself to notions that children should not be 'exposed' to gay or lesbian people 
(1994:38), and that it sets out to prove that the children of lesbian and gay carers 
are 'normal' in their development (Benkov 1994:62). Largely this revolves around 
anxieties to uphold and promote traditional gender roles and heterosexuality 
(Benkov 1994:59). 
 
Conclusion: Learning from Existing Research 
 
There are a number of points raised by the existing research on lesbians and gay 
men as adopters and foster carers, and as parents generally, which are therefore 
relevant to this study. Some of the existing studies argue for the right of 
entitlement of lesbians and gay men to be assessed as potential foster or 
adoptive carers 'the same' as anyone else (Brown 1991; Ricketts 1991; Skeates 
& Jabri 1988). However, as Skeates & Jabri clearly point out, research does not 
exist which considers in any detail the practices of social workers assessing 
 85 
lesbian and gay applicants, post-Section 28 or otherwise (Skeates & Jabri 
1988:74). Hence the need for this study, in order to apply a critical perspective to 
the idea of assessing everyone 'the same', and to examine the assessment 
practices used by social workers with lesbians and gay men. 
 
Lesbian and gay adoption and fostering is frequently presented as a case of 
adults', or gay, 'rights' over those of children (DoH 1990), Brown’s ‘dichotomy' 
(Brown 1991:11), yet it does not have to be seen is this way (Brown 1991; 
Skeates & Jabri 1988:8). Once again, this thesis will consider whether this is an 
interpretation made within social work fostering and adoption units. Where 
lesbians and gay men are accepted into the assessment process, then existing 
research points to 'discriminatory' practices; a range of 'myths' about lesbians, 
gay men and their effects upon children (Ricketts 1991:47; Skeates & Jabri 
1988:20), narrow conceptions of who makes a 'family' (Ricketts 1991:8), a focus 
on sexuality in assessment to the exclusion of all else or, at the opposite 
extreme, the practice of ignoring it (Ricketts 1991:119). This thesis, then, will 
consider these points in order to assess whether they are the case with the social 
workers interviewed. Also, and more importantly, this study will apply a critical 
perspective to what constitutes a 'discriminatory' practice within an assessment 
of a lesbian or gay applicant, arguing that this is not so 'straight-forward' as it 
may appear. 
 
Significantly, gender, race and disability issues are key to existing research, all of 
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which points to the anxieties about gender roles raised by lesbian and gay 
fostering and adoption (Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:111; Skeates & Jabri 
1988:21). Skeates & Jabri reported a process of 'double discrimination' for black 
lesbians and gay men (1988:28), and all note the likelihood that disabled children 
be placed with lesbian or gay carers (Ricketts & Achtenberg 1990:104; Skeates 
& Jabri 1988:56). I intend to examine the gendered nature of constructions of 
'lesbian' and 'gay' by the social workers, and to examine the particular issues for 
black lesbian and gay applicants (Beam 1986b; Jones 1986; Lorde 1984; Mason-
John 1995; Seneviratne 1995). I also intend to consider whether the 'unspoken 
policy' of placing disabled children with lesbians and gay men continues. 
 
Existing research recommends that social work agencies and social workers 
need to examine their own 'attitudes' and 'values' (Goodman 1990:122; RWLCG 
1986:185; Romans 1991:15; Steinhorn 1985:35), but my approach, as I have 
argued in the previous chapter, is not to see constructions of 'lesbian' and 'gay' 
as mere 'values' held by individual social workers. 'Lesbian' and 'gay' exist at the 
levels of discourse, practice, organization and text, and they are contested 
concepts that have many versions within social work that I intend to analyse. 
Existing research says that 'out' lesbian and gay applicants receive less 
favourable responses, or are placed under greater scrutiny (Ricketts & 
Achtenberg 1990:104; Skeates & Jabri 1988:49-50), yet tends not to specify how 
these are manifested. This study aims to examine these claims too, in order to 
suggest practices which do disadvantage lesbian and gay applicants via special 
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scrutiny because of their sexuality alone. Existing studies also point to 
contradictory responses amongst social workers, often with a lack of any policy 
back-up, which range from the homophobic to the supportive. This study looks 
for a range of responses amongst the social worker cohort, and will specifically 
consider how 'homophobia' is manifested, whether policies exist, and how some 
social workers attempt to develop 'anti-oppressive' assessment practices with 
lesbians and gay men. 
 
However, before turning to an analysis of the data from the social worker cohort, 
it is important that I explain how I went about its generation. For this thesis is 
also a series of knowledge claims made by me, and it is to such questions of 
epistemology, methodology and grammatology (Derrida 1976) that I now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
 
‘Big Old Lies’1 : the Poetics of Methodology 
 
‘I’ is only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being. 
Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some truth 
mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to 
decide whether any part of it is worth keeping. If not, you will of 
course throw the whole of it into the waste-paper basket and 
forget all about it. (Woolf 1928:6)2 . 
 
I was glad when somebody told me, “You may go and collect 
Negro folklore.”...From the earliest rocking of my cradle, I had 
known about the capers Brer Rabbit is apt to cut and what the 
Squinch Owl says from the house top. But it was fitting me like a 
tight chemise. I couldn’t see it for wearing it. It was only when I 
was off in college, away from my native surroundings, that I could 
see myself like somebody else and stand off and look at my 
garment. Then I had to have the spy-glass of Anthropology to 
                                                           
1 Hurston (1935:8). 
2 All page numbers for A Room of One’s Own refer to the 1945 edition published by Penguin 
(London). 
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look through at that. (Hurston 1935:1)3 . 
 
Methodology chapters traditionally concern themselves with the ‘doing’ of 
research, wherein the researcher explains how the data was generated and the 
reasons for adopting such an approach to the ‘getting of’ knowledge. I intend to 
do this here, and I shall explain my reasons for using interviewing and case study 
methods for this research. However, I also think it crucially important to adopt a 
critical epistemological position which explicates my construction of such 
versions of knowledge, and one which also analyses how my text is a 
representation of the world and not a series of social ‘facts’ (Clifford & Marcus 
1986; Stanley & Wise 1993; Weedon 1987).  
 
In this sense, then, I am as much interested in the practices which go into the 
construction of a research text - here a Ph.D. thesis - as I am in those which 
generate data, and I want to examine how research texts traditionally suggest 
themselves to be ‘the truth’ of the social (Schratz & Walker 1995). This is what 
might be termed the ‘methodology of methodology’. For, as well as being 
concerned with how knowledge is generated and by what it is constituted, 
methodology must also be about how the research is written, structured, edited 
and textualised; that is, its poetics or grammatology (Atkinson 1990; Clifford & 
Marcus 1986; Derrida 1976; Coffey & Atkinson 1996; Kitzinger 1987:22). 
 
                                                           
3 All page numbers for Mules and Men refer to the 1990 edition published by Harper Perennial 
(New York). 
 90 
For these reasons, I have chosen to “read” my methodology through texts by two 
women who were absolutely concerned with these points, Virginia Woolf’s (1928) 
A Room of One’s Own and Zora Neale Hurston’s (1935) Mules and Men. I will 
argue that they help to illuminate questions of qualitative research methodology 
but particularly, and more importantly, its textual practices. 
 
The Textual Speaking ‘I’ 
 
Virginia Woolf’s (1928) A Room of One’s Own anticipates many of the  
current concerns of debates about research epistemologies, despite the fact that 
her posthumous reputation has been constructed in ways which largely ‘organize 
out’ her radical ideas (Spender 1982:672). For in A Room of One’s Own are 
questions about the notion of the speaking ‘I’, a deconstruction of the notion that 
text=truth, and ideas about whether one is an insider or outsider within language. 
All of these are central to methodological poetics since the researcher “cannot 
avoid expressive tropes, figures, and allegories that select and impose meaning 
as they translate it” (Clifford 1986:7). Thus the research text is a construction of 
reality, a version of events, rather than the ‘truth’ of what was found or 
discovered ‘in the field.’ And relatedly it is the researcher’s text, produced by a 
thinking, experiencing and theorizing self that is represented as the speaking ‘I’ 
(Stanley & Wise 1990:39).  
 
Virginia Woolf was very interested in this textual speaking ‘I’, which she called in 
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A Room of One’s Own4 “a convenient term for somebody who has no real being” 
(Woolf 1928:6). Indeed she gives her reader a choice of possible names to give 
to this speaking ‘I’ (Woolf 1928:6-7) since she sees this as unimportant. The 
point that Woolf is making here is that the ‘I’ that is speaking to the reader in a 
text is at the very least unreliable, but certainly not ‘truthful’. Texts do not tell ‘the 
truth’, they tell versions from which the reader will make sense.  
 
This is very pertinent to questions about the speaking ‘I’ in methodological  
poetics. For in traditional methodologies, the researcher is at once absent and 
present; absent in the sense of there being no interpreting being within the text 
(Stanley and Wise 1993:58), but present in the sense of adopting the role of the 
all-knowing, objective researcher who tells us the ‘truth.’ The ‘I’ is removed - ‘I 
did...’, ‘I found...’, or ‘I think...’ all obliterated - to be replaced by the objective third 
person - ‘This research has shown...’, ‘The figures prove...’, ‘It is arguable that...’ 
- so that the text appears as ‘neutral, scientific, fact’ (Kitzinger 1987:24). In terms 
of research poetics, this is as much achieved in how the textual functions, in how 
methods are constructed as carriers of truth. We are constantly told that the 
knowledge generated is truth because methods are valid, that they were 
consistently and objectively applied, that the research is reliable, all of which can 
be read as circular arguments serving only to elide their status as mere 
knowledge-claims. 
 
                                                           
4 Hereafter referred to as A Room... 
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Instead I would like to argue for the unreliable research author here, since the ‘I’ 
that is writing this text is presenting my version of social events as I interpreted 
them. I will suggest that you - the reader - should not accept text=truth, but 
instead should ask yourself whether you can indeed trust me? For this text may 
be lies, but I will also go on to suggest that the biggest lie of all, in my view, is the 
construction of research texts that claim all-knowing truth status. This they do via 
poetics, but this is dangerous because all texts are “constructed truths...made 
possible by powerful ‘lies’ of exclusion and rhetoric. Even the best ethnographic 
texts - serious, true fictions - are systems, or economies, of truth.” (Clifford 
1986:7).  
 
I argue that a large part of textual poetics revolves around shifts and changes in 
the speaking ‘I’, fractured into a series of ‘beings’ in the research text and field. 
There is, at the very least, myself, the speaking ‘I’ who is the author of the text, 
the set of ‘I’s who were my research subjects, and there is you, the ‘I’ that is the 
reader. But how can you be sure which I am presenting, for like a shape-shifter5 
‘I’ choose to present aspects of myself, and of my research subjects, which can 
never be the whole of me or them, which can never sum up such complex 
selves. Don’t be fooled by the idea that my subjects speak directly to you - 
remember that they are filtered through me, that I have reconstituted them for 
                                                           
5 Shapeshifters, for the uninitiated, are beings able to take on the shape (appearance) of other 
forms, objects, other species, other beings, at will. See ‘Star Trek: Deep Space Nine’ (Carson 
1994) in which the character of Odo is a shape-shifter who can take on humanoid, as well as 
object, forms. Shape-shifters even have terms of abuse for humanoids, calling them ‘monoforms’ 
and ‘solids’. This idea has particular cultural resonance at present, also featuring in the film 
‘Mimic’ (Del Torro 1998). 
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you. I may take on their shapes, but I can also change myself at will. I am a 
shape-shifter... 
 
Shapeshifting 1: Interviewing  
 
A social worker enters the room. He is black, and I guess him to 
be in his late fifties. He looks at me suspiciously for I am a 
stranger within his domain, his place of work. “Hello,” I say, and 
he replies, “Hello.” He now looks less suspicious, more friendly, 
but still he does not know who I am. At least, this is what I think 
to myself, but then maybe he does know, for he knows that I am 
coming to his office, this gay man who is researching lesbians 
and gay men who foster or adopt. “I’m Steve,” I say, “...I’m the 
person who’s looking at lesbians and gay men who foster or 
adopt. You’ll have seen the letter from me...” “Oh yes,” he says. 
We’re awkward but amiable. I wonder what he thinks of me, of 
my sort. No doubt I’ve already formed several impressions of 
him, his difference from me. He still hasn’t told me his name, and 
then he says, “I’m Wayne, I’m on the adoption team, you’re 
seeing me later.” “I know,” I say, for I have a detailed schedule 
which tells me when I’m seeing him. He introduces me to his two 
young daughters who happen to visit him at the office. 
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Later, it is time for ‘the interview’. He’s a bit late, “very busy,” he 
says. We sit in a small side room and I explain to him a little 
more about the research project. I ask him whether it’s okay to 
tape-record the interview and he says this is fine. I turn on the 
tape-recorder, checking for the pulsating red lights that show the 
recording levels. As usual, this creates a boundary, the idea that 
‘the interview proper’ has now started. Initially we are nervous 
but I ask him easy questions to begin with. He’s brought some 
assessment forms with him to help explain some of the process 
to me. 
 
I begin to notice how he’s saying things as much as what he’s 
saying. He has some problems with the words ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’, 
preferring ‘homosexual’ but more often phrases which refer to ‘it’ 
without actually saying ‘it’. Antagonism begins to creep in on my 
part, but I decide to remain calm and put my questions to him 
politely. He settles down, forgets about the tape, and begins to 
tell me what he really thinks about gay people and the idea of 
their caring for children. He suggests several times that sexuality 
is no big deal and that social workers are perfectly fine with it. 
“He means that I’m making it a big deal,” I think.  
 
I find his ideas about lesbians and gay men pretty awful and I try 
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to counter his arguments with other perspectives. Nevertheless 
my overriding thought is this: “How come he feels so comfortable 
in putting me down?” “He’s black,” I think to myself in a white 
liberal kind of way, “surely he understands about oppression?” 
But, unlike the black women I’ve spoken to so far, he chooses 
not to make any links across race and sexuality. Instead he 
keeps going on about the heterosexual ‘norm’ and telling me 
examples from his own life which fit with this; his marriage, his 
wife, his children, how lesbian and gay people are always so 
uppity. “I’m a threat,” I think, “he’s being polite - ‘professional’ 
even - but he hates me and my kind.” 
 
My data substantively consists of the results of interviews with a cohort of twenty-
eight social workers from three local authority fostering and adoption units. 'South 
River Council' is an inner-London authority which has a unit divided into a 
fostering team and an adoption team. Here I spoke to seven workers; one senior 
and six social workers, one of whom was a locum worker6. At the time that I 
visited, October 1994, South River Council had one gay male couple doing 
fostering. 'North River Council' is a larger inner-London borough and has a 
fostering and adoption unit which is made up of four teams; under 11s fostering, 
over 11s fostering, a permanency team (generally adoption, but some long-term 
fostering) and a leaving-care team. Here I spoke to eleven workers; the children’s 
                                                           
6 A temporary worker brought in to cover sickness or leave of permanently employed staff. 
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care services manager, two team managers, an equalities officer, and seven 
social workers. At the time that I visited, April 1995, North River Council had two 
gay male couples and a single lesbian fostering children over eleven, and a gay 
male couple registered with the leaving care team. The 'North Eastern Council' is 
a large metropolitan authority in the north of England. Its unit is divided into three 
teams; a 0-8 years team, a 9-plus team, and an initial response team dealing 
with all enquiries and referrals. Here I spoke to ten workers, all social workers on 
the teams. At the time that I visited, March 1996, the North Eastern Council had a 
single gay man doing emergency (short-term) fostering, and a lesbian couple 
fostering for the 9-plus team. 
 
I chose to employ interviewing as a method because, primarily, I was interested 
to find out how social workers made sense of the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ in 
relation to the potential to foster or adopt children. Epistemologically, I reasoned 
that, in order to generate data on such interpretations, experiences and 
understandings, I needed to talk to the social workers so that I could record their 
accounts (Mason 1996:40). Nevertheless I was aware that interviews are re-
countings of events, and that meanings would be achieved between myself and 
the interviewee in each and every contextually-dependent situation.  
 
I did not want to use either survey-based data or observational data. I felt that a 
survey would not allow me to pick apart the constructions of meanings attaching 
to such concepts as ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, or ‘carer’, and I also decided that, in 
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dialogue, I might be more able to encourage the social workers to discuss any 
reservations they might have about lesbians and gay men caring  
for children. As I have previously noted, I was also interested to investigate 
‘micro’-levels of social work practice with lesbians and gay men, far more than 
any global picture about a comparative study of agencies across the country. I 
wanted to get to what the social workers felt they had done in their practice when 
assessing lesbian or gay applicants and I did not think that a survey would 
provide me with such data. Observing social work assessments in action was not 
an option for me anyway, since agencies would not allow this. But I was also very 
wary of the idea that, if I had ‘observed it’, it would somehow be more ‘truthful’. 
Observations ‘in the field’ are still interpretations of what is happening by the 
researcher (Clifford & Marcus 1986). 
 
Having decided to pursue interviewing as a method, I then had to make decisions 
about where to conduct the research. I wanted to speak to social workers in local 
authority fostering and adoption units because they handle the vast majority of 
fostering and adoption work, while a small amount is handled by voluntary 
agencies (Triseliotis et al. 1995, 1997). In thinking about which local authorities to 
approach, I had to bear a number of factors in mind: 
 
• I wanted to approach at least one agency with a ‘radical’ reputation; by this I 
mean a local authority with explicit statements of equal opportunities which 
included lesbians and gay men, and preferably one which had either 
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participated in the Skeates & Jabri (1988) study and/or had something of a 
national reputation for being ‘politically correct.’ My reasons for this were that I 
wanted to research in at least one authority about which commonsense 
notions were that ‘there was no discrimination against lesbians and gay men’ 
within that agency. 
• I wanted to approach at least one inner-London borough, partly for the 
reasons outlined above, but also because I felt that some of the London 
boroughs had developed more experiences of working with lesbians and gay 
men through anti-oppressive work carried out via equalities initiatives in the 
1980s and under the Greater London Council (Greater London Council 1985; 
Greater London Council Women’s Committee 1986). 
• I wanted to ensure that I spoke to black, as well as white, social workers; that I 
spoke to both fostering and adoption workers; and that I spoke to at least 
some men (most social workers being women). 
• I wanted to approach at least one agency which had a good ‘reputation’ 
amongst the lesbian and gay communities, especially those involved in 
fostering and adoption. 
• I wanted to ensure that I spoke to some lesbian and gay social workers 
because I was very interested to see whether their experiences were markedly 
different from those of heterosexuals. 
• In contrast to the London boroughs, I wanted to approach an agency in the 
north of England since I had been aware that the Skeates & Jabri (1988) study 
had a London-bias. I already knew that my case study (chapter six) would 
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draw upon data from two further authorities, one in the north of England and 
one in the Midlands. 
• I was not interested to do a ‘macro-level’, large-scale comparative study of 
agencies across the country; as I have previously noted, I was not interested 
in the ‘good authorities versus bad authorities’ version of social work practice. 
Instead I decided to focus on a small number of agencies but to try to interview 
a fairly large number of workers (in the end, twenty-eight). 
• I was also mindful of the practicalities of access (Burgess 1984; Lee 1993), 
which I shall discuss later. I felt that my research topic was likely to be a 
sensitive issue (Lee 1993; Renzetti & Lee 1993) for local authorities and so I 
was unsure as to whether I would be able to persuade agencies to give me 
permission to carry out the research, let alone whether social workers 
themselves would actually talk to me. 
 
This presented me, pragmatically, with the issue of access to willing research 
sites and subjects, and achieving this relied upon a combination of factors. First, I 
was able to secure ‘sponsors’ (Lee 1993:131) for each site. By this I mean that I 
was able to develop a contact with a worker in each authority who was 
supportive of my research, and, more importantly, acted as an advocate for the 
research project. These three women - a lesbian who worked as an equalities 
officer for social services, a heterosexual woman who was a fostering social 
worker, and a lesbian who was a fostering social worker - were central to 
negotiating access to do the research and I think crucial to the research 
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happening at all. Finding them was the result of a combination of my existing 
contacts through earlier research, my involvement with lesbian and gay fostering 
and adoption support networks, and some degree of serendipity. All three met 
with some suspicion about the project from colleagues, and some stated 
resistance. There were always some social workers in each of the authorities 
who refused to speak with me, often the case with ‘sensitive’ research topics 
(Lee 1993:122). 
 
Second, I had to work hard to negotiate access myself. I spoke with senior 
managers and entered into correspondences about the research project. In each 
case, negotiating access took a period of six months from the point of initial 
contact to the point at which I was able to visit the authority. I met with some 
suspicions about my motives, but I found that I was able to reassure managers 
and workers by sending them detailed outlines of the research project. Their 
main concerns were that I would expose the practices of authorities or individual 
workers to hostile scrutiny, ridicule or even media attention, and so it was 
important that I made careful negotiations around confidentiality and also 
explained the content and purpose of my interviews. 
 
I found that I had to do some ‘reassurance’-work here, emphasising that I was 
not out to ‘trap’ or ridicule individual workers. Reports back from my ‘sponsors’ 
indicated that the most frequent concerns of the social workers were that I would 
be disparaging about their attempts to assess lesbian and gay applicants, or that 
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I would not think them ‘right-on’ enough. This raised the issue of potential 
interviewees feeling possibly intimidated by the prospect of talking to a gay man 
about assessing lesbian and gay applicants, and the idea that they would have to 
be ‘politically correct’ in what they said. As I will discuss, I did not find this to be 
the case when doing the interviews. 
 
I ‘reassured’ potential research subjects by outlining my project and the content 
of interviews. I made it clear that the purpose of the interviews would be to find 
out their views and how they had handled assessments of lesbians and gay men, 
whatever their position on this topic. I found that the fact that I was also a social 
worker at the time that I did the research7 made a big difference. I was able to 
emphasize that I saw social work as a complex and difficult activity without ‘easy 
answers’, and this helped greatly with access to willing subjects - they saw me as 
‘one of them’ on this level at least. 
 
Of the twenty-eight respondents, 22 were women and 6 men; 5 were lesbians, 
none were gay men and 23 were heterosexual; 6 were black and 22 white (of 
whom one was Jewish); none were disabled; 17 worked in fostering, 7 in 
adoption and 4 were managers. I did find that adoption workers were consistently 
more likely to refuse to participate in the study than were fostering workers. 
 
                                                           
7 I was employed as a Social Worker (Job-Share) for children under eleven and their families at a 
voluntary project in Manchester. I worked half-time (I couldn’t have done the PhD if I’d been a full-
time social worker!), doing children and families work, including child protection. 
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Method 1: The Interview 
 
The interview is an important research technique in empirical 
sociology. Interviews may either be formal, using a structured 
interview schedule, or informal, the interviewer being able to 
follow up points made by the interviewee. Interviews may also 
provide either quantitative or qualitative data. Doubts have been 
expressed concerning the reliability of the interview. Thus its very 
formality may mean that the respondent does not act ‘typically’. 
The interview is not a neutral social relationship and the 
respondents’ perceptions of the interviewer may well affect 
replies. (Abercrombie et al. 1994:221). 
 
This version of ‘the interview’, taken from a dictionary of sociological terms, 
expresses some of the poetics classically employed to make claims for the 
‘scientific’ status of the data generated. Typically, as here, the interview is seen 
as a research tool, structured so that respondents are asked exactly the same 
questions as others in order that the tool remains reliable. The interviewer is 
expected to remain detached and objective in order to minimize interviewer-
effects that are seen to influence the respondent. Thus the respondent may give 
‘false’ replies based upon how they perceive the interviewer, they may say what 
they think the interviewer wants to hear, or the interviewer may indeed ‘bias’ 
responses by giving too much away about themselves, by showing their 
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opinions, by entering into a dialogue with the interviewee, and so on (McCracken 
1988:26).  
 
Such versions of the interview are about making truth-claims for the material 
generated. What they ignore is that an interview is a dialogic relationship 
between researcher and researched, and that no two interviews are ever likely to 
be ‘the same.’ Thus my own view of the interview was that each and every one 
would achieve contextually-dependent forms of knowledge, rather than ‘truth’. 
The interview generates accounts of events which are negotiated between 
interviewer and interviewee (Mishler 1986; Schratz & Walker 1995), dependent 
upon how each ‘reads’ the other person, and which are also bound to leave out 
information which the interviewee feels they do not want to discuss.  
 
The traditional view of the interview has been much critiqued, especially in 
feminist and postmodern accounts (Coffey & Atkinson 1996; Finch 1984; 
Fontana & Frey 1998; Graham 1984; Mason 1996; Oakley 1981; Phoenix 1994; 
Reinharz 1992; Wise 1987). Ann Oakley criticised 'the interview' for its claims to 
a neutral, objective and scientific status, and noted that, in traditional versions of 
the interview, the researcher was to be removed, an ‘objective tool’ (Oakley 
1981:32); “...the paradigm of the ‘proper’ interview appeals to such values as 
objectivity, detachment, hierarchy and ‘science’...” (Oakley 1981:38). Instead, 
Oakley found that her women interviewees asked her questions back, and that 
she formed relationships beyond that of interviewer-interviewee with some of 
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them which she felt were non-hierarchical (Oakley 1981:47). Thus she wanted to 
acknowledge the role of ‘the personal’ in constructing research knowledge, and 
she felt that she shared a similar social location to her interviewees: 
 
Where both share the same gender socialisation and critical life-
experiences, social distance can be minimal. Where both 
interviewer and interviewee share membership of the same 
minority group, the basis for equality may impress itself even 
more urgently on the interviewer’s consciousness. (Oakley 
1981:55). 
 
Nevertheless, claims made by Oakley and other feminists (Finch 1984; Reinharz 
1992) about the status of knowledge via interviewing are themselves 
problematic. The work of Sue Wise (1987) is important here, as she has argued 
that Oakley (1981) and Finch (1984) actually avoid confronting the power 
dynamics that exist between all researchers and their subjects. She does not 
accept that power imbalances are solved via women's shared structural position: 
 
"In the research relationship, being women takes us so far, being 
a feminist a bit further, personal style and skill play an important 
part, but there comes a point at which structural inequalities do 
interfere with communication and understanding...;we can, and 
do, exert power over each other." (Wise 1987:74). 
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Thus there are important objections to the suggestion that women share the 
same standpoint within a researcher/researchee relationship. Whilst they do 
share experiences of structural oppression as women, they do not share the 
same positions of power within the research itself, and the power of the 
researcher, not least to write a version of other women's lives, must be 
acknowledged rather than ignored. Second, there is no single foundational truth 
of women's lives that can be easily accessed by better 'feminist' interviewing. 
Third, the notion of a shared subject position between woman researcher and 
women subjects does not acknowledge the material and structural differences 
that exist between them, not least due to class, sexuality or race. 
 
These critiques are also evident in the work of Ann Phoenix (1994), who 
discusses the dynamics of race that divide women, as a black woman 
interviewing both white and black female subjects. She is unhappy with the 
suggestion that woman-to-woman interviewing necessarily produces rapport 
through shared gender identification: "Nor are the power positions between 
researcher and researched fixed dichotomies; the balance of power between 
interviewers and interviewees shifts over the course of a study." (Phoenix 
1994:55). More importantly for Phoenix (1994), the work of Oakley (1981) or 
Finch (1984) glosses over material differences between women such as racial 
difference. 
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Instead I argue that the interview is a dialogic relationship in which notions of 
power are shifting and changing according to how the subjects are positioned 
within particular discourses. Additionally, the interview is a re-counting of events, 
a narrative account (Mishler 1986), a ‘version’ rather than fact and it ‘generates’ 
data as opposed to ‘collecting’ it. This is an important distinction since data are 
not “... ‘out there’ as an already existing stock of knowledge, ready to be 
collected and independent of our interpretations as researchers” (Mason 
1996:36). 
 
Jennifer Mason (1996) characterizes the ‘qualitative interview’ as one which uses 
a relatively informal style, based upon a thematic, topic-centred, biographical or 
narrative approach, and in which the epistemological assumption is made that 
data are generated via the interaction between interviewer and interviewee(s) 
(Mason 1996:38). I felt that the idea of using structured interviews that did not 
deviate from a set script would be unhelpful. I wanted to be able to follow up 
respondents' own areas of concern, and to examine their experiences of 
assessments where possible. This meant that my interviews were unstructured 
(Fontana & Frey 1998:56), but used a series of “planned prompts” (McCracken 
1988:35) which allowed me to ensure that I covered my key areas of interest with 
each respondent. For example, I wanted to know whether each respondent had 
done an assessment of a lesbian or gay applicant, I wanted to know whether 
they had undergone any training on this issue, and I wanted to know what they 
made of certain key anxieties usually raised about the children of lesbians and 
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gay men. Thus I used a prompt sheet to guide me, and I have included my 
interview schedule as Appendix 1 (p. 406). 
 
The interviews usually lasted between one and two hours, and I recorded them in 
two ways; first, I used a tape-recorder to record the interviews which I later 
transcribed. In each case, I asked whether tape-recording was acceptable and in 
only one case did the interviewee object (here I took notes throughout). Second, I 
made detailed notes on my impressions of the interview immediately afterwards, 
and I found this was especially important in later remembering the ‘tone’ of 
interviews (whether interviewees seemed to be hostile or friendly towards me, 
whether they had any particular views they wanted to get across, and so on). 
 
I piloted and refined my interview questions as I went along. Initially I had 
planned a whole series of questions concerning post-panel issues, looking at 
whether lesbians and gay men actually had children placed within their care. 
After interviews in South River Council, the first authority I visited, I found that 
these questions were not the central focus of my research and, more importantly, 
I did not have enough time to ask them. Instead I re-focused my questions onto 
the issue of assessment of carers. I experimented with asking the social workers 
about some of the most commonly raised objections to parenting by lesbians and 
gay men, and I found that these were particularly fruitful and engaging debates 
for the interviewees. In particular I found that these questions ‘allowed’ social 
workers to state some of their oppositions to lesbians and gay fostering and 
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adoption. 
 
However, I did not always ask each social worker ‘exactly the same’ questions, 
as I wanted to allow for dialogue. Where a social worker had done an 
assessment of a lesbian or gay man, we spent some considerable interview time 
on this looking at how they had gone about this piece of work. Where a social 
worker had no such experience, then I asked them how they might go about it. 
 
Of course my interviews did not run in a smooth, problem-free manner. I found 
that certain terms and meanings were not shared between myself and the social 
workers and so we had to work to reach understandings; for example, when I 
asked how they went about assessing an applicant’s ‘sexuality’, several of the 
social workers took this to mean ‘sexual activity’ rather than identification with 
categories such as lesbian, gay or heterosexual. Other terms covering the 
categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' were used by the social workers, but not generally 
by me: 'sexual preference', 'sexual orientation', 'homosexuality', 'differently 
sexually-oriented.' Several other events interrupted the ‘neat’ planning of my 
interviews: during two interviews my tape-recorder batteries ran out and I found 
myself having to take notes whilst listening to interviewees; when I visited the 
North Eastern Council I was not well, but could not face the idea of trying to 
rearrange a series of meetings with ten social workers and so went ahead as 
planned, but feeling pretty awful.  
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One of my key interviewees, a senior manager of children’s services, used what I 
considered to be ‘avoidance tactics’ with me. When I arrived on the morning of 
the day our interview was planned, I met her in the lift and she told me that she 
was ‘in a bad mood’. Later she rearranged the interview for another time, and I 
began to think she didn’t want to see me, despite having agreed to be 
interviewed. When we did the interview, she refused to be tape-recorded but 
made a joke that tapes ‘could be used as evidence in formal complaints and 
inquiries.’ During the course of the interview itself, she kept saying things like, 
“...Oh I could say more, but I won’t...” which, of course, I found frustrating. Later 
she asked me whether I would write a report on the findings for her child care 
services section and I refused. I arranged to meet with the Equalities Officer to 
do some feedback, which was our original agreement, but my attitude was that, if 
a large social services department wanted to seriously consider its practice with 
lesbian and gay carer applicants, then it ought to commission its own research. I 
did not want to become a ‘cheap’ alternative for such work, yet I struggled with 
this decision. 
 
I received some feedback from the social workers about the interviews and this 
was generally positive. Maude, for example, told me that the workers felt that 
they had been able to get their points across to me without feeling threatened or 
‘put-down.’ I think that this was because, even where I was interviewing people 
whose views I found abhorrent, I did allow them to make their points clearly and I 
listened to what they had to say. There were some interesting dynamics involved 
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in the interviews, for example: 
 
• at least three of the interviewees asked me to turn off the tape-recorder part 
way through because they wanted to make a point that they did not want to be 
recorded on the tape; one of these was the belief that it was more appropriate 
to place disabled children with lesbians or gay men because they would not 
understand, or be influenced by, the sexuality of their carers; another was to 
make a criticism of what the worker argued was homophobia on the part of her 
manager. 
• I found that some of the workers sometimes told me details about their own 
sexuality, and/or sexual history; for example, one heterosexual woman told me 
about sexual experiences she had had with other women when younger. I did 
not feel it appropriate to stop people from telling me personal details when 
they wanted to, and yet I was also concerned as to whether they had really 
‘consented’ to giving me such information since it was not the substance of my 
thesis. 
• several of the workers were worried that I would think them ‘stupid’, 
‘professionally inept’, ‘not politically correct enough about lesbian and gay 
issues’ and so on, while others simply refused to speak with me for reasons I 
cannot know but can only guess at. 
• many of the workers told me that they really enjoyed the interviews, that they 
rarely had the opportunity to talk about and reflect upon these issues, and that 
they hadn’t noticed the time ‘slipping by’. This is what Raymond Lee refers to 
 111 
as the ‘cathartic effect’ of interviewing around sensitive topics (Lee 1993:107). 
 
Shapeshifting 2: Presenting a ‘Self’ in Interviews 
 
When interviewees cannot be placed into a category of 
'dispossessed' or 'powerful', and especially when they express 
views you abhor or hold status positions well above yours (which 
does not necessarily mean that they are powerful within the 
problematic being studied), the relation between researcher and 
subject becomes more problematic...My first concern was to gain 
access, and thus while I did not claim to be born-again, I most 
certainly did not present myself as a Jewish, lesbian, socialist 
feminist. I was not engaging in covert research, but neither did I 
wish to jeopardize the project. I did not lie, but I did not tell the 
whole truth - I said I was a sociologist of law (which, from their 
perspective, was bad enough)... (Herman 1994:14/15). 
 
Like Didi Herman, who interviewed members of the New Christian Right in 
Canada concerning their attitudes towards issues of lesbian and gay equality 
(Herman 1994), I found myself in the position of an openly gay researcher 
approaching large and bureaucratic social work organizations, often interviewing 
social workers whose views I found objectionable and who felt perfectly at ease 
to make homophobic comments despite knowing that I was gay. However, like 
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Herman, my concern was to gain access to local authorities and indeed to just 
those social workers who had reservations about lesbians and gay man as foster 
or adoptive carers.  
 
For this reason, issues of the presentation of ‘self’ for me as a researcher were of 
prime importance and worked on many different levels. In order to gain access to 
the local authorities, I presented myself as a genuine, serious academic 
researcher, interested in the policies and practices of the organization: I used 
University letter-headed paper and described my project and willingness to 
maintain confidentiality.  
 
Doing the interviews raised issues about how much of my ‘self’ I should divulge 
to interviewees, and indeed how I was presenting myself to them. I certainly 
formed impressions of them, and positioned them in certain ways, and no doubt 
they did so in relation to me. My approach to the interviews, even where the 
social workers expressed what I considered to be anti-gay remarks, was to tell 
them that I was interested to hear what they had to say. I did not discuss my own 
views about lesbian and gay fostering and adoption except where they asked me 
questions back and here I felt that I should answer them (Oakley 1981). Where I 
disagreed with what was being said, I let them express their views and would 
then present an alternative argument to see what they made of it. Nevertheless, I 
also did the reverse; where social workers expressed views in line with my own I 
would present opposing arguments to them.  
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This revolves around the idea that I was being partly ‘covert’ in my approach 
(Bulmer 1982; Fielding 1982); because I did not say to each and every social 
worker, ‘I am a gay man, and my views about lesbian and gay fostering and 
adoption are...’ it has been assumed that I was deceiving my interviewees on 
some level8. Such self-presentation was also an issue for Herman (personal 
communication 1995), but in both our cases ethical concerns meant that we felt 
unable to actively deceive research subjects. For Herman, this meant that she 
used techniques of avoidance/not answering questions fully, in order to obscure 
her personal point-of-view, otherwise her subjects would refuse to speak to her 
(Herman 1994:15; personal communication 1995): 
 
I thus felt uncomfortable leading them to believe, through a  
sympathetic tone or smile, that I might be supportive of their cause. 
On the other hand, I was also motivated by an activist concern to 
acquire useful information, and in this sense the research 
resembled the covert model. To do this, I needed to establish some 
kind of trust or empathy during the interviewing process. And yet I 
found this was achieved at a personal cost, particularly when some 
individuals expressed the most vicious perceptions of lesbian and 
gay sexuality. (Herman 1994:15). 
                                                           
8 This was commented upon at my formal upgrading panel from MPhil to PhD, where a comment 
was made that one of my interviewees ‘didn’t really know what he was saying’, as though I had 
trapped him into making homophobic statements. I have also found that this idea is often raised 
when I have presented my research in academic settings. 
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I also felt that, were I to present all my views on lesbian and gay fostering and 
adoption to each and every potential interviewee, this might prevent those who 
disagreed with me from coming forward. Nevertheless I did not actively ‘deceive’ 
them; I made my views clear when asked and I told them that I was a gay man. 
What is more interesting to me is the assumption that, where a social worker 
expressed homophobic views to me, I must have ‘duped’ them into doing so. 
This is certainly not how I experienced the interviews; those social workers who 
expressed homophobic views seemed to me to feel only too secure in doing so, 
at least because they were relying upon dominant discourses concerning 
sexuality. The view that I, as the researcher, was always in a position of power, 
able to dupe my interviewees into making statements they did not really mean, 
does not hold for me here. Instead I felt that they positioned me in a less 
powerful position, as gay, as a researcher, as someone who did not work in 
fostering and adoption, in comparison to them, heterosexual, working in a large 
organization of which I knew relatively little, and experienced in fostering and 
adoption work. At other times, however, the reverse was true; they positioned me 
as an ‘academic with all the answers’ who might ridicule or catch them out. 
Notions of power here then shift across the course of a research project and 
across the course of an interview (Phoenix 1994). But this also brings me back to 
the question of ‘shapeshifting’, for what is a truthful presentation of ‘self’ in 
interviews? Is this ever possible? 
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Very little was said directly to me and when I tried to be friendly 
there was a noticeable disposition to fend me off...The men 
would crowd in and buy soft drinks and woof at me, the stranger, 
but I knew I wasn’t getting on...Then one day after Cliffert Ulmer, 
Babe’s son, and I had driven down to Lakeland together he felt 
close enough to tell me what was the trouble. They all thought I 
must be a revenue officer or a detective of some kind. They were 
accustomed to strange women dropping into the quarters, but 
not in shiny gray Chevrolets...The car made me look too 
prosperous. So they set me aside as different...I took occasion 
that night to impress the job with the fact that I was also a fugitive 
from justice, ‘bootlegging.’ They were hot behind me in 
Jacksonville and they wanted me in Miami. So I was hiding out. 
That sounded reasonable. Bootleggers always have cars. I was 
taken in. (Hurston 1935:60-61). 
 
Zora Neale Hurston used the representation of ‘selves’ throughout her life and 
work (Hemenway 1977), and in Mules and Men (Hurston 1935) and also Dust 
Tracks on a Road (Hurston 1942), she describes how she was initially positioned 
as an outsider by the people of Eatonville - the place where she had grown up - 
when she went back there to collect and research black folklore. She felt that 
they did not trust her initially - “The glamor of Barnard College was still upon me. 
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I dwelt in marble halls...” (Hurston 1942:174-59) and so, in order to gain trust, she 
presented another ‘self’ to them, and, in typical ‘Zora style,’ this self was pure 
fabrication, for she certainly was not a fugitive or bootlegger. 
 
This example illustrates quite neatly some of the problematics involved in 
suggestions that the researcher-interviewer ought to present an honest self to the 
interviewees. It is impossible for the interviewer and interviewee to ever fully 
‘know’ each other during the process of an interview; instead, each gleans small 
pieces of information about the other and begins to position that other 
accordingly (Silverman 1989). The idea that I could have presented a complete 
and honest self to my interviewees seems to me to be impossible, but also based 
upon the idea that there is a single, essential self that could be so neatly 
summed up.  
 
The social workers made sense of me, positioned me according to certain 
information about me (Edwards 1993), but were not duped by me into making 
false statements. Indeed, if it can be argued that I was ‘duping’ the social workers 
into making false statements, then it can equally be argued that they were 
‘duping’ me, presenting more flattering versions of their practice, or what has 
been called ‘managing impressions of themselves’ (Lee 1993:75).  
 
 
                                                           
9 All page numbers for Dust Tracks on a Road refer to the 1986 edition published by Virago 
(London). 
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An ‘Institutional Ethnography’ 
 
Having described the interview as ‘method’, I now wish to return to its 
methodological implications. I used the interview within the context of conducting 
what Dorothy Smith has termed an ‘institutional ethnography’ (Smith 1987:160), 
and I show how I used this analytically in chapter four. This is a research 
methodology that explicates the institutional relations that determine the 
everyday worlds in which the social workers were practising. Smith argues that 
an institutional ethnography should uncover the ‘relations of ruling’ which govern 
everyday social relations and practices. The relations of ruling are forms of 
consciousness, created via the construction of practices and discourses, which 
belong to organizations and to those discourses therein (Smith 1987:3) Thus the 
relations of ruling are the dominant ways of making sense of our everyday 
worlds; here, the dominant ways that the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ are made 
sense of within fostering and adoption practice, and they are also the practices 
which sustain and reproduce such versions of the world; here, the assessment 
practices which continue to reproduce certain representations of the categories 
‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’. Thus an institutional ethnography analyses discourse in order 
to investigate what are constituted as ‘norms’. 
 
Methodologically, an institutional ethnography must begin in the everyday 
practical reasoning of individuals, and it is for this reason that I used the interview 
to understand how the social workers theorized about lesbian and gay 
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applicants. An institutional ethnography should therefore analyse how the work 
done by the social workers is constitutive of their everyday worlds, and how 
these practices sustain institutional processes. Where such practices are 
performed by many social workers, and/or repeatedly so, then they can be 
understood to be the social relations of ruling governing such practices (Smith 
1987:166). I have summarised Smith’s (1987) methodology in diagrammatic 
form: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY 
     start with the standpoint of the                              THE PARTICULAR 
     actors; a women’s standpoint, 
     or the standpoint of the 
     excluded 
                                                                                                  
                           
 
               analyse the texts produced 
               in order to look for their 
               problematics; to make the 
               everyday world problematic                        AN INSTITUTIONAL 
                                                                                     ETHNOGRAPHY 
                                                                                   LOOKS FROM THE  
                                                                                  EVERYDAY AT THE  
                                                                                  SOCIAL RELATIONS 
                             use these to investigate                      OF RULING 
                             the organizational processes 
                             within which the everyday is 
                             embedded 
 
                                                                                                         
 
                                        end with social relations                THE GENERAL 
                                        which organize the 
                                        everyday 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
 119 
The first point of an institutional ethnography, then, is to consider the standpoint 
of the actors within the social situation being investigated; that is, to investigate 
their everyday worlds (Smith 1987:105). The sociologist-researcher must begin 
with these daily, local social relations, and so here my aim was to generate data 
that were about the social workers’ everyday understandings of assessing 
lesbian and gay applicants.  
 
Smith’s feminist sociology is concerned to explicate how women are outside the 
frame, ‘the other’, of the dominant relations of ruling, and so how she can 
develop a sociology from the standpoint of women, “a way of seeing, from where 
we actually live” (Smith 1987:9). Men’s views of the world, their versions of 
knowledge, masquerade as the universal, and so women’s standpoints occupy a 
critical epistemological position here, even though they do not share a common 
viewpoint (Smith 1987:78). This was something of a problem for me, since quite 
clearly some of the social workers did occupy positions outside of the 
heterosexual relations of ruling - as women, as black, as lesbians - while others 
did not - as white, as heterosexual, as men. Nor were there easy alliances here; 
for example, some of the white heterosexual men I interviewed were clearly 
critical of homophobic and sexist ideas, some of the white heterosexual women 
were homophobic and against lesbians and gay men caring for children, and a 
black heterosexual man also held homophobic and sexist views. Nevertheless I 
felt that I could use the social workers’ accounts in order to understand the 
everyday world in which they were social work-ing lesbian and gay applicants. 
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The next stage of the institutional ethnography is to analyse the ‘texts’ produced 
by the social actors in order to look for their problematics. The mechanics of this 
analytic process are summarised in Appendix 2.a (p. 410). Here, however, the 
word ‘text’ refers to understandings, both verbal and written, discourses and 
social practices. Thus I looked at how the social workers constructed versions of 
the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ in relation to the ‘carer of children’, both in their 
talk and in how they later represented these in written format (e.g. the 
assessment report). However I believe that I was also investigating what I term 
social work assessment ‘scripts’, and by this I mean the standard ways that 
lesbian and gay applicants are regularly assessed by social work units. Here I 
was investigating how social work practices constitute ‘norms’ (Smith 1987:155), 
such norms taking on both the expectations of how lesbians and gay men ought 
to be assessed as suggested by fostering and adoption panels for example, and 
the dominant ways of going about such assessments based upon key 
assumptions made about the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’. Here then I was 
largely looking to understand how the social workers made sense of lesbian and 
gay applicants, and to consider both dominant and critical versions of such 
knowledge. 
 
The third stage is to use these texts in order to investigate the organizational 
processes within which the everyday understandings are developed. Here I was 
making sense of how the social workers’ versions of ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ were both 
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constituted by, and constitutive of, dominant assessment practices. For example, 
how did the version of ‘lesbian’ as a threat to men become constitutive of, and 
also constituted by, an assessment practice in which lesbian applicants were 
asked many questions about their attitudes towards men, whether they had male 
friends and so on? 
 
This takes us to the final stage of the institutional ethnography, in which we can 
analyse how social texts become social work practices which, when performed 
by many workers, constitute the social relations of ruling which organise the 
everyday worlds of the social workers. Thus we have moved from the particular - 
the social workers’ everyday standpoints - to the general - the dominant relations 
of ruling within social work practice which produce particular versions of ‘lesbian’ 
and ‘gay’. In this sense, that is the purpose of the remainder of the thesis and I 
have specifically analysed the ‘relations of ruling’ in section three of chapter four, 
but I used the interview in order to generate data which would help me to analyse 
the everyday worlds in which social work-ing with lesbian and gay applicants took 
place. 
 
Shapeshifting 3: “Are you a feminist, then...?” 
 
My research text analyses gender as a key determinant of social relations, and 
especially of the ways that the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ were understood by 
the social workers, and further, the way that social relations are structured on the 
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basis of oppression due to gender in which women are disadvantaged in relation 
to men. Social work contributes to such ‘relations of ruling’ (Smith 1987) as much 
as any other social structure or organization. Chapters five and six particularly 
analyse what I have called ‘gender anxiety’, but also how the relations of ruling 
within fostering and adoption favour compulsory heterosexuality, the 
maintenance of traditional gender roles and the privileging of men's power within 
social work and understandings of the ‘socialization’ of children. My analysis in 
the thesis, then, has been significantly influenced by work on feminist research 
and epistemologies. 
 
Early work on feminist research (Eichler 1987; Finch 1984; Oakley 1981; Roberts 
1981) was largely concerned with ensuring that women’s lives and experiences 
were represented in what had formerly been androcentric studies, developing 
‘non-sexist’ qualitative methods and using these in less exploitative ways 
(Reinharz 1992). However, this raises some problematics since we need to ask 
questions like, ‘what is particularly feminist about the interview?’, and, ‘what is 
wrong with feminists using quantitative techniques to produce knowledge?’ 
(Graham 1983; Jayaratne 1983; Mason 1994). Additionally, the suggestion that 
power dynamics can be removed from research relationships is a nonsense 
(Wise 1987). Feminist research which sees feminism in method alone does not 
specify the basis for this being feminist knowledge, and so this is not accountable 
or indeed particularly ethical knowledge. Nevertheless feminist researchers also 
argued clearly for reflexive practices which located the construction of knowledge 
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via the researcher’s own experiences (Roberts 1981:16). 
 
However, it is important to note that this was not, by any means, the sum total of 
work on the idea of feminist research (Stanley 1997b:205). Contemporaneous 
with these developments were other versions which proposed a feminist 
methodology concerned with epistemological issues (Bowles & Klein 1983; Smith 
1987; Stanley & Wise 1983a, 1983b,1993). Liz Stanley & Sue Wise (1983b) were 
critical of the notions that feminist research was about simply ‘adding women 
into’ existing versions of ‘science’ (1993:30), that it should just be research ‘on, 
for and by women’ (1993:30), or that it should be concerned with method, and 
only ‘soft, qualitative methods’ at that (1993:34). Instead they argued that the 
‘feminism’ of feminist research was located in a way of ‘seeing reality differently’, 
that feminism was about having a feminist consciousness about the world and, 
therefore, about interpreting ‘reality’ (Stanley & Wise 1993:43). Relatedly, they 
also argued clearly that the researcher, as an experiencing being, was and ought 
to be central to the research process; thus researchers ought to show how ‘the 
personal’ is implicated in how they produce knowledge (Stanley & Wise 1983b, 
1993:150). Later they called this an ‘intellectual autobiography’ (Stanley & Wise 
1990:23), the idea that researchers ought to show how knowledge has been 
constructed, both in the research process and through writing. Thus all 
knowledge, including feminist knowledge, “results from the conditions of its 
production” (Stanley & Wise 1990:39), and therefore: 
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...knowledge is actually a crucial part of the ‘textually mediated 
relations of ruling’. It is political knowledge through and through, 
because it necessarily derives from the world-views, 
assumptions and frameworks concerning knowledge (that is, the 
epistemologies) of its producers; and these are typically highly 
particular groups of men who give voice/text to the social world 
as seen, understood and colonised by men like themselves. 
(Stanley & Wise 1990:39). 
 
Stanley & Wise did not accept the existence of a single feminist version of 
research, and certainly not a single version of knowledge, and here they argued 
that women’s standpoints were multiple not least along axes of sexuality and 
race (Stanley & Wise 1990:47). Thus there co-exist a number of epistemologies, 
but these cannot be placed in any hierarchical relation. Instead, they argued that 
their feminist epistemology, what they have called a feminist fractured 
foundationalism, is preferable because it makes more ontological sense (Stanley 
& Wise 1993:228, 230). 
 
The new edition of Breaking Out (Stanley & Wise 1993) provides a summary of 
their feminist epistemology, and it is worth discussing it here as it has so 
influenced my ideas on what counts as knowledge, my own ‘intellectual 
autobiography’. In their feminist epistemology (Stanley & Wise 1993:8-9): 
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• the researcher exists on the same critical plane as those being researched; 
both are able to make knowledge-claims about the world which may be 
contested; the ‘researcher’ does not have ‘scientific, objective’ access to 
‘better theory’, 
• the ‘researched’ ought to include men, and not just women, for feminists, 
• all research proceeds from the researcher, a person who is making 
knowledge-claims, 
• all knowledge is, therefore, a version of the world which can be debated, 
• what are seen as ‘structures’ in social life are analysed, recognising that these 
are in fact everyday regular occurrences and inequalities which come to be 
defined as ‘facts’, 
• the statement that ‘women are oppressed’ is axiomatic to feminism, but there 
is a crucial recognition that differently located women have different 
experiences, and that they can and do exercise power at different times, 
• the category ‘men’ is therefore also open to be prised apart, 
• different categories of ‘women’ have different material experiences, and 
therefore epistemologies, and so feminism has to change its ways of working 
accordingly, 
• that the idea of a ‘self’ is always socially constructed, 
• and that there is a social reality that exists beyond our constructions of it, but 
this is not the unproblematic, foundationalist version of traditional social 
science. 
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The question remains as to whether I am ‘doing’ feminism (Digby 1998), and by 
implication how my epistemology is also one that relies upon ‘seeing the world’ 
as gay, as white, and as a man. In the thesis, I have adopted an approach 
usually termed 'pro-feminist' (Brod 1998; Hearn 1998), yet I also dispute the 
notion that there is one 'feminism', as do others (Kemp & Squires 1997; Stanley 
1997a), and have argued in chapter one for a feminism which locates sexuality 
and race as key dynamics and which takes some of the claims of postmodernism 
seriously. 
 
It is also important that I analyse how the notion of a ‘gay epistemology’ relates to 
that specified by feminisms; that is, is there a distinctly ‘gay’ way of seeing the 
world and of constructing knowledge? Certainly I have experienced many 
examples of my being reminded, personally and academically, that my research 
'is gay', and this is frequently employed as some kind of academic 'put down' 
(and see Morgan 1981:101, 1992:165; Spender 1981), but this does not mean 
the same thing as understanding the world ‘from a gay standpoint.’ Does such a 
discrete standpoint exist? For, if nothing else, this thesis demonstrates how 
fractured the category ‘gay’ remains. In relation to defining gay epistemology/ies, 
I acknowledge two key texts of importance here, Liz Stanley's Is There A Lesbian 
Epistemology? (Stanley 1992a) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's Epistemology of 
the Closet (Sedgwick 1990), which I would like to discuss. 
 
Stanley's (1992a) paper examines the ways in which knowing, as a lesbian, is a 
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political process, and is therefore about questions of power, about who knows 
and why. For the lesbian, problematic is the privileging of heterosexual 
knowledge: 
 
It is the presumption of heterosexuality which for me signifies 
what is socially and politically extra-ordinary, a puzzle, something 
epistemologically and ontologically strange. Presumptive 
heterosexuality sees itself as a defining characteristic, not only of 
human kind, but also of the behaviours and constitution of 
animals, and the behaviours  and constitution of plants and 
vegetables. (Stanley 1992a:18). 
 
Stanley (1992a) goes on to outline features of a lesbian epistemology, which 
include the construction of social reality through shared social meanings, the 
notion of experiencing, both as the self and as a social being, the impossibility of 
making any foundational knowledge claims, the basis of knowledge in ontology, 
and the use of categories in our daily thinking and theorising, which cannot be 
rejected but can be made less rigid. She is therefore proposing a distinct lesbian 
epistemology, shared by women who go under the category ‘lesbian’, which is 
different to how others, gay men, heterosexuals, see the world, and therefore 
how they construct knowledge: 
 
 ...there is a distinct lesbian epistemology, a viewpoint on and a 
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construction of knowledge - both other people's and our own. 
This does not mean that every lesbian woman sees the world in 
exactly similar ways....but [there is]...a particular set of 
experiences shared by lesbian women-loving women in a 
heterosexual world. (Stanley 1992a:66). 
 
What I draw from Stanley's (1992a) paper is that lesbians and gay men, in 
different ways, 'know reality differently' (see also Stanley and Wise 1993: 32). 
This I take to mean that we examine 'knowledge' critically for the ways that it 
rests upon an assumed and central heterosexuality. Relatedly, however, I have 
also argued for seeing 'lesbian' and 'gay' as forms of knowledge, which must also 
be examined for their effects. 
 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's work (1990) acknowledges the fact that much of 
modern Western thought is structured, and fractured, by what she terms the 
crisis of homosexual/heterosexual definition (p. 1). In terms of developing 
theories of a gay epistemology, Sedgwick has the following to say : 
 
The special centrality of homophobic oppression in the twentieth 
century...has resulted from its inextricability from the question of 
knowledge and the process of knowing in modern Western 
culture at large. (Sedgwick 1990:33/34). 
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For Sedgwick, then, much of what we know is structured by our own particular 
sexual epistemology: we view the world through women's, men's, gay, lesbian 
eyes. For gay men and for lesbians, the 'closet' is "...the telling secret" (p. 67) of 
gay lives, a speech act of silence (p. 3) which is the defining structure for gay 
oppression. Relatedly, categories such as 'lesbian' or 'gay' are categories of 
knowledge. 
 
Gay men, then, know the world in a different way, due to "...the epistemological 
distinctiveness of gay identity and gay situation in our culture..." (Sedgwick 1990: 
75). A piece of work on gay men by a heterosexual researcher will 'know' from a 
different epistemological position than that by a gay one, Kath Weston's point 
(1991: 13), though, as I argue later, not necessarily a 'better' one. My own gay 
epistemology, learning from feminist and lesbian research debates, would hope 
that such positions be explicated by the 'knower', and is thus predicated upon a 
number of important points: 
 
• Gay people 'see reality differently' (this is Stanley and Wise's phrase, 
1993:32). By this I do not mean that gay men are born with an essentially 
different world view. I believe that it is largely socially constructed, but it is 
'different' in many of its claims to those of heterosexual 'knowledges'. 
• Gay men therefore share some epistemological experiences, and it is through 
these that we construct the category ‘gay’, however much a ‘necessary fiction’ 
(Sinfield 1998:40) it is. Certainly it is a necessary fiction since there are wide 
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divergences of standpoint within the category ‘gay’, and this point is developed 
in chapter five. 
• Sexuality is a key determinant of social relations, and there is no knowledge 
that is not produced from a particular location; heterosexual, lesbian, gay and 
so on. Nevertheless social relations are also as much racialised and 
gendered. 
• The categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ do not exist other than as knowledge-claims. 
Understandings of these categories are 'versions' that can be contested. 
• Gay, lesbian and heterosexual research subjects 'know' the social world as 
much as I do. They experience different oppressions (ontology), and theorize 
from their own experiences, not from mine. 
• The researcher exists on the same critical and theoretical plane as the 
researched (Stanley 1992a:31). I do have power as a researcher, particularly 
in terms of writing a research product, and it is important that I examine the 
sources of such power, but my research subjects can, and frequently do, resist 
my theorizing in favour of their own. 
• My own epistemology is as much research data/material (Chung Yuen Kay 
1990) as theirs, and I should explicate my position as fully as I can; that is, 
explain how and why I come to know what I do. 
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‘Writing Culture’, or Secrets and Lies 
 
“...truth is only to be had by laying together many varieties of error.” (Woolf 
1928:104). 
 
Stanley (1997b) has argued for the ‘open text’ as a feminist form of knowledge 
and writing, and what I want to propose here is a ‘deconstructive text’ (Derrida 
1976). By this I mean a text which foregrounds poetics, ‘writing’ itself, in order to 
show to ‘you’, the reader, that the textual is also a representation of the world, 
also a form of knowledge. 
 
Jacques Derrida (1976) argued that the text is always already full of its own 
deconstructiveness, and that ‘true’ textual meaning was open to continual 
deferral, not least because language itself is not a neutral mediator of thought. 
His concept of writing sous rature (Derrida 1976) is therefore helpful in showing 
how the text is haunted by the trace of other, absent meanings. Thus we could 
write here TEXT=TRUTH. In a sense, we could apply this to the notion of the 
‘speaking voice’ and shapeshifting; for ‘my’ voice here speaks in this text to ‘you’ 
but it speaks ‘as’ others - Nita, Wayne, Fazila, Clare and so on. My voice is 
haunted by the absent presence of my research subjects, since I shapeshift in 
order to present them to you, and yet it is always me that speaks. Nevertheless 
for Derrida there is no authentic speaking subject here, since all these voices are 
haunted by earlier traces of meaning, by ideas constructed out of a language 
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system preceding the individual (Derrida 1976). 
 
I suggest that a deconstructive text should therefore: 
• maintain reflexivity about its own poetics, in order to demonstrate how textual 
devices are also constructors of meaning, 
• accept that language is a key constructor of meaning, but that meaning in 
language is never fixed but constantly open to contestation and deferral 
(Derrida 1976; Weedon 1987:24), 
• specify its methodology, that is how knowledge is produced, but including 
attention to grammatology, that is how it is written (Derrida 1976), 
• present different ‘fictional’ forms, foregrounding the reader’s ability to 
deconstruct the notion that text=truth. 
 
This text may deconstruct itself in that it mixes different, and conflicting, forms of 
writing in the presentation of methodology - fictions, personal accounts, stories, 
quotations, narrative and so on - in order to demonstrate methodological poetics 
in action. Thus a concern with research poetics shows the fruitlessness of 
searching for ‘truth’ represented in writing. Woolf, in A Room..., asserted this, 
noting that “...one cannot hope to tell the truth. One can only show how one 
came to hold whatever opinion one does hold” (Woolf 1928:6). Indeed the entire 
text of A Room... constantly returns to this theme, reminding us that what is 
authored in research too is a form of fiction (Krieger 1983): 
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‘Truth’ is a social construct, in the same way that objectivity is; 
and both are constructed out of experiences which are, for all 
practical purposes, the same as ‘lies’ and ‘subjectivity’. And so 
we see all research as ‘fiction’ in the sense that it views and so 
constructs ‘reality’ through the eyes of one person. (Stanley & 
Wise 1993:171). 
 
Method 2: Case Study or ‘Auto/biography’? 
 
CASE STUDY: The detailed examination of a single example of 
a class of phenomena, a case study cannot provide reliable 
information about the broader class. But it is often useful in the 
preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides 
hypotheses which may be tested systematically with a larger 
number of cases...Cases are selected to represent what, on the 
basis of theory or prior knowledge, are thought to be contrasting 
examples...Case studies may provide data of a richness and 
detail that are difficult to obtain from broader surveys, but at the 
cost of a lack of generalisability. (Abercrombie et al. 1994:46-7). 
 
In addition to the interviews with the social workers, I also conducted a detailed 
case study of a lesbian couple’s application to adopt. This forms the entirety of 
chapter six of the thesis, in which I analyse the experiences of the couple, whom 
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we decided between us to call ‘Nita and Clare’. Once again, the process of 
analysis is summarised in Appendix 2.b (p. 412). However, I think that it is 
important to begin with a definition of what is meant by ‘a case study’, the 
standard version demonstrated by the quotation from Abercrombie et al. (1994). 
There are a number of definitions within existing literature (Abramson 1992; 
Bradshaw & Wallace 1991; Feagin et al. 1991; Hamel et al. 1993; Hartley 1994; 
Langrish 1993; Orum et al. 1991; Platt 1988, 1992; Ragin & Becker 1992; H. 
Rose 1991; Schuller 1988; Sjoberg et al. 1991; Stake 1994, 1995; Stoecker 
1991; Yin 1981, 1984, 1992, 1993). Yin (1984), for example, suggests that a 
case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within a real-life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its 
context are unclear, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 
1984:23). Stake (1995) writes that case study is "the study of the particularity and 
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances" (Stake 1995:xi), while Stoecker suggests case studies are "those 
research projects which attempt to explain wholistically [sic] the dynamics of a 
certain historical period of a particular social unit." (Stoecker 1991:97-8). Orum et 
al. (1991) argue that a case study is "an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, 
using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is 
conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data sources." 
(Orum et al. 1991:2). 
 
My own definition of a case study would be that it is an in-depth, interpretivist 
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investigation of a social group, persons, community, activity or events, bordered 
by a set of boundaries which are said to define 'the case'. Case studies rely upon 
multiple sources of evidence, and the use of multiple methods. Where my 
understanding of case studies differs from the definitions in existing literature is in 
the fact that I would like to emphasize the role of auto/biographical processes 
(Cotterill & Letherby 1993; Stanley 1992b, 1993, 1994; Swindells 1995) in their 
production, an idea which raises the issue of case studies as ‘fictional accounts 
of lives’, a point I shall return to later. 
 
There are many reasons why I decided to use a case study as part of the 
research for my thesis. In particular I felt that, because lesbian and gay fostering 
and adoption is so little researched and because issues concerning the 
assessment of such carers are complex, then it would be helpful for the reader to 
have at least one in-depth story, something that would be engaging but also 
exemplary. I also wanted to show how my research data is both complex and 
detailed, dealing with aspects other than just sexuality alone. I therefore felt that 
Nita and Clare's story, dealing as it does with issues of gender, race and ethnicity 
as much as lesbianism, would help to illuminate such intersecting dynamics. I 
anticipated that a case study would focus on the processes of social work 
assessment, and also be able to investigate the differing meanings given to 
these by the actors themselves, and I wanted to be able to look at an 
assessment from a number of points of view. 
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So why did I choose to work with Nita and Clare for my case study? Partly this 
was opportunistic; they had expressed interest in my research, and when I 
suggested working with them on a case study they were only too pleased to help. 
This involved no small amount of labour on their part, since I asked them to 
participate in three separate interviews, each of at least 90 minutes. But more 
especially, they felt it was likely that the social worker that had assessed them, 
Barbara, would also agree to be interviewed, and they were prepared to let me 
see their assessment report form (Form F) which contained detailed personal 
information.  
 
Additionally, I wanted to locate human subjects within the text of my thesis, but of 
course this was not a simple issue, and I cannot say that Nita and Clare have 
been straightforwardly 'allowed to tell their story', since ultimately it is my 
representation of them that is this text. Nevertheless I have worked closely with 
them on this case study, seeking their active feedback on my writings, and I have 
used their own words wherever possible. By this I mean that I have relied upon 
their own theorizing of events as much as my own, that we inhabited the same 
'critical plane' from which to interpret social actions (Stanley & Wise 1993: 8), 
rather than suggesting that I have been able to get to a single foundational 'truth' 
about the case. We developed a good research relationship, and I hope that I 
have been able to reflect Nita and Clare's active resistance to oppression, their 
resistance to being concretely positioned by social workers, and their active 
theorizing of their own experiences in this text.  
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What interested me most about doing a case study, however, was not the issues 
of design and method, but rather the auto/biographical processes that were 
involved in constructing Nita and Clare's 'story'. Stanley (1992b, 1993) argues 
that the easy distinction popularly made between autobiography and biography is 
in fact not so easy (Stanley 1992b:3; 1993:42). Any auto/biography is an artful 
construction within narrative, and versions of a ‘life’ may be hotly contested as 
Jacqueline Rose’s The Haunting of Sylvia Plath so expertly points out (J. Rose 
1991). Thus the text has a complex relationship with the material realities of the 
life it describes (Stanley 1992b:243). In this sense, then, I have not simply 
recorded a faithful rendition of the 'truth' of Nita and Clare's accounts. I have 
interpreted what they said, taken the parts that I felt to be significant or 
meaningful to my research, and put them together as the case study. However, I 
do see the text as an interplay of my writing with their voices, and I think that they 
are very much 'present' in the text. 
 
What I am arguing here, then, is that doing a case study involved processes of 
constructing a version of life experiences. Thus the different voices within the 
case study are contestations of what happened, and they do not always agree. 
For example, Barbara told me that she thought through the kinds of questions 
she would need to ask a lesbian couple in advance of doing the assessment. 
Nita and Clare, however, argued that they were responsible for raising the 
specifics of lesbian adoption and that Barbara would not have done so if they 
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hadn't. How, then, do we understand such claims based upon experience via 
memory? Many positivist researchers have argued that such claims are 
problematic and unreliable, but like Stanley (1994), I cannot see why knowledge 
based upon experience should be any more or less problematic than other 
claims. ‘Experience’ itself is never ‘raw’ and obvious, but must be made sense of 
(Scott 1993) and all claims are rooted in the knowledge-production processes 
(Stanley 1994:146). 
 
As I have said, it is the interplay of voices, of versions of the past, that interested 
me most in doing the case study, so where there were disagreements I recorded 
them. I gave my accounts to Nita and Clare to get active feedback from them, 
and they commented on these. These comments form the basis of footnotes 
provided in my final version of chapter six. I argue that case study allows for the 
generation of complex and contradictory data that can highlight the contestation 
of meanings given to events or concepts by different social actors. The social 
'world' is messy, contradictory and full of dispute, and so the case study is helpful 
for showing this. This is why I felt it was methodologically appropriate to a 'story' 
which, at the very least, was concerned with contestations of categories such as 
'lesbian', 'Hindu', 'Asian', or 'gender role'. 
 
One of the most frequent objections to case study research is that it proves 
nothing, since relying upon a case of one does not allow for generalization 
(Abercrombie et al. 1994:47). However, this critique is based upon a positivist 
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epistemology that sees knowledge as inhering in the statistical generalisability 
and validity of findings. Case studies are not based upon such an epistemology 
in my view, since they are concerned with the investigation of a single case in 
detail in order to theorize about actors' accounts of social processes. A case 
study is not a population 'sample' from which to generalize statistically. Indeed a 
case may be studied for its uniqueness and diversion from the 'norm' alone 
(Langrish 1993). 
 
Many writers argue that case studies use analytical, rather than statistical 
generalization (Yin 1993); that is, they can be used to generate, and generalize 
to the level of, theory (Hartley 1994:225; Orum et al. 1991:13; Platt 1988:17; Yin 
1992:126, 1993:39), and it can be seen from my own case study of Nita and 
Clare that I believe this to be true. I have theorized from the data concerning the 
intersecting dynamics of race, gender and sexuality, and have generalized from 
this about how the category 'lesbian' is represented via the processes of social 
work assessment.  
 
Stoecker (1991) interestingly points out that writers such as Yin (1984, 1993) 
defend case study research by claiming that it incorporates 'scientific rigour' 
(Stoecker 1991:92). Yin (1984) is very keen to emphasize the validity and 
reliability of case study research, especially through the use of triangulation and 
multiple cases. In his article, 'The Case Study Method as a Tool for Doing 
Evaluation' (Yin 1992), Yin clearly states that case study assumes a "single 
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objective reality that can be investigated by following the traditional rules of 
scientific inquiry." (Yin 1992:128). Stoecker (1991) argues that, instead of 
defending the scientific rigour of case studies, we might critique the foundational 
basis of such an emphasis. Certainly I do not assume a 'single objective reality' 
as the basis for my case study research and, relatedly, would not argue that my 
research design has allowed me access to such a seamless 'truth' about the 
social world. I also argue that a case study is particularly appropriate where 
detailed sensitive information (Lee 1993) is needed regarding the processes and 
interactions of social work policy and practices. 
 
I was therefore able to study events from a number of different 'points of view', 
what some writers call 'triangulation' of the data (O'Connell Davidson & Layder 
1994:55; Silverman 1993:156). For example, in looking at their assessment by 
Barbara, I used mixed sources as follows:  
Mixed Data Sources in the Case Study 
 
           social worker version                    Form F report version 
                                                                              
                                                        
                                                                              
        applicant one version---THE COUPLE---applicant two version 
 
Figure 3.2 
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I also had to define what I saw as my 'case', and the boundaries for my data 
sources, and I used the following: 
 
• three in-depth interviews with Nita and Clare, looking at pre-assessment, 
assessment and post-assessment issues. 
• an interview with the assessing social worker, Barbara. 
• the 'Form F' assessment report presented to the adoption panel. 
• the Midlands Council Equal Opportunities Policy Statement. 
• letter from the Assistant Director (Children's Services) of the Midlands Council 
to the couple. 
• letter of complaint by the couple to the Chief Executive of the Midlands 
Council. 
• complaint investigation reports of the Investigating Officer (Midlands Council) 
and the Independent Person. 
 
My methods, therefore, were in-depth qualitative interviewing, for which I used an 
interview guide (schedule), but also the analysis of documentary sources. I 
recorded my interviews on audio tape (with Nita and Clare) and by hand (with 
Barbara who did not want to be taped), and then transcribed these verbatim. I 
reviewed each interview before going on to do the next one, noting questions I 
needed to ask again and areas that were emerging as significant from the data. 
The research involved a number of ethical issues especially concerning 
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confidentiality. I made agreements with my subjects about how to refer to them 
and I felt I had to be especially careful not to identify the Northern City Council, 
since Barbara was the only black worker in the adoption unit, and Nita & Clare 
could be easily identified as a ‘mixed race', and the first out lesbian, couple to 
adopt. Their Form F report also contained detailed personal information, and we 
agreed that the couple would delete their names, and any parts they did not want 
me to read, from the document. 
 
Shapeshifting 4: Researching Black and Lesbian Lives 
 
Can, and should, a white gay man research the lives of lesbians and black 
women? This is the question that I intend to address here in relation to the case 
study, because this was a dilemma: if I do not accept that there is a single 
foundational truth to be accessed, then how far is it ethically and politically 
possible to research the lives of people 'other' than myself? And this is also to do 
with questions of representation: "whether, and how, we should represent 
members of groups to which we do not ourselves belong - in particular, members 
of groups oppressed in ways we are not." (Kitzinger & Wilkinson 1996:1). For the 
case study is a representation of black and lesbian women’s lives. 
 
All of this is concerned with the question of epistemic privilege which suggests 
that those who experience particular forms of social oppression, due to racism, 
sexism, homophobia, therefore have a privileged access to an understanding of 
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reality. This is by virtue of the fact that they see both the oppressors' versions of 
the world but also their own. They see the centre from the point of view of the 
margin, having a kind of double vision on reality (hooks 1984). 
 
The notion of epistemic privilege has held much sway in research terms, 
particularly where it is oppressed groups that are being investigated. For some, 
the complex ethical and political dilemmas involved in negotiating the power 
dynamics that are always present in all research can be easily solved by reliance 
upon the notion of epistemic privilege. This is realized by the idea of 'matching' 
the characteristics of the research subjects with the researcher along the lines of 
race or gender, for example. But we have seen that this did not work for Zora 
Neale Hurston in the case of Mules and Men (Hurston 1935), where those she 
was researching regarded her with suspicion. Claudia Bernard (1994), similarly, 
is a black woman who researched with other black women, and she argues that, 
"even though both the researcher and her respondents may share a 
subordinated position in society, the power dynamics between them in the 
research process are not lessened...these become more complex." (Bernard 
1994:21). Like Wise (1987), Bernard also points out that research relationships 
are always built upon unequal power, and that this cannot be so easily 
disappeared by 'matching' (Bernard 1994:21).  
 
In fact, as I have been arguing, what is more dangerous is an assumed similarity 
or sameness (Hurd & McIntyre 1996) between researcher and researched simply 
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on the grounds of race, gender or sexuality. It is politically significant that this is 
questioned by black researchers, lesbians, gay men and feminists (and of course 
combinations of those), but rarely when white researchers interview other white 
subjects (though see Frankenberg 1993), or heterosexuals other heterosexuals. 
 
If we consider the notion of epistemic privilege in relation to researching lesbians 
and gay men, then an article by Joseph Styles (1979) is explicitly concerned with 
'insider/outsider' status in ‘gay research’. What interests me about Styles' (1979) 
work is that he discusses how far he was an 'insider', both of a gay male 
subculture but also as a participant observer in sexual activity in a gay 
bathhouse. Styles makes the point that he initially believed that, as a gay man, 
he "was in a position to conduct research that would be close to the experience 
of gay men themselves." (Styles 1979:136). This is a 'standpoint' claim, based on 
the notion of a common experience as members of a category 'gay'. However, 
Styles goes on to describe how, in researching sexual activity amongst gay men 
in a bathhouse, he remained an 'outsider' as he himself did not initially engage in 
sex with other gay men (Styles 1979:142). Later he did participate in sexual 
activity, and says, "I began to use myself - my own experiences, my perceptions, 
my desires, my interests - as a way of clueing myself into the concerns of other 
bath-goers. After all, I was now a 'real' insider." (Styles 1979:142). 
 
Styles goes on to suggest that his notions of 'insider/outsider' were not so easily 
fixed in the research field, and he is ultimately dismissive of epistemic privilege: 
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"There are no privileged positions of knowledge when it comes to scrutinizing 
human group life." (Styles 1979:148). He describes 'outsider' and 'insider' myths 
in research, suggesting that 'outsider' myths hold that only outsiders have the 
necessary distance and objectivity needed to study particular groups, while 
'insider' myths hold that only insiders have the ability to appreciate the 'truth' of a 
group's experiences (Styles 1979:148). Styles concludes by saying that he did 
not possess any special access to the life of the baths merely because he was 
gay (Styles 1979:148).  
 
This is an important critique of notions of epistemic privilege, for, whilst there are 
different epistemological positions, these are not hierarchical; nor, I argue, does 
belonging to the same epistemological ‘community’ give a researcher privileged 
access to the ‘truth’ of their researchees’ lives. Bat-Ami Bar On (1993), for 
example, suggests that epistemic privilege is usually seen as a function of 
‘distance from the centre’, which sets up competing claims for the most marginal, 
therefore 'privileged', experience (Bar On 1993:89). She argues that such claims 
to expertise on the basis of a privileged view of the world are a 'master's tool' 
(Bar On 1993:97), presumably as objectionable as all other claims to truth made 
by malestream research. 
 
What points, then, am I making about my own researching of black and lesbian 
lives? Am I saying that it is simply okay for anyone, any man, to research black 
and lesbian women? Well no, I am not and, relatedly, I believe that the issue of 
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participants’ active choice is a crucial one here. I believe that it is ethically 
important for all subjects to have the choice to participate in research or not. 
Barbara, Nita and Clare chose to participate in my research because they trusted 
me as a researcher and knew something of my views regarding gender, sexuality 
and race. Nor am I saying that my account is more 'authentic' simply because I 
am gay. It is my version of their experiences that forms the research text, and 
this would have been very different if it had been done by a lesbian researcher, a 
black researcher, a woman researcher.  
 
The point made by Stanley (1992a) here about ontological difference is 
important. Thus I do not share a lesbian or black or women's ontology, because 
these are "different way[s] of being in the world...rooted in the facts of 
oppression." (Stanley 1992a:253). In that sense, then, I can research lesbian 
and/or black women's lives, but cannot claim to represent the 'truth' of their 
experience, but then I would not do so anyway because that is naively realist. 
Lesbian and/or black women researchers might produce preferable accounts or 
reject mine based upon their experiences. 
 
Thus standpoints exist, but they do not have epistemic privilege over one 
another, and therefore my point is that researchers cannot claim such privilege 
via 'matching'. As I have shown, with regard to race, gender and sexuality, one 
response to the notion of epistemic privilege is to take the position that one 
should only attempt to represent the lives of subjects similar to oneself, or even 
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only to speak for oneself and no-one else, a position taken by Joyce Treblicot 
(1988:3; 1994).  
 
As a researcher I chose to speak about and theorize the experiences of 'others', 
but I do not claim that I am speaking for them. This I cannot do, for the research 
is contextually and situationally produced by me. I do not simply represent the 
reality of other people through my research because I cannot do that, and I do 
not think research does so. But then all research represents 'the other' (Wilkinson 
& Kitzinger 1996a) in some form; if the research has subjects, then such 
representation is occurring (Wolf 1992:12). 
 
To return to my original question, then, I am making a political or ethical 
justification for my inclusion of in-depth interviewing with black and lesbian 
women in my research. First, my research is a large-scale study of the social 
work assessment of lesbians and gay men who apply to foster or adopt children. 
To leave out black and/or lesbian subjects would be, as Edwards (1990, 1996) 
has noted, ethically objectionable in itself. Second, I believe that the women in 
question - Nita, Clare and Barbara - chose to participate in the project, and I think 
that this was at least partly because they knew that my stance as a researcher 
was pro-feminist, but also analytical of race and sexuality as key dynamics of 
social processes. 
 
More importantly I am not claiming that my inclusion of black and lesbian voices 
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is some kind of simple description of their authentic realities. Research is no easy 
representation of a foundational world, and I have not included them to 'spice up' 
an otherwise white project, or in order to claim that I have allowed black or 
lesbian voices 'to be heard' in my text. For it is not they who are speaking, it is 
me, a white gay man who is the researcher. Indeed it is always possible that they 
may produce their own preferable accounts of their experiences, and they 
certainly may object to mine. 
 
Conclusion: A Palimpsest? 
 
                                                                       Longwood, Fla. 
                                                                      Aug. 20, 1934 
Dear Dr. Boas, 
I am full of tremors, lest you decide that you do not want to write 
the introduction to my “Mules and Men”...Mr. Lippincott likes the 
book very much and...wants a very readable book that the 
average reader can understand...So I hope that the unscientific 
matter that must be there for the sake of the average reader will 
not keep you from writing the introduction. It so happens that the 
conversations and incidents are true. But of course I never would 
have set them down for scientists to read... (Zora Neale Hurston, 
letter to Franz Boas of Columbia University anthropology 
department, Aug. 20 1934, from collection of the American 
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Philosophical Society Library; in Hemenway 1977:163-4). 
 
 
Here I have been writing over my own writing, demonstrating the basis upon 
which the text - this thesis - has been constructed, but also showing that the 
social actors’ own accounts have also been ‘written over’ by me. Text is a 
representation and, in terms of the subject matter of this thesis, that is also what 
fostering and adoption assessment reports are, a representation of the 
categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’. I have argued therefore that this text is both 
deconstructive and ‘unreliable’ in order to show that all research is fiction, a 
narrative, a form of storytelling, even ‘big old lies’ (Hurston 1935:8). 
 
However, my argument is also that those researcher-narrators who absent 
themselves from texts, from their knowledge-claims, are far less trustworthy. 
Zora Neale Hurston’s shapeshifting ‘self’ - that she bothered to present a 
narrating ‘self’ at all in a collection of black folklore - is at least more honest 
because we catch glimpses of her within the text of Mules and Men (Hurston 
1935). If we have an awareness of the researcher within the text, then at least 
we, as readers, can interrogate them. I have argued that the ‘self’ is not fixed 
either in interviews, case studies and so on, or within the text. Instead research 
texts present multiple, shapeshifting selves, and the ‘biggest lie’ is to absent this 
self through notions of objectivity. 
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I have used the examples of the interview and the case study in order to show 
that my research data are recountings of events in which meaning is 
situationally-dependent and achieved (Parton et al. 1997). Thus interviews, for 
example, can and should be ethically conducted, but they do not represent the 
subject’s ‘own voice’, nor does this remove inequalities from research 
relationships. Case studies, similarly, rely on the role of the auto/biographical in 
their construction, so are helpful in demonstrating that data are competing 
versions of social events. 
 
I have argued for the adoption of a critical epistemological position that explicates 
the production and reproduction of research knowledge via work ‘in the field’ and 
‘in the text’. This also involves a specification of what counts for knowledge, and I 
have shown this via the examples of feminist and gay epistemologies. ‘Scientific’ 
research methods do not guarantee ‘true’ knowledge, but instead all knowledge 
or theorizing is experientially based and, also, contestable.  
 
Indeed the language we use is itself a constructor and giver of meaning, rather 
than a neutral descriptor (Derrida 1976; Weedon 1987). It was Derrida’s 
assertion that ‘speech’ is no more authentic than ‘writing’ (Derrida 1976) but this 
logocentric notion is frequently employed by researchers when they make claims 
that they are presenting the ‘real speaking voices’ of their subjects, or the 
‘experiences of the oppressed’ or the ‘hidden voices of the little-researched’ and 
so on. Instead I have shown that the notion of epistemic privilege does not give 
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researchers easy or ‘better’ access to the ‘truth’ of their subjects’ lives. 
 
Rather our research texts re-write social actors’ experiences; we write over these 
like a palimpsest, not totally erasing the trace of the voices of our subjects, but 
nevertheless very much re-presenting them. Further, epistemologies of the 
oppressed have indicated that we must account for how we have produced the 
knowledge which we call ‘research’, for ultimately this text is my version of the 
data. But at least a deconstructive text allows ‘you’, the reader, to disrupt the idea 
that what I write is ‘truth’. Perhaps, instead, the question you should ask yourself 
is this: “How shall I ever find the grains of truth embedded in all this mass of 
paper?” (Woolf 1928:28). 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Social Work Assessment of Lesbian and Gay  
Carers: introducing data from the research study 
 
This chapter introduces my analysis of the data from the social worker cohort, 
and is concerned to discuss what I argue to be evidence of ‘discrimination’ 
against lesbian and gay applicants in the assessment process. It is divided into 
five sections, and in the first I present evidence of a range of assessment 
practices, using the concept of a continuum in order to show how the social 
workers went about assessing lesbians and gay men. In section two I identify 
what I consider to be the key factors influencing the outcome of such 
assessments; that is, whether there are significant themes arising from the data 
set which indicate a 'likelihood' that lesbian or gay applicants will be treated ‘on 
merit’. Section three goes on to discuss the view that assessments of lesbians 
and gay men are governed by a series of everyday ‘myths’, explaining why I am 
unhappy with such a view, and then examining how the social workers 
constructed the idea of ‘risks’ posed to children by lesbians and gay men. Here I 
employ Dorothy Smith’s ‘everyday world as problematic’ (Smith 1987) in order to 
make sense of the work involved in socially accomplishing the discourse of what 
I have called ‘the good carer.’ 
 
In the fourth section I argue that my research has uncovered evidence of 
 153 
assessment practices which are ‘disadvantageous’ on the basis of a lesbian or 
gay sexuality. I shall explain what I mean by this, before going on to analyze 
evidence from my interview data. I look at how the social workers handled 
questions about sexuality, and at the debate about whether lesbians and gay 
men should be asked “the same questions” as everyone else in assessments. 
The final section pays significant attention to those social workers whom I 
interpret as attempting to ‘make a difference’; social workers who were keen to 
develop what they saw as ‘anti-discriminatory’ assessment practices with 
lesbians and gay men. This involves, perhaps most importantly, analysis of what 
is meant by ‘anti-discriminatory’ and ‘anti-oppressive practice’ in relation to 
lesbians and gay men  (Appleby & Anastas 1998; Brown 1998; Burke & Harrison 
1998; Dalrymple & Burke 1995; Dominelli 1998; Hidalgo et al. 1985; Logan et al. 
1996; Thompson 1993, 1997). 
 
SECTION ONE: The Assessment Process 
 
Most, but by no means all, social work agencies employ the assessment 
structure, or at least a variation upon this, provided in Form F: Information on 
Prospective Substitute Parent(s) (BAAF 1991) for the purposes of the ‘home 
study’ of foster or adoptive applicants (Campion 1995:47). Both social workers 
and applicants therefore commonly use the phrase "Form F", and this has given 
rise to the idea that there exists a standard assessment practice which ought to 
be followed in all cases. Indeed, Form F itself says that it was “designed to 
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provide fostering and adoption agencies with a standard way of collecting and 
presenting information about prospective substitute parents.” (BAAF 1991:1, my 
emphasis).  
 
In investigating whether lesbians and gay men are ‘discriminated against’ in the 
assessment process, then, the most commonly held assumption would be that 
they should be tested against the ‘standard’ model: Are lesbians and gay men 
treated ‘the same as’ or ‘differently to’ heterosexuals? However, this poses 
serious problems since it is my contention that there is no standard assessment. 
Assessments are likely to cover broadly similar areas, but each and every one 
differs, not least in the ways that they are structured as a whole, and the place 
that the home study occupies, but also because each person being assessed 
presents new information which has to be interpreted by the social worker. 
 
Little attention has been paid to the role of assessment in social work practice, 
but where it has been discussed, the ‘standard model’ approach prevails. This 
tends to construct assessment not as a practice or process, but merely as a set 
of key tasks, common sources of information and areas that ought to be covered 
(Coulshed 1988; Curnock & Hardiker 1979). What this completely ignores, then, 
is the role that ‘making sense’ of information plays in assessment, which is what I 
am arguing that all social workers do. Commenting on traditional views of 
assessment, Judith Milner and Patrick O’Byrne argue that there are “only too 
many linear, prescriptive and stylised assessment formats that come nowhere 
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near meeting the complexities, uncertainties and ambiguities of current social 
work practice.” (Milner & O’Byrne 1998:3).  
 
Milner and O’Byrne go on to discuss the work of Smale & Tuson (1993), who 
identified three key models of assessment; the questioning model, where the 
social worker processes answers, and the agenda is worker-led; the procedural 
model, where the agenda is led by agency function and checklists are used; and 
the exchange model, where people being assessed are also viewed as experts 
on their problems, and the emphasis is upon exchanging information rather than 
interpreting (Milner & O’Byrne 1998:29). All these writers favour the ‘exchange 
model’, and yet there is a key problem here which is the suggestion that social 
workers do not interpret information. I am arguing absolutely against this view, for 
I see all assessments as constructions or ‘versions of the world’ that are formed 
via the interpretations of social workers.  
 
Milner and O’Byrne do acknowledge this dilemma, however, because they note 
that there “can never be a truly neutral perspective” (Milner & O’Byrne 1998:30), 
and they later suggest: 
 
Assessments have to be more like qualitative than quantitative 
studies, and be ‘making sense’ activities rather than ones 
clinging to naive realist epistemologies. Influenced by 
postmodern perspectives, we believe that no single theory can 
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fully tell the truth and that there is anyway a plurality of truths. 
(Milner & O’Byrne 1998:47). 
 
It is just this ‘making sense activity’ which I have investigated in this thesis, for I 
am arguing that the social workers made sense of the categories ‘lesbian’ or 
‘gay’ when considering foster or adoptive applicants, and, further, that they did 
this throughout the whole assessment process. The social workers theorized 
what ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ meant, in relation to the care of children, in advance of and 
during the home study part of the assessment, and they constructed a version of 
such categories in their later textual and discursive representations. Thus Milner 
and O’Byrne do acknowledge that “the particular theoretical approach that a 
social worker implicitly holds, or selects, influences the questions asked when 
reaching for depth of understanding.” (Milner & O’Byrne 1998:51-52). 
 
I shall be arguing this throughout the thesis, but in addition I shall argue that the 
way that social workers theorize the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ takes place 
within existing and available discourses of sexuality (Mills 1997). That is, views of 
sexuality are not freely constructed but are at least partly governed by prevailing 
cultural beliefs, some of which are discussed in this chapter in relation to lesbians 
and gay men (see section three).  
 
Such beliefs also inhere in assessment processes designed to construct the 
‘good enough carer of children’ in fostering and adoption, and I shall argue that 
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this rests upon ideas of ‘heteronormativity’. Thus within social work there is a 
prevailing, and heteronormative, discourse concerning the ‘good carer’ which 
also allows for what can and cannot legitimately be said about the categories 
‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’. Where we have views of assessment as needing to be an 
‘equal playing field’, or being concerned only with equal opportunities - what 
Milner & O’Byrne argue should be “equal access to resources” (1998:65) - then 
such analyses ignore the operations of power going on within social work-ing. 
This constructs a liberal view of assessment, in which lesbians and gay men 
should be treated ‘the same’ and are expected to fit into existing structures. No 
account is taken of how being lesbian or gay may actually disadvantage 
applicants within an assessment process used to work with heterosexuals. 
 
Assessment Approaches 
 
I wanted to look for the range of assessment approaches employed by the social 
workers when assessing lesbians and gay men, and so I began by asking them 
questions about the process itself. What were the different stages of assessment 
as a whole that had to be negotiated by applicants? Where did the home study fit 
into the assessment process? I found that, although similar, the assessment 
process varied between the three authorities in question. In South River Council, 
the home study occupied stage seven of an eight-stage process. North River 
Council, however, had a nine-stage assessment process, in which the home 
study occupied stage eight. In the North Eastern Council, the process was more 
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lengthy, with eleven stages of which the home study was stage ten (Figures 4.1 - 
4.3) : 
 
South River Council 
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Thus I found a marked difference across social work agencies in terms of the 
assessment process as a whole. I found, for example, that both North River 
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Council and North Eastern Council placed far more emphasis upon the role of 
the preparation group in assessing applicants than did the South River Council. 
We cannot, therefore, assume a ‘standard’ way of assessing applicants across 
different agencies in terms of process.  
 
Before going on to look at how these agencies handled the issues raised by 
lesbian or gay applicants, I also asked the social workers about Form F (BAAF 
1991). I found that most used Form F as a basis for their assessments, but none 
stuck to it rigidly. South River Council were only just starting to use Form F at the 
time that I was interviewing social workers there (October 1994), and before this 
had been using a locally designed format. As I have already said, this did not 
surprise me for it was not my view that assessments are ever ‘standard’; instead 
I expected social workers to differ in the ways that they carried these out. 
 
Looking at Form F itself (BAAF 1991), there is anyway some contradictory advice 
in this respect. As I have noted, it suggests a “standard way” of collecting 
information (BAAF 1991:1), and also goes on to argue that Part 1 of the form 
“comprises factual information” while part 2 “contains guidelines for writing a 
descriptive report” (BAAF 1991:1, my emphases). Both of these - fact-gathering 
and description - deny the ‘making sense’ role of the assessor. Later, however, 
social workers are warned to “examine the basis of their own value systems so 
that their own agendas do not impinge on those of the families they are 
preparing...Stereotyped notions of the ideal family should be examined critically. 
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A particular type of family structure does not guarantee parenting skills or 
parenting capacity.” (BAAF 1991:2). Whilst this does begin to recognize the role 
of the assessor’s ‘values’ in assessing, nevertheless this also suggests that 
these should be held in check and that assessment ought to be an objective, fair, 
but not an interpreting activity. 
 
In looking at the particular dynamics that arose for the social workers in 
assessing lesbians or gay men, I found that three key areas were consistently 
mentioned and discussed; the idea of treating applicants ‘on merit’, the role of 
local authority policies of equality of opportunity, and the relative importance to 
the social workers of a policy specific to lesbian and gay fostering and adoption. 
 
‘On Merit’ 
 
The “policy” as such, although it’s unwritten so it’s more of a 
general view, and also the practice around it, is that any person 
or persons who approach the agency as a gay or lesbian person 
would be taken on merit...There is no “policy against...”, and in 
fact they should be considered like any other family. [Social 
Worker, NR48]. 
 
                                                           
8 Codes refer to data as follows: ‘SR’ = South River Council, ‘NR’ = North River Council, and ‘NE’ 
= North Eastern Council. Numbers are used to distinguish between respondents. ‘NR4’ therefore 
refers to the fourth respondent in the North River Council. 
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The social workers frequently spoke to me about taking an ‘on merit’ approach to 
assessing lesbians and gay men. This approach usually suggests that sexuality 
itself is no determinant of the ability to care for children, and so lesbian or gay 
applicants ought to be given the chance to be assessed like anyone else. This 
approach also suggests that child care abilities are the most important factor in 
carrying out assessments and that, in theory, lesbians and gay men are no more 
or less likely to be able to demonstrate these than any other applicants. Up to a 
point, this approach is fair enough since it acknowledges that sexuality in itself 
does not determine parenting ability (Patterson 1992), and it is an approach 
commonly raised in defence of lesbian and gay applicants. My argument, 
however, is that the ‘on merit’ approach rests on the idea of treating lesbians and 
gay men “the same” as everyone else, and that it therefore carries with it a 
number of problems for such applicants. 
 
Thus 'on merit' tends to be ill-defined, or poorly thought-through, so that ‘we treat 
lesbians and gay men on their merits’ is frequently stated but rarely specified. As 
I shall later argue, a key question here is 'the same as what...?' 
Therefore the phrase 'on merit' actually glosses a whole range of approaches 
(see the continuum model below). It operates a ‘sameness’ model of equality, in 
which lesbians and gay men are expected to be treated the same as 
heterosexual applicants and to demonstrate the same skills (see section four), 
and so downplays a lesbian or gay sexuality, seeing this as secondary to child 
care skills, and sometimes as unimportant. Thus the phrase ‘irrespective of 
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sexuality...’ can actually mean a denial of the importance of sexuality to 
applicants and to the assessment process. Further, 'on merit' is usually a reactive 
model to sexuality, and by this I mean that lesbian and gay issues tend not to be 
thought about unless they arise with a specific applicant. 
 
‘We don’t have a policy on this...’ 
 
I asked the social workers about questions of agency policy regarding lesbian 
and gay fostering and adoption. Parallel research regarding the placement of 
black children with black carers has found that some local authorities had 
developed policies specific to this issue (Barn 1993; Rhodes 1992). Whilst 
‘having a policy’ is no guarantee of good, or indeed anti-oppressive, practice 
within fostering and adoption units or on the part of social workers, Rhodes 
argues that sustained political changes in social work practice are difficult to 
sustain without policy back-up: 
 
Although the link between policy and practice may be fuzzy and 
change may occur in the absence of a policy initiative, it is, 
nevertheless, unlikely that it will be sustained without some form 
of policy directive. (Rhodes 1992:83). 
 
Many of the social workers who spoke to me supported this view in relation to 
assessing lesbian or gay applicants. Primarily they felt that, in the absence of 
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any agency policy, were they to argue for the approval of lesbians or gay men 
as carers, then as individual social workers they would be “sticking their necks 
out”, open to a whole range of criticisms should anything go wrong or should the 
press get hold of such information. 
 
On the issue of ‘policy’ I found two significant themes; none of the agencies had 
a policy specific to lesbian and gay foster or adoptive carers, and all of the social 
workers referred me instead to their local authority statements of equal 
opportunities. This confirms my argument that the relationship between social 
work policy and practice is both a complex and dynamic one; the social workers 
who were practising in the most 'anti-oppressive' ways regarding lesbian and 
gay applicants were doing so in the absence of any specific policy, but, 
relatedly, even where agencies had stated policies of equal opportunity this did 
not prevent examples of what I will argue are 'discriminatory' practices. To 
suggest that there are “good” agencies which, having stated commitments to 
challenging discrimination against lesbians and gay men, therefore do not 
‘discriminate’ is unhelpful. Similarly, to suggest that “bad” agencies are those 
with no policy does not account for the complexity of practice situations where 
individual social workers may be ‘doing’ anti-oppressive practice regarding 
lesbian or gay applicants. That is why I have argued against the ‘good and bad 
authorities’ approach to this issue throughout the thesis. 
 
All of the authorities that I visited had statements of equal opportunities, and the 
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social workers regularly referred to these. They also linked equality of 
opportunity to the ‘on merit’ approach to assessment. Nevertheless, I found 
different degrees of commitment to equal opportunities. At one extreme was a 
feeling that it was ‘imposed “right-on”-ness’ with which the social worker did not 
agree: 
 
Their stated policy is equal opportunities, and once you’ve said 
that you can’t very well renege on it because somebody is 
something ‘different’...Whether I agree with it or not is, at the 
moment, beside the point because you’re asking me about [local 
authority]. [Social Worker, SR1]. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, some of the social workers felt that statements 
of equal opportunities guaranteed absolutely nothing since they were not 
enforcible: 
 
If the department says, “Yes we will deal with everyone equally 
and fairly,” then I think we should actually do that and not just say 
‘No’ to people. I’ve said that the department is not putting its 
money where its mouth is, because it made no sense even 
encouraging gay people to apply if ultimately we will find some 
reason not to actually take it any further than their enquiry. But I 
was reminded very forcefully that I am obliged to do what the 
 167 
department says, but I wasn’t happy because I think it’s just 
hypocrisy. I’d rather not assess people who’ve actually said they 
are gay if we’re then going to find some reason not to approve 
them. I don’t think that [local authority] is necessarily as 
progressive as it appears to be. [Social Worker, NR10]. 
 
Interestingly I found that those social workers who were the most cynical about 
relying upon a notion of equal opportunities were those most committed to 
attempting anti-oppressive practice. The black women and lesbian social 
workers who spoke to me, comprising two groups of five out of the twenty-eight 
in the cohort, were particularly critical of equal opportunities which they largely 
saw as a liberal equality approach. They drew upon their own experiences, and 
upon practice examples of taking black women, lesbian and gay applicants to 
panels, in order to explain to me how much harder it was for such applicants to 
gain approval as foster or adoptive carers. They clearly argued that lesbian, gay 
and/or black applicants had to 'jump through more hoops' in the assessment 
process. I argue that this is because, in a liberal equality approach, black, 
lesbian and gay applicants are constructed as “other” to, and having to match up 
to, a white heterosexual ‘norm’ (Mac an Ghaill 1989). 
 
None of the authorities in question had formal policies on fostering and adoption 
by lesbians and gay men. All of the social workers referred to this, and, whilst I 
accept that such policies may exist, I have yet to come across an authority with 
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one which has been formally ratified by a social services committee. This 
remains a contentious area of social work practice, and in one example, which 
hit press headlines, Hampshire County Council decided not to exclude lesbian 
or gay applicants from the fostering process but were clear that “any application 
to become a foster carer, including by gay or lesbian people, should be 
considered on an individual basis and on its merits, concentrating exclusively on 
the interests of the child.” (Community Care 1993:2). I did find evidence of 
moves, particularly by lesbian and gay workers, to ‘work up’ policies on lesbian 
and gay fostering and adoption, but none had been as yet successful. I discuss 
such attempts in section five. 
 
Models of Assessment 
 
A Continuum Model of Assessment Practices           
 
          |------------|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------|-----------| 
     rejection       last resort           differently       on merit          thinking       child care      child     anti-oppressive 
        a priori        exception or           treated        sameness         it through        and/or         care            practice 
                            special cases                            heterosexual          in           panel-driven     and 
                                                                                    models          advance                            sexuality 
 
Figure 4.4 
 
I have interpreted a range of models of assessment from the social worker data, 
which is represented in the form of a continuum at Figure 4.4. My argument is, 
therefore, that the social workers assessed lesbian and gay applicants in a whole 
range of ways and that these have different implications for the potential for 
‘discrimination’. Reading from left to right, the models are as follows: 
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Not ‘on merit’ Categories: 
• rejection a priori - here no actual Form F assessment occurs, since a lesbian 
or gay sexuality has already been assessed to be incompatible with the ‘good 
carer’ or the ability to care for children. All lesbian or gay applicants are 
rejected outright on the basis of their sexuality alone. None of the agencies in 
question had such a ‘policy’, but I did find evidence of (i) lesbians or gay men 
being prevented from being assessed by ‘unstated’ positions taken by teams 
that they would be unsuitable, and (ii) statements that adoption panels, in 
particular, would be so unlikely to approve lesbian or gay applicants that social 
workers felt it was not worth pursuing such assessments. Policies which reject 
all lesbian or gay applicants outright do exist, however, as in the case of 
Bromley Council (Waugh 1997).  
• the ‘last resort’ - this position suggests that lesbians and gay men are 
generally the least suitable carers of children, but they can be used as a ‘last 
resort’ (Hicks 1996), as was emphasized in the adoption law review (DoH/ 
Welsh Office 1992). Here lesbians and gay men are assessed, but their 
sexuality is viewed as a problem and therefore unsuitable for most children. 
However, in special or exceptional circumstances, lesbians and gay men can 
be used as carers, and this is usually where the children or young people 
being placed are viewed as ‘hard to place’ due to their being disabled and/or 
having learning difficulties, behavioural or emotional problems. This model is 
frequently commented upon by lesbian and gay carers themselves, who feel 
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that it operates a “second-class citizens get second-class children” dynamic 
(Hicks & McDermott 1999). 
• ‘differently treated’ - this model of assessment makes no claims to treat 
lesbian or gay applicants ‘on merit’, or to treat them ‘the same’ as 
heterosexual applicants for the purposes of the assessment. Instead, they are 
expected to ‘jump through a series of extra hoops’ which are applied to them 
only because of their sexuality. Examples would include having to undergo 
psychiatric assessment (Smart 1991) or taking applications to panels for 
approval to go ahead with an assessment (that is, in advance of any 
assessment having occurred), reported to me by a social worker on an 
adoption team. Nevertheless, different treatment can, and does, have both 
negative and positive outcomes for lesbian and gay applicants and this is 
discussed in section four. 
 
‘On merit’ categories: 
• the ‘on merit’ model - this model has been previously described, but I also 
found that the social workers tended, therefore, to apply ideas and concepts 
relating to heterosexual applicants to lesbians and gay men, and that is 
because it is based upon the idea of treating everyone “the same”. For 
example, the notion that lesbian adoptive applicants must be childless, 
infertile, and therefore coming to adoption as a ‘second-best choice’. When I 
pointed out to one social worker on an adoption team that lesbian applicants 
might come to adoption as a first choice, she responded by telling me that she 
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would expect to assess their progress in ‘coming to terms with the loss of not 
having a biological child’ and would be looking for applicants who were 
‘resolved with this issue’ [Social Worker, SR5]. 
• “thinking it through” versus “just see how it goes”... - some of the social 
workers, who were operating various forms of the ‘on merit’ categories, told 
me that they would pay attention to the issues of sexuality in advance of 
commencing an assessment of lesbian or gay applicants. They said they 
would ‘think it through’: “I would have sat down and worked out the things that 
I would want to cover with them, you see...” [Social Worker, NR4]. This was in 
contrast to the position adopted by other workers which might be summed up 
by the phrase ‘just see how it goes...’ Here, the social workers told me that 
they would deal with the issues of sexuality as and when they arose in the 
‘home study’ assessment itself: “I tend to kind of wait and see what I’ve got 
when I go to see them, and I tend to do that in all my work...I think I’ve got an 
awareness of the issues but perhaps I just go blindly into things and then 
think, ‘Oh that’s interesting,’ but I could make better use of my time to actively 
think about it...” [Social Worker, SR7]. 
• prioritizing ‘child care’ - this model of assessment sees child care skills, or 
the assessed ability to look after children, as constituting the main focus of the 
assessment and the most important factor in the likelihood of carers being 
approved. This is the standard 'equality' approach to assessment (see, for 
example, UK Joint Working Party on Foster Care 1998:21). It prioritizes child 
care abilities over sexuality, and it was the argument most frequently used by 
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those social workers who took an ‘on merit’ approach to applications by 
lesbians and gay men. Sexuality is seen as no determinant of the ability to 
care for children, which it is not (Patterson 1992), and therefore sexuality is 
sometimes here seen as unimportant or not to matter: “I’m quite clear that we 
should be looking at a person’s parenting capabilities and their caring 
capacity, and not looking at their sexuality.” [Senior Social Worker, SR3]. 
Sometimes here I found the social workers emphasized the issue of meeting 
children’s needs over and above those of adults, and there was an attendant 
suspicion on the part of some workers that lesbian and gay applicants were 
applying to meet their own needs and not those of children: “I do have to keep 
reminding people that we are child centred and we do not offer a service to 
adults, we offer a service to children...so I don’t want to ‘recruit carers from the 
lesbian and gay community’ because I don’t want to make them into a special 
case. I’m not looking to recruit from them, I’m looking to recruit people who 
can look after children regardless of their lifestyle or sexual orientation.” [Team 
Manager, Fostering, NR9]. I also found that the social workers who prioritized 
child care often told me that this was because lesbian and gay applicants 
would not be approved by panels unless they did so. Thus assessments 
became panel-driven in focus, with the social worker covering what they 
anticipated would be the questions that would be raised by the panel. One of 
the lesbian social workers, Annie, was very critical of this and yet she 
understood the role of the social worker in constructing a particular version of 
the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ for panels: “I had to try to work out what I 
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thought the panel would ask me about this lesbian couple, and it would have 
been pointless me taking a report to the panel unless I was happy that I’d 
done so. Basically you have to represent applicants’ thoughts and 
feelings in a way that suits the panel.” [Social Worker, NE10, my emphasis]. 
• child care and sexuality - this model was less commonly argued by the 
social workers, but I found it was raised by nearly all of the lesbians who 
spoke to me. It argues that both child care skills and sexuality should be key 
areas of any assessment of lesbian or gay applicants, but that both of these 
should be seen as a part of the whole. Sexuality must be addressed but 
should not be allowed to dominate the assessment to the exclusion of all else, 
a criticism commonly lodged by lesbian and gay applicants themselves (Hicks 
1996). What this model also takes on board is that assessing lesbians’ and 
gay men’s child care abilities is important, but assessments also need to 
address questions of their sexuality, a theme that I have developed in my 
discussion in chapter six. 
• anti-oppressive practice - this position was the least evident of all the 
models in my research, and I was not surpised by this. ‘Anti-oppressive’ 
practice is by no means an agreed social work concept and it is discussed in 
section five. An anti-oppressive model of assessment would look at 
homophobia, racism, and sexism as they impact upon lesbian or gay 
applicants, and would consider how the notion of the ‘good carer of children’ is 
constructed via traditional views of race, gender and sexuality. It would, most 
importantly, examine the theoretical assumptions about sexuality upon which 
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the assessment is based. It would see child care and sexuality as key to any 
assessment, but would also take account of how the assessment process, 
which has been traditionally constructed to assess white heterosexual 
couples, disadvantages lesbian and gay applicants. Examples here would 
include: how do preparation groups disadvantage lesbians and gay men, often 
the only ones in an otherwise heterosexual group setting? how do questions 
about infertility and childlessness, or links with biological family actually rest on 
heteronormative assumptions? or, why are lesbians and gay men expected to 
prove that their sexuality is not a ‘risk’ to children in ways that heterosexuals 
are not? 
 
SECTION TWO: Key Themes Across the Data Set 
 
Here I identify the most significant factors, arising from the data set as a whole, 
which were likely to indicate that agencies, and individual social workers, were 
attempting to treat lesbian and gay applications ‘on merit’. I looked for the key 
factors that seemed to influence the social workers to assess lesbians and gay 
men more positively, and I did this by constructing comparative tables for each 
authority. The table for the South River Council is given below as an example: 
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Key Themes: South River Council 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
 
Experience 
of... 
 
 
Team 
 
 
Research 
 
 
Training 
 
 
Values 
 
Lesbian 
or gay? 
 
 
SR1 
 
On  merit 
Equal 
Opps 
 
None 
 
Not 
raised 
 
Not 
aware 
 
CQSW 
and PQ 
None 
 
Liberal 
Double 
burden 
 
No 
 
 
SR2 
 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
Gay 
couple and 
lesbian 
 
Raised 
rarely in 
adoption 
 
Not 
raised 
 
CQSW 
some, PQ 
none 
 
Anti-opp 
Positive 
Black 
issues 
 
No, but 
knows gay people 
 
SR3 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
She has 
approved 
cases 
 
Tends to be 
avoided 
 
Own exper-
ience 
 
PQ - 2 
day course 
 
Anti-opp 
but child 
care focus 
 
Lesbian  
mother 
 
SR4 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
None but 
research on 
this 
 
Raised 
rarely and 
negative 
 
Read and 
quotes from 
research 
 
CQSW yes; 
PQ - 2 day 
course 
 
Anti-opp 
 
Positive 
 
No, but knows 
gay people 
 
SR5 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
None 
 
Some 
discu-ssion 
in adoption 
 
Not raised 
 
PQ - 2 day 
course 
 
Liberal but 
child's 
needs 
 
No 
 
SR6 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
None 
 
Some 
 
Not raised 
 
Not 
CQSW, PQ 
- 2 day 
 
Positive but 
not about 
male carers 
 
No 
 
SR7 
 
On  merit 
etc 
 
Current 
lesbian 
couple asst. 
 
Some 
 
Hasn't seen 
any resea-
rch 
 
PQ - 2 day 
course 
 
 
Positive 
Feminist 
Worried 
about male 
carers 
 
No, but knows 
gay people 
Figure 4.5 
 
In analysing the data, I looked for key themes which related to the ‘stance’ taken 
by any team and individuals, and might best be described as the practice context 
within which the social workers were conducting their assessments. Here, then, I 
looked for the policy position taken by the authority, whether the social worker 
had experiences of assessing lesbians or gay men, whether the team raised and 
discussed this issue (or 'took a position'), and whether the social workers knew of 
existing research in this area. In addition, I also looked for individual 
understandings of categories such as ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ and personal commitment 
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to issues of anti-oppressive practice. Here I looked for any training on lesbian 
and gay issues undertaken by the social workers during, or post-qualifying, 
values statements made by them about lesbian or gay carers, and whether they 
were themselves lesbian or gay, or lesbian and gay-'friendly'. 
 
Key Themes from the data: Practice Issues 
• policy - the public stance taken by the authority affected both the likelihood 
that lesbians and gay men would apply to that agency in the first place, and 
also whether the social workers to adhered to the concept of ‘fair’ 
assessments for all. None of the agencies had a policy on lesbians and gay 
men as carers, but all had equal opportunities statements to which the social 
workers referred. The social workers told me that equal opportunities 
statements which explicitly mentioned sexuality (or ‘sexual orientation’) were 
important in attracting enquiries and applications from lesbians and gay men. 
All of the twenty-eight interviewees in the cohort told me that their agency 
adopted an ‘on merit’ approach to lesbian and gay applicants, despite my 
arguments that individuals used different approaches in carrying out 
assessments. Even where social workers did not approve of lesbian and gay 
carers, they were reminded by equal opportunities statements that they ought 
to treat them ‘fairly’. 
• experience of such applications - whether a fostering or adoption team, and 
indeed an individual social worker, had previous experience of handling 
applications by lesbians or gay men was another significant factor, and in this I 
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found great variation within and across agencies. In South River Council, four 
out of seven respondents had no experience of assessing lesbians or gay 
men, although one of these four had been researching this issue herself. Of 
the remaining three, two had previously assessed lesbians and gay men but in 
former jobs, and one was currently assessing a lesbian couple for respite 
foster care when I visited. In North River Council, four of the eleven 
respondents had some past experiences of assessing lesbian and gay carers. 
In the North Eastern Council, three out of ten workers had practice experience 
of assessing lesbian or gay applicants. I did find, however, that others had 
experiences of acting as a support or link worker to approved lesbian or gay 
carers. Those social workers with previous experience of working with lesbian 
and gay carers were far more conversant with the issues involved in carrying 
out such assessments and were far clearer on the kinds of questions they felt 
needed to be addressed with such applicants. They also had more confidence 
in their ability to take such assessment reports to a panel. A panel which had 
never considered an application by lesbians or gay men was seen by all the 
social workers to be a major stumbling block to approval, and this particularly 
applied to the adoption panels in all three authorities. 
• team ‘culture’ - the stance adopted by particular teams, including whether 
lesbian and gay fostering and adoption was actively discussed and debated, 
was also significant. I found that adoption teams were far less likely to have 
approved lesbians or gay men, far more likely to have incorporated more 
‘discriminatory’ arguments about lesbian or gay applicants, and adoption 
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workers were far less likely to agree to speak with me for the purposes of my 
research. This does not mean that all adoption social workers were 
‘discriminatory’, and some actively opposed what they saw as prejudice within 
their teams. Fostering teams were generally more likely to have debated and 
discussed lesbians and gay men as potential carers, but often only where 
specific applications had been made. In South River Council, six of the seven 
workers told me that lesbian and gay carers were rarely discussed amongst 
team members and one worker said it had never been discussed in her 
experience. In North River Council, there had been some discussion of the 
issues in the fostering teams especially as these had two gay male couples 
and a lesbian single carer on their books. The adoption team rarely discussed 
these issues and one worker felt any discussions had been particularly 
homophobic. In the North Eastern Council, one fostering team regularly 
discussed the issues, and this was at least largely due to the presence of 
lesbian social workers on the team. There had also been a ‘lesbian and gay 
issues working party’ which had actively raised the topic for debate amongst 
all teams. All the teams had discussed the topic at some point and so the 
social workers were far more conversant with current debates about areas for 
assessment. 
• the relevance of research - some of the social workers were aware of key 
areas of research knowledge which they used to counter arguments made 
against the suitability of lesbians and gay men to care for children. These were 
especially to do with existing knowledge concerning the ‘effects’ of lesbian or 
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gay parents upon children and concerning the gender and sexuality of known 
child abusers. In South River Council, one of the social workers had read 
research on the psychosocial development of children of lesbians and gay 
men, and used this to counter perceived risks to such children. Another worker 
told me that she was not aware of research, but used her own experiences as 
a lesbian mother to help construct her arguments. In North River Council, 
research was only mentioned by three workers, two of whom referred to 
figures regarding sexual abuse in order to argue that children were most at 
risk from known heterosexual men. Another worker had detailed knowledge of 
the Tasker & Golombok (1997) studies (discussed in chapter two) and used 
these to counter perceived risks to children. In the North Eastern Council, six 
of the ten workers mentioned figures regarding sexual abuse but none had 
knowledge of research on the children of lesbians and gay men. I found, most 
significantly, that the social workers were unlikely to be aware of existing 
research studies concerning the children of lesbians and gay men (e.g., 
Patterson 1992). 
 
Key Themes from the data: Understandings of ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ 
• training - I asked the social workers whether they had experienced any pre- 
or post-qualification training which looked at lesbian and gay issues as a 
whole, or which was directly concerned with lesbians and gay men as carers. 
In South River Council, the entire unit had recently undergone some training 
about lesbian and gay issues in fostering and adoption by a voluntary training 
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agency, a rare event indeed. This, however, had been at the request of one of 
the social workers who had been researching this issue herself and had 
become increasingly concerned by what she perceived to be homophobic 
ideas suggested by some of her colleagues. Two of the seven workers told me 
that their social work qualification courses had covered some aspects of 
lesbian and gay issues, and five had attended the recent post-qualifying 
training event. Otherwise there had been no training on this issue for workers. 
In North River Council, one social worker out of eleven remembered covering 
lesbian and gay issues in his social work qualifying course, and one other had 
received some training post-qualification. None of the other social workers had 
done any training covering lesbian and gay issues. When I spoke to the 
Equalities Officer for North River Council, she told me that she was keen to 
develop such training programmes, but, when I put this to the Children’s Care 
Services Manager, she told me that she did not consider this to be a priority 
for fostering and adoption workers. She felt that training on issues of child 
protection was far more pressing, but she did feel that some general equalities 
issues training might be appropriate for the fostering and adoption panels. In 
the North Eastern Council, none of the ten social workers had covered lesbian 
and gay issues as a part of their qualifying courses, and none had received 
any such training post-qualification. 
• ‘values’ / ‘making sense’ of ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ - I have interpreted a whole 
range of ‘values’-positions amongst the social workers concerning how they 
made sense of the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ in relation to the potential to 
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care for children. In South River Council, two of the seven workers took 
ostensibly liberal ‘on merit’ positions, but one of them used the argument that 
lesbian or gay carers posed a ‘double burden’ for children (see section three), 
and another felt that I was emphasizing adults’ over children’s needs in 
discussing this issue. Three other workers adopted positive and anti-
oppressive stances, one of whom drew direct parallels with her own 
experiences as a black woman and another of whom emphasized the need for 
child care skills amongst potential carers. The two final workers adopted 
positive approaches to lesbians and gay men but both had reservations about 
men, of whatever sexuality, as carers (see chapter five). In North River 
Council, two of the eleven workers adopted liberal equality models, whilst five 
adopted positive, anti-oppressive stances. Of these five, two drew direct 
parallels with black carers again based upon their own experiences as black 
women, one of these positioning herself as the only ‘radical’ member of an 
adoption team which she considered to be homophobic. A further two workers 
took up positive equality stances which tended to emphasize child care skills 
as the main focus. The final two adopted less positive positions, one having 
concerns about the poor ‘role models’ provided by lesbians and gay men (see 
section three), and the other focusing on children’s needs and being 
suspicious that lesbians and gay men had an adult’s and gay rights agenda. In 
the North Eastern Council, half of the ten workers adopted positive, anti-
oppressive approaches, three of whom based this upon their own experiences 
as lesbians and one of whom drew upon her experiences as a black (Asian) 
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woman. The three male workers adopted ‘on merit’ equality models which 
were also pro-feminist in their analyses. The final two workers took up equality 
models which emphasized the need to look for child care skills as well as 
understanding sexuality issues. 
• being lesbian or gay - finally, I found that workers being lesbian (I did not 
manage to speak to any openly gay male workers), or having experiences of 
working or living alongside lesbians and gay men as colleagues and friends, 
did make a difference to how they constructed ideas of what a ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay 
man’ was like and, crucially, whether these were seen as being compatible 
with 'the good enough carer' of children. Those workers who were 
heterosexual and had no personal experience of lesbians and gay men tended 
to construct the most discriminatory views of a lesbian or gay sexuality - as 
other, exotic, abnormal, threatening and so on. In South River Council, I spoke 
to one lesbian, and three women who had lesbian and gay friends or family. In 
North River Council, I spoke to one lesbian, and three workers told me they 
had lesbian and gay friends and family. In the North Eastern Council I spoke to 
three lesbians, and three other workers told me about lesbian and gay friends 
and family. 
 
I suggest, therefore, that where a social worker and/or agency scored positively 
on most or all of these key themes, they were more likely to be conversant with 
the issues involved in assessing lesbians and gay men, and more likely to 
construct versions of ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ compatible with the ‘good carer’. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize here that these are not claims to 
‘representative figures’ for the authorities in question, since I did not speak to all 
workers in the fostering and adoption units, and indeed some of them refused to 
speak with me.  
 
Similarly, the key themes do not ‘predict’ a likelihood to approve lesbian or gay 
applicants. At the times that I visited the authorities, the South River Council had 
no lesbian carers on their books but did have one gay male couple doing 
fostering. North River Council had one single lesbian foster carer and two gay 
male couples doing fostering, and the North Eastern Council had a single gay 
man doing fostering and a lesbian couple fostering. None had any openly lesbian 
or gay adopters.  
 
These represent very small percentages of approved lesbian or gay foster 
carers, and as I have noted there were no approved lesbian or gay adopters. As I 
have shown, even where an agency has a stated equal opportunities position 
and workers conversant with the assessment of lesbians and gay men, there are 
other workers who do not approve of such applications, as there are managers 
and members of panels. It is for these reasons that I chose instead to focus on 
how the social workers constructed versions of ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ in and through 
their assessment practices. 
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SECTION THREE: Constructions of ‘Risk’ 
 
Some of the arguments most commonly used against lesbians or gay men as 
potential foster or adoptive carers are constructed in the form of notions of ‘risk’ 
posed to children (Hicks 1997). These are most frequently: 
• the ‘double burden’ argument - the idea that children being placed in 
substitute care have enough to cope with, either from their previous 
experiences of abuse or in coming to terms with being fostered or adopted, so 
that to place them with carers who are ‘different’ because of their lesbian or 
gay sexuality creates a double burden for the child.  
• the teasing argument - the idea that children who are placed with lesbians or 
gay men will be mercilessly teased at school and suffer poor and damaged 
interactions with their peer groups. This is the idea that children will suffer 
stigma by proxy due to living with lesbian or gay parents. 
• the abnormal gender role models argument - the idea that children need 
and learn gender role models from their parents, and so they should have a 
male and a female parent if they are to develop a healthy gender identity in the 
future. This is the idea that lesbians and gay men cannot provide balanced 
gender role models, or that the role models they provide are distorted. 
• the corruption argument - the idea that children will suffer by association 
with lesbians and gay men. This argument suggests that such children will 
themselves become gay by force of example, or that they will be corrupted into 
the ways of gay sex (including being sexually abused) by lesbian or gay 
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carers. 
• the ‘pawns of the gay rights lobby’ argument - the idea that lesbians and 
gay men are not really interested in parenting or helping children, and that 
they are just using children to make a political point for gay rights and equality 
with heterosexuals. This argument suggests that lesbians and gay men apply 
to foster or adopt just to prove a point, and that they are promoting the gay 
(adults’) rights agenda at the expense of children’s needs. 
 
I wanted to examine these arguments as a part of my research because I was 
interested in how the social workers made sense of them, whether they had 
heard them, how they used them, or how they might counter them. Certainly I 
found they were key themes in all the interviews, and were therefore central to 
how the social workers made sense of ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’. These arguments are 
commonly reviewed in writings on lesbian and gay parenting (Martin 1993; 
Ricketts 1991; Saffron 1996) but are often referred to as ‘myths’ or ‘stereotypes’ 
about lesbians and gay men (Benkov 1994:58; Rights of Women Lesbian 
Custody Group 1986:125; Skeates & Jabri 1988:17). 
 
Skeates & Jabri (1988), for example, have the following to say about what they 
term “misrepresentations and untruths” (1988:23): 
 
[T]his hostility...amounts to no more than a belief system wholly 
based on a false set of assumptions about lesbians and gay men 
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and their lifestyles. These assumptions themselves stem from 
the incorporation of a large number of myths and stereotypes 
about lesbians and gay men...However, the most damaging of 
these myths and stereotypes are those whose effect is to throw 
serious doubt on the desirability of allowing lesbians and gay 
men to be in close contact with children and young people. 
(Skeates & Jabri 1988:18). 
 
I believe that use of the word ‘myth’, however, is unhelpful here for understanding 
how the social workers used what I have preferred to term ‘risk-based’ 
arguments. ‘Myth’ tends to suggest a pre-existing set of beliefs to which the 
social workers had access, as in “...myth n. (primitive) tale embodying esp. 
ancient popular belief or idea” (Oxford Dictionary). This suggests a passive 
model of the construction of ideas in which such pre-existing ‘myths’ are ‘pulled 
off the shelf’ at will by social workers; or it suggests that ‘myths’ take the role of a 
dominant ideology of which the social workers are the passive dupes. Instead, 
my argument is that some of the social workers did use risk-based arguments, 
certainly all of them referred to them, but that these are actively constructed 
versions of the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’. The social workers, if they so wished, 
made arguments about the risks posed to children by lesbians and gay men that 
were specific to fostering and adoption, but this was an active process which 
involved their discursively representing lesbians and gay men as ‘dangerous’, for 
example. 
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Thus I argue that this is the construction of social work discourse (Parton & 
Marshall 1998; Philp 1979; Rojek et al. 1988) concerning ‘lesbians’, ‘gay men’ 
and the notion of the ‘good enough carer of children’, ‘discourse’ being:- 
 
...not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of 
utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a 
social context, which are determined by that social context and 
which contribute to the way that social context continues its 
existence. Institutions and social context therefore play an 
important determining role in the development, maintenance and 
circulation of discourses. (Mills 1997:11). 
 
The point that I wish to make here is, then, that a discourse serves regulatory 
purposes, thus having concrete effects in everyday social work practice: 
 
...discourse is not just speech; it is embedded in a historical and 
cultural context and expressed often in the frame of a scenario or 
cultural performance. It is about practice...Insofar as the 
discourse evolves it begins to effect the practice. (Obeyesekere 
1992:650, quoted in Loomba 1998:103). 
 
Constructing a view of the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ as carrying the risk of 
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stigma is a particular view of sexuality and one which, I think, concomitantly 
stigmatizes. It also has the effect of requiring social workers to spend efforts and 
time convincing others (e.g. panels, courts) of the quite ridiculous notion that the 
children of lesbians and gay men will never suffer any teasing ever, something 
which cannot really possibly be true of any child anywhere. Further, it serves the 
regulatory function of ensuring that only those lesbian and gay applicants who 
can demonstrate the ability to deal with such potential teasing will be approved. 
Of itself this is no bad thing, but what such a version does not address is the 
source of such teasing in the first place, that is a heterosexuality which claims 
that lesbians and gay men are immoral, abnormal or whatever. 
 
This example begins to demonstrate why simply ‘opposing’ risk-based arguments 
with the assertion that ‘they are not true’ becomes meaningless. Instead I argue 
that it is impossible to say that all children who have lesbian or gay parents will 
never be teased, it is quite possible that some of them will grow up to be lesbian 
or gay, it is possible that they may develop critical attitudes about traditional 
gender roles and may demonstrate non-traditional gender role behaviour. It is 
also possible that some children will find the idea of living with lesbian or gay 
carers simply too shameful, and it cannot be said that all men and women who 
go under the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ are constitutionally incapable of ever 
abusing power and/or abusing children.  
 
Instead I am interested to examine how such heteronormative discourses, both in 
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their discursive construction and in their practice effects, divert attention away 
from heterosexuality. For example, it could as easily be argued that most children 
being placed in substitute care have been formerly ‘victimized’ in heterosexual 
households (usually by men), that heterosexuality continues to exert prejudice, 
and physical and emotional violences, against lesbians and gay men, that 
children who do not exhibit ‘correct’ gender behaviour also suffer such 
opprobrium, that young lesbians and gay men suffer greatly as a consequence, 
or indeed that the vast numbers of children who do not live in heterosexual two-
parent families are similarly disadvantaged.  
 
The social workers rarely made such arguments, however, because, even where 
they opposed the notion that the children of lesbians and gay men were ‘at risk’, 
they nevertheless were constrained to represent lesbian and gay applicants to 
fostering or adoption panels in ways which did address these arguments. For 
example, some of the social workers told me that they did not have concerns 
about the gender role models presented by lesbians and gay men, yet they also 
said that they would have to address this concern because panels would raise it. 
I have also developed this argument in chapter six with regard to the panel-
driven nature of Nita and Clare’s assessment. 
 
‘The Everyday World As Problematic’, or Problematizing ‘Common Sense’ 
 
What is going on here then? It is helpful to analyze the construction of such 
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knowledge-claims by focusing on social work practice as an ‘everyday world’ 
which should be ‘made problematic’, in Dorothy Smith’s words (Smith 1987). 
Smith argues that a feminist sociology should begin its analysis not within 
discourse, which she defines as abstracted and textually mediated social 
relations, but within our daily, local worlds (Smith 1987:98). This problematization 
of ‘the everyday world’ aims to make visible these social relations, or the 
‘relations of ruling’ by which it is organized (Smith 1987:88). It is exactly this 
which interests me here in terms of analyzing the ‘relations of ruling’ that 
structure what are in fact ‘everyday’ arguments about the children of lesbians and 
gay men.  
 
Such risk-based arguments are ‘everyday’ in the sense that they are the regular 
stuff of television talk-shows, press reports, radio phone-ins, discussions in pubs 
or on street corners, or indeed within universities, about lesbian and gay 
parenting generally (see for example BBC ‘Esther’ 1996; BBC Radio 4 1994; 
Brennan 1994; McRobbie 1991; Powell 1998; Weese & Wolff 1995). They are 
‘common sense’ arguments, well known to, and well used by, the social workers. 
Nevertheless, as Smith argues, an amount of work is required to constitute such 
arguments as ‘norms’ (Smith 1987:155), and it is the heterosexual relations of 
ruling which structure the social accomplishment of these as ‘knowledge’ about 
lesbian and gay parents. 
 
What Smith argues is that this socially accomplished knowledge is achieved via 
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practices which construct the world “as texts” (Smith 1987:3) but that this takes 
place within existing ‘relations of ruling’, which are: 
 
a complex of organized practices...as well as the discourses in 
texts that interpenetrate the multiple sites of power. A mode of 
ruling has become dominant that involves a continual 
transcription of the local and particular actualities of our lives into 
abstracted and generalized forms...Forms of consciousness are 
created that are the properties of organization or discourse rather 
than of individual subjects. (Smith 1987:3). 
 
I think that this notion of the relations of ruling is helpful for understanding why 
the social workers felt largely constrained to address risk-based arguments about 
lesbian and gay applicants, even where they did not support such arguments 
themselves. Fostering and adoption assessments are “a complex of organized 
practices” (Smith 1987:3) which constitute the world ‘as texts’ via discursive and 
written representations, or via talk and text. The social workers regularly talked 
about the expectations demanded of such work by panels, for example. We can 
see these expectations, therefore, as revolving around ‘norms’ of gender and 
sexuality, and relatedly, panels, assessment reports, assessment interviews, and 
so on as practices which are constituted by heterosexual relations of ruling. 
Fostering and adoption, I suggest, are governed not only by Smith’s relations of 
ruling which exclude women’s ways of seeing, but also by those which prioritize 
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and shore up things heterosexual. Men’s versions of the world, and heterosexual 
versions of the world, are portrayed as neutral knowledge, as the ‘norm’ (Smith 
1987:19). It will become clear in chapter five that I see the social workers’ 
anxieties about gender and sexuality as closely entwined, and so I see no reason 
to remove the specificity of Smith’s arguments about gender here. 
 
Thus the everyday world for the social workers here is a heteronormative one, 
one in which prevailing discourses concerning sexuality legitimate what is 
desirable, undesirable, acceptable and unacceptable (Bristow 1997:170). These 
also legitimate what can and cannot be said about the categories ‘lesbian’ or 
‘gay’, and that is why the social workers were constrained to represent versions 
of these categories which addressed the risk-based arguments. Such was the 
force of the heteronormative social work discourse of ‘the good carer’ here. 
 
The ‘double burden’ argument was used by those social workers who were the 
least happy about lesbians and gay men as carers: 
 
But it’s not the sexuality that’s important is it? It’s what the 
sexuality may or may not do to the child, how it affects the child. 
Children being placed with foster parents are traumatized 
anyway by definition and I think we also know that children have 
a horror of being different...different from the gang, different from 
the group. So what we’re looking at is traumatized children, and 
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traumatizing them again because they haven’t got a mother and 
a father is reinforcing difference. It needs a child who is quite 
strong and stable and secure in him or herself to be able to cope 
with being different and our children who come into care don’t 
have that inner stability and security. [Social Worker, SR1]. 
 
Here the social worker constructs an argument with a child ‘at risk’ at the centre. 
Lesbians and gay men are represented as the source of (additional) trauma 
because their sexuality is seen as ‘difference’. Cathy also argued that having 
lesbian or gay carers would be “something extra that the child is going to have to 
come to terms with...and you don’t want to add any extra difficulties...” [Social 
Worker, SR5]. However, others did not accept the ‘double burden’ argument. 
Maude, for example, pointed out that it was not long ago that black families were 
often seen as dysfunctional by social work agencies, and she drew a parallel with 
lesbians and gay men to argue against any difference from the white 
heterosexual standard being seen as ‘abnormal’.  
 
Still others took a middle-ground option, in which they argued that some children 
would not cope with lesbian or gay parents, particularly those who craved 
‘normality’ and ‘wanting to be like everyone else’: 
 
I do have some sympathy with this argument and that is because 
some kids do find giving explanations about their position as 
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fostered quite hard, and I’m aware that the children of lesbians 
and gay men are often quite troubled by that as well, you know 
having to tell their mates... [Social Worker, NE7]. 
 
The ‘middle-grounders’ took two positions from this; either that the ‘double 
burden’ was strong enough to argue that lesbian and gay carers were always 
inappropriate for some children, or that this could be worked through as long as 
carers were able to handle such issues with the child in question.  
 
I found contradictory views concerning the age at which it would be appropriate 
to place children with lesbians or gay men, and this related directly to the notion 
of ‘double burden’. Some of the social workers felt that it was more appropriate 
for older children to be placed with gay carers, but this was sometimes because 
they felt that older children were less ‘corruptible.’ Wayne, for instance, argued 
that older children would have already formed a view of gender roles and sexual 
relationships, so would be less likely to take on the role models provided by 
lesbian or gay carers. Others, like Liz, felt that children over eleven were more 
likely to cope with the ‘difference’ of having lesbian or gay parents, or would be 
better at giving explanations of their situation to peers. The reverse of this 
argument was to make the point that younger children are not so ‘corruptible’ 
because they understand less about issues of sexuality, or that they would cope 
better with lesbian or gay carers because they would not be aware of this, a 
similar argument applied to the placing of disabled children with lesbians and gay 
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men, as we shall see later. 
 
The risk to children from teasing, or stigma by proxy, was also high on the social 
workers’ agenda: 
 
Teasing and bullying, the sort of teasing and bullying that leads 
to suicide, are very much to the forefront of people’s minds at the 
moment, so if I did need some sort of proof that children are 
picked on because they’re perceived to be different it’s that, 
because children have to be like everybody else as their egos 
are just not strongly developed enough to be able to branch out 
on their own and be different, and to carry that differentness and 
not be damaged by it. [Social Worker, SR1]. 
 
Here the social worker constructs lesbians and gay men as so ‘dangerous’ or 
‘risky’ to children that this might result in child suicides. However, I found that this 
was an unusual response in terms of the social worker cohort. Most of them did 
address the teasing issue, but felt that children get teased for many different 
reasons - due to being in care, due to being fostered or adopted, due to being 
black, due to being fat and so on. What they were looking for in assessments 
were lesbian and gay applicants who acknowledged this as a possibility and 
were prepared to address it with the children and with peers and schools if 
necessary: 
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One of the questions I always ask, and I ask it because it’s an 
experience I have as a black person, is, “What happens if 
somebody calls your child a name? or says, ‘Your Dad is this or 
that’? How would you deal with it?” I say this to white families 
who have black children, “What happens if the child gets called a 
nigger, or black #!x+, or whatever? How would you deal with 
that?” So I’d also put that to a gay couple and ask how they’d 
respond, because in terms of teasing you get different responses 
from people, and a child might be experiencing name-calling at 
school because their parents are gay...[Social Worker, SR2]. 
 
The social workers wanted lesbians and gay men to be able to help children 
cope with any possible teasing, and many felt that applicants needed to be ‘out’ 
and positive about their sexuality in order to do this - “...children shouldn’t be 
made to feel there’s somehow something wrong or secretive about the carers’ 
relationships” [Social Worker, NE4]. Gill also felt it was important that such 
children had some regular contact with others who had lesbian or gay parents, a 
point rarely raised by the social workers. 
 
The risk of poor gender role models was also commonly discussed, and this is 
also evident in chapter five where I argue that such gender anxiety was key to 
the ways that the social workers intepreted the categories ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’. 
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Lesbians and gay men were frequently constructed as outside of gender norms: 
 
What lesbians and gays don’t have is the set-up that fulfils 
society’s accepted norms, so you’ve got all that confusion about 
‘who’s Mum and who’s Dad?’ So we have to find that for a child, 
because lesbians and gay men can talk until they’re dumb to the 
child about his or her needs and how to meet them, but they 
can’t turn themselves into a father and a mother which I think is 
the child’s basic needs. One person can’t give as much as two, 
and the two is more than the sum of the father and the mother, 
it’s more than two...it’s a completeness. [Social Worker, SR1]. 
 
Many of the social workers, however, argued against such views of lesbians and 
gay men, and some argued that we should not be promoting traditional gender 
role models. Nevertheless, most of them were keen to address this point in 
assessments and were keen that lesbian and gay applicants were able to 
present a ‘range of male and female role models’ in their daily lives, families and 
friendship networks, which the social workers could then represent to panels. 
The social workers frequently told me that panels were looking for ‘gender 
balance’ and this argument is similarly developed in chapter five. 
 
Concerning theories about corruption, I found some concern that lesbians and 
gay men would present negative views of heterosexuality and/or expect children 
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to become lesbian or gay: 
 
You’d need to ask them how they’re going to cope whichever 
way it goes with that child, whether they turn out to be gay, 
lesbian or heterosexual, and how that’s going to make the carers 
feel. What sort of images are they going to present to the child 
about sexuality? For example, what sort of assumptions are they 
going to make about a sexually abused child, and what images 
are they going to present of, say, a birth father who has sexually 
abused the child? What image are they going to present of 
people who are heterosexual? Like...would it be ‘they all abuse 
people’ and that sort of thing? [Social Worker, SR5]. 
 
In another example, a panel asked the social worker whether the applicants had 
any friends who ‘weren’t gay or lesbian’ [Social Worker, SR6], while Wayne 
argued that lesbians and gay men would not be able to ‘socialize children into the 
norm’ of relationships. All of these are examples of compulsory heterosexuality 
(Rich 1980), the idea that children might turn out to be lesbian or gay and that 
this would constitute a failure. However, I found that many of the social workers 
were less worried about this argument and felt less need to address it in their 
assessment questions or reports. 
 
Maude argued against the idea of ‘corruption’: 
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I do believe that children do acquire influences very early on in 
their lives and we are responsible for those influences, but for me 
it’s the idea about what people consider to be normal ‘families’, 
and what is the norm. My experience, coming from a Caribbean 
background, was that there were lots of Aunties and Grandmas 
within a community and I don’t think it’s affected us that much 
being brought up in that environment. I know we are influenced 
but the dominant society’s influence is more prevalent... [Social 
Worker, SR2]. 
 
Others quoted research showing that children were not adversely affected, or 
argued against the idea that children ‘copy’ the sexuality of their parents. None of 
the social workers supported the view that lesbians or gay men posed a greater 
sexual risk to children, although there were reports that such views were held by 
some who refused to speak with me. All of the social workers I spoke to argued 
against this idea, pointing out that most sexual abuse of children is by known 
heterosexual men. They did not make claims that gay or lesbian people were 
incapable of abusing children, but did argue against any greater likelihood. 
Indeed some argued for less likelihood, especially by lesbian carers. None of the 
social workers felt they had to address the issue of potential child abuse due to a 
lesbian or gay sexuality in their assessment reports. Nevertheless, at least one 
social worker was questioned about this when she took her report on a gay male 
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couple to fostering panel. 
 
Finally were the arguments made about lesbian and gay applicants having a ‘gay 
rights/adult rights’ agenda, over and above the ‘needs of children’, Helen Cosis 
Brown's false ‘dichotomy’ (Brown 1991:11). As I have earlier argued, lesbian and 
gay applicants’ access to being assessed or ‘being considered like anyone else’ 
is an issue of ‘gay rights’, since it is about not discriminating against lesbians and 
gay men on the basis of their sexuality alone. This political point, however, is 
often reframed by its opponents as pushing an adults’ rights agenda over the 
needs of children (Whitfield 1991), and some of the social workers took this view.  
 
Anya felt that children placed for fostering do not have the inner security to cope 
with having gay parents, and so to place them with lesbians or gay men was to 
consider the rights of adults over those of the child. Here we can see that the 
paramountcy principle of the Children Act 1989, that decisions should always be 
made in the best interests of the child, can be used as the ultimately ‘politically 
correct’ way to reject lesbian or gay carers (Reece 1995). Wayne was concerned 
that gay or lesbian applicants just wanted to ‘prove a point’, that they could be ‘as 
good as heterosexuals’, while Denise was worried that social workers might be 
using children ‘as the vanguard’ of change in attitudes about lesbian and gay 
parenting. Caroline also made the point that she did not want to give any special 
consideration to the needs of lesbians and gay men in terms of recruitment and 
assessment of carers because she felt that would be meeting adults’, not 
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children’s, needs.  
 
Here the spotlight is removed from potentially discriminatory social work services, 
and this is Davina Cooper’s point about discourses which identify sexuality as a 
private matter leaving lesbians and gay men “vulnerable to claims that they are 
trying to push into the public realm unacceptable sexual practices” (Cooper 
1995:69; see also Cooper & Herman 1991). The unquestioned ‘right’ of 
heterosexuals to be assessed as potential carers is so because heterosexuality 
is invisiblized into the practices of the relations of ruling within fostering and 
adoption. 
 
Thus I am arguing that constructions of risk-based arguments concerning 
children being placed with lesbians and gay men were ‘everyday’ to the social 
workers in their settings. In analyzing these arguments I wanted to start from the 
social workers’ experiences of them (Smith 1987:105), and I found that they were 
competent knowers; they knew the arguments well, had used them frequently, 
and, in many ways, were the most loquacious on these points out of all that we 
discussed in the interviews. They identified them as key anxieties, and by this I 
mean that the social workers had to address these arguments in their 
assessments whether they agreed with them or not, because they identified this 
as a practice expectation. Thus the arguments worked  something like a 
Foucauldian panopticon (Foucault 1979:200), exerting a disciplinary power upon 
the social workers on the basis of a normalising judgement concerning ‘the good 
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carer’. This is what Cooper and Herman define as a form of self-policing, where 
some “lesbians and gay men may be accepted into the ‘norm,’ but only at the 
continued exclusion and further marginalization of those who cannot or will not.” 
(Cooper & Herman 1991:77). 
 
I have analyzed these risk-based arguments as constitutive of the ‘relations of 
ruling’ (Smith 1987, 1990) which establish organizational discourses and 
practices which prioritize and ‘naturalize’ heterosexuality. Where this is 
challenged, as in the case of lesbian and gay applicants to fostering and 
adoption, then organizational practices insist that lesbians and gay men 
constitute a potential ‘risk’ since they fracture the heterosexual relations of ruling. 
It is for this reason that the social workers have to spend large amounts of time 
and labour addressing risk-based arguments concerning lesbians and gay men. 
This is a dilemma, for some of them argued that, if they did not do so, then the 
outcome for lesbian or gay applicants might be rejection by fostering or adoption 
panels. Where many people, individually, are involved in large amounts of social 
work-ing which constructs such risk-based arguments, then these constitute the 
heterosexual social relations which govern fostering and adoption assessments. 
 
SECTION FOUR: What is ‘Discrimination’ in Assessment? 
 
In this section I analyse what I consider to be examples of the differential 
treatment of lesbians and gay men in the fostering or adoption assessment 
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process. When I started my research, some five years ago, I had set myself the 
question of whether assessments of lesbian and gay applicants were 
‘discriminatory’ or not, but I now find this a very difficult question to answer as I 
hope will become clear. I have no difficulty in saying that the rejection a priori of 
all lesbian or gay applicants on the basis of their sexuality is a form of 
discrimination, since this quite clearly is an example of persons in a similar 
situation being treated differently because they belong to a particular ‘class’ or 
group (Banton 1994:1; Sohrab 1996:114). However it is certainly not clear that 
this would constitute discrimination in the eyes of the law (Sandland 1993). 
 
What is far more complicated, however, is the consideration of how those 
lesbians and gay men, who are accepted into the application process by 
agencies, are treated within the assessment. Quite clearly, some social workers 
believe that they treat everyone ‘the same’, but, as I have shown, there is no 
such thing as a standard assessment and so, when considering lesbians and gay 
men, I have to ask ‘the same as what?’ However, I shall also be arguing that 
lesbians and gay men are differently treated on the basis of their sexuality, and I 
shall give examples of social work practices which I think do just this. Different 
treatment does not automatically disadvantage lesbians and gay men however, 
and in some cases it actually advantages them. Some anti-oppressive models of 
practice are based upon different treatment in that they argue that lesbians and 
gay men are ‘different’ to heterosexual people, that they have different needs 
which should form a part of the assessment and that they are always already 
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disadvantaged within a system which inherently favours the heterosexual. Here 
then I will consider debates about ‘sameness vs. difference’ models of equality 
taken from feminist writings (Bacchi 1996; Evans 1995; Scott 1997; Sohrab 
1996), in order to assess whether different treatment is good or bad for lesbians 
and gay men. 
 
‘Sameness’ Models of Equality 
 
In the sameness model of equality, all groups should be treated the same, so in 
Judith Evans’ version this represents a liberal approach to feminist claims, where 
women want equality with men and to be treated the same as men within the 
existing system (Evans 1995:31). This is very much an ‘Equal Opportunities’ 
model that ignores questions of difference (Williams 1996). 
 
The sameness model applied to fostering and adoption assessments is the ‘on 
merit’/’equal opportunities’ version which emphasizes child care skills and 
downplays the importance of sexuality. Here no account is taken of lesbians’ and 
gay men’s ‘difference’ from heterosexuals, or whether they have particular 
needs, but instead the usual models of (heterosexual) assessment are applied. 
Examples here would include asking about childlessness, not taking any account 
of how lesbians and gay men might feel as the only non-heterosexual people in 
preparation groups, giving no consideration whatsoever to targetting lesbians 
and gay men in recruiting carers, not asking about their lesbianism or gayness, 
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or relying upon traditional kinship models of ‘family’ when assessing lesbians’ 
and gay men’s support networks. 
 
In the sameness model, then, there is no differential treatment, but this actually 
disadvantages lesbians and gay men by expecting them absolutely to fit in with 
the heterosexual relations of ruling. One of the consequences of this, I argue 
especially in chapters five and six, is the 'heterosexualisation' of lesbian or gay 
applicants by and during the assessment process; lesbians and gay men have to 
be represented to panels in the most ‘heterosexual’ forms possible and those 
that are ‘too lesbian, too gay’ will be rejected.  
 
The consequences of sameness models also include expecting lesbians and gay 
men to interact with an unequal system (Sohrab 1996:55), so here they have to 
prove more than heterosexual people about their fitness. An example par 
excellence of this is having to answer to the anxieties about risk discussed in 
section three. Further, sameness models reinforce the status quo of the existing 
system (Sohrab 1996:55), so here the assessment programme remains one 
which favours heterosexuals over and above others, and lesbians and gay men 
may be positioned at the point of last resort (Hicks 1996). 
 
Sameness equality models with regard to assessing lesbians and gay men can 
be illustrated by the example of ‘whether to ask them about their sexuality or 
not?’ This remains a debate amongst social workers, and I found it to be so with 
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those that spoke to me. One such view of sameness is that social workers should 
not ask lesbians or gay men anything about their sexuality, since heterosexuals 
are not asked such questions and so this would be ‘discriminatory.’ This was 
reported to me by Jo, herself a lesbian and a senior social worker: 
 
When I read the assessment reports there was nothing in there 
about how these [gay] men had come out for instance. And I 
remember having a big argument with the social worker that had 
done the assessment because he was saying, “We don’t need to 
know about those things,” and his attitude was that it was not 
‘right-on’ to ask those questions. I was saying, “This would be an 
important part of those men’s lives and it’s important to 
understand how they dealt with that, what did it mean to them?, 
how did they handle it?, were people supportive?...” etc. And it 
was like, “We don’t need to ask that, we don’t need to know 
about that, we take that as read,” and I was saying, “You 
shouldn’t take anything ‘as read’...You have to ask people what 
those things mean to them.” If that had been a straight couple 
then those things wouldn’t have been avoided, but here the 
attitude was that, if you started ‘homing in’ on the fact that they 
were gay, you would therefore be stereotyping them. I think this 
social worker genuinely thought that by asking about a person’s 
sexuality you were discriminating against them. [Senior Social 
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Worker, SR3]. 
 
This came up a number of times. Angela, a lesbian who worked on a fostering 
team, told me that other social workers had approached her for advice on 
assessing lesbians or gay men: “They’d ask, ‘Do you think I ought to ask...?’ and, 
‘Is it appropriate to ask...?’ or even, ‘Is it discriminatory to ask...?’...” [Social 
Worker, NE1]. I therefore wanted to investigate this issue of whether to ask 
lesbians and gay men about their sexuality or not, because it illustrates very 
nicely the debate about sameness/difference equality models.  
 
My argument is that it would be extremely unhelpful for all concerned to conduct 
an assessment of lesbians or gay men that did not discuss their sexuality. It 
would disadvantage lesbian and gay applicants by preventing them from 
discussing major aspects of their lives and histories, by not allowing them to think 
through the particular dynamics and potential problems specific to lesbian or gay 
fostering and adoption, and by setting up potentially disastrous situations when 
children are finally placed within their care.  
 
This also exemplifies the ‘same as what...?’ question that I have earlier raised; 
that is, when social workers say that they think that lesbian and gay applicants 
should be treated ‘the same’, then I ask ‘the same as what?’ Quite clearly it is 
impossible to treat lesbians and gay men ‘the same’ as heterosexuals since 
many of the questions heterosexuals get asked are irrelevant to lesbians and gay 
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men (e.g. questions of infertility, questions about marriage), but concomitantly, 
there are specificities to living under the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ which need 
exploration (see Martin 1993). Here then we return to the point that there is no 
standard assessment against which to judge lesbians and gay men. 
Nevertheless the ‘sameness’ model of assessment has great currency amongst 
social workers, backed up by notions of equality of opportunity and ‘on merit’ 
models. 
 
Outings: Should you ask if someone is gay or lesbian? 
 
A key dilemma for social workers operating ‘sameness’ models, then, is whether 
to ask if someone is lesbian or gay and how to do so. For heterosexuals are 
rarely, if ever, asked detailed questions about their sexuality. Certainly I found 
that the social workers, if anything, assumed an understanding of what 
‘heterosexuality’ was in applicants that presented as heterosexual. Some of them 
told me that they had begun to ask heterosexuals questions about their sexual 
activity (‘do you have an active sex life?’, ‘do you still have a sexual 
relationship?’, ‘how and where do you show affection?’, were some examples), 
but none asked how applicants knew that they were heterosexual, came to an 
understanding that they were heterosexual, what heterosexuality meant to them, 
how they expressed their heterosexuality and so on. These are all questions that 
lesbians and gay men are regularly asked of their sexuality, yet heterosexuality is 
so much ‘normalised’ that it is absent from assessments. 
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Therefore, in trying to operate sameness models with lesbians and gay men, the 
idea of asking about lesbianism or gayness can appear to be “discriminatory” on 
this basis because it is asking things which are not asked of heterosexuals. 
However, I shall argue against this, showing that trying to treat lesbians and gay 
men “the same” as everyone else actually disadvantages them within the 
assessment process. 
 
My first example is the assumption made by some of the social workers that a 
lesbian or gay sexuality was solely the business of applicants, and therefore the 
onus was upon applicants to raise sexuality within the assessment. Some of the 
social workers told me that there should be ‘no reason’ why lesbians and gay 
men could not ‘come out’ and discuss aspects of their sexuality within the 
assessment; indeed there were suggestions that lesbians and gay men who did 
not do so, or were fearful of the consequences of doing so, were ‘dishonest’, 
‘unsuitable’ and also ‘in denial about their sexuality.’  
 
This version of sameness sees a lesbian or gay sexuality as a ‘private’ matter 
belonging to the individual, and it is therefore up to applicants to raise it. There is 
no recognition of reasons why lesbians and gay men might be fearful of raising 
their sexuality (the possibility of their applications being rejected, for example), 
and no recognition of how the assessment system (the heterosexual ‘relations of 
ruling’) might actually discourage ‘out’-ness. Social workers who took this view 
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said they would not ask applicants if they were lesbian or gay because that would 
not be treating everyone “the same”. 
 
My second example is those social workers who felt it was important to discuss a 
lesbian or gay sexuality but were reluctant to ask this straight out. These social 
workers talked of ‘signalling to applicants’ that a lesbian or gay sexuality was not 
a bar to being assessed, of referring to equal opportunities statements that 
included sexuality, of ensuring that lesbian and gay issues were covered in carer 
preparation groups, and of trying to include questions about lesbians and gay 
men in all assessments. They felt that the home study stage of the Form F 
assessment was the most appropriate point at which to discuss lesbianism or 
gayness, and talked of ‘offering applicants opportunities’ to talk about their 
sexuality at this point. Nevertheless many said that they would still be reluctant to 
ask an applicant straight out whether they were lesbian or gay. 
 
However, my argument here is that sameness models disadvantage lesbian and 
gay applicants because they work to prevent active discussion of sexuality in the 
assessment process. My first example shows how sameness assumes that 
lesbian and gay applicants are no different from others and so, if they do not 
raise sexuality themselves, then this is seen as ‘their’ problem. My second 
example shows how sameness assumes that asking lesbians and gay men 
about their sexuality is a form of “discrimination” because it is ‘treating them 
differently.’ Both point to problems with the sameness model of equality as it is 
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applied to lesbians and gay men. 
 
‘Difference’ Models of Equality 
 
Difference models of equality suggest that lesbian and gay applicants are not the 
same as heterosexuals, but that they should nevertheless be seen as possessing 
equal worth (Evans 1995:47). Evans terms this either ‘difference-equality’ or 
‘radical-equality’ forms of feminism, in which sexual politics point to the 
oppression of women within the existing system (Evans 1995). Difference models 
thus reject the equal opportunities position because the group in question - here, 
women - will always remain disadvantaged with a system that favours men. 
 
With regard to lesbians and gay men, then, difference models ought to assert the 
specificity of lesbian and gay experience within the heterosexual relations of 
ruling, and acknowledge that issues of homophobia need to be dealt with in order 
not to disadvantage the ‘group’. Thus the different treatment of lesbians and gay 
men within the assessment system is preferable because it does not expect 
lesbian and gay applicants to fit in with existing heterosexual models.  
 
Treating lesbians and gay men differently because of their sexuality can, 
however, have both negative (disadvantageous) and positive (advantageous) 
effects. It is disadvantageous, I argue, where lesbians and gay men are expected 
to prove themselves doubly ‘worthy’ in ways that heterosexual applicants are not, 
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and where this is solely because a lesbian or gay sexuality is regarded as a ‘risk’ 
in and of itself. Examples here include: 
  
• taking a request by a gay male couple to be considered for adoption to the 
adoption panel in advance of any assessment; here the social worker told me 
that this was to check out with the panel whether the application could be 
taken any further. Panels do not consider requests for assessment under 
usual circumstances, and this was done in this case solely because the couple 
were gay men. This is an example of the ‘extra hoop to jump through’. 
• asking a lesbian couple who had applied to adopt to provide a third named 
referee; under usual circumstances applicants provide two referees and this 
was done solely because the applicants were lesbians (this is discussed in the 
case study of Nita & Clare in chapter six). 
• asking a gay male couple who had applied to adopt to undergo psychiatric 
testing (Smart 1991:17); in this example this was solely because the couple 
were gay men, and under usual circumstances this does not happen. 
• allowing assessment and approval of lesbian or gay applicants only because 
they have requested, or been specifically identified for, the care of particular 
disabled children, usually considered ‘hard to place’ (Triseliotis et al. 1997). 
Here lesbian and gay carers are used as a ‘last resort’ for children that social 
workers have been unable to place elsewhere, children who may be 
considered ‘less corruptible’ and even ‘too stupid to understand about 
sexuality’ because of their disability: “With lesbian or gay couples we tend to 
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want to persuade them to take children with special needs and that’s because 
it’s easier for us to actually justify that and take the case to court on that basis, 
that they are filling a gap or providing a special resource.” [Social Worker, 
NR10]. 
 
Clearly these are examples of ‘different but worse’ treatment (Sohrab 1996:58), 
which may also trap lesbians and gay men into reified roles where their 
‘difference’ is constructed as ‘natural’ (Sohrab 1996:64). By this I mean that 
‘different but worse’ models assume that lesbians and gay men are essentially 
different from heterosexuals and therefore expect them to prove themselves 
twice over. Relatedly, the heterosexual relations of ruling remain the standard 
against which lesbians and gay men are judged here; are they as ‘psychiatrically 
sound’ as heterosexuals, for example?  
 
Nevertheless I also found examples of different treatment which I think 
advantage lesbian or gay applicants, and this is where such practices attempt to 
tackle the inequalities inherent within the assessment programme. I found only 
two examples: 
• offering preparation courses which acknowledge forms of discrimination 
experienced by applicants; although I did not find an example of this relating to 
sexuality, in chapter six I describe how Nita told me that she was invited to a 
course for black single adoptive applicants only. 
• placing recruitment advertisements in lesbian and gay spaces (including 
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press), and having explicit statements that sexuality is no bar to being 
considered; an example of this exists in fostering information sent out by 
Manchester City Council which includes a leaflet aimed directly at lesbians 
and gay men (Manchester City Council, no date)2.  
 
These examples are ‘different but better’ (Sohrab 1996:63) since they 
acknowledge that the assessment programme is already unequal since it is 
governed by heterosexual standards. However, the problem with all differential 
treatment is that it skirts, and does not deal with, the issue of structural inequality. 
Differential treatment, even with advantageous outcomes for lesbians and gay 
men, leaves the status quo - the heterosexual ‘relations of ruling’ - of 
assessments in place. 
 
Should Lesbians and Gay Men be Asked Specific Questions? 
 
I want to argue here that there are questions specific to a lesbian or gay sexuality 
that should be asked of such applicants during the assessment.  
Questions about developing a sense of oneself as ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’, and at what 
point in one’s life, coping with a lesbian or gay identity in childhood, adolescence 
or adulthood, coming out to others including family members, the reactions of 
others to one’s lesbian or gay identity, the attitudes of a particular culture, 
                                                           
2 This leaflet was designed at the request of, and in large part by, the Positive Parenting 
Campaign in Manchester, a group concerned with lesbian and gay parenting issues. 
Nevertheless it is supported by the Council, is sent out with all fostering packs, and is being 
currently rewritten and updated. 
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ethnicity or religion towards lesbianism or gayness, the development of a positive 
sense of a lesbian or gay self, understanding a lesbian or gay sense of self in 
relation to gender, ethnicity, race, religion, and culture, one’s relationship to the 
lesbian and gay community via political/social activism and/or the gay scene, the 
development of a network of support including relationships with other lesbians 
and gay men, the emergence of a sexual identity and the forming of adult 
relationships with partners, the relevance of being gay or lesbian in the 
workplace, the realization that parenting might be possible for lesbians or gay 
men and the particular reasons for choosing adoption or fostering, attitudes 
regarding how potential children will be told about one’s sexuality, how this will 
be communicated with schools, health professionals, birth and extended families 
of children, or how potential teasing of children will be handled by carers are just 
some of the key areas that I am arguing ought to be raised during the 
assessment of lesbians and gay men, as do others (Brown 1991; Martin 1993). 
Further, in earlier research (Hicks, 1993) and in research for the case study 
which forms the basis of chapter six of this thesis, lesbian and gay applicants 
themselves commonly reported the need to discuss the specificities of adopting 
or fostering as a lesbian or a gay man. 
 
Nevertheless, this was not always agreed by the social workers, and there 
remains a debate as to whether lesbians and gay men should be asked ‘special’ 
questions in an assessment. Once again, this is the crux of the 
sameness/difference models; sameness suggesting that to ask lesbians and gay 
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men ‘special’ questions is to be “discriminatory”, difference suggesting that 
asking such questions is an important part of assessing the specificity of being a 
lesbian or gay adopter or foster carer. 
 
 
Should lesbians and gay men be asked ‘the same’ questions?  
 
         SAMENESS                                 ‘MIDDLE GROUND’                             DIFFERENCE 
          |--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| 
       ‘the same’ questions                   should be treated equally                         ask questions 
         as everyone else                      but there are some specific                        specific to a 
                                                          areas that should be raised                      lesbian/gay man 
Figure 4.6 
 
When I asked the social workers whether they felt there were questions that 
needed to be asked in an assessment specifically because the applicants were 
lesbian or gay, I found a range of responses, represented at Figure 4.6 . 
Adopting a ‘sameness’ response, the idea that all applicants must be treated 
exactly “the same” and that to ask any different questions based on sexuality 
would be ‘discriminatory’, was the least common response, but nevertheless it 
was held by some people. For example, Caroline, a team manager, told me that 
all applicants were asked about their sexuality and sexual relationships 
regardless of whether they were heterosexual, lesbian or gay.  
 
Nevertheless I found that most of those social workers who adopted the 
sameness response qualified this by moving towards what I have termed the 
‘middle ground: same but different’ category. By ‘middle ground: same but 
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different’ I mean the response which says that lesbian and gay applicants ought 
to be asked ‘the same’ questions and treated ‘the same’ as everyone else in the 
name of equality, but that there are some areas specific to a lesbian or gay 
sexuality which it is helpful to discuss and which such applicants often raise 
themselves, such as coming out, forming adult relationships, dealing with 
prejudice and so on. For example, Richard started with a sameness response but 
qualified this by moving towards the ‘middle ground’: 
 
I think I’ve already said that we should be asking everybody 
questions about their sexuality, about their relationships, about 
how they divide up roles in the home if it’s a couple, about their 
social life, their commitments, and so on and so forth. So I don’t 
think we should be asking specific questions. However, the only 
thing that I can say about that is, bearing in mind what I’ve been 
saying about vulnerability and so on, I think there are questions 
about the attitudes which will make fostering very difficult for 
them, and that is not just from families but from social workers as 
well. There was somebody who used to work here who felt very 
strongly that we should not be looking at lesbians or gay men as 
foster carers on religious grounds. So I think we do need to look 
at the particular support needs of certain groups. But it’s not like 
we do ‘ask everyone the same questions’ anyway, because the 
process isn’t like that and you don’t ask everyone the same, and 
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if something like ‘coming out’ comes up then, yes, that is 
something I’d want to discuss. [Social Worker, SR6]. 
 
I think that sameness responses sprung from a genuine wish on the part of most 
of the social workers to treat all applicants fairly, but it tended to avoid or ignore 
questions of a lesbian or gay sexuality unless these “came up” during the 
assessment, which usually meant that they had to be raised by applicants 
themselves. 
 
‘Middle ground’ and ‘difference’ responses were evenly split amongst the 
remaining social workers in my cohort. ‘Middle grounders’ clearly argued that all 
applicants ought to be treated “the same” because this was not ‘discriminatory’, 
yet they also had to acknowledge that there were some areas specific to being 
lesbian or gay which needed discussion. I found those areas mentioned were: 
coming out, adult relationships, possible vulnerability to allegations of abuse, 
whether they were accepted by family, how they might tell a child about being 
gay, whether they were trying to ‘prove a point’, whether they understood they 
might be rejected, and issues about gender roles. I think that the problem with 
the ‘middle ground: same but different’ approach is that it does not think through, 
in any systematic way, the full range of issues pertinent to lesbians and gay men 
adopting or fostering. Instead issues seem to arise on an ad hoc basis, and this 
discussion is developed in my case study of Nita and Clare in chapter six. 
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‘Difference’ approaches were also raised by some of the social workers. For 
example, Jo, a senior social worker and herself a lesbian, said that it was vital to 
cover lesbian and gay issues with such applicants. More importantly she felt that 
it was not ‘discriminatory’ to do so, and that such questions were vital in 
investigating applicants’ sense of ‘self’ and their ability to care for children. 
Audrey, more pragmatically, explained that lesbian and gay specific issues would 
in all likelihood be raised by adoption or fostering panels, and so she argued that 
it was pointless for a social worker to present an assessment report which had 
not addressed itself to such concerns.  
 
I found that the social workers raised issues of ‘difference’ that they felt needed 
to be addressed either by themselves, or because they predicted that these 
would be raised by panels. Issues raised by the social workers were as follows: 
 
 
‘Difference’: Specific areas raised by social workers 
 
coming out 
how/when understood they were gay/lesbian 
potential bullying of children 
forming adult relationships 
dealing with prejudice 
potential for allegations of abuse 
how do they view ‘heterosexuality’? 
how will they cope with being ‘outed’ by children? 
how ‘lifestyle’ differs from others 
gender role models 
handling contact with child’s birth family 
how they demonstrate/show affection 
how to tell a child they were lesbian/gay 
their network of friends/family, and who knows about their being lesbian/gay 
how would they cope with prejudice within the fostering/adoption system? 
are their support networks single-sex? 
do they want to foster gay young people? 
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why do they want to be parents? 
“do they have anything to prove?” 
involvement in lesbian/gay scene and/or community activism 
how will they cope with a young person’s heterosexuality? 
if they are single, what will happen if they start a relationship? 
Figure 4.7 
 
However I also found issues specifically referred to as being raised by adoption 
and fostering panels: 
 
Areas raised by Panels 
 
sleeping arrangements 
how they show affection 
nudity in the home 
gender role models 
how will they deal with schools, and any potential teasing? 
concerns about stated gender preferences of children 
how do they allocate roles in the home? 
“can they [gay male couple] do laundry?” 
“do they know anyone who isn’t gay?” 
how settled is their relationship? 
do they know other lesbian or gay carers, for support? 
         Figure 4.8 
 
I believe that the two figures demonstrate quite different agendas, however. 
Figure 4.7 shows the social workers largely concerning themselves with, first, 
some of the specificities of lesbian and gay applicants' lives and, second, some 
of the risk-based arguments concerning children that I discussed in section three. 
The list at 4.7 is not as comprehensive as my own earlier examples of lesbian 
and gay-specific questions (page 216), and is clearly more risk-based, especially 
in terms of maintaining heterosexual role models for children. Figure 4.8 shows 
panels having a marked tendency towards 'protection of children' issues, and, 
more tellingly, towards the 'heterosexualisation' of lesbians and gay men; that is 
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ensuring that lesbian and gay applicants who are successful are represented as 
closely to the heterosexual 'norm' as possible. I develop this idea in chapters five 
and six. 
 
Whilst I have supported the idea that lesbians and gay men do need to be asked 
'different' questions specific to their sexuality, I have also admitted that this tends 
to 'fix' lesbians and gay men in positions close to essentialism; the idea that 
their/our difference is 'natural' (Sohrab 1996:64) and that 'lesbian' and 'gay' can 
be specified as having obvious agreed meanings. The question here then is how 
do we know what specific questions to ask lesbian or gay applicants without 
fixing a version of 'lesbian' or 'gay' which ought to be addressed like some check-
list? For example, it might be assumed that all lesbians and gay men should be 
asked about 'coming out' and that 'healthy' lesbians and gay men have done so, 
but coming out has been critiqued within lesbian, gay and queer theories, not 
least by black lesbians and gay men (Seidman 1997). 
 
Resolving ‘Sameness vs. Difference’? 
 
Joan Scott argues that the sameness/difference dichotomy is unhelpful since it 
puts in place an ‘impossible choice’ for feminists: “If one opts for equality, one is 
forced to accept the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for 
difference, one admits that equality is unattainable.” (Scott 1997:765). She 
suggests that sameness models cannot be the only grounds upon which equality 
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can be achieved. Indeed sameness models offer the impossibility of equality, 
since, because - in my example - lesbians and gay men cannot be identical to 
heterosexuals in all respects, then they cannot expect to be equal (Scott 
1997:766). Scott instead argues for equality claims that rest upon acknowledging 
difference, not an essential difference, but one which retains ambiguity and 
disrupts fixed binaries, like gay/straight (Scott 1997:768).  
 
I have argued that any claims to treating lesbians and gay men ‘equally’ in the 
assessment process rely on something unspecified; that is ‘equality with 
what...?’, ‘the same as what...?’ That is, how do we specify ‘equality’ here? 
Sameness models I have shown to be disadvantageous, but arguing for 
‘difference’ models of equality nevertheless retains heterosexuality as the 
defining standard against which lesbians and gay men are judged in fostering 
and adoption. It is for these reasons that I develop arguments about the 
‘heterosexualisation’ of lesbians and gay men in the remainder of the thesis. 
Instead, an assessment process which challenges the heterosexual ‘relations of 
ruling’ of adoption and fostering would neither rely upon sameness nor difference 
models. Working towards such models of assessment, as they affect lesbians 
and gay men, is difficult and the area within which the notion of an ‘anti-
oppressive’ social work practice is most frequently suggested. 
 
 
SECTION FIVE: "Getting it Right...": Social Work, ‘Anti-
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Oppressive Practice’, Lesbians and Gay Men 
 
"I think I would be quite wary of getting it right, and putting the 
right amount of emphasis on sexuality, because it would be 
something that either adoption or fostering panel would be 
looking at..." [Social Worker, NE5]. 
 
"I was aware that I was assessing them individually, more than I 
would have done with a heterosexual couple, so I had to check 
that out...and maybe that was my anxiety about getting it right 
and feeling there was a spotlight on me, yes..." [Social Worker, 
NR7]. 
 
"It was one of the first ever lesbian couple applications to go to 
the adoption panel, and I felt I had to fight...well, I don't know 
about 'fight,' but I felt I had to get it right..." [Social Worker, NR6]. 
 
Social workers who want to ‘get it right’ with lesbian and gay applicants do so for 
two main reasons; first, they want to produce an adequate assessment which 
concludes as to whether the lesbians or gay men in question will make good 
enough carers of children, and, second, they want to assess lesbians and gay 
men in a way which is not discriminatory on the basis of sexuality. This is a 
difficult balancing act and by no means were all the social workers interested in 
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achieving it. Some of them focused solely on the needs of, and potential risks to, 
children so much that they were uninterested in whether lesbians and gay men 
experienced discrimination or not. Still others had reservations about the fitness 
of lesbians and gay men per se to care for children. These are largely examined 
in the remainder of this thesis, and so here I wish to focus on those social 
workers whom I understood as attempting to ‘make a difference’, to develop ‘anti-
discriminatory’ and adequate models of assessment in relation to lesbians and 
gay men. This is because I am keen not to produce a piece of work that suggests 
that “all social workers are homophobic.” 
 
What is ‘Anti-Discriminatory’ and ‘Anti-Oppressive Practice’ with Lesbians 
and Gay Men? 
 
There is a growing literature on ‘anti-discriminatory’ and ‘anti-oppressive’ social 
work practice (Burke & Harrison 1998; Dalrymple & Burke 1995; Dominelli 1998; 
Thompson 1993, 1997), alongside a small number of publications which consider 
social work in relation to lesbians and gay men (Appleby & Anastas 1998; Brown 
1998; Hidalgo et al. 1985; Logan et al. 1996). Literature has distinguished 
between anti-discriminatory practice, which is the attempt by social workers to 
ensure that their services are provided fairly to all without discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, age, sexuality, class or disability, and anti-oppressive 
practice, which takes a wider structural view that social work is a part of a society 
in which racism, sexism, ageism, heterosexism, classism and disablism are 
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endemic and mediated via discourses, practices, organizations, texts and 
representations (Thompson 1993). However, those texts that take anti-
discriminatory or anti-oppressive  practice as their focus tend to marginalise or 
ignore questions concerning lesbians, gay men and social work. 
 
Indeed I intend to argue here that specifications of an anti-discriminatory practice 
are usually limited, and certainly extremely problematic, when attempting to apply 
them to lesbian and gay adoption and fostering. Definitions of anti-discriminatory 
practice suggest that it is “a form of social work practice which addresses social 
divisions and structural inequalities in the work that is done with ‘clients’ (users) 
or workers” (Dominelli 1998:7), or that it “seeks to reduce, undermine or eliminate 
discrimination and oppression, specifically in terms of challenging sexism, 
racism, ageism and disablism..., and other forms of discrimination or oppression 
encountered in social work.” (Thompson 1993:33). The question remains, then, 
how such statements of intent might be put into practice, and it seems to me that 
this involves specifying what terms such as ‘power’, ‘oppression’ and 
‘discrimination’ mean within a social work context. As I have already argued, this 
is no ‘easy’ task when considering assessments of lesbian and gay carer 
applicants: what would constitute an example of ‘discrimination’ here?  
 
My answer is that we need to return to my arguments for seeing social work as a 
‘making sense’ or theorising activity. Social workers need to examine the 
theoretical bases for what they construct as ‘knowledge about’ lesbians and gay 
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men which can be seen as a concern with anti-oppressive practice, rather than 
relying upon set formulae for a social work which is anti-discriminatory. The 
notion that anti-discriminatory practice with lesbians and gay men can be 
achieved by following ‘steps one to five...’ is unhelpful. 
 
Furthermore it is my argument that much of the theoretical basis for the literature 
on anti-discriminatory practice is flawed in its conceptions of issues such as 
‘power’, and that this is unlikely to produce anti-discriminatory outcomes for 
lesbians and gay men, much less a wider concern for the anti-oppressive. 
‘Power’, in the literature, is frequently seen as a thing which social workers 
‘have’, while, relatedly, their clients ‘do not’; it is a thing to be given up by social 
workers to clients or to be shared with them (Dalrymple & Burke 1995:15; 
Dominelli 1998:8). 
 
This is not a concept of power that I have recognized in this thesis. In chapter 
one, I argued for the relevance of feminist, queer, postmodern and discourse 
models of ‘power’. Here a central concern ought to be an analysis of how 
‘knowledge about’ lesbians and gay men is implicated in power via the competing 
versions to ‘truth’ about sexuality and gender which are produced. Assessments 
of lesbians and gay men are textually mediated examples of the ‘relations of 
ruling’ (Smith 1987) within social work, and they are also knowledge-claims about 
categories like ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’, usually made by social workers who are given 
socially validated expertise via their place of authority within the institution 
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(Seidman 1997:28). Thus here social work knowledge is never neutral, nor 
indeed is the language used by social workers (Brown 1998:19; Rojek et al. 
1998; Weedon 1987).  
 
One of the major problems with existing versions of anti-discriminatory practice 
is, therefore, their reliance upon notions that ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ are states of being 
held by fixed, rational subjects. Therefore, lesbians and gay men are assumed to 
have an unproblematic status, or ‘identities’, which social workers ought to simply 
be careful not to oppress or discriminate against. Instead, I have been arguing 
through this thesis for ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ to be seen as categories of knowledge, 
around which competing claims are made within discourses which define and 
regulate how lesbian or gay selves, desires and so on ‘can be known’. Thus the 
hetero/homo-sexuality binary exists as a power/knowledge regime (Seidman 
1997:150), rather than as identities which have fixed levels of power. The 
analysis in this thesis, for example, shows how the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ 
are by no means obvious in their meanings to social workers, and nor are their 
meanings the property of those individuals who describe themselves as such. 
 
The existing literature also tends to rest upon ‘liberal’ ideas about notions of 
power and (in)equality. My argument would therefore be that this leaves in place 
a central, ‘benign’ heterosexuality, which becomes the standard to which 
lesbians and gay men are held. In the literature, terms like ‘justice’, ‘power-
sharing’ and ‘participation’ are used (Appleby & Anastas 1998; Dominelli 1998; 
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Thompson 1997) but it is far from clear how these might be applied in our 
example of the assessment of lesbian and gay carers. George Appleby and 
Jeane Anastas (1998), for example, talk about applying the concepts of caring, 
justice, independence, and freedom to social work with lesbians and gay men 
(Appleby & Anastas 1998:6-7), yet there is no analysis of how such terms and 
ideas are absolutely gendered, raced and sexualized (Cooper 1994; Evans 
1993).  
 
Lesbian and gay access to ‘justice’, for example, is limited in a whole range of 
arenas, not least of which is the law (Gooding 1982; Herman 1990), but more 
importantly, as I have already been arguing, liberal equality models do not 
necessarily produce ‘non-oppressive’ social work assessments. Concepts such 
as justice, freedom and so on translate very easily into the ‘on merit’/treat 
lesbians and gay men “the same” models of assessment that I have discussed, 
but such liberal approaches fall apart when considered in relation to models 
which see dominant discourses as defining lesbians and gay men as ‘outside’ of 
concepts like ‘carer of children’, via the law or via cultural knowledge. 
 
‘Getting It Right...’? 
 
Instead I have chosen to focus here on strategies adopted by those social 
workers who were attempting to promote what they saw as anti-discriminatory 
assessments of lesbians and gay men or anti-oppressive practices. I shall argue 
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that attempts at anti-discriminatory assessments were usually frustrated by their 
taking place within a practice context structured by the heterosexual ‘relations of 
ruling’. Thus a focus on anti-discriminatory practice, that is not discriminating 
against individual lesbian or gay applicants, is limited in my view and likely to be 
only a short-term, ‘sticking-plaster’ measure. Anti-oppressive practice, however, 
ought to show a wider concern to challenge existing categories of knowledge 
concerning the ‘good carer’, including those forms of social working used with 
lesbian and gay applicants. Thus, drawing on my previous arguments, we need 
to look for approaches which: 
 
• assess lesbians and gay men on the basis of their child care skills and the 
relevance of their sexuality, 
• do not apply standard heterosexual models of assessment, 
• do not ignore the importance of sexuality,  
• crucially, acknowledge that lesbians and gay men are always already 
disadvantaged within a system which favours the white heterosexual norm, 
• consider the impact of heterosexism, but also how this operates within social 
work, 
• do not expect lesbians and gay men to uphold traditional versions of gender, 
or indeed of men's power and privilege, 
• examine the version of 'lesbian' or 'gay' being constructed through the 
assessment itself. 
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These are difficult points to practise within the current context of adoption and 
fostering, which I have already argued is governed by the heterosexual 'relations 
of ruling' (Smith 1987). A dilemma for the anti-discriminatory social worker here is 
that, in attempting to conduct a less discriminatory assessment on the basis of 
sexuality, does this deny the importance of other factors such as race and 
gender, and further will this actually result in approval given the current 
expectations of 'good carers' by adoption and fostering panels? The difficulty in 
implementing any positive action within social work is partly that it relies upon 
social workers actually not ‘discriminating’ (Cooper 1994:92), but also having 
support from their management (Cooper 1994:93), which here would need to 
include adoption and fostering panels, and sometimes local councillors too. We 
shall see that, on both counts, attempts by some of the social workers to promote 
anti-discriminatory work with lesbians and gay men were foiled by lack of support 
from managers or panels.  
 
My visit to the North Eastern Council was partly prompted by the fact that I knew, 
via other contacts, that the unit had always had a high percentage of lesbian and 
gay staff working there. I therefore wanted to visit to see how much of a 
difference this made to practice: did having openly lesbian and gay social 
workers make any difference to practice with lesbian and gay carer applicants? 
My view is that it did. The North Eastern Council social workers were far more 
used to discussing lesbians and gay men as potential carers, and had developed 
far more of a team ‘culture’ of ‘on merit’ approaches than in other authorities. 
 231 
Note that this was not a supposedly ‘radical’ inner-London borough. Many of the 
social workers, including those who defined themselves as heterosexual, 
acknowledged that having openly lesbian and gay staff (although, when I visited, 
the gay men had left for other jobs) made a big difference. They referred to the 
issues being ‘kept alive’, ‘on the agenda’ by lesbian staff, and they also felt able 
to seek advice from their lesbian colleagues.  
 
This did not resolve all problems however, and in particular the lesbians I spoke 
to felt that management had not backed staff on these issues. Angela felt that 
they had been actively hostile at times: 
 
I do think as a team with a large proportion of lesbians, and 
indeed a gay man at one time as well, there is a certain amount 
of being very wary of us. We always seem to be in conflict with 
management and I always felt that sexuality was a part of it. 
When it was raised, of course, it was said that it wasn’t a part of it 
but it was the thing about being perceived to be threatening in 
whatever ways people find lesbians and gays threatening. [Social 
Worker, NE1]. 
 
Apart from keeping the issues on the agenda, lesbian and gay staff had also 
been central to the establishment of a ‘Lesbian and Gay Issues Working Party’. I 
was given access to records of their meetings. The Working Party recorded 
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minutes of meetings for only nine months, from July 1990 to March 1991, but 
made some achievements in working for change concerning lesbian and gay 
carers. The meetings were set up initially to attempt to generate some practice 
guidelines around assessing lesbian and gay applicants, although such 
guidelines never materialised. Early meetings wanted to find ways to attract more 
lesbian and gay carer applicants, and members contacted other authorities to 
find out their approaches. Subsequently the Working Party: 
 
• met with representatives of the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering 
(BAAF), to consider their position, described as one of ‘equal opportunities for 
all.’ 
• tried to organise training for foster/adoptive carers on issues of sexual identity 
as they affect gay young people: aims were agreed but the training was not 
implemented. 
• circulated a discussion paper on lesbian and gay adoption and fostering to all 
teams, including area child care teams, for consultation: there was poor take-
up of discussion amongst the teams generally. This discussion paper was 
drawn up partly in response to a newspaper article which argued against gay 
fostering (Sunday Express 1990). 
• made a formal response to paragraph 16 of the Department of Health’s 
fostering guidance consultation paper (DoH 1990), pointing out that all 
applicants should be considered and that the phrase about ‘gay rights’ would 
allow local authorities to exclude lesbians and gay men, which they felt was 
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discriminatory. 
• advised their authority’s press/publicity section to prepare a statement on their 
stance concerning lesbian and gay carers. 
• wrote an addendum to their comments on paragraph 16 (DoH 1990) which 
reviewed research on the children of lesbians and gay men (specifically 
Golombok et al. 1983; Green 1978), and also pointed out that professional 
bodies such as BAAF, the National Foster Care Association (NFCA), and the 
National Council for Civil Liberties (the then NCCL) had similarly objected to 
paragraph 16. 
 
There are a number of points to be made about attempts by the lesbian and gay 
social workers, including the Working Party, to make changes to practice with 
lesbian and gay carers. First, they show a wider concern with anti-oppressive 
practice; that is, I argue that they were about challenging categories of 
knowledge. However, a lack of management and panel support for these 
initiatives crucially meant that key ideas were blocked or 'organized out' (Cooper 
1995:69); no practice guidance was worked up, no training provided for foster 
carers, and little encouragement was given to discussion of the paper written by 
the Working Party. Indeed their ideas met with some suspicion and invoked a 
'threat' for the authority as an institution. Second, however, the group achieved 
some not insignificant small changes; raising awareness of the issue amongst 
teams and contributing to the eventual removal of the "gay rights" statement from 
what eventually became Children Act 1989 guidance on family placements (DoH 
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1991). Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that this had any effect upon the 
assessment of lesbians and gay men generally. What may have been crucially 
achieved, however, was some support amongst lesbian, gay and some 
heterosexual staff to keep the issue 'on the agenda' and to argue, at the very 
least, for 'on merit' child care approaches. 
 
I also found that some of the social workers raised the idea of 'matching' lesbian 
or gay social workers to assess lesbian or gay applicants, and this I argue is an 
example of anti-discriminatory practice in action. This idea was often raised 
within the context of practices where black applicants were assigned at least one 
black social worker to consider their cases. Similarly, some of the social workers 
felt that lesbian or gay social workers had been purposely asked to assess 
lesbian or gay applicants. In another case, Maude told me that she had assessed 
a gay man alongside a gay 'consultant', brought in to work on the case with her. 
Maude argued that this was a helpful experience for her, as she was able to 
check out how she was assessing sexuality issues with Doug, the consultant. 
However, other social workers argued against the idea of 'matching', because 
they felt it was unnecessary (heterosexual social workers who felt confident in 
assessing lesbians and gay men, and gay social workers who felt 'matching' was 
not a straightforward answer), or because they had other concerns: 
 
I think it would be asking too much of a gay man or a lesbian 
woman not to feel more empathetic with a gay or lesbian applicant 
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than somebody who was not, and I think that would be very difficult 
and almost asking too much. There's an argument for them not 
doing it, unless they can demonstrate that they're actually not 
biased and can be objective and not let that issue cloud everything 
else. [Social Worker, SR1]. 
 
Wendy also felt that she had not been allocated assessments of lesbians 
because there would be some suspicion on the part of her fostering panel that, 
as a lesbian herself, she would not be able to be 'objective' in her views. 
However, other lesbians in her unit had undertaken assessments of lesbian or 
gay applicants. 
 
My view of the 'matching' debate is rather like my view of 'matching' in questions 
of research methodologies (see chapter three). Matching is no easy answer to 
complex questions, and certainly does not 'solve' questions of power dynamics 
that always exist between applicant and assessor, whether that assessor be 
lesbian, gay or heterosexual. Thus I argue that matching is anti-discriminatory in 
that it is an example of a small concession made to lesbian or gay applicants 
within the context of an otherwise unchanged assessment dynamic.  
 
Nor am I happy with the idea of setting up lesbian or gay workers as 'experts' on 
conducting assessments of lesbians and gay men. This can result in 
heterosexual workers not having to think about, or engage with, lesbian and gay 
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issues, and it does not follow that a lesbian or gay social worker will automatically 
conduct a 'better' assessment. Indeed, Annie told me that she found assessing a 
lesbian couple more difficult than she had expected because they assumed that 
she would not have to ask them about lots of areas because she too was a 
lesbian. 
 
I am arguing against 'matching' as an easy answer to anti-discriminatory practice, 
then, because it does not remove the need to conduct a thorough assessment, 
and it does not remove the need for social workers to 'make sense' of lesbian or 
gay applicants through the assessment process. This does not mean that I think 
lesbian and gay social workers shouldn't assess lesbians and gay men, but I do 
not think that any assessment is ever 'objective, bias-free' and so on. As I have 
been arguing throughout, all social workers have particular understandings of the 
categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' and these will always inform their representations 
via talk and text of applicants. Therefore I do not think that matching contributes 
to better assessments of lesbians and gay men. 
 
What is perhaps more crucial is what the social workers expressed as their 
'attitudes and values' about lesbians and gay men. For these are their versions of 
such categories, they are their 'making sense' in action. Thus those who talked 
about 'getting it right' were worried that they had to be 'politically correct' about 
lesbians and gay men, to the extent that this sometimes resulted in feelings that 
they could not question lesbian and gay applicants too much or they would be 
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being "discriminatory". Again this is an unhelpful approach: good assessment 
practice with lesbian and gay applicants has to be able to say that some will be 
unsuitable, for various reasons not to do with being lesbian or gay as such, and 
that they should therefore be rejected. However, the criteria for such rejections 
must be clearly on the basis of unsuitability to care for children and not related to 
the ‘difference’ of being lesbian or gay. Alternatively, other social workers felt that 
some of their colleagues held extremely "discriminatory" views about lesbians 
and gay men but would not state these openly for fear of being seen as "not 
right-on enough." Presumably this was why some workers refused to speak with 
me, for fear that their ideas about lesbians and gay men would be questioned 
and exposed.  
 
Maude, a black heterosexual woman who worked in an adoption team, spent 
some time talking with me about what she called her change in attitudes about 
lesbian and gay applicants. She told me that, when she qualified as a social 
worker, she had not really come across any lesbians or gay men, but, when she 
joined an adoption team, an assessment of a gay couple came in. Maude said 
that her colleagues refused to do the assessment, whereas her attitude was, 
"Well, I don't know much about gay people, but I don't think they should be 
unfairly treated, and so I will do the assessment and maybe I will learn about 
their lives." Maude conducted the assessment alongside a gay consultant 
colleague, and she told me that this was extremely helpful for her and that she 
had requested it because she felt she did not know enough about gay people to 
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be able to conduct the assessment fairly. 
 
I found this a very interesting and refreshing example. Maude argued against 
people who thought that they knew 'all the answers' about race, about sexuality 
and so on (this she would see as 'political correctness'), but instead admitted that 
she had had to learn about lesbians and gay men and did not profess to 'know 
everything'. She felt she had still more to learn. This interested me because here 
was a social worker talking about the role of 'making sense' of 'lesbian' or 'gay', 
and acknowledging different versions, albeit in a rather different way from me.  
 
Of my three examples, then, it is this one that I focus on in the remainder of the 
thesis. I think that this is crucially the way forward in developing anti-oppressive 
assessment practices with lesbians and gay men; to make not just small changes 
within existing practices but to argue instead for an approach that takes 'social 
work' and changes it as a whole bottom-to-top, challenging the heterosexual 
relations of ruling, or the heterosexual hegemony within the cultural politics of 
knowledge that construct 'lesbian' and 'gay' (Seidman 1997). This is certainly no 
easy task, but I suggest some ways forward in my concluding chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have proposed that a range of assessment models, which can 
be placed along a continuum, are currently in use with lesbian and gay 
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applicants. My data from the social worker cohort leads me to suggest the 
dominance of the 'on merit' prioritising child care model, and this will be further 
examined in subsequent chapters.  
 
I have also demonstrated key themes which I argued were important to the social 
workers’ assessments of lesbian and gay applicants, and how 'risk-based' 
arguments about supposed effects upon children were central to how the social 
workers later represented versions in their assessment reports. I argued that 
these risk-based arguments were constitutive of the heterosexual relations of 
ruling (Smith 1987) currently dominating adoption and fostering practice. I went 
on to analyse 'discrimination' in assessments, arguing that sameness models of 
equality were unhelpful, though they are largely supported by the current system, 
and that assessments needed to acknowledge 'difference' in the sense of dealing 
with the specificities of being a lesbian or gay carer. 
 
Finally I have proposed that an analysis of the relations of ruling (Smith 1987) 
within adoption and fostering is key, since changes in how lesbians and gay men 
are assessed can only be made if we consider how 'lesbian' and 'gay' are made 
sense of within the context of prevailing discourses of sexuality. Further, 
sexuality is not understood in isolation and I shall use chapters five and six to 
show how it was also an absolutely gendered and racialised concept for the 
social workers, and examine the consequences of this for lesbians and gay men 
as gendered subjects, and for black lesbians and gay men in particular via my 
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case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
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Assessing Lesbians, Assessing Gay Men 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections that consider data from the social worker 
interviews with regard to the assessment of lesbian carers and the assessment 
of gay men. Both point to the importance of the dynamic of gender in assessing 
sexuality. 
 
Section 1: 'lesbian\mother': Assessing Lesbian Carers 
 
"...I felt cheated...I wanted to talk about child care, and I wanted 
to prove to them that I could be a good parent, that I had 
experience of kids, that I knew about child development ...All 
they wanted to do was talk about me being a lesbian." [Lesbian 
Foster Carer]. 
 
"...It feels like social workers are less threatened by lesbian, than 
gay, carers...I think the image of a single female carer is much 
less threatening than two men together, as it's a much more 
traditional caring role." [Social Worker, NR8]. 
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"...I've heard many women say that in fact they have a 'right' to 
be parents ...One of the contradictions I saw is that, if you 
choose then to reject the normal process - so to speak - of going 
with a guy to have children, since you have rejected that, still that 
child has to be a man's child. Only the man can partly make that 
child for you to have, so isn't that a contradiction? You hate men 
maybe? But you still need his service one way or the other..." 
[Social Worker, NR4]. 
 
What happens when a social worker is asked to assess the suitability of a person 
or couple describing themselves as lesbian? When the categories 'lesbian' and 
'carer of children' are brought together in this dynamic, then how do social 
workers actively theorize the category 'lesbian mother' via assessment practices? 
And just how 'discriminatory' are these practices? Does the assessment focus 
exclusively on lesbian sexuality? Are lesbians seen as more acceptable carers 
than gay men because they are women? Why, on the other hand, is the 'lesbian 
mother' seen as such a threat by some? Is this because she comes to represent 
the ability of women to bring up children without men? In this section I address 
these, and other, questions, drawing upon data from my interviews with the 
social workers. 
 
I use examples of feminist theories (Butler 1990; Carabine 1996; Harne & Miller 
1996; Pollack 1987; Richardson 1996a; Wilkinson & Kitzinger 1993) in order to 
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analyze the specific 'threat' that the lesbian mother poses to male power, and 
how that power is defended via social work-ing. 'Male power' can be a rather 
loose concept, but I use it here to mean, first, the structural and institutional 
dominance by men of key decision-making bodies within social work 
assessment, such as management positions or fostering and adoption panels 
(Cavanagh & Cree 1996); second, the defence of a masculine heterosexuality 
through social work discourses concerning 'the good carer'; and third, the active 
construction within such discourses of the category 'lesbian' as threatening to 
men. This 'threat' is graphically represented by the last of the quotations that 
open this section, taken from one of my interviews with a social worker. Here is 
the idea that all women 'need' men's "...service one way or the other," and that 
children belong to men. 
 
'Dual Identities'? 
 
The notion of the 'identity' of the 'lesbian/mother' (Starr 1995) is of crucial 
importance here, because, as discussed in chapter two, existing literature has 
theorized that 'lesbian' and 'mother' represent two distinct identities - 'dual 
identities' (Romans 1990, 1992) - which must be negotiated, co-ordinated, 
intersected by women who inhabit both categories (Lewin 1993; Romans 1990, 
1992; Starr 1995). Pat Romans (1990, 1992) argued most strongly for such an 
analysis, locating this 'dual identity' thesis within a theoretical framework 
suggested by symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969; Plummer 1975, 1991, 
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1995). She argued that, for such women, 'lesbian' and 'mother' were two core 
identities, and yet these were given opposing meanings in terms of their relative 
acceptability within the wider society (Romans 1990:20).  Whilst the label 
'mother' was understood to be acceptable along the lines of meaning attached to 
a gendered heterosexuality and familial concepts, the label 'lesbian' was a 'threat' 
to the norms of gender, motherhood and the family (Romans, 1992:99). Thus in 
symbolic interactionist terms, the 'lesbian/mother' had to mediate her 
presentation of self and identity in her everyday interactions with others, and also 
in the way that she gave meaning to her own understanding of herself (1990:4). 
Romans termed 'co-ordinators' those women who had managed an "integration 
of both roles...having brought the heterosexual and lesbian aspects of their life-
styles into successful relation to one another." (Romans 1992:103). 
 
The work of Ellen Lewin (1993) also argued that the identity of 'lesbian/mother' 
must bring together two apparently incompatible elements (1993:16), but that 
such an identity was negotiated within the existing socially constructed systems 
of gender and motherhood. Thus Lewin's work emphasized the similarities 
between identities adopted by both heterosexual and lesbian mothers, since both 
had to negotiate an identity within the shared system of meaning attaching to the 
concept of 'motherhood' within - here North American - culture (Lewin 1993:182). 
 
I want to argue against the 'dual identity' thesis here, and this is for a number of 
reasons. First, it relies upon the assumption that the categories 'lesbian' or 
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'mother' have single and fixed meanings, whereas I have been arguing that such 
categories are open to a number of different and contextually-dependent 
constructions or representations, some of which serve regulatory and 
discriminatory functions. My data does not support the suggestion that social 
workers simply theorize 'lesbian' as a stigmatized and negative identity that has 
to be somehow integrated with the valued and positive identity represented by 
the category 'mother/carer of children'. Second, symbolic interactionism suggests 
that identities are individually picked-out from a kind of psychological 'shopping-
list', whereas I argue that such categories are political through-and-through (Rich 
1976, 1980; Stanley 1984) and are therefore open to hetero-sexist interpretation 
as much as any other. Thus some 'identity categories' carry wider negative 
connotative meanings. In this sense, the category 'lesbian' can never exist 
outside of the regulatory discourses of heterosexuality (Jagose 1994:162). A 
'lesbian' who applies to foster or adopt will be subject to regulatory practices, 
discourses, and representations that inhere in the process called 'assessment'. 
Third, I do not think that a symbolic interactionist understanding of the 
'lesbian/mother' deals with the 'threat' that this poses to what I shall be arguing 
are heteronormative constructions of the 'good carer'. Indeed, in feminist terms 
the lesbian/mother represents a threat to male power (Pollack 1987:318). 
 
The question to be asked here is how can a lesbian mother be understood as 
"heterosexual", as both Romans (1990) and Lewin (1993) suggest? Whilst I do 
argue that she may be represented in 'heterosexualised' ways (and see chapter 
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six also), the lesbian mother is not "heterosexual", and the category actually 
disrupts conventional understandings of (heterosexual) motherhood. The 'lesbian 
mother' cannot be understood by grafting existing frameworks of the 
'heterosexual mother' onto her, as the former challenges understandings of the 
latter, rather than their easily intersecting. 
 
This feminist understanding of the lesbian/mother 'identity' is argued by Christina 
Starr (1995), who points out that such categories do not necessarily 'intersect'. 
Instead; 
 
The one identity which informs both more than anything and 
which keeps them connected, like thread running through two 
disparate pieces of fabric, is that I am also a woman...It is 
feminism, then, which most informs my motherhood and, 
perhaps, which most informs my lesbianism. (Starr 1995:182). 
 
Here, I analyze data from my social worker interviews, then, concentrating on the 
ways in which my respondents theorized the category 'lesbian/mother', and I 
argue that such theorizing was always gendered, as much as it was about 
sexuality. I argue that the social work assessment of lesbians is a regulatory 
practice designed to 'organize out' certain versions of 'the lesbian', that is to 
prevent their approval as fosterers or adopters, but also one which favours 
another version, what I have called the 'good lesbian carer'. Specifically, I 
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concentrate on the key themes arising from the data, which are: lesbians and 
men (attitudes towards men, the 'anti-men' idea), gender role models, preference 
for caring for boys or girls, whether lesbians qua women are more acceptable as 
carers, caring for sexually abused girls, assessing lesbians as 'single women', 
and the 'lesbian threat'. 
 
By no means was the category lesbian always negatively theorized by the social 
workers with regard to fostering or adoption, and some of my respondents 
constructed versions of the 'lesbian mother' which were positive. Indeed some of 
the social workers I interviewed were also themselves lesbian (actually five out of 
the twenty-eight). So I shall not be dealing with solely negative constructions 
here, and my data is contradictory in this respect. This did not surprise me, 
however, as I did not expect to find that "all social workers discriminate against 
lesbian applicants". Nevetheless, even where social workers constructed positive 
versions of lesbian carer applicants, for the purposes of approval at panel, my 
argument is that these were still a particular version of 'the good lesbian carer'. 
The notion of 'the lesbian' as a challenge to conventional heterosexuality or 
understandings of gender was 'organized out' of assessments. 
 
Social Workers Assessing Lesbians: evidence from the data 
 
Lesbian applicants are frequently asked about their attitudes towards men, and 
whether they have male friends (Hicks 1996:19), and so I asked the social 
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workers whether this was a factor in their assessment practices. I found that 
most of the social workers theorized that the concept of a lesbian carer would be 
problematic, if not for themselves then for others such as the panel or children, in 
gendered terms. Specifically, social workers that had assessed lesbian 
applicants felt that they had to address attitudes towards men: 
 
I guess if we were faced with a lesbian couple who came along 
and said, 'We think all men are absolutely awful' - but that's a 
myth as well, that there are women like that - but I'd think, 'I'm 
not convinced you've got the approach which is in the interests of 
children...It's fine for you but if you feel you have to bring children 
up like that then I'd feel unhappy.' [Social Worker, NE5]. 
 
We talked about gender role models in the assessment, because 
they both had brothers, or certainly one had brothers who would 
be visiting with his children, and any child placed would have 
been reciprocating those visits. Also they had men friends - as 
people do! - who visited them, and they were very conscious of 
wanting men to be a part of their life, and not wanting to say, 
'Men are awful and hideous.' [Social Worker, NR6]. 
 
This draws upon particular versions of gender role modeling theory (Golombok & 
Fivush 1994:75), which suggests that children will only fully acquire gender via 
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interactions with, and the ability to model the behaviours of, both male and 
female adults. As I argue below, I think that social workers' reliance upon 'role 
model theory', which has been critiqued by social psychology and feminism 
(Golombok & Fivush 1994), is located within traditional fostering and adoption 
practices which favour heterosexual couples as being able to provide children 
with 'role models' of a gendered heterosexuality.  
 
Thus where concerns to maintain a conventional gendered heterosexuality are 
particularly evident in social work assessment practices - at fostering or adoption 
panels, for example, where men traditionally hold key management and decision-
making positions within social work hierarchies - then this becomes especially 
significant: 
 
Lisa: ...With the lesbian young woman that was taken to panel, that 
was a big thing, you know, 'Where are the men in this woman's 
life?'... 
Steve: A big thing for the panel? 
Lisa: Yes...[Social Worker, NR7]. 
 
Thus I found evidence of the social workers utilizing the notion of lesbians being 
anti-men, or unable to provide balanced gender role modeling, for which they 
developed a number of practice responses. The first was to re-present the 
'lesbian' in ways that would be acceptable to the notion of the 'good carer' held 
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by themselves or by fostering or adoption panels. Lesbians were described by 
social workers in their assessment reports as having men in their networks 
(which, of course, many did have), or as having male family members, and as 
being 'not anti-men'. Others, however, were critical of this approach, such as 
Annie, herself a lesbian social worker: 
 
It's the whole thing about role models which people are obsessed 
with; that, if you are a lesbian couple, there's no male role model, 
or with gay men that there's no female or indeed male role 
model, and I don't agree and I don't really understand it because 
it doesn't take much brain to see through it. [Social Worker, 
NE10]. 
 
The second approach was to discourage or prevent applications by lesbians who 
were perceived as being too threatening with regard to 'heteronormativity' 
(Warner 1993b:xxi). Lesbians who were, or were perceived or constructed as 
being, too radical, or did not know enough men, were therefore positioned as 
being too far outside of heterosexuality and therefore inappropriate as potential 
carers: 
 
It's to do with them being integrated, and having relationships 
with the wider community, and the child having an experience 
that is wider than just the household. I'd be looking for a rounded 
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personality, someone who's not only seeking friendships with 
people who share their own sexual orientation but who also has 
a family life. [Fostering Team Manager, NR9]. 
 
I think that these are prime examples of social work assessment as a regulatory 
practice, and one that disadvantages or discriminates against those who fall 
outside of the heteronormative 'good carer'. By 'regulatory', I mean that such 
practices seek either to represent lesbians in ways that are acceptable within 
compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1980), as 'safe', 'heterosexualised' (Wilton 
1996c) and unthreatening to gendered norms, or to institute assessment tools 
which uphold particular versions of the 'good carer'. Requiring lesbian applicants 
to have enough men in their daily lives - and how many men are enough to 
satisfy this measure? - is a example par excellence of a regulatory 
heterosexuality which constructs heterosexual couples as somehow naturally 
able to provide balanced gender roles for children, but lesbians as unable to do 
so.  
 
I was interested to discover and highlight such social work-ing practices because 
it is my view that these constitute 'discriminatory' measures with regard to lesbian 
applicants, and act to gatekeep or 'organize out' (Cooper 1994, 1995:69) those 
versions of the lesbian that are threatening to the idea of the 'good (heterosexual) 
carer'. In Cooper's 'organizing out' thesis (Cooper 1994, 1995), it is liberal lesbian 
and gay politics within local government services which fail absolutely to analyze 
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constructions of heterosexuality as the norm. Instead, those aspects of the 
categories lesbian or gay, which are perceived to threaten this liberal discourse, 
are removed via practices that focus on them as problematics: 
 
The limitations of a discursive framework which identifies 
homosexuality as a matter of private sexuality articulated to 
public (asexual) citizenship rights becomes particularly apparent 
where state bodies are requested positively to support gay 
lifestyles, for instance, through education policies, adoption and 
fostering provision and community funding. Because proactive 
heterosexual strategies are naturalized into invisibility, it is 
lesbian and gay forces who remain vulnerable to claims that they 
are trying to push into the public realm unacceptable sexual 
practices. (Cooper 1995:69).  
 
Thus I argue that 'rounded personalities', people with a 'family life', those who are 
'integrated', and indeed do not know only other lesbians and gay men, are all 
active constructions of the good lesbian carer here, and they problematise 
aspects of the lesbian which threaten the invisible, yet central, construction of 
heterosexuality at the core of the notion of the 'good carer'. Constructing the 
good lesbian carer relies upon fixing a series of "coherent gender norms" through 
"regulatory practices that generate coherent identities" (Butler 1990: 17), and it is 
worth comparing the points I am making here with the table 'Heteronormativity: 
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Who Makes a Good 'Parent'?' (Figure 6.2) on page 369 of chapter six. 
 
Of course, other social workers recognized such practices and argued against 
them. June, for example, is a heterosexual woman who works on a fostering 
team: 
 
June:  If I was assessing a lesbian couple, would I be worried 
that they were going to turn their girls into a man-hating little 
person, is that the kind of thing you're asking? 
Steve:  Yes, that's certainly something lesbians get asked... 
June:   Oh yes, 'Do you like men? Can you prove it? Will this 
child grow up to be a man-hating girl?'...No, I wouldn't take that 
approach I don't think. [Social Worker, SR4]. 
 
How, then, was the notion of lesbian gender role models theorized by the social 
workers I interviewed? A key example of how the social workers thought about 
this was in their considerations of whether it would be appropriate to place girls 
or young women who had been sexually abused by men with lesbian carers. I 
found opposing views here; at one extreme was the view that young women 
would need positive male role models in the future in order to see that not all 
men were abusive, but that lesbians might be unable to provide these, or even 
that they would reinforce negative views of men held by abuse survivors: 
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If relationships with men have failed in the past, then you need to 
look at how they view men and how they're going to represent 
them to that child...[Social Worker, SR5]. 
 
Such a view seems to me to be actually about protecting male power and 
deflecting attention away from men's sexual violence, in the sense that the notion 
of the 'positive male role model' is used here to reinforce the theory of the man 
who perpetrates sexual abuse as the aberrant or pathological exception 
(Armstrong 1996; Hester et al. 1996; Kelly 1988). At the other extreme was the 
idea that lesbians present strong, positive role models for young women: 
 
You're more likely, if you're a girl living with two lesbian women, 
to have a stronger opinion of what women can be, what they can 
achieve and things like that, rather than if you were living in a 
household where the woman was beaten up. [Team Manager, 
NR5]. 
 
We have here, then, two views of the 'lesbian carer', both of which seem to me to 
be equally premised upon the construction of the category lesbian as outside of 
usual gender norms; here the lesbian is either likely to present unbalanced and 
negative views of men, or she is inherently likely to present positive, strong and 
healthy role models of being a 'woman'.  
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I was interested in how the social workers handled the stated child gender 
preferences, if any, of lesbian applicants. Fostering and adoption applicants are 
routinely asked whether they would prefer to care for girls or boys, and such 
preferences are usually accepted and taken seriously by social workers and 
panels (Triseliotis et al. 1995, 1997). Indeed there is a specific space on the 
Form F (BAAF 1991) for this question to be addressed. As I have described in 
chapter six, Nita & Clare were dissuaded from stating their preference to care for 
girls only by Barbara, their social worker, who believed that this would not be 
accepted by the adoption panel. In my social worker interviews, I found one 
example where a lesbian couple's stated preference to care for girls only was 
accepted: 
 
With most people that come through, we tend to want to know 
what they're asking for, and no I wouldn't advise them to say 
they'd take both if we knew they just wanted to take girls 
particularly when we can see the benefit of that kind of resource, 
so they weren't ever advised to say they'd take both. It was quite 
clear and we were upfront about it and it was just accepted at 
panel without any argument. [Social Worker, NE9]. 
 
However, the appropriateness of lesbians caring either for girls or boys was a 
key question that the social workers told me was routinely raised by panels, and 
one which they largely felt compelled to address in their assessment reports: 
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It came up at the panel, and it was, 'Should it be girls or boys?' I 
said, 'Well, any child, it doesn't matter because this particular 
family have a lot of contact with other families and other set-ups 
and what-have-you, and I think that children would feel 
comfortable.' So that certainly came up at panel. [Social Worker, 
NR6]. 
 
There was some evidence from my interviews with social workers of what has 
elsewhere been termed the 'safety is a nice lesbian' dynamic (Carter 1993:102). 
This is a key example of the gendered nature of understandings of the category 
lesbian, in which lesbians qua women are theorized as the 'natural' carers and 
protectors of children in opposition to men, including gay men, seen as 
'unnatural' carers and posing a sexual risk to children. This has largely to do with 
the gendering of the institution of child care via motherhood (Rich 1976), so that 
lesbians are placed upon what Carter calls 'the pedestal' of virtue (Carter 
1993:103): 
 
The pedestal is always limited as a critical tool. If lesbian 
households are safer than male headed ones it is important to 
examine the many complex reasons why this might be the case, 
rather than suggest that it arises out of the essential safeness of 
lesbian sexuality. It simply will not do to infer that lesbians are 
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constitutionally incapable of abusing power. (Carter 1993:103).   
 
My argument here is that some of the social workers theorized the category 
lesbian as meaning 'automatically' likely to protect children from abuse, or to be 
appropriate carers for abused children, which may appear to contradict my earlier 
arguments about lesbians being seen as too much outside of the 
heteronormative 'good carer', but I did find contradictory evidence within what the 
social workers told me. Here I think that it is gender that is being analyzed as the 
key dynamic, and so lesbians are understood first and foremost as women, and 
therefore as more 'natural' and 'safer' carers. For example, Maude, a social 
worker on an adoption team told me: 
 
Maude:  I think it might be a bias I've got, but I think I'd feel 
better with two women...I've never worked with two women but 
maybe it's just to do with feeling comfortable amongst women 
really, more than anything else. You know, there's nothing else 
that I could say... 
Steve:  Do you mean that you'd feel more comfortable doing an 
assessment with women...or would you feel more comfortable 
with the concept of two women fostering or adopting? 
Maude:  I think I'd feel more comfortable with both, with women 
fostering and adopting. [Social Worker, SR2]. 
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This point arose in several other interviews: Audrey, a manager of fostering and 
adoption teams, told me that she felt lesbians were "more palatable than gay 
men" within social work and to panels; Pete, who worked with young people 
leaving care, felt that he had focused far more on gay men than lesbians in his 
interview because social workers tended to be less concerned about women as 
carers than men; Sarah, a fostering social worker, felt that lesbian carers were 
less threatening than gay men because of the traditional caring role associated 
with women; Gloria, who worked on an adoption team, said that most derogatory 
comments were made about gay men not lesbians; Fazila felt that her adoption 
panel might approve a lesbian couple but not gay men; and Mark, who worked 
on a duty team, felt that there was far more of a tradition of women doing foster 
or adoptive care which meant that lesbians were more accepted than gay men. 
With regard to children who have been sexually abused, Pete told me: 
 
I think that people tend to see - particularly if we're looking at 
sexual abuse I think - they see sexual abusers as men, even 
though as I say they tend to be heterosexual men, and I think the 
idea of placing somebody who's been abused with men is not on 
really. [Social Worker, NR3]. 
 
Tom, who worked on a teenage fostering team, also commented: 
 
I would say it was more appropriate often - particularly for 
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children abused by men - to place them in lesbian households, 
and that would include boys and girls. I think as a choice for boys 
who've been abused by men, I'd prefer them to go to a lesbian 
couple, or single woman, if only to allay the child's fear of what 
might happen next sort-of-thing. But I think I'd probably be 
happier placing with women rather than with men generally, 
because women tend to be less abusive, in the main, compared 
to men. [Social Worker, NE4]. 
 
Here, then, is a key contradiction in my data, and therefore in the ways that the 
social workers theorized the gendered nature of the category 'lesbian'. On the 
one hand, Cathy, an adoption worker, had told me that lesbians might reinforce 
negative views of men for children who had been sexually abused and that this 
would be inappropriate. Here the lesbian is understood via her sexual identity, 
perceived to be a threat to men because it is seen as a sexuality without men. 
On the other hand, Pete, Tom and others felt that placing with women, including 
lesbians, was more appropriate since most children are abused by 
(heterosexual) men. Here, instead, the lesbian is understood via her gender 
identity, perceived to be 'safe' for children because she is seen as a woman 
without men. Most interestingly, all of the lesbian social workers that spoke to me 
did not operate with the 'safety is a nice lesbian' dynamic. They were keen to 
emphasize that the category lesbian did not automatically equate with non-
abusive. Whilst they made reference to the fact that most sexual abuse is 
 260 
perpetrated by heterosexual men, they also pointed out that not all lesbians 
make good foster or adoptive carers. 
 
I also found evidence of the social workers assuming that it was more 
appropriate for lesbians, rather than gay men, to take younger children. I found 
that lesbians were far more likely than gay men to be considered by the social 
workers for longer-term forms of care (including adoption), and for children under 
eleven. Gay men, as I shall discuss later, were often considered to be the 
appropriate carers for young people (teenagers), usually young men, and for 
shorter-term forms of fostering. Sarah, for example, asked me whether I had 
noticed that lesbians tended to request younger children. I pointed out that it was 
my view that assessment practices actually construct notions of what is 
appropriate for specific carers, and then channel those applicants into approval in 
that way. I asked Melba, who worked on a fostering team for young children, 
about some carers she had worked with: 
 
Steve:  What about the lesbian couple in [London borough], what 
did they get in terms of placement? 
Melba:  They had placements but they had little ones, who 
actually ended up staying with them quite a while, but the gay 
men had over-elevens. [Social Worker, NR11]. 
 
I also asked the social workers about the 'single women' question, because I 
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knew, both from anecdotal evidence and from earlier research (Hicks 1993), that 
some lesbians had gone through the process of assessment as 'single women'. 
This meant hiding or concealing their sexuality, either actively or sometimes 
passively, in the sense of not bringing it up in discussions. Even when social 
workers suspected, or had guessed, that a woman was lesbian, they colluded 
with the silence about sexuality, either avoiding the topic altogether or by talking 
only about former relationships with men. This may be largely to do with the 'tacit 
acceptance' model, in which to state the lesbian sexuality of a woman applicant 
would be to state the unacceptable and would therefore prevent her approval by 
panel. For example, Fazila told me: 
 
Fazila:  But I have this sense of feeling that I have known of 
women, particularly who've come from lesbian backgrounds, that 
haven't felt able to share it, not necessarily with me because I 
haven't been the worker involved, but I'm pretty sure we did 
approve at least two women in the past that I know. 
Steve:  'Single women'...? 
Fazila:  Yes, and I know that they are lesbian, but I don't know 
that they shared that with us and it's not my right to read that 
they are 'therefore worse'... [Social Worker, NE3]. 
 
Another adoption worker, Martin, also raised this issue: 
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I placed a boy for adoption with a single woman in another 
authority, and she lived in the house with another woman. Her 
Form F had been written about her, with the other woman under 
"other people in the household", and although everyone was 
clear about how this other woman fitted in, in terms of caring for 
the child, no-one asked about their relationship. It wasn't in the 
assessment report, and no-one asked during the matching 
process, and I never asked the applicant or her social worker, 
and the boy's social worker never asked and the panel never 
asked. I guess in a way we were opting out, but I do think if the 
other person living in the house had been a man then we would 
have asked, and I guess we didn't ask because we weren't really 
sure if you should ask. I think my feeling was if I'd done the 
assessment I would've been unhappy about not putting in what 
the nature of their relationship was, because it felt like you didn't 
get the whole picture, like there was a big hole. I wanted to know 
whether in the assessment it had been asked about and a 
decision was made not to put it in there, or if it just hadn't been 
asked about. In some ways it made life easier because it made it 
hard for adoption panel to challenge them on those grounds, 
because I feel that if we went to our adoption panel with a 
lesbian couple I'm not convinced that they would say it was fine. 
[Social Worker, NE5]. 
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This point also came up in a number of the interviews with social workers. When 
I asked them whether they had any lesbian carers, several respondents replied 
along the lines of, "If you mean openly lesbian, then no...". Many of the social 
workers recognized that their single women carers, either in the past or amongst 
present carers, may have been lesbians, but they suggested that openly 
acknowledging this in an assessment would have prevented the approval of such 
women by panels. 
 
The 'Lesbian Threat'? 
 
Law reports on B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) (see Family Court 
Reporter 1991; Family Law 1991; Family Law Reports 1991) point to the 
distinctions made in constructions of different versions of the category 'lesbian' in 
law. The judgment in B v B stated: 
 
...what is so important in cases is to distinguish between militant 
lesbians who try to convert others to their way of life, where there 
may well be risks that counterbalance other aspects of welfare 
and are detrimental to the long-term interests of children either in 
relation to their sexual identity or corruption, and lesbians in 
private. In this case, I am dealing with two lesbians who are 
private persons who both do not believe in advertising their 
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lesbianism and acting in the public field in favour of promoting 
lesbianism...So it is a wholly different kind of case from that of 
the militant lesbianism... (1 FLR: 410). 
 
I have used this example to show the distinctions made in discourse surrounding 
the lesbian (Jagose 1994) between the acceptable ('private') lesbian and the 
'militant', the lesbian as a threat (Stanley & Wise 1993:88). I think that my data 
from the social worker interviews illustrates how such distinctions are made, 
discursively and textually, by the social workers with regard to how lesbianism is 
represented as 'the good carer' or as unacceptable. The most unacceptable 
'lesbian' is the militant lesbian, and it is my view that this particular version is the 
one that constructs the lesbian as most threatening to male power, to compulsory 
heterosexuality and to a regulatory gender system.  
 
In this version of the lesbian 'threat', applicants may be theorized as having 
rejected men, and this is why they are so threatening: 
 
"...lesbians are oppressed because we are particularly 
threatening women - women who aren't dependent on men and, 
in this sense, 'free women'." (Stanley & Wise 1993:88).  
 
Returning to the quotation which I discussed at the start of this section, here 
children are seen as the property of men, and so the threatening lesbian - who 
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has rejected men - is selfish in her application to foster or adopt because that is 
the only way that she is able to get a child. I think that this view was expressed to 
me by Wayne, an adoption worker: 
 
Take a woman who is - say - twenty-five, maybe thirty, well why 
is it that she wants to adopt? Has she ever been in a relationship 
with a man? How does she know she won't have a child and who 
told her so? What made her believe she wouldn't? Lots of 
women out there are single and they have their own children and 
they don't even want to know about the father, you know... I've 
known women who don't want the guy except that she wants a 
child. Women do have these things going for them sometimes. 
So why would a young, healthy woman want to adopt without 
going through that process? If the reason you're doing it is totally 
a rejection of men, that is a different situation. [Social Worker, 
NR4]. 
 
I put it to Wayne that some lesbians are not interested in trying to have a 
biological child, and that they have chosen adoption as a first choice, not 
because they have failed to, or cannot, have a birth child. In fact I gave him the 
example of Nita & Clare, discussed in chapter six. His response was to suggest 
that they were using the child to bring a 'warmth' to their relationship that he 
obviously felt would be lacking. Wayne's version of 'the lesbian' is one of threat, 
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women who have rejected men, equating lesbianism with lack (Jagose 
1994:111). 
 
A Feminist Analysis 
 
I have been arguing that my research with the social workers found social work-
ing here acting as a regulatory practice, in which lesbian applicants were, at the 
very least, represented according to the heteronormative expectations of the 
'good carer', and, at worst, rejected as 'too radical, too political, too challenging of 
men, indeed too lesbian'. This relied upon fixing such a category as having a 
singular meaning: the lesbian as 'threat' to male power, gendered norms and 
heterosexuality.  
 
I am not arguing that all the social workers responded in this way, and I have 
suggested that the lesbian social workers operated differently. They 
demonstrated Brown's model of assessment which was neither positively nor 
negatively stereotypical (Brown 1991, 1992a), in that they argued that the 
category 'lesbian' did not mean either automatically unable to care for children or 
automatically 'safe, able to care'.  
 
Nevertheless, here I want to focus on the regulatory practices that I discovered in 
the social work assessment of lesbians. What perhaps surprised me the most 
when looking at the data was the fact that the social workers continued to raise 
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issues of gender, far more than sexuality, with regard to lesbians, and it is this 
'gender anxiety' that I focus on here.  
 
It might be appropriate here to start with the question "what is a lesbian"? (Wilton 
1995:29). The category brings with it a multiplicity of contradictory meanings, so 
much that the notion of 'a lesbian' is hard to define (Butler 1991:15; Takagi 1996: 
250; Vicinus 1989). Indeed, among lesbians "...there is profound dissensus about 
lesbian identity, with essentialist and constructionist theories of varying kinds and 
degrees giving rise to contradictory and often competing performances of 
'lesbian', as well as political and theoretical positions." (Wilton 1995:29). This is 
certainly not to say, however, that the 'lesbian' does not exist - certainly she 
does, and the word describes an important political, epistemological and 
ontological category (Stanley 1992a). Attempting to define what is a lesbian, 
however, is probably impossible and certainly objectionable. Instead, a focus on 
lesbian epistemology and ontology is a more productive project (Stanley 1992a: 
2). The existence of the category depends upon a shared set of experiences and 
knowledge, but it does not describe a 'type' of person (National Lesbian and Gay 
Survey 1992). 
 
Asking a woman how many men she knows is a practice which rests upon a 
particular interpretation of 'lesbian', and one in which gender anxiety is to the 
fore. Social work, and social workers, do not have any agreed sense of what is a 
lesbian (Brown 1992b), and my data shows a number of different interpretations. 
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However, in the majority of cases the social workers relied upon the most readily 
available of cultural definitions of 'lesbian' - or, in Foucauldian terms, the most 
powerful definition exercised through the regulatory discourse surrounding 'the 
lesbian' (Foucault 1978) - which constructs the lesbian as a threat and invokes 
gender anxiety.  
 
The regulation of the lesbian 'threat', and the consequent distinction made in 
discourse between the 'good' and the 'bad' lesbian, has been discussed in earlier 
work on court cases concerning custody disputes over children involving lesbian 
mothers (Arnup 1989, 1995; Arnup & Boyd 1995; Gavigan 1995; Harne & Rights 
of Women 1997; Hitchens & Price 1978/79; Hunter & Polikoff 1976; Polikoff 
1990; Rights of Women Lesbian Custody Group 1986). Much of this work points 
to what we might term the dilemma or debate about 'court-room strategies', in 
which lesbian mothers have to present a version of themselves as the 'good 
carer' to the court: 
 
Good lesbian mothers, women who live quiet, discreet lives, who 
promise that they will raise their children to be heterosexual, who 
appear to the outside world to be heterosexual single parents, 
have in recent years increasingly succeeded in winning custody 
of their children. "Bad" lesbian mothers, women who are open 
about their sexual orientation, who attend gay and lesbian 
demonstrations and other public events, and who view their 
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lesbianism positively or as one aspect of an entire challenge to 
society, are almost certain to lose custody of their children to 
their ex-husbands. (Arnup 1995:382-3).  
 
This was picked up in some of the earliest work on custody cases involving 
lesbian mothers (Hitchens & Price 1978/79; Hunter & Polikoff 1976). Hunter & 
Polikoff pointed out that distinctions in court were being made between the so-
called 'discreet' lesbian and the lesbian living in an open and ongoing relationship 
with another woman. Thus in the case Mitchell v. Mitchell, the court awarded 
custody to the mother on the condition that she not live with her female 
companion, and that she associate with her only when the children were away at 
school or with their father (Hunter & Polikoff 1976:697-8; see also Hitchens & 
Price 1978/79:455).  
 
Hunter & Polikoff advise court-room strategies or trial tactics that they argue 
increase the likelihood of the lesbian mother winning custody of her children. 
These include presenting herself as living alone, and providing expert testimony 
that argues that lesbianism is not the most important factor in her parenting 
abilities. She should also emphasize her positive relationships with men in her 
network (Hunter & Polikoff 1976:715-729). Hitchens & Price also argue for expert 
testimony which points out that the children of lesbians are no more likely to grow 
up to be gay, to have confused sex-role identification, or be socially stigmatized 
(Hitchens & Price 1978/79:464-68). They conclude that such testimony "...can 
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serve to lessen the impact on the court of the mother's lesbianism, thus 
creating a situation where the mother may be judged on her own individualized 
merits." (Hitchens & Price 1978/79:479, my added emphasis).  
 
Thus lessening the impact of lesbianism is largely about diverting attention away 
from the challenge that lesbians pose to compulsory heterosexuality, gender 
roles and male power, their "ability to raise children autonomously from men." 
(Arnup & Boyd 1995: 79). In the work of Hunter & Polikoff (1976) and Hitchens & 
Price (1978/79), this is acknowledged as a court-room strategy, most likely to win 
the lesbian mother custody of her children, but it involves a presentation and 
construction of a certain kind of lesbian self, the 'good/discreet lesbian'. Arnup & 
Boyd argue that this has been necessary because the legal system has shown a 
"profound resistance to parenting outside the institutions of heterosexuality and 
patriarchy" (Arnup & Boyd 1995:81), and that lesbians in court have had to "act 
as 'straight' as possible" (Arnup & Boyd 1995:83).  
 
In re-reading this work on lesbian custody, I was struck by the similarities 
between the 'good/discreet' lesbian, who is awarded custody of her children, and 
the 'good lesbian carer' constructed by many, though not all, of the social 
workers that I interviewed. I am also reminded of my own arguments in chapter 
six about the heterosexualisation of lesbians (Wilton 1996b, 1996c) in the case of 
Nita & Clare (see page 346). I set about constructing a table which compares the 
'good/discreet lesbian' of custody cases with the 'good lesbian carer' found in the 
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data from my interviews with the social workers, and this is shown at Figure 5.1: 
 
THE 'GOOD LESBIAN' 
 
The good/discreet lesbian mother  The good lesbian carer who 
who wins custody.    is approved for fostering/ 
      adoption. 
 
Discreet, quiet, non-'promoting' of  Able to deal with anti-lesbian 
lesbianism.     prejudice of birth families,  
      some children/young  
      people and panel. 
 
Prove or promise to raise kids   Not threatening to gender  
straight, with correct gender-role  norms, integrated with 
identification.     heterosexuals. Positive role 
      model of a woman. 
 
Provide male role models, and   'Gender anxiety': likely to know 
heterosexual role models.   men, have male role models, 
      present positive images of 
      men. Integrated into wider 
      (heterosexual) community 
      and family. 
 
Probably not in a lesbian   'Single women': issues of 
relationship, though not always.   sexuality not raised. 
 
Lesbianism not central to her   The 'on merit' model: child 
child care abilities.    care abilities emphasized as 
      paramount. 
 
Does not involve herself in   Non-'militant', non-radical, 
political activities, does not see   not political. 
lesbianism as a challenge to 
society and/or male power. 
 
Can argue that her lesbianism will  Able to deal with teasing of 
not influence or stigmatize children -  children, able to cope with 
use expert psychological testimony.  heterosexual children or  
      emergent heterosexuality of 
      children. 
Figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.1 therefore illustrates the most common themes emerging from my data 
in terms of how the social workers theorized bringing together constructions of 
the categories 'lesbian' and 'carer of children (mother)' as 'the good lesbian 
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carer'. These themes do not 'truly represent' the lesbian applicants in question, 
but rather show how the regulatory processes of social work assessment here 
construct an acceptable version of that category within the discourses 
surrounding 'the good carer'. 
 
Early examples of lesbian feminism (Abbott & Love 1972; Faraday 1981; Frye 
1983; Johnston 1973; Martin & Lyon 1972; Radicalesbians 1970) identified the 
lesbian as threatening to male power since lesbians were seen to exhibit a 
sexuality without men (Abbott & Love 1972:19), especially in the case of lesbian 
mothers (Martin & Lyon 1972:123). But all agree that it is as women, as much as 
because of sexuality, that lesbians are oppressed: 
 
What is a lesbian? ...on some level she has not been able to 
accept the limitations and oppression laid on her by the most 
basic role of her society - the female role... (Radicalesbians 
1970:172). 
 
An example of the lesbian as 'threat' is that of 'single women', evidenced in my 
data. When suspected - and sometimes known - lesbians are assessed by social 
workers as 'single women' only, even when they are living with another woman 
as in the case reported to me by Martin, then lesbianism is the absent presence. 
The sexuality of the woman in question is left unstated by the assessing social 
worker, so that the version presented to the fostering or adoption panel is a 
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'single applicant'. This relates directly to the model of 'tacit acceptance' of lesbian 
or gay carers - subsumed under the misnomer 'single people' - in the adoption 
white paper (DoH et al. 1993). Here then lesbianism is a lacuna, and so the 
'single woman' comes to represent the 'absolute good carer': female, caring, 
protective, single, with no men around the home to worry about, as long as - in 
this case - lesbianism is left unstated. Bring a stated lesbianism into the frame, 
and a whole series of cultural anxieties about gendered heterosexuality are 
brought into play. 
 
These cultural anxieties were evident in the social workers' responses to the 
assessment of lesbians. Many of them were concerned that their fostering or 
adoption panels (especially adoption panels) were 'too conservative' and unlikely 
to approve lesbian applicants. With regard to the 'good lesbian carer', I found - in 
summary - that lesbians were asked whether they had male friends, what male 
role models they could provide, and about their attitudes towards men. 
Concerning heterosexuality, lesbians were asked whether they could provide a 
balance of gendered role models, whether they had heterosexual friends or 
influences, and to show that they knew people other than lesbians and gay men. 
Lesbians were frequently expected to provide heterosexual referees, and to 
show that they had regular contact with other 'families', heterosexual not lesbian 
ones. Concerning gender, there was a debate about whether lesbians provide 
the correct gender messages to sexually abused children, lesbians were asked 
about their attitudes towards gender roles for children, and there was some 
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concern that a stated gender preference for girls or boys would cause problems 
with approval.  
 
A particularly helpful feminist response, here, is to turn things around and to 
actually ask then "what is heterosexuality?" and how does it function? (Maynard 
& Purvis 1995a; Richardson 1996a; Wilkinson & Kitzinger 1993). This is a novel 
way of using my data, since the data is - on the surface - about lesbians and 
about gay men, but I think that it also tells us a lot about heterosexuality. Such an 
analysis of oppression relating to both gender and heterosexuality has been 
central to lesbian feminism for many years (Bell & Klein 1996; Harne & Miller 
1996; Jeffreys 1993; Leeds Revolutionary Feminist Group 1981; Radicalesbians 
1970; Rich 1980). 
 
With regard to fostering and adoption assessments, heterosexuality is largely 
absent from analysis, as it is generally (Kitzinger & Wilkinson 1993:3), rather like 
'whiteness' (Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1993). Identifying what heterosexuality is, 
or how it works, is rare (Kitzinger & Wilkinson 1993:5), but when lesbianism 
enters the frame, then heterosexuality is threatened, so much that some have 
suggested that the lesbian cannot be 'woman' as it is traditionally constructed 
under heteronormativity (Wittig 1992). Thus the lesbian mother - the lesbian 
carer applicant - is a threat to patriarchal institutions such as the family (Pollack 
1987:318), and so she is judged against an implicit heterosexual norm (Pollack 
1987:320). 
 275 
 
I think that my data supports the view that fostering and adoption assessment 
practices are based upon heteronormativity, so that lesbian applicants displace 
implicit assumptions behind social work practices: 
 
...most of the conceptual frameworks we use to theorize human 
relations rely implicitly upon a naturalized heterosexuality, where 
(hetero-)sexuality tends either to be ignored in the analysis or is 
hidden from view, being treated as an unquestioned paradigm." 
(Richardson 1996b:1). 
 
But I have also been arguing quite clearly that this heterosexuality is gendered 
absolutely (and I use chapter six to show how it is also raced). Diane Richardson 
notes that "heterosexuality inscribes difference; it is a construction of 'otherness' 
in gendered terms" (Richardson 1996b:6), and so in the assessment of lesbians 
there was much confusion amongst the social workers about a perceived 'lack' of 
gender difference within, say, a lesbian couple. This 'gender difference' is 
therefore looked for elsewhere by the social workers, using questions like, "how 
many men do you know?" and so on. 
 
This also links directly to the social workers' questions about the gender and 
sexual development of children placed with lesbian carers. Concerns that 
children should receive the correct amount of male and heterosexual role models 
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betray what Michael Warner calls 'fear of a queer planet' (Warner 1993a), and 
what Cindy Patton suggests is, in fact, heterosexuality's dread; "...the possibility 
of turning into a queer (or turning out to be queer)..." (Patton 1993:150). Thus in 
traditional sex role socialization theories, lesbians can only ever be 'mal-
socialized deviants' (Stanley & Wise 1993:102) who may pass on such role 
models to children, those models being either 'queerness' or one which questions 
male privilege. Lesbians generate gender anxiety, here, because they cannot be 
'read off' against gendered heterosexuality in any unproblematic way: 
 
The heterosexualisation of desire requires and institutes the 
production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between 
"feminine" and "masculine," where these are understood as 
expressive attributes of "male" and "female." The cultural matrix 
through which gender identity has become intelligible requires 
that certain kinds of "identities" cannot "exist" - that is, those in 
which gender does not follow from sex and those in which the 
practices of desire do not "follow" from either sex or gender. 
(Butler 1990:17). 
 
Thus gender anxiety here relates not only to the concerns of the social workers in 
assessing lesbian applicants as potential carers, but also to their theorizing of the 
supposed 'effects' of lesbianism upon the gender and sexual development of 
children that might be placed within lesbian homes. Conversely, fostering and 
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adoption assessments have traditionally so much constructed heterosexuality as 
equating with 'good carer' that the (hetero)sexuality of such applicants is rarely, if 
ever, addressed. Thus I am arguing that there is an unacknowledged assumption 
that heterosexual carers will automatically 'socialize' children into correct gender 
and sexual identities, but that this is also a regulatory social work practice: 
 
...the "unity" of gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that 
seeks to render gender identity uniform through a compulsory 
heterosexuality. (Butler 1990:31). 
 
Here we are, then, a long way from a 'dual identities' analysis. Instead I found 
that 'the lesbian' generated a whole series of gender anxieties for the social 
workers, and also concerns about the threat that the lesbian posed to 
heterosexuality and male power (specifically, the example of the cultural 
assumption that children are the property of men).  My analysis of the 'good 
lesbian carer' points to a social work-ing which is actually about constructing, and 
shoring up, such normative heterosexuality in relation to who makes a good carer 
for children.  
 
In the next section, I go on to consider how the social workers handled 
applications to foster or adopt by gay men, and - once more - I found that 'gender 
anxiety' was a key dynamic. 
Section 2: Assessing Gay Men 
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If a sexuality is to be disclosed, what will be taken as the true 
determinant of its meaning: the phantasy structure, the act, the 
orifice, the gender, the anatomy? And if the practice engages a 
complex interplay of all of those, which one of these erotic 
dimensions will come to stand for the sexuality that requires them 
all? (Butler 1991:17). 
 
 
The elaborating of certain erotic preferences into a 'character' - 
into a kind of erotically determined essence - can never be a 
disinterested scientific enterprise. The attempted stabilizing of 
identity is inherently a disciplinary project. (Bersani 1995:2-3). 
 
A homosexual couple applied to adopt...I think they were actually 
applying for a physically handicapped child. The social worker 
took it to the panel initially for a decision, before she started the 
home study, and I think the answer came back that it was okay to 
go ahead with it. It wasn't something that we could let go by, 
because not many people come here and offer to adopt a 
physically handicapped child...and, if you're talking about a child 
that has a mental handicap or had got learning difficulties of 
some kind, then maybe it wouldn't have been so obvious to them 
that the couple were differently sexually oriented...[Social 
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Worker, SR5]. 
 
In this section I analyze the data from interviews with the social workers, 
concentrating on what they had to say about assessing gay men as the potential 
carers of children. I construct a comparative analysis with the data on assessing 
lesbians, focusing on the gendered understandings of the category 'gay', the 
issue of gender role models, whether it is boys or girls that the social workers 
thought gay men should care for, how gay men qua men are seen as the 
potential carers of children, constructions of the 'gay man' as sexually predatory 
or abusive, what are seen as appropriate placements for gay carers, and how the 
notion of the 'single male carer' was handled.  
 
Further, I consider two areas which I found came up in relation to gay men that 
did not with regard to lesbians; and these are, first, the generation of an 'anxiety' 
about the "vulnerability" of gay men to allegations of child abuse by the children 
in their charge, and, second, adoption especially being seen as a  less 
appropriate form of care. Finally, I go on to present an analysis of what might be 
termed 'the promotion of homosexuality', in which I consider how 'gay-ness' 
disrupts heterosexuality as the unmarked norm in fostering and adoption.  
 
Throughout this section I have also drawn upon data from a further small-scale 
case study. This is the story of John, a single white gay man, who applied and 
was approved to foster Ismail, a young heterosexual man of Muslim Turkish 
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Cypriot origin. John had been in a previous heterosexual relationship at the time 
of his fostering application, and so was not explicitly 'out' as gay. Some time after 
he had been fostering Ismail, John met and began a relationship with Rob, an 
Asian gay man of Indian descent who grew up in Britain. Rob moved in, and so 
John informed the social workers of this development, which he believes they 
handled very badly. The couple later made a request to be considered as the 
carers of Nazan, Ismail's sister, but they were refused, despite the fact that 
Nazan wanted to be placed with her brother. 
 
A Return to the 'Dual Identities' Thesis? 
 
In chapter two I showed how the research of Frederick W. Bozett, like Romans' 
(1990, 1991) work on the 'lesbian mother', concentrated on the 'identity' of the 
gay father. This he also saw as a 'dual identity' incorporating the extremes of 
social acceptability, 'gay' versus 'father' (Bozett 1981, 1985, 1987d, 1989b, 
1990). Bozett similarly argues that the typical 'career' of the gay father involves 
moving towards the successful integration of a conflicting identity, achieved 
through a series of phases (Bozett 1985:330). Bozett argues that the gay father 
has to 'come out' of a 'double closet', telling heterosexual people that he is gay 
and gay people that he is a father (Bozett 1985:337).  
 
Bozett's work (1981, 1985, 1987d, 1989b, 1990) is problematic in much the same 
ways as that of Romans (1990, 1991), since it rests on the notion that gay fathers 
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work towards achieving "an identity as a gay and an identity as a father..." 
(Bozett 1981:552), which rests within psychological and personal processes: 
 
By actively functioning both as a gay as well as a father, in time he 
can eliminate cognitive dissonance and place himself in the 
cognitive category of gay father. By these means, then, the gay 
father achieves identity congruence and self-acceptance. (Bozett 
1981:559). 
 
Once more, the notion of an identity category here is a fixed, singular one, seen 
as belonging to the individual subject. When gay men present themselves to be 
considered as potential foster or adoptive carers, however, it is highly unlikely 
that social workers construct their 'identities' in this way. First, my data will show 
that the category 'father' is by no means universally "culturally accepted and 
respected" (Bozett 1981:552) by the social workers who are confronted with 
having to assess men as the potential carers of children. Second, the category 
'gay' has no agreed understanding amongst social workers either; for instance, 
some social workers do not hold 'negative 
stereotypes of homosexuality' (Bozett 1981:552). Thus here I want to examine 
the data in order to understand the kinds of "versions of gay" being constructed 
by the social workers via their social work-ing. 
 
Social Workers Assessing Gay Men: evidence from the data 
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When a fostering or adoption applicant presents themselves to a social work 
agency as 'a gay man', any number of understandings of that category might be 
used by the assessing social worker. This is a point made by Butler (1991) with 
regard to the category 'lesbian': 
 
I'm not at ease with "lesbian theories, gay theories" for...identity 
categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes....So I am 
skeptical about how the "I" is determined as it operates under the 
title of the lesbian sign, and I am no more comfortable with its 
homophobic determination than with those normative definitions 
offered by other members of the "gay or lesbian community." ...For 
it is always finally unclear what is meant by invoking the lesbian-
signifier, since its signification is always to some degree out of 
one's control, but also because its specificity can only be 
demarcated by exclusions that return to disrupt its claims to 
coherence. (Butler 1991:13-15). 
 
Thus describing oneself as 'gay' in no way guarantees how this will be 
understood by social workers. The category itself is always partly regulatory 
since, first, it privileges sexuality over any other categories that might have been 
used; 'white', 'working class' and so on. Second, uses of the category 'gay' by the 
social workers are always regulatory since 'gay' is interpreted and represented by 
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them as 'acceptable' or 'unacceptable' to the notion of who makes a good-
enough carer of children. Third, however much choosing to define oneself as the 
'stable identity' gay is a limiting project (Bersani 1995: 2-3; Edwards 1994:113), 
this absolutely does not guarantee any reading of that category by others, here 
the social workers. 
 
As with the assessment of lesbians, I found that gender was a key concern of the 
social workers when they talked to me about gay men. Just as the category 
'lesbian' raised anxieties about correct gender role modelling, and the need for a 
conventionally balanced (heterosexual) view of gender, so too with gay men: 
 
In their social groups, are they only socializing with men because 
they are also men? Are they socializing with men who are the 
same, like a club? What women do they know? To ask things like 
that would be useful...[Social Worker, NR4]. 
 
Lisa also raised this: 
 
Steve: Did you talk to them about gender issues in terms of what 
women were in their network? 
Lisa: Yes because that came up at panel too,  and I knew that 
would come up in panel...Yes I did, do you want to know what 
came out of that really...? 
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Steve: Yes... 
Lisa: I mean, yes they had sisters who visited occasionally. 
There wasn't a lot of regular contact...Well it was regular but 
infrequent, the contact with the sisters, but they were important 
and good relationships that they had but they weren't rushing to 
the house all the time. They certainly had colleagues through 
work, some lesbian women, and a few neighbours. Primarily it 
was a male household but it wasn't exclusively male. There were 
women around, and certainly in the assessment I picked up that 
they'd been very encouraging of the mothers of the young 
people, that they'd looked after in the supported lodgings 
scheme, to be involved, so I didn't feel there was any difficulty 
that they had including women in their lifestyle and in their world. 
It was just that their interests were probably spent more with 
men. 
Steve: And that came up at panel as well? 
Lisa: Yes. 
Steve: Do you remember what was said? 
Lisa: I think it was just that they said, 'What about the women?' 
and I just said, 'Yes I've addressed that,' and I don't think it was a 
big thing...Certainly I was expecting it because, when they were 
used by another local authority, then I know that their panel were 
asking that...'Where are the women?' [Social Worker, NR7]. 
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As with my analysis regarding the data on lesbians, this demonstrates the kinds 
of cultural gender anxieties brought into play by the category 'gay'. Here, once 
again, is the theorization of gender role models, seen as coming from within the 
home and from the carers only, seen as directly modeling gender for children 
(Golombok & Fivush 1994), and more importantly seen as a problem because 
not conventionally 'gendered' in heterosexual terms. 
 
My analysis of whether gay men were seen as the appropriate carers for girls or 
boys showed a marked gender preference for boys and young men by the social 
workers. Rarely, if ever, were gay men seen to be appropriate as carers of girls 
or young women, although this did happen in some cases. The social workers 
did one of two things here; first, they assumed that gay men would want to care 
for boys or young men only, and talked about their gay carers in these terms. I 
found this to be the case, even where the gay carer(s) in question had been 
approved to care for boys and girls. Second, others argued that it was 
inappropriate for gay men to care for female children, and that they would not 
place girls with male carers. Tom told me that this was the case, yet he began to 
question the basis for this practice: 
 
I suppose you could understand that, if it were a single straight 
man, it would be inappropriate to place fifteen-year-old girls with 
him, but you wouldn't use the same argument for gay men. In 
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fact, that same argument would say you shouldn't place boys 
with gay men if the idea is that single straight men could seduce, 
or be seduced by, or have sexual relationships with teenage 
girls. [Social Worker, NE4]. 
 
This shows a contrast to what I found in relation to the assessment of lesbian 
carers. Lesbians were sometimes asked not to make a statement of preference 
to care for girls or young women (see chapter six on Nita and Clare, for 
example), and were frequently approved for, and seen as the appropriate carers 
of, both boys and girls. Gay men, however, were largely held to be the 
appropriate carers of boys and young men only by the social workers. Rarely 
were they approved to care for girls (although this does happen in some cases).  
 
'Maternal' Men or 'Perverts'? 
 
My analysis of the data has discovered what I term a 'discourse of suspicion' 
concerning the idea of men as the carers of children. Social workers are far less 
used to working with men as clients (Cavanagh & Cree 1996), and, in fostering 
and adoption, I believe that there are assumptions made about the role of the 
woman in a heterosexual couple as primary carer, protector, and nurturer. This is 
at least partly because social workers are used to dealing with children who have 
been subjected to the physical and sexual violences of men (Hearn 1990, 1998; 
Kelly 1988; Pringle 1995): 
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Men are more likely to be accused of abuse and we're actually 
normally recruiting a lot of single women, or women with male 
partners, and a lot of it is about the women protecting the males 
in the household...If the children have been abused, then they're 
likely to have been abused by a male (but not always), so for gay 
men this is a particular problem because they don't have a 
female that can back them up and take over...We do have 
[straight] partnerships where the male is at home and the female 
is working, so the male is doing the basic care of small children, 
but we haven't - interestingly enough - had gay men offering to 
look after very small children and I would say we would probably 
have quite a bit of time convincing a panel as to why, and that is 
to do with prejudice about why men want to care for small 
children. [Team Manager, NR9]. 
 
Gay men, then, bring this 'discourse of suspicion' into play for the social workers 
doing assessments, because when they apply to foster or adopt - and this 
applies to 'single men' also - the assessing social worker has to confront a male 
household, a household in which it is unlikely that there is a woman that they can 
position as carer, nurturer, protector. Instead, gay men bring two sets of cultural 
anxieties into play here; gay men qua men are not seen as the 'natural' carers of 
children and, relatedly, as gay men they disrupt the conventionally heterosexual 
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model of 'the family' which still holds sway in much fostering and, especially, 
adoption practice. 
 
There is little evidence that men do much child care within heterosexual 
partnerships (VanEvery 1996) and much that they are responsible for most 
physical and sexual violences against children (Archer 1994; Hester et al. 1996; 
Kelly 1988). The social workers were often suspicious of the category 'men' in 
relation to child care, although they did make exceptions to this. Nevertheless, I 
found several references to the idea that men are not generally regarded as the 
'natural' carers of children. Further, in the case study, John told me that his 
assessment as a potential foster carer focused on his position as a 'single man', 
seen in itself as unusual, in order that the social worker could check out his ability 
to perform a range of caring tasks for Ismail. I argue, therefore, that social work 
here traditionally relies upon the idea that women protect children from men. Gay 
male applicants are a problem here because the social workers have no women 
in the household assessment to rely upon in terms of the protection of children. 
 
When analyzing the data, I became very interested in the language used by the 
social workers in relation to the categories 'men' and also 'gay men'. Around the 
category 'men' I observed the construction of a discourse of 'dangerousness' and 
'non-care' of children, and this is represented in Figure 5.2: 
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THE CATEGORY 'MEN' 
 
predatory 
abusers 
need to be protected from allegations by children 
not 'natural' carers 
not nurturers 
more likely to sexually abuse than women 
need to be careful about, or shouldn't be, touching or bathing children 
 
'there is more of a tradition of women bringing up children' 
'boys who've been sexually abused shouldn't go to men' 
'we're prejudiced against male carers' 
'why do men want to care for children?' 
'every male person is going to be a threat to them...' 
Figure 5.2  
 
I found that, for those social workers who believed that gay men could make 
good foster or adoptive carers, there was a tendency to reverse this discourse in 
order to present the category 'gay' as equating with the notion of 'maternal men'. 
The social workers theorized that gay men would either act as a 'positive male 
role model' for children who had had abusive experiences of men in the past, or 
they represented gay men in terms that are more usually applied to women as 
carers: 
 
THE CATEGORY 'GAY MEN' 
 
affectionate 
warm 
really open 
caring 
gentle 
 
'he took a very female role' 
'men can be gentle, caring and the other side of things' 
'one of them actually took on a much more traditional maternal role, and the other paternal, 
and people are looking for those in panel...' 
'they were so open and easy to work with' 
'he offers traditionally "Mum"-things, and traditionally female strengths...' 
Figure 5.3 
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My argument here would be that such terms, as they were used by the social 
workers, are not mere descriptors, but rather active linguistic constructors of 
meaning (Barthes 1977). Thus language here is no neutral conveyor of an 
already-agreed concept - such as 'gay' - but instead demonstrates the social 
workers' theorisations of such a category. This is also quite clearly bound up with 
their practices, so, where a social worker takes a report on a gay carer to 
fostering or adoption panel for approval, that report is also a textual 
representation of the category gay. Here, then, 'gay men' are largely represented 
or constructed as 'maternal', and some of the language in Figure 5.3 represents 
gay men in heterosexual terms: 
 
"...one of them actually took on a much more traditional maternal 
role, and the other paternal, and people are looking for those in 
panel..." [Social Worker, NR7]. 
 
However, in contrast to the way that gay men were constructed as 'maternal' by 
the social workers, as a different form of 'men', they were also regarded with 
suspicion as gay men. Here the focus was far more upon sexuality rather than 
gender, and this relates to the persistent connotation of 'pervert', 'predatory' and 
'paedophile' by the category 'gay'. This 'corruption theory' (Berry 1987) surfaced 
a number of times in my data. In the case study, John told me that, when he 
came out to his social worker about his relationship with Rob, he was asked 
questions about the nature of his relationship with Ismail and whether this had 
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ever been sexual. This question was never addressed in John's fostering 
assessment or approval, but only when he came out as gay. 
 
Lisa told me that her fostering panel also raised this question: 
 
What did come up in panel was the protection thing...I felt it was 
quite hard going through the panel and, although people feel 
they're terribly fair and right-on about these things, there was 
underlying stuff around. This was about protection and I can only 
think that assumptions were being made that a young person 
going into this household was going to be more at risk because 
these people were gay. I thought that was really unfair, but I had 
addressed all the usual stuff about how to deal with young 
people who've been abused, and how the carers will protect 
themselves, in my assessment so I said, 'Well, I've actually 
addressed that...' But I was really quite shocked by that. [Social 
Worker, NR7]. 
 
Caroline, a fostering team leader, also told me that she would be questioned by 
her panel about why gay men would want to care for younger children. She 
related this to the idea that carers in all-male households would need to be very 
clear about how to protect themselves from allegations of abuse, or from 
situations which could be interpreted as abusive, but she felt that this would be a 
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bigger issue for gay men: 
 
Gay men are going to have a much more difficult time because, 
well, there are more men abusers and men are seen as more 
predatory and not the natural carers of children. [Team Manager, 
NR9]. 
 
The social workers frequently mentioned this 'pernicious association with child 
abuse' [Social Worker, NE6] for gay men, but I found that they linked this to two 
major areas; first, they told me that it was fostering or adoption panels that 
maintained such 'prejudices', and, second, they linked this to what they described 
as gay men's extra "vulnerability" to allegations of child abuse, which I discuss 
later. 
 
Gloria, who worked on an adoption team, told me that some of her social work 
colleagues held what she called stereotypical views of gay men: 
 
Colleagues will say, 'Oh they're so promiscuous.' We had a 
discussion about sexuality one day and I just could not believe 
what I was hearing because I was under the misconception that I 
was working with enlightened beings! I was absolutely shocked 
because I could not believe the homophobic utterances. One 
colleague said, 'You have to accept that it is a fact that 
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homosexual men are so promiscuous,' and another said, 'I can't 
bear the thought of what men do sexually.' So the stereotypical 
thing is promiscuity and instability and disgusting sexual 
practices and contamination of innocent minds, all that kind of 
thing. [Social Worker, NR10]. 
 
This 'discourse of suspicion' was frequently cited by the social workers as a 
reason why decisions were made not to place children in the care of gay men. In 
one example, Jo, a senior social worker with a fostering team, told me that a 
social worker looking to place a fourteen-year-old young man, who had been 
abused by an older man, would not consider placing him with a gay foster carer 
because this was seen to be inappropriate. The social worker said that the gay 
carer would be more likely to be at risk of allegations of abuse, but Jo felt that the 
social worker thought 'gay men will have sexual relationships with children'. 
 
As with lesbian carers, the issue of whether to place children who had been 
sexually abused with gay men was a key point for the social workers. As I have 
already noted, there was a general suspicion about the appropriateness of men 
per se caring for such children, but this was linked to the idea that male carers - 
whether gay or straight - act as 'role models' to such children by force of 
example. Thus I found that one version, here, was to argue that children who 
have been sexually abused should not be placed with men, especially as most 
will have been abused by an adult male: 
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I was talking to a social worker about a referral she had made of  
a young man who needed fostering. One option I offered was the 
gay male couple, but she was concerned that, as this young 
person had been abused by a man, how would that be for him, 
being placed with two men? I don't see it as being a problem but 
clearly it was for her. [Social Worker, NR3]. 
 
However, I also found some evidence of a version which suggested that gay men 
could act as 'positive male role models' to such children, since the children would 
then see that not all men are abusers, an idea which I have criticized elsewhere 
(Hicks, forthcoming).  
 
Neither of these versions of the gay man - the 'naturally "maternal" positive male 
role model' or the 'predatory abuser' - seem to me to be particularly helpful in 
terms of conducting assessments of gay men who apply to foster or adopt. They 
encapsulate Brown's positive and negative stereotypes (Brown 1991, 1992a) in 
which the category 'gay' is used in an unquestioning way that confers upon it a 
fixed and determinate meaning. Where such a meaning is given to the applicant 
in advance of any assessment, this is likely to impair the social worker's ability to 
assess child care skills, and indeed sexuality. 
 
Relatedly, I also looked at evidence from my data about the 'type' of placements 
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for which gay men are approved, and/or have children placed within their care. In 
addition to the preference for placing boys or young men which I have already 
mentioned, I found there were five significant factors which tended to 
characterize the children placed with gay men. First, gay men were seen as the 
appropriate carers of older children, usually over the age of eleven; second, they 
were far more likely to be approved as foster carers rather than adopters; third, 
they were often given shorter-term and/or emergency placements rather than 
children being placed with the view to permanency; fourth, they were sometimes 
seen as the appropriate carers for disabled children, including those with a 
learning difficulty, a point confirmed in existing research (Ricketts 1991; Skeates 
& Jabri 1988); and, fifth, they were often seen as the carers of young gay men.  
 
I asked the social workers about how they went about assessing 'single men', 
since I wanted to find out whether the same dynamics arose as had with the 
'single women' question. The social workers told me that a single man applying 
to foster or adopt was, in itself, unusual and so this raised a series of questions 
which seem to me to relate to issues of gender and sexuality. The social workers 
told me that a single man is likely to provoke a series of questions for themselves 
and for panels, since social work agencies often work with the assumption that 
(heterosexual) men (in partnerships) do not care for children. Applications by 
single men, then, although in themselves rare, do raise questions about their 
motives in wanting to care for children, and about their sexuality. Many felt that 
'single man' was often read as 'gay', but certainly 'odd' because panels were so 
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unused to the idea of men as primary carers of children. Annie told me that she 
had never heard a request by a placing social worker for a single male carer: 
 
I can't ever remember seeing a placement form where someone 
has written 'this child needs a single male household.' I have seen 
'single female' quite a lot, and never 'two men' or 'two women'... 
[Social Worker, NE10]. 
 
In my case study, John told me that his application to foster Ismail was unusual 
as he was a 'single man' at the time. The assessing social worker made much of 
this in the assessment, John remembered, checking out that he was able to 
perform a range of caring tasks. He also felt that there was some degree of 
suspicion about his motives in wanting to care for a young man, but this was not 
raised openly until John later came out as gay when he began his relationship 
with Rob. Applications by 'single men', then, including those few by men who are 
heterosexual, raise the 'discourse of suspicion' which I have discussed earlier in 
relation to the category 'gay'. This is in marked contrast to applications by 'single 
women', where I found no evidence of such suspicions. Single men were also 
seen as being particularly "vulnerable" to allegations of abuse by children in their 
charge, and it is to this question that I now turn. 
 
I found that many of the social workers constructed the idea that gay men would 
be more "vulnerable" to allegations of abuse being made against them. Several 
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talked about this in terms of gay men taking a greater 'risk' than others by 
fostering or adopting, and they constructed this 'risk' in a number of ways; first, 
gay men were seen to be more "vulnerable" because allegations would be likely 
to confirm the stereotype of them as 'predatory abusers', whether that allegation 
were true or not. Here concerns about the media getting hold of such stories 
were paramount, and this betrays a wider concern amongst fostering and 
adoption units that the press might expose them for approving gay, or indeed 
lesbian, carers. What is most interesting, here, was the way that the social 
workers placed responsibility for this issue onto gay men themselves; they talked 
of gay men 'taking a greater risk', of gay men 'being more vulnerable' and of how 
'hard it was for gay men to protect themselves'. 
 
Second, men are more likely than women to be accused of abuse, the social 
workers told me. Richard, who worked on a fostering team, explained that figures 
from the National Foster Care Association showed that it was almost always 
male carers who were accused of abuse by children, usually for what were seen 
as forms of 'inappropriate touching'. Richard told me that his unit advised male 
carers in heterosexual partnerships never to be alone with children and not to 
involve themselves in intimate care such as bathing. For gay men, he said, this 
was a problem and so they were more "vulnerable". A team manager also told 
me that gay men do not have a woman to protect them from what she called 
'mischievous allegations' by children in the home, and so she felt that the issues 
of self-protection were much harder for gay men. 
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Two points arose from this; one was that some placing social workers used these 
ideas to argue against using gay carers. In one example, Jo told me that a social 
worker had decided she did not want to place a young gay man with a gay foster 
carer. She argued that the boy had been in a "relationship" with a thirty-year-old 
man when he was just eleven, and so she felt that the gay carer would be more 
vulnerable to allegations of abuse by the young man. Second, where an 
allegation was made against a single gay carer, this was largely 'read' by the 
social workers via 'gay'-ness; by this I mean that the allegation itself was talked 
about in terms of 'the gay issue', and it became 'a gay issue' as opposed to 'an 
allegation issue'. Rarely do social workers focus on the heterosexuality of the - 
vast majority of - men who do abuse children in their care, but instead 
investigations focus on 'what happened' and who committed the abuse. In my 
example here, however, an allegation that the social workers decided was false 
was 'read' as a 'gay issue'. Rose, the social worker, told me that, in discussions 
about this allegation, the word "vulnerability" was used again and again to 
describe the gay man in question. This may be seen as a coded response to the 
anxieties that this carer embodied for the social workers - single, gay, man. 
 
I also found, in line with my findings that gay men were generally understood to 
be the appropriate carers of young men needing short-term placements, that 
adoption was seen as less appropriate for gay men. Maude told me that she had 
volunteered to do an assessment of a gay male couple who had applied for 
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adoption, despite never having done such an assessment before, because no-
one else in her team wanted to do it. She felt that many of the social workers 
were embarrassed about the idea of assessing gay men, and the team overall 
had no previous experience of adoption by gay men. Another example is the one 
represented by the quotation from the social worker that I used to preface this 
section; here, a gay male couple applied to adopt and had to be taken to the 
panel for a decision to be made that the social workers could go ahead with an 
assessment. This is an example par excellence of disadvantageous (different) 
treatment of gay applicants, since it is not usual practice to take applicants to 
panels in advance of an assessment. Second, the social worker told me that the 
couple were more readily accepted by the panel because they had applied to 
adopt a learning disabled child, a rare resource indeed, and they also felt that the 
child might therefore be less aware that the carers were gay, and presumably 
less 'influenced' by this. 
 
Three adoption workers told me that their panels were 'more conservative' than 
fostering panels, and therefore extremely unlikely to countenance applications by 
gay men. Martin also told me that his adoption panel would see this as 'forcing a 
gay lifestyle' onto the child in question. These social workers also made the point 
that it was gay men, not lesbians, that they felt would not be acceptable to their 
adoption panels. This is not to suggest that applications to adopt by lesbians are 
easily or universally accepted - far from it - but I did find that gay men are far less 
likely to be considered and/or approved for adoption. I also know this to be the 
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case from previous research (Hicks 1993, 1996); there are few gay men 
approved as adoptive carers. Adoption retains the more conservative views of 
'family life' both in practice and legislation (DoH et al. 1993; Triseliotis et al. 
1997), and gay men challenge or threaten this on the grounds of gender and 
sexuality. 
 
'Gay is to straight as...': Promoting Homosexuality? 
 
The replication of heterosexual constructs in non-heterosexual 
frames brings into relief the utterly constructed status of the so-
called heterosexual original. Thus, gay is to straight not as copy 
is to original, but, rather, as copy is to copy. The parodic 
repetition of "the original"...reveals the original to be nothing 
other than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original. 
(Butler 1990:31). 
 
I want to argue, then, that applications to foster or adopt by gay men do bring into 
play a set of cultural anxieties about heterosexuality and its supposed natural-
ness for some of the social workers, but certainly for fostering and adoption as a 
whole. Using Butler's (1990) argument, gay applicants are regarded by the social 
workers as different, as potentially able to care but not the same as the 
heterosexual carers that they are used to assessing. Whilst this does set in 
motion a whole range of ideas of what is a 'gay man', as I have shown, this also 
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throws some not insignificant focus onto assessment practices which rest upon 
an assumed and invisible heterosexuality. In Butler's version, this heterosexuality 
has no original essence, but instead has to constantly repeat and perform 
versions of itself: 
 
...the parodic or imitative effect of gay identities works neither to 
copy nor to emulate heterosexuality, but rather, to expose 
heterosexuality as an incessant and panicked imitation of its 
own naturalized idealization. (Butler 1991:22-23). 
 
Thus there is no original heterosexuality possessed by straight applicants, but 
instead this in constructed during each assessment by the social worker, and it 
relies upon often unstated, but equally as much constructed, social norms around 
'balanced gender roles', 'correct sexual development', compulsory 
heterosexuality and a kind of 'everyday, boring normality.' This, of course, 
contrasts nicely with the 'exoticism' given to lesbians and gay men who apply.  
 
My data on the assessment of gay men points to this assumptive 'normality' of 
heterosexuality within the social workers' accounts, or what I have termed a 
'heteronormativity' in chapter six. The heterosexual couple, and the 'nuclear 
family' (Brosnan 1996), were acknowledged by the social workers as the 'norm' in 
fostering and adoption practice, to the extent where some told me that they found 
themselves using the model of 'the heterosexual couple' in order to assess gay 
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men or lesbians: 
 
What I started doing was just an ordinary assessment which was 
the standard form, and so I was looking at the caring capacity of 
the individuals, as opposed to whether they're gay or not, and so 
my questions were geared generally to 'male and female' which is 
what we have usually...and I'm thinking, 'Well this is ridiculous 
because these are two guys here...' [Social Worker, SR2, my 
emphasis]. 
 
Relatedly, I found the social workers constructing 'gendered difference' within the 
gay couple, representing one as 'the man' and one as 'the woman' in order to 
deal with the expectations of panels. This was largely because some of the social 
workers, and their panels, read caring tasks as gendered tasks; thus discipline, 
care, cooking and so on were often seen in traditionally gendered terms, with 
men often assumed to 'do' discipline whilst women 'do' care, protection, and 
cooking. In one example, Jo told me that a fostering panel looking at a gay male 
couple had asked whether they were able to do laundry. 
 
I also found evidence of the anxiety that gay men would not be able to provide 
the correct role models of heterosexuality. Panels often wanted reassurance that 
gay men knew heterosexual people, not just other gay people, and some of the 
social workers were concerned about children not being able to 'learn 
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heterosexuality' from gay men: 
 
If the child lives with them, then the point is will the child see this as 
an easy thing to accept rather than making a relationship with 
someone of the opposite sex? And if the two of you go to bed in the 
same room and the child's room is next door, what sort of 
messages do you believe he will get from that? Is the child likely to 
take on the same orientation, because it's the child I'm concerned 
about, not the two individuals... [Social Worker, NR4]. 
 
In another example, Cathy, a social worker on an adoption team, had similar 
anxieties about maintaining heterosexuality: 
 
I'd ask gay men how they would see a boy...I mean presumably it 
would be a boy that you would place with them, I would imagine, so 
how would they see that relationship developing as they got 
older...would they want them to be either lesbian or gay or 
whatever...? [Social Worker, SR5]. 
 
The concept of two gay men bringing up a young boy to "become a lesbian" 
expresses the absolute, and irrational, fear of queer-ness here. In one reading of 
'gay is to straight...', then, I found that the social workers were panicked by 
applications from gay men. Because the category 'gay' points to the institutional 
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locus of heterosexuality within fostering and adoption practice, 'gay' is read as a 
threat, and the motives of gay applicants, I found, were questioned on the basis 
that they were 'promoting homosexuality.' This relates to the reading of lesbian 
and gay applicants as wanting to 'prove a point' as discussed in the risk-based 
arguments in the previous chapter, rather than being really interested in caring 
for children, an interpretation of their 'motives' as suspicious and part of an adult 
'gay rights' agenda (DoH 1990; Whitfield 1991).  
 
Where institutional heterosexuality is too much threatened by gay applicants, 
there is a further panic concerning the idea of a 'critical mass', or the notion that 
too many gay men may apply and be approved which would upset the 
hegemonic position of heterosexuality. In one example, a senior manager, who 
was involved in the investigation of an unfounded allegation made against a gay 
foster carer, remarked, "...And we've just approved another gay man this 
morning." Here I also found that gay applicants, unlike heterosexuals, were seen 
as wanting to 'promote' their 'homosexuality': 
 
One of them was much more active politically around his 
sexuality and, in the preparation group, he really hammered it 
home, and a bit too much I think because every issue that came 
up he wanted to address sexuality which was a bit over the top in 
the end. This need to promote and promote and promote raised 
a big question for us about how resolved was he with his stuff? 
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Because of his need to put sexuality on the agenda of 
everything, we just wondered whether he'd be able to see the 
complete young person really, as opposed to just their 
sexuality...As it could be with sexuality, or race or whatever, how 
sort of threatening might that be to a young person coming in? 
What if somebody just wanted to do it in a low key way? [Social 
Worker, NR7].  
 
What I am arguing here, then, is that the social workers worked with an 
'inside/out' binary system of thought, in which heterosexuality, the norm, the 
everyday, the invisible was assumed a priori to equate with 'the good carer' of 
children. However, when assessing gay men the social workers' theorisations of 
that category, and indeed the social work practices they adopted, constructed 
'gay' as other, exotic, different, and often outside of what were seen as 
appropriate constituents of 'the good carer'. In my case study, for example, John 
told me that, when his partner Rob attended a child care review meeting, the 
social worker asked him, "Who is this?" John replied, "My partner, Rob," to which 
came the response, "What's this meeting got to do with him?" It is extremely 
unlikely that a heterosexual couple, living together and caring for a foster son, 
would have been questioned in this way. 
 
Thus I have been arguing that applications to foster or adopt by gay men disrupt 
both gender and sexuality norms, and this accounts at least in part for the small 
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numbers of gay men who are approved for adoption and/or to care for younger 
children. It is heterosexuality that is in panic here, but it seems to me that it is a 
far more stubborn and far less fragile heterosexuality than that suggested by 
Butler (1990). Butler's (1990) view of heterosexuality is that it is always 
performatively produced. She calls this "a matter of reiterating or repeating the 
norms by which [heterosexuality] is constituted" (Butler 1997:17). Whilst I support 
the view that heterosexuality is performed in and through the assessment 
practices of the social workers, Butler's argument does not account for the 
institutional locus of heterosexuality within fostering and adoption practice. For 
example, 'heterosexuality' is promoted within legislation and guidance concerning 
fostering and adoption, not least in the white paper on adoption where the 
married couple are referred to as the preferred 'family structure' (DoH et al. 
1993:9). As I have also argued, the social workers relied upon an unspoken 
assumption that heterosexual relationships included a woman who would be 
responsible for protection of children from men. Heterosexuality is here so central 
and assured that the risk posed by heterosexual men to children is overlooked 
simply because women are in the equation. Gay men, however, bring such 
anxieties to the fore for the social workers, as they question the assumptions of 
such a gendered heterosexuality. 
 
We might return to some feminist theorisations of institutional heterosexuality 
here, for it has been within feminist theory that heterosexuality has been critiqued 
as something enforced or compulsory (Rich 1980; Wilkinson & Kitzinger 1993), 
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even as eroticised dominance (Leeds Revolutionary Feminist Group 1981; 
Wilkinson & Kitzinger 1996b). Sue Wilkinson & Celia Kitzinger (1996b) have 
argued that, in Butler's (1990) version, hetero- and homo-sexualities become 
merely interchangable, but if that were the case then there would be no evidence 
in my data of such 'heterosexual panic' amongst the social workers having to 
assess gay men. The category 'gay' does not here mean merely 'different', but is 
at the very least a 'threat' to the heteronormative version of 'the good carer of 
children'. This institutional locus of heterosexuality within fostering and adoption 
practice is anything but the fragile version suggested by Butler (1990). 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have analyzed how the social workers made sense of the 
categories 'lesbian\mother' and 'gay father' in and through their assessment 
practices. I have argued that 'the lesbian' represents a threat to the institutional 
dominance of men within social work, and to a masculine heterosexuality, both of 
which are defended in discourses concerning 'the good carer'. In their 
theorisations of 'lesbian', I found that the social workers demonstrated 'gender 
anxiety' via their concerns about the ability of lesbians to provide gender role 
models, the attitudes of lesbians towards men, and the appropriateness of 
lesbians' stated preferences for caring for girls or boys. I have argued that 
assessment practices 'organize out' the version of the 'bad lesbian' and favour 
the 'good lesbian carer', a construction which I have represented at Figure 5.1. 
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This argument is developed in the following chapter, where I look at 'who makes 
a good parent?' under heteronormativity. 
 
With regard to applications by gay men, I have argued that there are different 
ways of making sense of the category 'gay', and that these were demonstrated 
by the social workers. I found a reliance amongst the social workers on the 
"ethnic identity" model of 'gay' (Epstein 1987), where 'gay' is regarded as a 
discrete 'cultural' minority. This version of 'gay' was more acceptable within 
fostering and adoption, and to panels, but is one of 'liberal difference'. Here gay 
men have to be interpreted and represented by the social workers in largely 
heterosexual terms. Thus the construction of 'maternal men' is a key example 
that I found whereby the category 'gay' is made acceptable via heteronormative 
ideas; gay couples are 'read' via gendered difference, and are associated with 
'maternal' qualities. 
 
As with lesbian carers, I found 'gender anxiety' in how the category 'gay' was 
assessed. Social workers were concerned about whether gay men knew enough 
women, and they demonstrated a preference for placing boys/young men with 
gay carers. I also found what I have termed a 'discourse of suspicion' in relation 
to gay men; as men they were not regarded as the 'natural' carers of children, 
and as gay they were either constructed via notions of the 'maternal' or as 
predatory 'perverts'. I found that the social workers showed quite specific ideas 
about the types of placement that were appropriate for gay men, and these 
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tended to be older children, fostered not adopted, on a short-term basis, often of 
disabled children or young gay men. Rarely were gay men seen as appropriate 
adopters. 
 
I have argued against the 'dual identities' thesis in both cases, and this is 
because concepts such as 'lesbian', 'mother', 'gay', 'father', 'carer' are always 
political not just individual; that is, they are social constructions not 'psychological 
choices'. Thus 'lesbian\mother' and 'gay father' have to be reinterpreted through 
and via the social workers and their practices, which take place within a 
heteronormative system; no accident, then that few gay men are approved for 
adoption, or that 'the good lesbian carer' is the favoured version. 
 
My argument is that such social work-ing results in assessment practices which 
favour the 'on merit' model of assessment. 'Child care' skills were emphasized by 
the social workers making positive assessments of lesbians or gay men, which 
rely upon the liberal/"ethnic"-minority version of 'lesbian' or 'gay' (Epstein 1987). 
Here lesbian or gay applicants are seen as an oppressed minority who should be 
treated the same for the purposes of assessment, a consequence of the 
'sameness' models discussed in the previous chapter. Thus I found that the 
social workers tended to rely on assessment practices which they used for 
heterosexual applicants, and I develop this argument in relation to the 
'heterosexualisation of lesbians' in the following chapter on Nita and Clare. 
Chapter 6 
 310 
 
Nita and Clare: A Case Study of the Dynamics of 
Race9, Gender and Sexuality in Assessment 
 
Nita and Clare are a lesbian couple, one Asian and the other white, who made an 
application to be considered as adopters to their Local Authority, hereafter 
referred to as 'Northern City Council'. This case study follows the story of their 
application, subsequent assessment by the Northern City Council's Social 
Services Department, and eventual approval by the adoption panel. It then goes 
on to describe an application that the couple made, after having been approved 
as adopters, to be considered as the carers for a sibling group of seven Asian 
girls of Indian heritage. The Authority responsible for the care of the girls, which 
is in the Midlands and is hereafter referred to as the 'Midlands Council', 
considered whether to place them with Nita and Clare at both a linking meeting 
and matching panel, but eventually turned them down for reasons which will be 
described below. 
 
This case study is based upon data generated from three interviews with Nita 
and Clare, an interview with their social worker, Barbara, and documentary 
sources; namely their Form F assessment report, correspondence between the 
couple and the Midlands Council, and formal reports of the investigation of a 
                                                           
9 There is an academic convention of placing the word 'race' in inverted commas in order to 
indicate that it is a socially constructed category. It is my view, however, that in this sense 
'sexuality' and 'gender' are as much socially constructed as 'race', and so I have chosen not to 
employ this convention for the purposes of this chapter. 
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complaint made by the couple. The chapter is structured in three sections. 
Section one is a narrative account, designed to acquaint the reader with the story 
of what happened, and with the characters involved. The second section 
presents an analysis of Nita and Clare's assessment and approval as adoptive 
carers, and the final section examines how the intersecting dynamics of race, 
gender and sexuality were variously interpreted in relation to their application to 
be considered as the potential carers for the girls. In section two, I argue that, 
although their Form F assessment was largely a positive experience for them, 
and more importantly one which resulted in their approval as adopters, 
nevertheless Nita and Clare were represented to the adoption panel in ways 
which relied upon specific constructions of the category 'lesbian'. In the third 
section, I focus on how these intersecting dynamics of race, gender and sexuality 
became key sites for the contestation of social work meanings attached to such 
concepts, and how the figure of the 'black lesbian' (Smith 1994) was crucial to 
this process. 
 
Section One: Nita and Clare's story 
 
Nita and Clare live in a terraced house in a city in the North of England. They 
have been together for five years. Nita is thirty-five years old, and is a woman of 
Indian heritage who grew up in Britain. She trained as a teacher but now divides 
her time between writing and working at a local Asian women's training project. 
Clare is thirty-three years old, and is a white woman of English and Irish heritage. 
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She works as a teacher in a local secondary school. Both women are able-
bodied, neither practises any religion, and they see themselves as middle class. 
 
Their Application to Adopt: 
 
Nita and Clare were the first openly lesbian couple to make an adoption 
application to the Northern City Council. They knew that other lesbians, who had 
not come out, were providing foster or adoptive care for the Council, but Nita and 
Clare made a decision that they wanted to be 'out' throughout the process of their 
application. They explained to me why this was the case: 
 
Nita: We're living together anyway, and we couldn't face the 
thought of being so deliberately deceptive when mostly we're not 
in our lives, and we're not deceptive about our sexuality, we're 
just, you know, selective with the truth depending on the 
circumstances. We don't deny our sexuality overtly in that way, 
and we didn't want to get ourselves into the position of doing 
that, or implicating other people in lying as well because of the 
business of having to have referees and so on... 
Clare: ...And we just thought also that if we were going to do it, 
and that we did so pretending that we weren't lesbians, then, 
one, that really cut here [at the heart], you know, "I've got to 
pretend to be something that I'm not because it's a bad thing to 
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be" and, two, what sort of basis would that be for a child? It's like 
saying, you know, "You mustn't tell anybody and if you do..." 
 
Nita and Clare applied to be considered for adoption, and were eventually 
approved for the adoption of up to three children aged nought to seven years. 
Although they were approved by panel as a couple, it was Nita, in fact, who was 
the named adopter in law, and this was for two reasons; first, that adoption law 
currently does not allow for unmarried couples to be joint adopters, and this is 
unlikely to change (DoH et al. 1993), and second, because the couple had 
specifically offered themselves to adopt Asian, or Asian mixed race10, children 
the Northern City Council were keen to match black children with black adopters. 
 
I asked Nita and Clare what had prompted them to make their adoption 
application. Nita said that they knew a lesbian couple that had successfully 
adopted, and that the couple was also an Asian woman and a white woman, and 
that Nita knew the Asian woman quite well. She said that this "sowed a seed" in 
her head about the idea of adoption. Clare said that she had always thought that 
she might want children one day, but had never considered the idea of giving 
birth. For both women adoption was a positive, and first, choice: 
 
Clare: When we talked about having children, we didn't talk 
                                                           
10 By 'Asian mixed race', I mean a child who is of mixed racial parentage, having one Asian 
parent by birth. The term 'Asian' is also specific here to the Indian sub-continent (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh). Nita is of Indian heritage, and the couple was considering children from the sub-
continent or those with a heritage from the Indian sub-continent. 
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about 'having' children, we talked about adopting, so that's how it 
started. It didn't start from, "We'd really like to have children, how 
shall we do it? Shall we adopt? Shall we...", it started, "No...let's 
adopt." It was only when we started on the adoption process that 
we had to justify why it was that we were adopting, and it was 
only when we started to tell other people that we had to justify it, 
that we had to start thinking, "Why are we saying adoption?"...So 
it was always that way around. 
Nita: ...But as far as we were concerned, it was immediately 
obvious to us that we wanted to adopt and that was how we 
wanted to bring children into our lives. 
 
The couple were initially spurred to make the application to the Northern City 
Council because they saw posters in a local advertising campaign for adopters 
and foster carers. Clare told me, "...when we saw that, we thought, 'well maybe 
this is the time to do it,' especially as it said on the poster, 'You don't have to be 
married. You don't have to be...', you know, so it seemed like that was a door 
they'd opened, it seemed like now was a good time to do it..." Their application 
was made two and a half years after the start of their relationship.  
 
Nita and Clare approached the Northern City Council because they knew that no 
'out' lesbians had yet been approved as carers. Nita said that they felt they ought 
to look locally, and that the Council owed it to them to consider them seriously 
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given their stated policy of equality of opportunity. They also wanted to go 
through the process as an out lesbian couple in order to 'pave the way' for 
lesbians in the future. Clare explained: 
 
We thought we'd got a better chance than most people because 
we're both middle class, we're both trained teachers, we knew 
there was a dearth of resources for black families because that's 
what they were advertising for, and we thought all that had to 
stand in our favour. So maybe if we got through, then somebody 
who wasn't middle class who came along might get through... 
 
Nita and Clare had decided that they wanted to offer themselves as a resource 
for black11 children specifically needing adoption. Northern City Council was 
looking to recruit black adopters, and so the couple felt that, as Nita is an Asian 
woman, they wanted to offer a home to an Asian, or Asian mixed race, child: 
 
Nita: One of the first decisions that we'd made around this was 
that we wanted to adopt, or wanted in our lives, a black child or 
children...I didn't want to be in the position, and Clare didn't want 
me to be in the position, where the whole family was white apart 
from me. One of the messages we were getting, both from the 
                                                           
11 Here I am using the term 'black' inclusively to mean people of Asian as well as African 
descent, though the term is problematic and contested (see Mason-John and Khambatta, 
1993:32). But see footnote 2. 
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advertising campaign and generally, was that Northern City 
Council were particularly looking for black adopters,...so it just 
seemed to be so obvious, and also that we knew all the things 
that we could offer in terms of awareness of issues of identity... 
Clare: We would be happy to bring up a child in one of the 
religions of the Indian sub-continent, though we don't practise 
ourselves...We feel we've got enough knowledge about it to be 
able to do it, and we've got friends in our network...We 
specifically said that we felt confident, and would be prepared, to 
bring up a child as a Sikh, Muslim or Hindu, didn't we?... 
Nita: ...Yes and we've got support for that. We would know 
where to take the child, and we have friends who actually 
practise those religions themselves who could involve us in all of 
their festivals...I think for a lot of black people in this country, their 
religion is a real refuge and source of hope and positive feelings 
about themselves. 
 
The couple also wanted to offer a home to girls specifically, and Clare explained 
to me that this was because they felt what they had to offer as carers would be 
most relevant to girls. The couple felt that girls in the care system would have 
experienced a lot of negative messages about themselves, and so they wanted 
to work with girls and to provide them with a positive living environment. Clare 
told me that they also felt like they would be a limited resource, and so this 
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should be offered to those whose needs would be best met by the couple. Nita 
also explained that they felt that boys require a lot of work and energy in order to 
counter the messages that they get from society, and that the couple wanted to 
spend their energies on girls: 
 
Clare: It was quite hard to explain really, because we haven't got 
any problem with boys...we've got loads of boys in our lives, that 
was a boy on the phone just now!...and I work with boys and it's 
not that I dislike boys, but to try and explain to someone that we 
want to have girls rather than boys... 
 
The couple wanted to have younger children, preferably under fives, because 
they felt it was easier to start off with younger ones, and they also wanted to 
have some time at home with them before they started at school. They were 
advised to push this up to seven years old, because the Authority thought this 
would be more realistic for considering the placement of sibling groups of up to 
three children. 
 
Nita made the initial contact with Northern City Council adoption unit. After 
having seen the advertising campaign, she telephoned the section and explained 
that she was interested in adoption, and that she was a black woman. Nita asked 
about the Authority's statement of equality of opportunity, and was told that any 
applicant would be given equal consideration on the basis of their parenting skills 
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and whether they could provide a home for a child. At this stage, Nita was 
making an anonymous enquiry only and said she would call again. 
 
The next step was to contact the unit again, but at this stage Nita and Clare had 
to make a decision about when to come out as lesbians. As they didn't know of 
any lesbian workers in adoption, and were unsure of the response they would 
get, they decided not to come out at the initial point of contact. This was a 
complex decision, and Nita explained: 
 
We decided that we wouldn't be out on the initial contact 
because we wouldn't know who we were talking to and we didn't 
want everybody to know. I was actually an employee of Social 
Services then...I wasn't actually working in the Department as I 
was outposted to the Asian Women's Refuge, and I was a 
section eleven worker12 so I didn't have a lot to do with the 
Department. Nevertheless I was paid by them and there were 
files on me in personnel and I was known to quite a lot of people 
in Social Services through the work that I'd done with Asian 
women and around domestic violence, so we decided it was too 
risky to just go bouncing in there and say, "We're lesbians and 
we want to adopt..." So I contacted them and said that I was a 
black woman and that I was single and that I was interested in 
                                                           
12 A worker employed under section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act to work specifically 
with particular ethnic minority populations (Gordon, 1992:25). 
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adoption, and so I went to see the manager of the section and 
she was very helpful, but I knew this manager was quite a strong 
Christian so I didn't really want to come out to her because I 
didn't trust how she'd deal with it... 
 
The next stage was for Nita to attend the preparation course, a course which all 
applicants are asked to attend, and at which they do training on issues relating to 
adoption of children. Such courses are common practice in local authority 
fostering and adoption units (Triseliotis et al. 1995, 1997), and are a part of the 
assessment as people's attitudes and values are noted. Nita knew of another 
Asian lesbian who had been on such a course in which all the other participants 
were white heterosexual people, and the woman had found this very difficult. Nita 
therefore said that she was worried about the course, and that she thought it 
might be difficult for her being single and being black. The adoption unit manager 
agreed and said that they had other single black adopters coming forward at the 
same time and so they would hold a training course for black applicants only. 
 
Nita had a very positive experience of the preparation course, but, "...as far as 
they were concerned I lived on my own, and I hadn't come out." At the end of the 
course, applicants were asked to think about whether they still wanted to 
progress, and then Nita phoned the next day to say she was still interested. The 
Council then wrote back saying that she would be allocated a social worker. 
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It was at this point that Nita and Clare decided that they needed to come out as 
lesbians, as they wanted to be open throughout the home study part of the 
assessment. Nita felt, from contact on the training course and from what she had 
heard, that Barbara would be able to handle lesbian issues and would treat their 
application fairly. Therefore she decided to write to the Adoption Unit requesting 
Barbara as her social worker, an unusual move. Nita said in her letter that she 
wanted a black social worker because she would feel more confident in handling 
the issues of race, and Barbara was the only black worker in the adoption team. 
Whilst Nita feels that this was partly true, in actual fact she was more concerned 
to get a social worker who would be able to handle their coming out as lesbians. 
Barbara was allocated to the case, and arranged to visit Nita at home: 
 
Nita: Barbara came to see me at home, and actually Clare 
wasn't there because we didn't want her to just walk in and be 
confronted with us. So before we got into anything else, I said, 
"Look, there's something that I haven't told you...I'm not single...", 
and I told her about Clare, and she sort of took a deep breath 
and said, "Right Ok!" She was a bit taken aback, but she took it 
in her stride and said, "Well obviously we're going to have to 
rethink this," and then we went ahead and talked about things 
and she said she needed to meet Clare. We did it that way 
because we really wanted to know who we were coming out to 
first... 
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The Assessment: 
 
I asked the couple how they were assessed, and Clare explained that Barbara 
"...didn't know at the beginning whether to take us as a single adopter plus 
person living with her, or as a couple...she didn't really know." Although in law 
only one person in a lesbian or gay couple can be the named adopter, 
assessments should nevertheless take account of all adults in the household 
(DoH/Welsh Office 1992). In this case, the social worker started off the 
assessment as though Nita were a single adopter with Clare living in her house, 
but then later abandoned this approach in favour of assessing them as a couple. 
Barbara saw the couple together at first, then separately, and then together 
again. They thought that the assessment itself had taken about four months to 
complete, but the process of taking their report to panel delayed things further. 
Nita and Clare explained to me that they produced a lot of written material for the 
purposes of their assessment. Barbara asked the couple to fill in the personal 
history parts of Form F about half way through the assessment as a whole, and 
then used these to question them and to clarify issues with them. Clare noted 
that Barbara had said that they had written far more than most people she had 
assessed. 
 
Nita and Clare commented on how they felt their assessment was handled: 
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Nita: The assessment as a whole, I think she handled it well, and 
we felt quite enthusiastic about her as our social worker, and 
about the whole process...There were delays and that felt a bit 
frustrating, but of course it helped with getting through panel and 
being approved. 
 
The couple produced two referees for the purposes of the assessment in line 
with usual practice, but exceptionally were asked to give three in all. All of the 
referees were interviewed, but this was normal practice for Northern City Council. 
 
Post-Assessment Issues: 
 
Nita and Clare's assessment report went through the adoption panel very 
smoothly according to Barbara. The panel was happy with the assessment report 
and approved the couple for adoption. However, Nita and Clare experienced a 
delay after their approval as adopters, and they became very frustrated with 
waiting for any serious consideration of their assessment report form by a placing 
agency. Nita feels that this was partly to do with the specifics of their case: 
 
Nita: Maybe it was understandable...Maybe the social worker 
didn't anticipate all the issues to do with the combination of 
looking for an Asian child with all the issues about language and 
religion, and with having a mixed couple and a lesbian couple. 
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There are lots of different things really compounding it which she 
hadn't anticipated being such a problem, with hindsight...But the 
thing is if we had talked about those issues along the way, then 
we might have been more prepared and she might have been 
more prepared... 
 
Clare said that their report had also been referred to the British Agencies for 
Adoption and Fostering (B.A.A.F.), and that they had been led to believe that 
there was a specific matching service considering the placement of black 
children with black adopters. They therefore expected that they would hear from 
a placing agency, but the delay continued. Nita explained that this puzzled them 
as they had the impression that there were large numbers of Asian, or Asian 
mixed race, children in care and needing adoptive homes13 : 
 
Nita: We were still, at this stage, under the impression that there 
were actually quite a lot of Asian babies and toddlers around. 
Clare: Well there are...I saw a programme [this was BBC 'East' 
1995] where, in Bradford alone, there were something like eighty-
eight Asian children in care, of which fifty-five are Asian mixed 
race, so that's a lot of children...so that's only Bradford, and 
you've only got to duplicate that by Birmingham, Leicester, 
London... 
                                                           
13 In fact there is evidence to support this (see Ravinder Barn (1993:76); BBC ‘East’ 1995). 
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Nita: The other statistic that they gave was that Asian children, 
on average, take six times longer to be placed... 
Clare: ...and we thought, "Yes we know that!" 
 
After waiting some time, Nita and Clare decided to start looking for possible 
children in fortnightly adoption newsletters. Nita explained, "We phoned a lot of 
those up and most of them came back and said they were looking for a Muslim 
family or a Sikh family, or sometimes they just came back and said they'd had 
enough enquiries." 
 
Their Application to Care for Children: 
 
It was at this point that they noticed an advertisement in a November edition of a 
national adoption newsletter14. It had been written by the Midlands Council, who 
were seeking a permanent placement for a sibling group of seven Asian  girls. 
The advert described the girls as nominally Hindu, from a Punjabi speaking 
home, and needing a permanent placement, as they had been in foster care for 
two years. Nita and Clare discussed this at length and decided that they felt able 
to meet the needs of these children, and so they telephoned their social worker, 
Barbara. Clare explained to Barbara that they had thought about it very seriously 
and that they wanted to be considered, and so Barbara said she would contact 
the Midlands Council. 
                                                           
14  It was the P.P.I.A.S. newsletter ('Parent to Parent Information on Adoption Service'), now 
called 'Adoption U.K.' 
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Initially, Barbara was not too happy with the response: 
 
Nita: She thought that they were openly negative about us. The 
woman that she contacted was in the Homefinder team, and she 
said that she didn't approve of lesbians adopting, and that if the 
case was taken up by the Department then she would have 
nothing to do with it because she didn't agree with it. So that was 
Barbara's first encounter with this Authority! 
Clare: But she was not put off totally because the woman said 
that her views weren't necessarily departmental policy and also 
she wasn't the manager, and then I think Barbara did speak to 
the team manager who said it wasn't a problem and they would 
consider us. 
 
Barbara was then asked to attend a linking meeting15 at the Midlands Council in 
order that they make a decision whether to proceed with Nita and Clare as 
potential carers for the girls. It emerged at this stage that the girls were being 
placed for long-term fostering, rather than adoption, and so Nita and Clare had to 
agree to be reassessed with the view to long-term fostering. Nita and Clare were 
very keen for social workers from the Midlands Council to come and meet them 
                                                           
15  A linking meeting takes place to consider whether carers are appropriate to the needs of 
particular children. If carers are recommended at a linking meeting, then the placing Authority will 
look at them in more detail with the view to matching them with the children at a later 'matching' 
panel. 
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and asked Barbara to convey this. Unfortunately, at the time of the linking 
meeting, Barbara was unwell and so another social worker, Jane, who had acted 
as the 'second opinion'16 in Nita and Clare's original assessment, had to attend. 
Clare explained what happened at the linking meeting: 
 
Clare: Jane went to the linking meeting in the Midlands, and the 
social workers told her that they were also considering a single 
woman carer for the girls. They said they couldn't decide 
between us and the single woman because they didn't have 
enough information, and so they sent Jane back with a series of 
questions they wanted answered. These were: 'How would we 
explain our sexuality?', 'How would we provide for the children's 
religious and cultural needs?', 'How would we provide for their 
linguistic needs?'. They also said they wanted to meet us, but 
Jane specifically asked in the linking meeting, "Is my family [i.e. 
Nita and Clare] being seriously considered for these children?" 
and she was told yes, so when she came back she was positive 
in a way that she hadn't been previously. She also found out why 
it was long-term fostering, and that was basically because these 
children would be such a financial responsibility that foster care 
was the only way the Authority could tie in payment which they 
couldn't do with adoption. There was no way that the girls were 
                                                           
16  A 'second opinion' social worker comes in at the end of a Form F assessment to look over the 
work, to ask questions, and to give another independent opinion on the carers' suitability. 
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ever going back home to their parents because of the 
horrendous abuse they'd suffered...I mean the father had been to 
prison for it...the girls were also subject to Care Orders and the 
Authority were also going to apply for a Residence Order so that 
the placement would be secure, it would be a permanent 
placement but by long-term fostering... 
 
Nita explained that Jane left them with the series of questions to work on, and 
that they prepared their answers and were confident that they had lots to say 
about how they would meet the girls' needs. In fact, they wrote it all down on 
paper. Then there was a delay in waiting for the social workers from the Midlands 
Council to visit them. The visits were cancelled a number of times, first because 
the Authority had discovered a 'legal complication' as the birth father was 
challenging the Care Orders, and  second due to illness. Nita told me that the two 
social workers from the placing Authority, one Asian woman and one African 
Caribbean woman, eventually came to see them only two weeks before the 
matching panel17 was due to meet: 
 
Nita: Their visit was awful, they just didn't want to be here and 
they were really uncomfortable. They asked us questions but just 
things that were covered in our assessment Form F. We thought 
they'd want to focus on the questions they had given Jane to give 
                                                           
17 A matching panel meets to agree to place children with carers or not. 
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us but they hardly touched on these, and we ended up actually 
having to force our bits of paper with our answers on them and 
say, "Would you like to take these away with you? We've 
answered these questions which we understood you wanted to 
know about and maybe you'd like to take them to help at the 
matching panel." 
 
Clare said that one of the social workers from the placing Authority said, as they 
were leaving, "Oh I must make it clear that us coming here today doesn't 
necessarily mean that the children will be placed with you, and in fact they may 
not be placed with you or the single woman." The social workers also said that 
they would not be attending the matching panel as that was the job of their 
manager. Nita and Clare felt very pessimistic at this stage, but Barbara was more 
optimistic: "They've got seven girls to place and they're really lucky that anyone 
wants them, they've got to seriously consider you." 
 
Shortly after this, the Midlands Council matching panel met. Barbara attended, 
and was accompanied by Usha, an Asian Hindu social worker with whom she 
worked. Barbara said that, as soon as they arrived, they were greeted with, "Oh 
didn't you get our message? We sent a message telling you not to bother to 
come." Barbara said the matching panel was a shambles. The single woman 
carer hadn't even been approved as a foster carer, and Barbara recalled that 
there were issues in this woman's life that meant it was very unlikely that she 
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would ever be approved by a fostering assessment panel.  
 
Barbara said that when the matching panel came to discuss Nita and Clare, they 
announced that their Legal Department had something to say. The legal 
representative said that there was no way that Nita and Clare could be 
considered because they were a lesbian couple and it would never stand up in 
Court. They felt that this would endanger the placement, and might give a reason 
for the Care Orders to be revoked. They then went on to say that the children 
were nominally Hindu and that, "because the Hindu religion does not recognize 
lesbianism," the children could not be placed in a lesbian household. 
 
Barbara recalled that this was over very quickly indeed, in "about five or ten 
minutes," she said. Usha tried to engage them in debate about what she felt to 
be an outrageously discriminatory statement, but they would say nothing more. 
Barbara said that it was only really the Chair of the panel, who was the Assistant 
Director, and the solicitor for the Authority, both white men, who were allowed to 
speak. Barbara asked the Authority to write to Nita and Clare explaining why they 
had been rejected, as she was very upset by what had been said.  
 
Nita and Clare believe that they were rejected on the basis of their sexuality 
alone, and that the reasons given by the Midlands Council were a cover for this. 
They therefore decided to make a formal written complaint to the Authority18. 
                                                           
18 The substance of the complaint will be discussed later. 
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Their complaint was then formally investigated by an Officer of the Midlands 
Council, along with an independent person, a representative of a voluntary 
organization that represents the interests of children in care. The report of the 
investigating officer concluded as follows: 
 
Para. 3.14 [of Volume 3 of Children Act 1989 Guidance; DoH 
1991] reads as follows: "Authorities and those interested in 
becoming foster parents must understand that an authority's duty 
is, unequivocally and unambiguously, to find and approve the 
most suitable foster parents for children who need family 
placement. It would be wrong arbitrarily to exclude any particular 
groups of people from consideration. But the chosen way of life 
of some adults may mean that they would not be able to provide 
a suitable environment for the care and nurture of a child. No one 
has a 'right' to be a foster parent. Fostering decisions must 
centre exclusively on the interests of the child." 
My conclusion is that the .................SSD19 has operated both the 
spirit and the letter of this paragraph and has not arbitrarily 
excluded any particular group. 
 
Nita and Clare were very upset by this decision. They were keen to emphasize 
that the investigating officer's report did state that he could not find conclusive 
                                                           
19 Social Services Department. 
 331 
evidence to suggest that the Hindu faith was necessarily either sympathetic or 
antagonistic to lesbianism. Barbara was also very angry about the placing 
Authority's actions, and she called the whole thing a "waste of time and energy." 
 
I have known Nita and Clare for some time now, and I know that they have since 
gone on to successfully adopt20, but for the purposes of this case study, I am 
interested only to analyze the process of their assessment by the Northern City 
Council, which I do in the following section, and their subsequent rejection as 
carers by the Midlands Council, which forms section three. 
 
 
Section Two: The Dynamics of Race, Sexuality and Gender in 
Assessment 
 
Nita: I don't think the social worker handled the issues to do with 
our sexuality well...She wanted to be so non-discriminating that 
she just treated us like she would a heterosexual couple, and on 
one level that was good because she focused on child care, but 
we also needed to talk about the specifics of being lesbian 
adopters, and there are many issues we all needed to think 
                                                           
20 I will not be discussing the circumstances of this adoption in this case study. However, since I 
completed this research, Nita and Clare have gone on to successfully adopt, first, a ten-year-old 
Asian girl (where they were granted an adoption order and a joint residence order in the High 
Court), and, later, a two-year-old Asian mixed race, hearing-impaired girl. 
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through... 
 
In this section, I analyse the Northern City Council's assessment approach and 
also how issues of sexuality and gender were handled. In section three I focus on 
sexuality and race. All of these are intersecting dynamics which cannot be so 
neatly disentangled (Afshar & Maynard 1994; Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992; Brah 
1996; Mercer 1994), but I have separated them here for ease of analysis, and 
because I want to focus in detail upon each aspect. The assessment did not 
focus on lesbian sexuality alone, but incorporated issues of gender and race, not 
least because the couple in question are 'mixed race', one being white and the 
other Indian. Indeed, as I have already argued, no assessment ever focuses on 
sexuality alone.  
 
But it is not simply the case that gender and race were also key to this 
assessment because the couple were both women and of different racial 
backgrounds. I shall, in fact, be arguing that concerns around gender and race 
were actually central to the construction of the notion 'lesbian' in this case. More 
importantly, 'whiteness' and heterosexuality were also central dynamics here, for 
when an assessment deals with lesbians, one of whom is Indian, then what is 
challenged is social work's traditional view of an adoptive carer. Adopters are 
traditionally both heterosexual and white (Triseliotis et al. 1997), and therefore 
social work assessments of adoptive applicants construct 'whiteness' and 
heterosexuality as norms, albeit implicit, unspoken ones. Therefore it is important 
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to recognize that 'whiteness' and heterosexuality are just as much active 
constructions in social work assessments as lesbianism or 'Asian-ness', though 
far less visible of course. 
 
The Assessment Approach: 
 
It is important to be clear about the word 'assessment' here, as it can be applied 
to many stages of the application process. I have represented this process, as 
Nita and Clare experienced it, in diagrammatic form (Fig 6.1): 
Nita and Clare’s Assessment 
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Figure 6.1 
 
 
The 'Form F', or home study, part of the assessment consisted of a series of 
interviews carried out with the couple by the social worker, Barbara. This home 
study was then written up as a Form F report and presented to the adoption 
panel. This discrete part of the process is represented in Fig. 6.1 as the 'Form F 
assessment' (stages 7.i to 7.iv), and it is this that I analyse here. 
 
I argued in chapter four for understanding the practices of social workers 
assessing lesbians and gay men as constituting a continuum of responses. I 
think the assessment in this case used the 'on merit prioritizing child care' 
approach, and by this I mean that the Northern City Council Social Services 
Department's public stance regarding all adoption applicants was to look at the 
merits of their child care skills and parenting abilities, 'regardless of' the 
applicants' race, sexuality, gender etc. In this case, for example, Barbara told me 
that her Department would not reject lesbian or gay applicants a priori, but would 
consider all applications 'on merit' initially. Similarly, when Nita telephoned the 
Adoption Unit anonymously and asked about sexuality, she was told that all 
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 adoption panel 
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 training 
 
 Stage 9:  
 Adoption Panel 
 approves N&C 
 as adopters. 
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applicants would be assessed on their parenting skills and their ability to provide 
a home for a child, regardless of sexuality: 
 
Nita: I asked them about their Equal Opportunities policy and I 
wanted to know whether that included sexuality. They said they 
would give everybody equal consideration on their parenting 
skills and whether they could provide a home for a child, and 
that's what they said they would base it on regardless of any 
other factors. 
 
What does the 'on merit' approach mean for lesbians and gay men? Certainly 
this approach does not discriminate against lesbians and gay men at the point of 
application, as it rests on the premise that it is their child care abilities that will be 
assessed. For example, Barbara was keen to emphasize that she looked upon 
the couple's caring qualities as being the most important aspect of the 
assessment. I have argued, however, that this approach actually disadvantages 
lesbians and gay men because it employs a model of assessment usually 
applied to heterosexual applicants. It therefore uses a sameness equality 
approach. Nita and Clare, for example, were pleased that Barbara focused on 
their child care abilities, but they also felt that this was at the expense of 
considering the issues of their being lesbian adopters specifically. 
 
The major consequence of the 'on merit' approach is that the social worker does 
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not think through how to assess a lesbian couple in advance, but may actually 
'just see how it goes' (see chapter four). Barbara was unsure how to handle the 
assessment when she started, and did not know whether she should assess Nita 
and Clare as a couple or as two individuals. In fact, she changed her mind about 
this part way through the work. Barbara told me that she had to go back to her 
team for guidance on how to assess the couple, but she noted that other team 
members did not have experience of assessing lesbians, and indeed she 
suggested that some of them would not have supported applications by lesbians: 
 
Barbara: Some of my team wouldn't have done the assessment 
anyway....there is discrimination in my team. 
 
This meant that Barbara received very little guidance on the assessment: 
 
Nita: She did quite a lot of running round the Department saying, 
"What am I going to do with this one?" I think she must have 
gone back and said, "What do I do about this and how do I 
assess them?" 
Clare: And I think that's where all the confusion entered into it 
because nobody had any answers really. My impression is that 
when she went back to the Department and said all this, they 
weren't any help at all whatsoever. I think they were either 
completely without a clue, or said, "Oh this will never work, you'll 
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never get anywhere."  
 
The 'just see how it goes' approach had two consequences for this assessment 
in my view. First, it led the social worker to become driven by the adoption panel, 
or more specifically what she anticipated would be the panel's concerns, which 
are therefore heteronormative ones. Second, the focus of the assessment was 
on child care over sexuality. 
 
Being panel-driven is evidenced a number of times within my data. In fact I found 
eighteen references to it. Barbara told me that she had to gear the assessment in 
order to cover the kinds of questions she felt that the panel were likely to raise, in 
particular about a lesbian couple. Barbara felt she was always trying to anticipate 
what panel would expect her to cover, and this also meant that she felt the Form 
F report needed to be extremely detailed, thorough and faultless, far more so 
than usual. One particularly significant example of this panel-driven approach 
was that Barbara asked the couple to provide a third named referee for the 
assessment. The usual practice is for two referees, and the couple had named a 
single heterosexual Asian woman with children, and a white heterosexual woman 
whose partner was an African Caribbean man (with mixed race children): 
 
Nita: Barbara said that they weren't enough basically.... 
Clare: ...and that she wanted a third referee, and would it be 
possible to have another heterosexual couple, preferably with 
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children too! 
 
These extra referees are named on the Form F report, but additional space had 
to be added on the form for this. Barbara told me that she felt the additional 
reference made the couple's case better in the eyes of the panel, but again I 
believe that this indicates the ways in which lesbians and gay men are 
disadvantaged within an assessment process used to dealing with heterosexual 
carers. They were asked to provide additional evidence of suitability over and 
above what is required of heterosexual applicants, an example of the 'extra 
hoop.' 
 
Nita and Clare also felt that Barbara was very driven by the panel in her 
assessment: 
 
Clare: The way that our sexuality came up for her was more to 
do with the panel. She would say, "I have to ask you this 
because this is going to be an issue for the panel," or "I think 
panel will want to know this," or "I think they'll ask me more about 
this." So it was always 'panel-this' and 'panel-that'... 
Nita: She was uncertain about how she was going to approach 
the panel and quite worried about it. 
 
I am arguing that an assessment that is panel-driven actually disadvantages 
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lesbian, or gay, applicants, however. First, this practice points to the fact that the 
adoption panel itself is representative of another layer of potential discrimination 
against lesbians or gay men. The panel has the power to reject any applicant on 
the grounds of their unsuitability, and as we shall see this can be on the basis of 
anti-lesbian or anti-gay discrimination alone, that is rejecting an applicant a priori 
because of their sexuality. Second, a panel-driven approach is more likely to 
represent the lesbian couple in ways that the panel will find acceptable. Panels 
are far more used to looking at, and approving, heterosexual couples and it is my 
argument that the more that a lesbian couple are represented as resembling this 
'norm', then the greater are their chances of approval. Third, being panel-driven 
leads to defensive assessment practices, responding to the risk-based 
arguments, which tends to leave out space for discussing the specificity of 
lesbian adoption. Fourth, the panel-driven approach points to a dilemma for the 
assessing social worker, as can be seen a number of times in Barbara's 
comments. This is that her prime motivation was to get Nita and Clare through 
the panel, to get them an approval outcome, and therefore she geared her 
assessment, her report, and the way that she represented the couple, to do just 
this. If this meant compromising on certain principles - specifically their attitudes 
towards boy children, whether they had male role models, and how 
'heterosexual' they were, as we shall see - then she was prepared to do so in 
order to get them approved. Fifth, the panel-driven approach also points to other 
examples of how the assessment process is disadvantageous to lesbians and 
gay men. Barbara felt the report had to be more detailed than usual, she had to 
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include an extra referee, and she felt she had to cover far more with the couple 
than she normally would21. 
 
I want to suggest that the second consequence of the 'just see how it goes' 
approach is that the specifics of lesbian adoption became the lacunae of this 
assessment: 
 
Nita: She was much more interested, all the way through, in how 
we would cope as a couple with children in our lives, not in the 
fact that we were lesbians or what our sexual relationship was all 
about. 
Clare: ...And actually, to be honest, I think she should have 
asked us more about, you know, the things that were going to 
come up because of us being lesbian parents. 
Nita: ...There are issues that we needed to talk about with her 
about being lesbian adopters which we didn't really explore. 
 
Barbara told me quite clearly that she felt that sexuality should be considered, 
but that this would normally be done at the Form F stage, not at any earlier point. 
She also told me that she thought through the specifics of lesbian adoption in 
advance, and then asked the couple a series of questions based on this: 
                                                           
21 "It was as if we could only adopt if we were better than any heterosexual couple who'd gone 
before us, like it is for black people. If there's a white person and a black person of equal merit 
being considered, then the white person will be preferred. The black person would have to be 
'perfect' or exceptional to succeed." (Clare's comment). 
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Barbara: Yes I did think about the particular issues that would 
face lesbian adopters and I asked them about these during the 
assessment...I asked about how they'd explain their sexuality to 
a child, how they'd explain to a child why it has two mums, how 
they'd explain why they slept in the same bed, and also how 
would they cope if the child were teased at school?...  
 
This is a point of contradictory evidence in my interview data since, when I asked 
Nita and Clare about this, they told me that the assessment had only covered 
such issues because they brought them up. They said that Barbara did not raise 
such points with them. They felt it was their responsibility to raise lesbian 
specifics, and were very clear that Barbara should have asked them more about 
their sexuality, and how this would impact upon their care of a child: 
 
Clare: I don't think she made us think enough about what it was 
going to be like being lesbian parents...I think she should have 
made us think a lot more about that.  
 
I am not arguing that sexuality per se was absent from the assessment; Barbara 
did focus on, and represent, Nita and Clare's individual histories of coming out as 
lesbians in the assessment and on the Form F. She also felt that the adoption 
panel were pleased that the women had been so open about their sexuality from 
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the start. In the assessment report, Barbara describes the process of the couple 
meeting and forming a relationship that she characterizes as "strong, secure and 
stable."  
 
However, Barbara did not discuss the specifics of being lesbian adopters with 
the couple, and Nita and Clare raised this seven times with me during interviews. 
They wanted to discuss the specific impact of their lesbianism upon adoption and 
child care issues, and they made several attempts to raise these during the 
assessment. They felt that Barbara continued to focus on child care issues over 
and above sexuality, and they told me that she should have asked them more 
about lesbian issues: how would they get support as lesbian adopters? did they 
know any other lesbian carers? what issues would be raised for a child having 
lesbian parents? how might some birth parents react to them?22 These were 
crucial absences, and my view is that this was because the assessment model 
was one usually applied to heterosexual couples.  
 
Before going to the panel, Barbara insisted that some changes be made to its 
makeup. Specifically, she knew that one of the panel members held homophobic 
views and was unlikely to approve a lesbian couple. Barbara therefore insisted 
that the panel be given training on policies of equal opportunity as they applied to 
carer applicants. When the panel member in question still refused to consider 
                                                           
22 "Barbara was in fact unrealistic about this when we raised it. Whilst we weren't opposed to the 
idea of open adoption, it is an issue that needs to be discussed with lesbians concerning possible 
homophobic birth parents." (Clare's comment). 
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lesbians or gay men as potential carers, she was asked to leave the panel as this 
was in contravention of the Northern City Council's policy of equal opportunity.  
 
This was an important factor in this case, and indicates willingness on the part of 
the Social Services Department to address discrimination in the assessment 
process for lesbian or gay applicants. After all, what is the point of assessing and 
recommending a lesbian couple to an adoption panel, when it is impossible for 
them to be approved due to the views of one member? If such approval is 
organizationally impossible, then that is a definition of discrimination. Nita and 
Clare said that there was some delay in their report going to panel while this 
aspect was resolved, but that when their report was considered they were 
approved positively. Indeed the approval for up to three children is an unusually 
high number. 
 
Barbara said that the panel did raise some questions that can be linked to the 
risk-based arguments around gender and teasing raised in chapter four: 
 
Barbara: They asked what Nita and Clare would want the child 
to call them23, how they would tell the child about their 
lesbianism, how they would deal with any teasing of the child in 
school or in the community, how their families had responded to 
the news that they wanted to adopt, what male role models they 
                                                           
23 "...Something that Barbara never discussed with us and should have." (Clare). "It's an issue for 
us with children and does need to be addressed." (Nita). 
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could provide, what men they knew24, and what further hurdles 
the couple would have to face after approval. 
 
She also said that the panel was satisfied that she had addressed these points, 
and felt that the Form F was very detailed. 
 
 
The Assessment of Sexuality: Heterosexual/ising Lesbians? 
 
In this section I focus on how lesbian sexuality was represented, and it is my 
argument that this actually involved a process that I have called 
heterosexualisation. Tamsin Wilton has argued that the 'heterosexual imperative' 
structuring modern narratives of sexuality relies upon naive functionalist accounts 
which assume the polarity of sex difference by gender (Wilton 1996b, 1996c). A 
normative account of sexuality, therefore, privileges heterosex and its attendant 
division into things male and female (Wilton 1996b:104). Where this heterosexual 
imperative is upset by things 'queer' (the supposedly deviant sexual relations of 
lesbians or gay men), then a form of policing occurs, usually around gender 
identities. For example, the 'straight mind' (Wittig 1992) cannot conceive of gay 
or lesbian relations without inserting 'gender difference', so that lesbians and gay 
men are either assumed to have deviant gender identities or their relationships 
are thought to be structured according to the "heteropolar model" (Wilton 
                                                           
24 "This was all shown on our support network map, or what is called an ecomap on Form F" 
(Nita). 
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1996c:127). Lesbian or gay relationships are therefore accounted for by 
constructing them as essentially 'heterosexual', with one person being the 'man' 
(a 'butch' lesbian, a 'macho' gay man) and the other the 'woman' (a 'femme' 
lesbian, an 'effeminate' gay man)25. 
 
In the case of the representation of Nita and Clare as a lesbian couple, I think 
that there were processes of heterosexualisation at work. Whilst I do not think 
that they were represented as 'butch and femme', the adoption panel's question 
to Barbara about what a child would call them may be indicative of this kind of 
anxiety; if they are not 'Daddy' and 'Mummy', then what are they? or, 'which one's 
the man?' (Wilton 1996c). However, I think that the processes of 
heterosexualisation in this case were slightly different.  
 
Let me start with what I believe to be a key example of the processes of 
heterosexualisation in action; notions of infertility, childlessness and 
alternative/self-insemination (see, for example, Saffron 1994). Many applicants to 
adoption are childless heterosexual couples, often due to infertility (Triseliotis et 
al. 1997:151), and it is my view that social workers in adoption have become 
used to applying this kind of model in their assessments, a version of 'sameness'. 
This 'childlessness' model is one which sees adoption as a second-best 
alternative to having a birth child, and much work is done by social workers with 
                                                           
25 There are also some interesting discussions of the notions of 'butch/femme' within, and by, the 
lesbian and gay communities. See, for example, Jeffreys (1989), Kennedy & Davis (1993), Nestle 
(1992), or Wilton (1996a). 
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heterosexual couples looking at the issues of loss for them in coming to terms 
with their childlessness. Further, couples are frequently asked to produce 
certificated evidence of infertility (see footnote 18). Whilst there are some 
lesbians who come to fostering or adoption after being unable to conceive a child 
through alternative or self-insemination (Saffron 1994), this does not apply to all 
lesbian adoption applicants, and perhaps even less so to gay men. 
 
Nita and Clare were quite clear that they never wanted to have birth or biological 
children, for many reasons, and came to adoption as their first choice: 
 
Nita: They were relying on a deficit model of adoption where 
people come to it because they can't have their own children. 
Clare: They kept trying to push it like that as a negative thing, but 
we kept saying, "But we must be even better than people who 
normally come for adoption because we're not coming to it as 
second-best, we're coming to it as our first choice." In the 
assessment there were all these questions about, "Are you 
infertile? When did you find out whether you're fertile or not?", 
and we were saying, "Well we don't know!" 
Nita: ..."And we're not interested in whether we are or not." 
Clare: ...But they kept coming back to it. The second opinion 
social worker kept saying, "Well why aren't you interested?" ...So 
we said, "You've just explained to us all about how difficult it is 
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for an adopted child not knowing who their parents are, so what 
do you think it's like for a child who has an unknown donor for a 
father?" 
Nita: And we think that there are even more issues about that for 
black children...all that stuff about roots, histories and how far 
back you can go wanting to know the stories that come from your 
family... 
 
It is my view, and one that is shared by Nita and Clare, that this kind of model is 
one that comes from assessments of heterosexual couples and yet it has been 
applied here26. When Nita and Clare said that they did not know whether they 
were fertile or not, the second opinion social worker, Jane, asked them at great 
length about why they hadn't pursued alternative insemination as an option. 
Again Nita and Clare explained that adoption was their first choice and that they 
didn't want to consider a birth child. This was directly addressed, for the panel's 
benefit, in the Form F report which reads: 
 
As lesbians, they could have chosen artificial insemination, but 
they see adoption as a more sensible and valuable way of 
providing a home for a child who has already been born and 
                                                           
26 "On the health information sheet for the adoption panel, there is a section called 'Reason for 
Infertility'. This was filled in for both of us as 'Miss _____ is unmarried.' In fact, neither of us knew 
whether we were infertile or not!" (Clare). 
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needs a happy, secure home. They feel that AID27 has so many 
problems. For instance, if the donor is known, then the father's 
involvement can be unclear or change over time causing 
problems, and if the donor is unknown, there are problems of 
what to tell the child. They would feel uncomfortable with the 
involvement of a person in them having a child who is not part of 
their loving relationship (sic). Neither feels the need to 
experience pregnancy in order to become a parent, which they 
know that some women do. [Nita and Clare] have not specifically 
investigated the possibilities for themselves as it is not what they 
want to do. 
 
Barbara told me that the adoption panel also asked whether Nita and Clare had 
considered having birth children. Thus I think that the Form F represents Nita and 
Clare as having been assessed regarding their 'childlessness and infertility', even 
though this doesn't fit because they are lesbians and because they do not know 
whether they are fertile or not. 
 
I would also argue that processes of heterosexualisation are at work in the 
representation of Nita and Clare as lesbians 'with heterosexual influences'. This 
is not how the couple presented themselves, and I am not suggesting that they 
did. They presented as an openly lesbian couple with a range of friends and 
                                                           
27 This stands for Alternative (Artificial) Insemination by Donor. 
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family, and they actively resisted any attempts to 'cover up' their lesbianism. 
However I think that their representation by Barbara to the panel is slightly 
different, and I want to discuss three examples from my data sources here: their 
referees, their past relationships, and their support networks. 
 
I have already discussed the issue of Nita and Clare having to provide a third 
referee, but here I also want to suggest that this indicates a representation of a 
lesbian couple 'with heterosexual influences', which works at an implicit level.: 
 
Clare: When it came to referees, she asked for three when they 
normally get two... 
Nita: One reason was because the two that we put forward were 
both women, although one was living with a male partner but he 
wasn't in the picture so we didn't name him... 
Clare: ...And she wasn't married to him. 
Nita: So Barbara said, "Could you come up with a heterosexual 
couple with a child?" That's what she wanted...28 
 
I am also interested in the way that the women's past relationships were 
discussed in their Form F, both having had previous relationships with men. The 
Form F asks for information on 'marital status' (BAAF 1991:4), which is confusing 
                                                           
28 "This was a couple where both the man and the woman were our friends and both could 
comment on us. It was as if women's names weren't enough" (Clare), "We needed validation from 
a man as well" (Nita), "We never thought of having lesbians as referees, and I feel sure Barbara 
would've rejected the idea if we'd suggested it. I'm sure she wouldn't have thought the panel 
would like it." (Clare). 
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for the reader in this case. Nita and Clare are both described as 'single', and then 
the form states that they have been in a relationship for over three years. This 
confusion arises because the form is designed for heterosexual people, and it is 
only married couples who are able to jointly adopt in law (Triseliotis et al. 1997). 
Lesbians and gay men are therefore regarded as 'single people' for the purposes 
of the forms.  
 
Nita is described in the report as not having had "...a boyfriend until she was in 
the sixth form", and the form goes on to detail her first three significant 
relationships with men. Clare is described as having "developed a close and 
sincere relationship with a girlfriend" at the age of fifteen, and the form then goes 
on to report her relationship with a man whilst at University. Both Nita and Clare 
felt that their early heterosexual experiences were emphasized in the form in 
order to show that they had not 'always been lesbians' and that they had an 
'understanding of heterosexuality': 
 
Nita: We've both had previous relationships with men before we 
came out... 
Clare: ...And it would be interesting to see how it would have 
been if we hadn't. I mean if we were lesbians who hadn't ever 
had any relationships with men, would we have been regarded 
the same? I think sometimes lesbians who have had 
relationships with men are regarded somehow as not quite as 
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'deviant' as lesbians who have never had relationships with men. 
Somehow it's like, "Oh they were normal once, and then they just 
happened to meet the right woman." They rewrite it in their 
heads as if we were these heterosexual women who just 'fell in 
love', and they ignore all the other things you tell them. Are we 
something more acceptable than the 'ever-dyke', the lesbian 
who's always been a lesbian? With us they might think, "Oh well, 
if we place this child with these lesbians, then at least they have 
had relationships with men, so at least when their children get to 
the age when they're having heterosexual relationships they 
know what that's about."  
 
Like the issue of the referees, I believe that this also demonstrates  
heterosexualisation processes in operation. Whilst it is important to discuss all 
previous relationships, there is an implicit notion of 'heterosexual influence' here 
represented in the Form F. Actually this is an interesting example because in 
terms of debates around the etiology of homosexuality, it might be argued that 
Nita and Clare had made a political choice for lesbianism in opposition to 
heterosexuality. Their choice might therefore be understood within the terms of a 
social constructionist view of lesbianism (Kitzinger 1987), rather than an 
essentialist one which would see them as having 'always been' lesbian (see, for 
example, Altman et al. 1989; De Cecco & Elia 1993; McIntosh 1968; Stein 1990). 
This view of lesbianism as a political choice over heterosexuality is surely more 
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threatening to the heterosexual 'norm', and so for this reason was not presented 
in this way in Nita and Clare's assessment. 
 
Nita and Clare also felt that they were represented as an isolated example of a 
lesbian couple. By this I mean that they were seen in isolation from other 
lesbians, including other lesbian carers/parents, and the assessment did not 
discuss whether they knew, or indeed would draw support from, other lesbians: 
 
Clare: I don't think she even asked us if we knew other lesbians 
who had children, and she didn't ask us where we were going to 
get support as lesbian parents.29  
 
Again, whilst Nita and Clare regard the issue of support from other lesbian carers 
as crucial, both for themselves and for any child placed with them, this was not 
discussed by the social worker. This is another example of the need to represent 
them in certain 'heterosexual' ways to the adoption panel, not part of a 'lesbian 
community' but fitting into a heterosexual one. 
 
There are three other themes, taken from the risk-based arguments in chapter 
four, which hardly figured at all in this assessment, and these are whether any 
child placed would be teased because of having lesbian parents, whether there 
were any concerns about the possibility of sexual abuse of any child by lesbian 
                                                           
29 "That would have been the most worrying thing, if a child was placed with 'out' lesbians and 
surrounded by heterosexuals and no other lesbians" (Clare). 
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parents, and whether any child placed would be likely to grow up gay. All of these 
are important theories about the development of children living with lesbian and 
gay carers which frequently come up in such social work assessments, as I 
argued earlier, but they figured very peripherally here, if at all. The Form F report 
did detail the fact that Nita and Clare felt able to deal with any teasing that a child 
might experience, and noted that they would draw upon their own experiences of 
prejudice. Nita and Clare told me that Barbara did not raise any concerns about 
whether lesbians might abuse children with them, nor did she raise notions that a 
child might 'become' gay if placed with them. They did talk about how they would 
deal with a child's developing sexuality in adolescence, either heterosexual or 
homosexual. 
 
The Assessment of Gender: 
 
Theorising about, and representing, gender was as important to the process of 
assessment in this case as issues of lesbianism. Nita and Clare began their 
assessment with a stated preference for caring for girls rather than boys: 
 
Nita: We said girls because we felt we have got so much to offer 
girls, and that we have done a lot of work with girls about feeling 
good about themselves. We felt that obviously girls are made to 
feel worse about themselves, particularly girls in foster care who 
are coming up for adoption, and they're quite likely to have had 
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really negative messages and that we could do lots of work with 
them and provide a positive environment... 
Clare: And also we felt we are a limited resource, and if we feel 
that we can only have three children, then we should have girls. 
Nita: And we also felt that boys take a lot of energy to counter all 
the messages that they get from society, and we really wanted to 
spend that energy on girls, not on struggling with boys to try and 
counter everything that had happened to them... 
Clare: It was quite hard to explain that because we haven't got 
any problem with boys, we've got loads of boys in our lives and 
we work with them... 
Nita: Yes it was quite difficult because I think there's such a 
strong ethos that 'children are children' and that if you love 
children then you should love them all and not be selective, and 
that if you say you're only interested in girls or boys then there 
must be some other agenda going on!  
 
Initially Barbara accepted their stated preference, and indeed it is common 
practice for adoptive applicants to choose one sex or both (Triseliotis et al. 
1997:156). There is a specific question on the Form F that allows for this (BAAF 
1991:2). Later in the assessment, however, Barbara said that this was a problem, 
that the adoption panel might not accept it. The second opinion social worker, 
Jane, also strongly suggested that panel would not accept a preference for girls. 
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Nita and Clare eventually gave in30 and said that they would consider boys in 
sibling groups for example, and Barbara's comments in the report stated: 
 
The couple have made a first preference of a girl child as they 
feel they have something extra to offer, to enable a girl to grow 
up as a strong individual with self esteem and a good, clear 
sense of identity. They also feel that they know more as women 
what it is like to be a girl, having had some shared experience, 
whereas they wouldn't feel quite the same with a boy. They 
emphasized that they have not got a problem with boys and they 
know several boys and would consider one as a second 
placement if a sibling to the first child placed.  
 
Nita and Clare questioned whether more was made of this issue because they 
were lesbians, as heterosexual couples are able to state a preference (Triseliotis 
et al. 1997:156). They argued that some panel members might have concerns to 
do with sexual abuse if they stated a preference for girls as lesbians, this being a 
common assumption of 'risk' to do with children placed with such carers (Hicks 
1997). Secondly, they also felt that there might be a view of lesbians as 'anti-
men' (see, for example, case law in B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) 1 
                                                           
30 "She asked us if we'd consider a boy on several occasions. Eventually she said, 'If you had a 
girl placed with you and then her birth mother had another child, would you consider the 
placement of that sibling?' 'Yes,' we said. 'If it was a boy, would you consider him?' We felt bullied 
and looked at each other, 'Yes, we'd consider it.' Afterwards we both agreed that we would 
consider it in fairness to the first placement, but that the answer would probably be no. The 
answer we gave was really to keep Barbara happy." (Clare). 
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FLR 40231), and that Barbara used this point to represent them as 'not anti-men' 
rather than dealing with their child gender preferences. Certainly I would argue 
that this is a further point of disadvantage within the assessment process for 
lesbian applicants. If heterosexual applicants are able to state child gender 
preferences, then why should lesbians be prevented from doing so?  
 
Another way in which gender was assessed relates to notions of male role 
models. Barbara asked Nita and Clare to discuss what male role models they 
would be able to provide for a child placed, and the couple felt that she pushed 
this issue strongly. She asked what men they knew and what gender role 
balance they could provide for a child. Barbara emphasized that panel would 
want to know about this, and it is addressed a number of times in the Form F.  
 
It is important to think about what kind of 'theorising gender' is going on here, and 
the work of Golombok & Fivush (1994) is helpful. Asking a lesbian couple about 
male role models stems from certain assumptions made about the absence of a 
primary male carer in the home. Specifically, psychoanalytic theories of gender 
development were traditionally based upon the assumption that correct gender 
identity would only be attained via healthy interactions with both a male and 
female parent (Golombok & Fivush 1994:55). Later classic social learning 
theories suggested that children acquired gender by imitating roles provided by 
parents (Golombok & Fivush 1994:75). By implication then, a child living with two 
                                                           
31 "B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control), reported in Family Law Reports (1991) 1, pp. 402-
412. 
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women will not fully understand a male gender identity. 
 
There are a number of problematic assumptions with such theories of gender 
'acquisition' however. First, traditional psychoanalytic theories assume what I 
term 'compulsory gender', that all children ought to grow up to be stereotypically 
'men' and 'women', and that any deviance from this should be punished 
(Sedgwick 1991). Second, social learning theories assume that children learn 
gender by copying individual parents alone, when in actual fact they look to a 
range of individuals and behaviours to think about gender (Golombok & Fivush 
1994:84). More importantly, cultural assumptions about correct gender behaviour 
are just as influential, including gender stereotypes (Golombok & Tasker 
1994:77). Third, notions of gender balance and male role models, based upon 
these theories, make the major assumption that children simply copy the gender 
identities of their parents, when children's own active formation of views of 
gender, and issues of cultural roles, understandings, peers or play are just as 
vital. Gender development "results from a complex interaction between the 
individual and the wider social environment, of which parents are just one part." 
(Golombok & Fivush 1994:2). 
 
Barbara also told me that she asked the couple whether they had gendered roles 
at home, and the report reflects Nita and Clare's reply that they did not. Again I 
think this relates both to notions of social learning theory and to processes of 
heterosexualisation (Wilton 1996b, 1996c). Assessment practices used in 
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working with heterosexual carers make assumptions that they will provide 
balanced gender roles. In actual fact, there is little evidence that men in 
heterosexual relationships provide much child care (Golombok & Fivush 
1994:145-6). Here, the same assumption is applied to lesbians, but the concern 
that is being addressed is that they will not be able to provide correct gender role 
modeling, or that their lesbianism will have adverse effects upon the gender 
identity of a child. This is another common assumption of 'risk' to children placed 
with lesbian or gay carers (Hicks 1997) but one that is not supported by existing 
research evidence (Golombok & Fivush 1994:161; Golombok & Tasker 1994; 
Tasker & Golombok 1997). 
 
Barbara was also keen to represent Nita and Clare as 'not too feminist' in their 
approach to gender, emphasizing their relationships with, and views of, men. 
Again this does not bear any simple 'factual' resemblance to the way that they 
presented themselves. Indeed I think that they are, and do present as, 
feminists32. Rather it related to the need to address concerns for the adoption 
panel about lesbians being 'anti-men'. Nita and Clare told me that Barbara asked 
them about men friends in their network, and they also told me that Jane, the 
second opinion worker, seemed almost 'obsessed' with this point. Barbara 
confirmed this when she told me that she had asked about men, but she told me 
that this had been for the sake of the panel and also that she would ask any 
couple, of any sexuality, about this. When I asked Barbara if lesbians would ever 
                                                           
32 "In fact she never asked us if we were feminists. If she had, we would have said we were, as 
we are." (Clare). 
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be inappropriate as adopters, she replied, "Only if they are anti-men."  
 
The assessment report directly addresses this point, but also links it to an 
elliptical phrase about their lesbianism: 
 
The couple have contact with several males and have 
commented that they are all positive, healthy figures who would 
make good role models for a child to look up to and they certainly 
would not include aggressive, macho figures to be amongst their 
friends. [Nita and Clare] are not anti-men, and their being lesbian 
is something that they feel inside is a natural state for them." (sic) 
 
I read this as an attempt to represented 'de-politicized' or 'non-radical' versions of 
lesbianism, in which notions of sexuality as a form of political choice are 
removed. Instead the couple are 'natural' lesbians (Altman et al. 1989; Stein 
1990), and I argue that this is a direct construction of the couple as not 'anti-
men', and not likely to cause gender confusion (Brown 1992b:214). 
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Section Three: Contesting Identities/Constructing Identities: The 
Meanings of Race, Sexuality and Gender 
 
In this section, I examine how the intersecting dynamics of race, gender and 
sexuality were interpreted in relation to Nita and Clare's application to be 
considered as the potential carers for a sibling group of seven Asian girls in the 
care of the Midlands Council. I argue here, with regard to the eventual decision to 
reject Nita and Clare, that the contestation of social work meanings attaching to 
such categories as 'lesbian', 'Hindu' and 'Asian' resulted in a reliance upon fixed 
and exclusive notions of racial, religious and sexual identities. I believe that this 
informed a panel decision that was based upon heterosexist, or anti-lesbian, 
assumptions. The question that I want to ask here is this: does the social work 
assessment of lesbian carer applicants theorize across the intersecting dynamics 
of race, gender and sexuality in a way which disrupts commonsense and 
essentialist notions of fixed racial, ethnic, gender or sexual identities? Or, does it 
in fact reinforce such categories as 'lesbian', 'Asian', 'Hindu' so that these 
become single, seamless, unchanging, and more importantly exclusive of each 
other? To borrow from Judith Butler (1990) here: "...Is [social work assessment] 
an antifoundationalist inquiry that affirms the kind of sexual complexity that 
effectively deregulates rigid and hierarchical sexual codes, or does it maintain an 
unacknowledged set of assumptions about the foundations of identity that work in 
favour of those very hierarchies?" (Butler 1990:x). 
 
 361 
How does Social Work Theorize Identities? What is a 'Lesbian'? 
 
Brown (1992b) has noted that social work theory regarding lesbians has relied 
upon psychological and psychoanalytic models which pathologise and 
individualize sexuality, and that, in relation to the care of children, lesbians have 
been seen as 'not real women' and therefore unable to 'mother' or 'parent' 
(Brown 1992b: 202,214). In the case of Nita and Clare, however, their 
assessment and approval as adopters was a statement of their abilities to parent 
children, that they were 'good enough carers', and it is this which presented a 
dilemma for the Midlands Council. I argue that the Midlands Council had to take 
in good faith an application by a couple who were able to meet the specific care, 
racial, religious and cultural needs of the children, but that the workers relied 
upon a pathologising view of lesbianism which meant that Nita and Clare were 
ultimately rejected.  
 
In being considered as potential carers for the girls in question, Nita and Clare 
were represented to the Midlands Council as an openly lesbian couple who had 
been approved for adoption. The Midlands Council had a policy statement of 
equal opportunities that read "...the Council will take positive action to ensure that 
all requests for and recipients of any service are treated equally. Policies and 
procedures will be designed so as not to discriminate intentionally or 
unintentionally against any group or individual on any unjustifiable grounds," and 
the policy specifically included "sexual orientation." In terms of their consideration 
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of Nita and Clare as potential carers, then, an 'on merit' approach can be 
predicted on the basis of the Equal Opportunities statement. This was in fact the 
approach used by the Midlands Council Fostering/Adoption Unit, but only after 
some initial disagreement: 
 
Nita: Initially they were openly negative. The woman that 
Barbara contacted was a Homefinder social worker, Jo, who said 
that she didn't approve of lesbians adopting and that if the case 
was taken up by the Department then she would have nothing to 
do with it because she didn't agree with it, so that was Barbara's 
first encounter with the Authority. 
Clare: She didn't seem to think that this should put us off totally, 
because the woman who said that said it wasn't Departmental 
policy, it was only her view, and that she wasn't the manager 
anyway. I think Barbara then spoke to the Manager who was 
above Jo, and she said, "No it wasn't a problem," and that they 
would consider us.  
 
Here, then, we have two opposing views of the category 'lesbian' with regard to 
the potential to care for children. The first view, rejection a priori on the basis of 
sexuality alone, and the second, the 'on merit' approach which does not regard 
'lesbian' as an automatic disqualifier but is concerned with the assessment of 
child care skills or the ability to parent. In both cases, lesbianism is made the 
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issue over and above race, religion, gender and so on. The second approach 
was also in line with the Midlands Council's statement of equal opportunity, and 
so a decision was made to progress with consideration of Nita and Clare as 
potential carers for the girls.  
 
In this case, a linking meeting was held and attended by Jane, the second 
opinion social worker involved in Nita and Clare's initial assessment, at which she 
was told that the couple would be 'seriously considered' as potential carers for 
the girls. However, as I have stated, Nita and Clare were rejected at a 
subsequent matching panel. Barbara told me that she thought that they were 
rejected as carers on the basis of their sexuality alone, and there is evidence of 
this from two other data sources: the letter outlining the reasons for their rejection 
and the report of the officer who investigated the official complaint later made by 
the couple. The letter from the Midlands Council giving reasons for the couple's 
rejection stated: 
 
The Panel were clear that you would make various efforts to 
accommodate the girls' Hindu religious and cultural needs. 
However, there is a fundamental problem in seeking to do this in 
the context of a relationship which the Panel understood is 
not recognised in the Hindu faith. (my emphasis). 
 
The letter also noted that this would not be "in the best interests of the girls." 
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There are also two references which point to versions of the category 'lesbian' in 
the report of the officer who investigated the complaint. On page six, he noted: 
 
...the Assistant Director of Childrens Services has indicated 
that...the continuing national debate and media attention related 
to placement of children with lesbian and gay couples would 
cause children in such placements to feel insecure. 
 
Further, on page seven, he makes reference to an article dealing with case law 
regarding lesbians in residence and parental responsibility cases (Beresford 
1994), which he interprets in such a way that "even where there is no link to 
religious upbringing, the Courts are likely to consider lesbianism in a negative 
way." 
 
It is my view that all these active constructions of what is a 'lesbian' - that is, as 
being unsuitable for the care of children a priori, as being outside of the 
categories 'Hindu' or able to meet religious needs, as attracting media attention 
likely to cause insecurity for children placed, and as being regarded in negative 
and pathologising ways within law - rely upon fixed notions of the category 
'lesbian' as 'the Other' (Kitzinger & Wilkinson 1996), outside of heteronormative 
understandings of religious belief and who can properly care for children. What, 
then, do I mean by 'heteronormativity'? 
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Diane Richardson (1996b) has argued that the ways in which the social is 
theorized rely upon the centrality of a naturalized heterosexuality. This 
heterosexuality "is constructed as a coherent, natural, fixed and stable category; 
as universal and monolithic." (Richardson 1996b:2). She points out that it is none 
of these things, but is actually socially constructed (Maynard & Purvis 1995b) so 
that it remains naturalized and invisible, but present as a kind of 'blueprint' for 
social processes (Richardson 1996b:3). Thus I argue that theorizing about 
parenting, and who makes a good parent, is usually based upon a gendered and 
racialised heterosexuality. When this is disrupted, in the case of lesbian adoptive 
applicants, then questions about which one is the 'Mummy' indicate 
heteronormative values. 
 
It was the early work of Adrienne Rich (1980) that identified heterosexuality as a 
compulsory and political institution, rather than a naturally occurring majority 
(Yorke 1997:81). She noted that one of heterosexuality's means of self-
reinforcement was to render invisible the lesbian possibility (Rich 1980).  
Applications to care for children by lesbians, however, disrupt such 
heteronormative values. One response, as we have seen, is to regard lesbians 
as so much 'Other' to the heteronorm that they are rejected outright. Another 
response is to regard them as 'different', but to nevertheless assess their 
parenting skills, the 'on merit' approach. In the case of Nita and Clare, it is my 
view that the Midlands Council had to construct versions of the category 'lesbian' 
which were so 'Other' to heteronormative understandings of a 'good parent' in 
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order to allow them to reject the couple. This process relied upon fixed 
constructions of the categories 'heterosexual' and 'lesbian' in order to maintain a 
hierarchy of sexual codes (Butler 1990) with regard to who makes a good 
parent33.  
 
I have tried to reconstruct these crude categorizations of a 'heterosexual carer' 
and a 'lesbian carer' in Figure 6.2, in order to show how the 'lesbian' was 
represented as unnatural, unable to parent, and 'other' to the norm: 
 
HETERONORMATIVITY: 
Who Makes a Good 'Parent'? 
 
       Heterosexual Carer           Lesbian Carer 
 
Normative sexuality: de-sexualized  Sexualized beings with 
       abnormal sexuality 
 
Balanced gender roles    Unbalanced gender roles, 
       likely to affect child 
       development, likely to 
       be 'anti-men' 
 
Naturally occurring sexuality,   Chosen sexuality, so 
biologically essential    political and radical 
 
Normal      Abnormal, so    
       stigmatized  
       and stigmatizing (e.g. 
       teasing) 
 
Legally approved, e.g. adoption   'Outside' of the law 
law, case law                                                                      
 
Religious approval    'Outside' of religious 
       tradition 
 
                                                           
33 "Barbara said that, as it was clear that all or most of the girls had been serially sexually abused 
by at least two men, they'd never be successfully placed with a heterosexual couple, as their only 
experiences of men had been abusive and they needed space to heal. She therefore thought 
that, if they'd been in our authority, we'd have been a 'dream come true' as two female carers. 
She thought a sole female carer for seven girls was a complete non-starter, however good a 
support network they had." (Clare). 
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Natural parents, notion that birth   Unnatural parents, 
would have been possible but for   artificial 
childlessness 
 
Natural provision and socialization  Category 'lesbian' seen as 
of racial, ethnic and cultural factors  white, rarely black or  
       Asian, but if so then  
       seen as 'outside' of 
       cultural 'norms' 
 
Part of a natural parenting community  Isolated individuals with 
with support     little support 
         Figure 6.2. 
 
Thus a heterosexual carer is seen as possessing a normative sexuality, and 
indeed the sexuality of heterosexual carers is rarely discussed in social work 
assessments. Many heterosexual applicants do not disclose their sexuality at any 
point in the process, and may be constructed as implicitly 'normal'. That is, the 
explicit mention of heterosexuality is often elided in social work assessments. 
Heterosexuals are assumed to provide naturally occurring balanced gender 
roles, either as part of a heterosexual couple or through family and friends if the 
carer is single. Heterosexuality is assumed to be a biologically essential norm, 
rather than a choice or political institution, against which lesbians and gay men 
are tested as 'other'. Since heterosexuality is constructed as the norm, then the 
children of heterosexuals are not assumed to be likely to experience confusion 
about gender roles or teasing due to their parents' sexualities.  
 
Heterosexual carers are approved in material or structural terms via law, both in 
existing fostering and adoption legislation and in case law examples, and they 
are seen to attract religious approval by most faiths (Thomson 1993). 
Heterosexual carers are also seen as 'natural' parents, and again this is linked to 
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notions of biology. The construction of 'the childless couple' as parents for whom 
a birth child would have been possible but for physiological problems elicits 
particular sympathies in commonsense understandings, so much so that 
surrogacy and alternative insemination are widely accepted for 'childless' 
heterosexuals. So too with carer applicants, who may be constructed as 
'naturally able to care' but for their childlessness. Strangely, white heterosexual 
carers are rarely assessed as, or understood to have, race, culture or ethnicity, 
but black heterosexual carers are often constructed as the 'natural' providers of 
racial, ethnic and cultural factors in a way that black lesbians and gay men are 
not34 (Irvine 1996:218). Finally, heterosexual carers are seen as having the 
automatic support of friends, family, neighbours and community, whilst lesbians 
and gay men are assumed to be 'outcasts' without (heterosexual) support. 
 
In contrast, the 'lesbian carer' is understood as a sexual being, sometimes 
exclusively, whose sexuality is 'other' to the heteronorm. Lesbians are assumed 
to be unable to provide balanced gender roles, which is thought to adversely 
affect child development, and they are seen as 'anti-men'. Lesbian sexuality is 
seen to be different, and therefore chosen, rather than natural, so lesbians are 
constructed as political and radical. Lesbians are so 'other' to the heteronorm that 
they are assumed to carry stigma, and therefore for children this will result in 
teasing and bullying by peers. 
 
                                                           
34 "Black lesbians and gay men are sometimes considered rejects from the black community." 
(Clare). 
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Lesbian carers are largely, though by no means exclusively, outside of legal 
approval35, and are also seen as outside of any religious tradition or community. 
They are constructed as unable to be natural parents, as opposed to the 
'childless heterosexual', and so their desire to parent, and the means by which 
they might do so (which also includes alternative insemination), is regarded as 
artificial. The category 'lesbian' is usually understood to mean white, and rarely 
black or Asian. Black lesbians are seen as outside of the 'cultural norms' of their 
racial heritage, and so are not the 'natural' providers of racial, ethnic or cultural 
needs of children (Irvine 1996:218). Finally, lesbian carers are seen as isolated 
individuals with little support, outside of the heterosexual parenting community, 
but not understood as part of a lesbian community. 
 
Theorizing Racialised Identities: The Categories 'Asian', 'Hindu' and 'Black' 
 
Recent work concerned with the construction of identities according to race and 
ethnicity has been keen to assert that such dynamics also intersect with, and are 
interdependent upon, those of class, gender, sexuality, nation and religion 
(Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992; Bhattacharyya 1998; Brah 1996; Dyer 1997; Gilroy 
1997; Hall 1996; Lewis 1998; McClintock 1995; Mercer 1994; Woodward 1997b). 
I have argued in this chapter that social work assessments of lesbians theorize 
and construct the category 'lesbian' via race and gender as much as sexuality. 
                                                           
35 "No-one ever discussed legal stuff with us. We did all that ourselves - wills, residence order 
giving us both parental responsibility for the girl we eventually adopted. It should have been 
raised as we had to research it all ourselves." (Nita). 
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That is, I now believe that the social work assessment of lesbian, and indeed 
gay, foster or adoptive applicants is never solely based upon understandings of 
sexuality alone. 
 
With regard to issues of race and ethnicity, however, it is my view that, for the 
majority of white lesbian or gay applicants, their 'whiteness' is disappeared or 
absent (Dyer 1988; Frankenberg 1993; Helen 1992, 1993). This has been noted 
by Richard Dyer, as the "invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white 
(which is to say dominant) discourse...Whites are everywhere in representation. 
Yet precisely because of this and their placing as norm they seem not to be 
represented to themselves as whites..." (Dyer 1997:3). 'Whiteness', here then, 
functions as a dynamic of assessment in much the same way as I have been 
arguing that 'heterosexuality' does. But where a 'black' lesbian, or gay man, is 
being assessed then issues of race and ethnicity are brought very much into 
play.  
 
I was interested to see how issues of race were represented in the original 
assessment report prepared by Barbara for the Northern City Council. The Form 
F described Nita as 'Indian' on the front sheet, and goes on to detail her family 
roots in India. There are several references in the form which, taken together, 
build up a representation of Nita's 'Asian-ness'; for example, her travels in India 
and Pakistan, her work in an Asian women's refuge and with Asian women's 
community projects, her involvement with a national network of Asian women 
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writers, her regular visits to India. However, nowhere is her own understanding of 
her racial identity or heritage described36. I was also interested to find out how 
issues of race were assessed with Clare, who told me that the only thing she 
specifically recalled was Barbara asking her if she was happy to take an Asian 
child, which is reported in the form: "The couple are aware of the need for more 
black prospective adopters and this has motivated Nita in particular. [Clare] says 
that she feels similarly and said that they are both enthusiastic to be parents and 
it is not just a question of her going along with [Nita's] wishes." In fact, the couple 
commented that the only way that race really came up during the assessment 
was around Nita's racial background. The focus of race in the original 
assessment, then, was on the categories 'black' and 'Asian'37. 
 
I want to argue, however, that later constructions of the categories 'Asian', 
'Hindu', and 'able to meet religious and cultural needs', by social workers and 
managers from the Midlands Council relied upon singular and fixed notions of 
racialised and religious identities which excluded the category 'lesbian', thereby 
excluding Nita and Clare38 (Brah 1996; Mercer 1994; Thadani 1996). My 
evidence for this comes from the letter of the Assistant Director (Children's 
                                                           
36 Indeed there is a mistake on the form - "She wrote that I spoke Urdu at home which is not true." 
(Nita). 
37 "There was an assumption that I was okay about race because of Nita. It was not pushed. 
When I was assessed for the fostering panel, the social worker Usha asked me much more 
searching questions about race, especially about how I saw Nita. I talked about her as Indian and 
how this was crucial to our relationship and had enriched my life. She commented on how 
unusual this was because most white partners said race 'wasn't an issue.' It is an issue and will 
always be." (Clare). 
38 "Especially when the seven girls had been brought up as Hindu, Jehovah's Witnesses, Sikh 
and Christian at different points. The youngest children were 3, 4 and 6, and had been in care for 
two years and had really only known the white foster homes where they were placed." (Clare). 
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Services) for the Midlands Council, and the report of the Officer who investigated 
the couple's complaint. The decision to reject Nita and Clare was based upon two 
points, or "legal difficulties" as the letter put it, which are worth quoting in full here 
as they are complex and central to my argument: 
 
The specific problems that faced the Panel related to two legal 
difficulties which arise from the case...[T]hey provide the basis for 
the Panel's decision not to proceed with the match. 
 
1. Under Section 22 of the Children Act 1989 the Authority is 
required, before making any decision with respect to a child 
whom they are looking after, to ascertain the wishes and feelings 
of the child's parents. In this case, given the parents' professed 
strong Hindu beliefs39, it is our understanding that they would 
object to the placement on religious grounds. Although the Local 
Authority is not absolutely bound by the parents' wishes and 
feelings regarding placement40, these do have to be given due 
consideration. 
 
                                                           
39 "The birth mother had been Sikh, Hindu, Jehovah's Witness and Christian. The current man 
living with the mother was not the birth father of them all and had been convicted and imprisoned 
for abusing them." (Clare). 
40 This is an important point here - the Authority is not bound by the parents' wishes and feelings 
in making a placement, since the girls were all subjects of Care Orders under the Children Act 
1989 which dictated that they were not to be returned to the parental home under any 
circumstances due to the abuse that they had suffered. Indeed their birth father had served a 
period of imprisonment in respect of the criminal offences involved. 
 373 
2. Under Section 22(5)(c) of the Children Act 1989 the Authority 
must give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, 
racial origin and cultural and linguistic background in respect of 
children either accommodated or subject to a Care Order. For 
children subject to a Care Order, the duties are made even 
stronger by Section 33 of the Children Act which states that a 
Local Authority shall not cause a child to be brought up in any 
religious persuasion other than that in which he/she would have 
been brought up if the Care Order had not been made. The 
Panel were clear that you would make various efforts to 
accommodate the girls' Hindu religious and cultural needs41. 
However, there is a fundamental problem in seeking to do this in 
the context of a relationship which the Panel understood is not 
recognised in the Hindu faith. 
 
The point being made here, that lesbianism is not compatible with the Hindu 
faith, was the main reason given for the rejection of Nita and Clare. What is going 
on here then? Were Nita and Clare unable to meet the religious needs of the 
girls? In fact, the girls had been described as "nominally Hindu" and Nita and 
Clare had provided detailed written material specifying how they would 
incorporate the Hindu faith into the girls' everyday lives: 
                                                           
41 "...unlike the three separate white foster homes they were in. All the children were described as 
being 'confused and negative about their racial identity.' Some were involved in self-harm and 
one had tried to commit suicide." (Clare). 
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The [Children] Act requires the authority to ascertain "How the 
applicant would expect to participate in and nurture a child's 
religious life?" (Guidance to the Act, Volume 3, clause 3.24), not 
to find an identical religious background. We do not practise any 
other religion ourselves, and were committed to bringing the 
children up as Hindus42. We explained in great detail how we 
would give Hinduism a high priority in our daily lives and develop 
the children's understanding and practice of their religion beyond 
what the younger ones had experienced up to now, and certainly 
beyond what we are told they are currently receiving in their 
foster homes. We were also committed to developing their 
positive feelings about India and being Asian through our own 
family and friends and [Nita's] family contacts and roots in India. 
 
The Northern City Council fostering panel also "considered the couple to be 
suitable carers from [their] understanding of the children's needs as provided by 
[the Midlands Council]." Guidance under the Children Act 1989 is not prescriptive 
on this issue and has the following to say regarding religion: 
 
"...the social worker should seek to understand the extent to 
which religion influences the foster parent's family life. What is 
                                                           
42 "We made this point because nothing had been done about this for the past two years." (Clare). 
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the element of familiarity and sympathy with and understanding 
of other denominations and faiths with which the foster family 
may have links through relatives or friends?...How would the 
applicant expect to participate in and nurture a child's religious 
life?" (DoH 1991:26; para. 3.24). 
 
Indeed I argue that the Midlands Council panel accepted the couple's ability to 
meet the girls' religious needs, but it was Nita and Clare's lesbianism that was 
problematic for them. In response to this, however, the Midlands Council 
suggested that lesbianism is not recognized in the Hindu faith. Here, then, is a 
construction of 'Hindu' as an identity exclusive of the category 'lesbian'.  
 
There are two ways of contesting this assertion. First, as was argued by Usha 
and also by Nita and Clare themselves, is the argument that Hinduism is far more 
liberal on questions of sexual practice than many other religions, certainly 
including Christianity or Islam (Kurl 1993). Nita and Clare argued that social 
workers had relied upon racist stereotypes of Asian religions as oppressive and 
reactionary. Second, the question can be asked, 'what religion does explicitly 
recognize lesbian or gay relationships?', to which the answer is none (Thomson 
1993). This points to the fruitlessness of trying to establish a single 'Hindu belief' 
regarding lesbianism, yet this was attempted in the report of the Complaint 
Investigation Officer: 
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Hindu belief in relation to lesbianism: 
 
I have sought, by various means and contacts, to establish what 
is Hindu belief in this matter. My conclusion is that a distinction 
between religion and culture does not exist in this matter, and 
that Hinduism may be described as a system of practice rather 
than belief. The test I have therefore put to a range of people 
describing themselves as Hindu has been what would be the 
attitude in a temple to attendance by a couple known to be 
lesbian. This ranged from, "They would not be allowed in" to "In 
some temples they might be accepted." (my emphasis)43. 
 
Nita and Clare had made it quite clear how they thought that they were able to 
meet the girls' stated religious and cultural needs, writing in their complaint that " 
the children are now left with no immediate prospect of being together again in a 
permanent home with at least one Asian parent, participating in the Hindu 
religion, all of which [Midlands Council] has been directed to find for them and all 
of which we could have provided."44  Lesbianism, however, was seen here as 
                                                           
43 "The assumption made here is that Hindus who attend temples aren't lesbians. What about all 
the lesbian Hindus in India? There was a high profile case there of two women marrying and it 
was all over the Indian newspapers [see Thadani 1996:106]. Hinduism is a religion that does not 
have to be observed in attendance at temple, unlike Christianity where you're expected to attend 
church. Hindus must have a shrine in their home and that is where most worship." (Clare). 
44 "There was no consideration of 'the best interests of the child'. It was the requirements of the 
Hindu religion and their parents' views that prevailed. In fact four of the girls were over 8 years 
but were never consulted, as is prescribed in the Children Act 1989. Those seven girls now think 
that no-one wanted them. They knew they had been advertised but not that anyone had ever 
responded." (Clare). 
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somehow inappropriate in racial and cultural terms, and I think that this is partly 
to do with the construction of heterosexual carers as being the 'natural' providers 
of racial and religious identities (Irvine 1996; and see my earlier discussion of 
Figure 6.2). But it also has to do with the denial of black and Asian lesbianism 
and the interpretation of Hindu religion as being exclusive of lesbians45. 
 
Understandings of the 'black lesbian' are often so other to heteronormative ideas 
about who makes a good parent that the category is excluded (Hayfield 1995). 
The oppression experienced by black lesbians is rarely addressed in social work 
other than in pathologising ways (Swigonski 1995), and lesbianism itself is 
sometimes seen as a 'white' only thing, the 'white disease' (Mason-John & 
Khambatta 1993:21). Anna Marie Smith has argued that 'the black lesbian' and 
'the lesbian parent' were constructed as 'demons' key to New Right discourse on 
race and sexuality (Smith 1994:213), and that this discourse placed the figure of 
'the black lesbian' "at the furthest possible distance from the white familial 
nation." (Smith 1994:182). 
 
In reviewing evidence for the place of lesbianism within the Hindu faith, Giti 
Thadani's (1996) work is important for the historical evidence that she provides of 
                                                           
45 "No-one ever said what as lesbian carers we'd not be able to do or what we'd do that would be 
so bad. It wasn't about being two women, it was about being lesbian that they objected to. So if 
Nita had come forward on her own with me as a support, and we hadn't said we were lesbians, 
we'd maybe have got the kids. The girls were not Hindu anyway. They were advertised as 
nominally so and the Midlands Council said they wanted any foster parents. They didn't even say 
Asian carers, they just wanted somewhere the girls could all be together. No-one looked at our 
parenting skills to see if we could meet the girls’ needs. Our commitment to the placement was 
such that we'd said we'd both give up work to look after them full-time, and we'd move to a bigger 
house." (Clare). 
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feminine cosmogonies46 and woman-to-woman sexual contact in ancient Hindu 
texts and imagery, both sculptural and painted (Thadani 1996:77). In fact, she 
argues that 'Hindu-ism' has been reconstructed via colonialism so that it is now 
often understood as a masculine static single tradition, excluding feminine 
cosmogonies, and asserting compulsory heterosexuality (Thadani 1996:4-6). 
Again the 'lesbian' can be excluded from the Hindu faith only if that faith is seen 
as a static and essential entity. Thadani argues that lesbianism is subject to the 
same kinds of silencing and 'othering' in India as in other countries, where it may 
be viewed as 'un-Indian', an influence from the decadent West, the privilege of 
'Westernized' women only, or linked to women who are seen as gender non-
conformative (Thadani 1996:82/88/92). Instead, she argues that there is 
evidence of a long and rich tradition of lesbian 'identities' in India and a strong 
contemporary lesbian movement (Thadani 1996:114; and see also Mason-John 
& Okorrowa 1995:74). 
 
Cath (1996) echoes these points, noting the silencing of lesbianism in India, 
partly due to the legacy of colonial rule and law. She also describes the 
documentation of woman-to-woman bonding in the Hindu traditions of sculpture, 
texts and miniature paintings (Cath 1996:77/80/85). Arvind Sharma (1993) 
argues that the evidence for the 'acceptability' of homosexuality in ancient Hindu 
texts, dealing with dharma (righteousness, duty and virtue), artha (material 
gains), kama (love or pleasure) and moksa/tantra (spiritual or religious practice), 
                                                           
46 'Cosmogony' means origin of the universe. 
 379 
is contradictory and inconclusive at best (Sharma 1993:68). Most significantly he 
argues that we should "distinguish between Hindu religious attitudes and Hindu 
cultural attitudes. As a religion, Hinduism is perhaps more tolerant of 
homosexuality than it is as a culture..." (Sharma 1993:68).  
 
This is an important point, since the Midlands Council argued quite clearly that 
lesbianism is not recognized in the Hindu faith. Where was their evidence for 
this? The Investigating Officer found no evidence to support this claim. If the 
Midlands Council meant that lesbianism is not culturally acceptable to most 
Hindus (although that is not what they said), then this is discriminatory on two 
grounds; first, that of sexuality, since we could also say that most people who 
participate in white or black Christian cultures do not find homosexuality culturally 
acceptable (Thomson 1993). Nevertheless this does not justify discrimination on 
the grounds of sexuality in fostering or adoption, and it also suggests that Asian 
Hindu culture is 'more homophobic' than others. Second, on the grounds of 
religion, since it both rejects all lesbian and gay carers a priori and positions 
Hinduism as more 'reactionary' than other faiths, which in this case is an 
untested assumption. 
 
As an Asian lesbian, Nita was constructed as somehow unable to provide racial, 
religious and cultural needs, in opposition to the way that black heterosexual 
carers would have been seen as 'naturally' able to provide these. I think this goes 
back to Smith's (1994) arguments about the place of 'the black lesbian' in 
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discourses surrounding 'the family' and 'child care'. In my view it is telling that the 
Investigating Officer used a paragraph from Children Act 1989 guidance (DoH 
1991), which originally contained the infamous paragraph 16 (DoH 1990). He 
said: 
 
Para 3.14 [from DoH 1991] reads as follows: "Authorities and 
those interested in becoming foster parents must understand that 
an authority's duty is, unequivocally and unambiguously, to find 
and approve the most suitable foster parents for children who 
need family placement. It would be wrong arbitrarily to exclude 
any particular groups of people from consideration. But the 
chosen way of life of some adults may mean that they would not 
be able to provide a suitable environment for the care and 
nurture of a child. No one has a 'right' to be a foster parent. 
Fostering decisions must centre exclusively on the interests of 
the child." 
 
My conclusion is that the [Midlands Council] has operated both 
the spirit and the letter of this paragraph and has not arbitrarily 
excluded any particular group. 
 
My argument is that two lesbians were arbitrarily excluded, on the basis of 
sexuality alone, from caring for a group of children for whom they would have 
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been able to meet the stated needs. In my view the Midlands Council interpreted 
lesbianism as a 'way of life' unacceptable to their version of 'the Hindu faith' and 
therefore as an automatic disqualifier from caring for children.  
 
Conclusion: A Summary of Points 
 
In the second section of this chapter, I argued that the assessment approach 
used in this case was 'on merit'. For Nita and Clare the assessment had a 
positive outcome in that they were approved as adopters. The 'on merit' 
approach here led to a focus on child care issues over and above sexuality, an 
absence of discussion or analysis of the specificities of lesbian adoption, and the 
assessment being panel-driven in its concerns. This was a key dilemma for the 
assessing social worker; how much should she steer her assessment towards 
what she felt would be the panel's concerns, and how much more thorough 
should the assessment be, given that this was the first openly lesbian couple to 
be considered for adoption by the panel in question? 
 
I have argued that processes of heterosexualisation were in operation, and that 
Nita and Clare were represented as having 'heterosexual influences' and 
understandings. Specifically this involved the use of an extra heterosexual couple 
as referees, discussion of past relationships with men, and seeing the couple as 
an isolated example of lesbian carers, not part of a 'lesbian community' but fitting 
into a heterosexual one. I have also argued that the 'childlessness' model of 
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adoption was used in this case even though it was inappropriate47. 
 
With regard to gender issues, I have suggested that concerns about gender and 
role developments were a key part of the way that lesbianism was assessed. The 
couple was prevented from making a statement of their preference for girl 
children, and they were assessed in relation to their attitudes towards men and 
whether they could provide male role models. Both concerns, I suggest, have 
more to do with anxieties about what 'lesbians' are, and the need to maintain 
compulsory gender roles, rather than issues of child development. 
 
In section three, I argued that the social work assessment of lesbian, or indeed 
gay, carer applicants is not a straightforward transfer of foundational reality to 
written report (Form F). The categories 'lesbian', 'gay', 'Asian' or 'Hindu' are 
actively reconstructed via assessment processes, and their meanings are 
contested by various social actors in the process itself. In this sense, then, there 
is no such thing as a singular category 'lesbian', 'Asian' or 'Hindu', since both 
textual and discursive representations of these are active constructions of 
meanings attached to such categories by social actors.  
 
This is an important point, for it acknowledges that such categories are never 
singular, seamless identities, but in fact contain a whole range of contested 
understandings, not least those of the people who inhabit them. This does not 
                                                           
47 "It's a deficit model of adoption which sees it as a 'consolation prize' rather than as a first 
choice, which it was for us." (Nita). 
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mean to say that categories such as 'lesbian', 'Asian', 'Hindu' or 'black' are non-
existent, in fact far from it. They have important oppositional and resistant 
meanings for those people who claim them when faced with white 
heteronormative practices.  
 
What I am arguing, here, though, is that social workers in this case relied upon 
fixed and essentialist notions of 'identities', which reinforced hierarchies 
concerning who can be a good parent. These heteronormative notions actively 
construct the 'good parent' in textual, as well as discursive, forms (e.g. Form F). 
But in the case of the assessment of heterosexual carers, this norm-ing process 
is invisiblised. As Judith Butler (1990) has noted, compulsory heterosexuality and 
gender norms actively conceal what is in fact a constant process of their re-
construction, or 'performativity' in her words (Butler 1990:141). 
 
In contrast, lesbians are constructed as 'the margin not the centre' in such 
debates, so that they are outside of the heteronormative understanding of the 
good carer. The examples from my research positioned lesbians as the source of 
unwanted media attention, at the centre of damaging court decisions, outside of 
religious acceptability, as providers of unbalanced gender roles, and as 
unacceptable carers a priori due to their sexuality. But these factors are not due 
to lesbianism, they are all examples of the heterosexual oppression of lesbians. 
 
Similarly, social workers in this case relied upon fixed racial identities, which 
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perpetrated the ideas that 'all Asians are the same' and 'they don't recognize 
lesbianism'. The Hindu faith was seen as a singular entity, again which did not 
recognize lesbians, but it is my view that this was a reason given to mask 
discrimination on the grounds of sexuality48. As Helen Reece (1995) has noted, 
the paramountcy principle - what is seen as being 'in the best interests of the 
child', a key phrase used by the Midlands Council - can be used as the 'ultimate 
politically correct way' of justifying anti-lesbian decisions (Reece 1995). In this 
case, it was a supposedly Hindu norm that was constructed as something that 
had to be respected at all other costs, dressed up by social workers as meeting 
cultural and religious needs. This argument, however, could equally be applied to 
white religious 'cultures' (Christianity, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, for example) 
(Thomson 1993) and it is therefore a way of masking heterosexist social work 
practice. Certainly this is my view of the decision reached by the Midlands 
Council in relation to Nita and Clare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
48 "What about all our Asian friends who accept us and our sexuality, including Hindus?!" (Clare). 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions: Familiar Fears? 
 
March 1996: My final 'social worker interview' is over, and I say 
goodbye and thanks, leaving some chocolates for the social 
workers and especially for Wendy who helped me so much. She's 
not there - out 'doing' social work, so I leave her a card. I walk back 
to the station to get the train back home, and I'm exhausted. 
Tomorrow I have to go back into work and be a social worker again 
myself. 'Well,' I think, 'I'm glad that's over, all those interviews 
done...I wonder if I've really done 'enough' for a PhD?...' But of 
course it's most definitely not over - for I have a mass of paper, all 
those interviews to painstakingly transcribe, and I realise that it's 
just the beginning. Now I have to make some sense of all this talk... 
 
In this thesis I set out to examine how a group of social workers went about 
assessing the suitability of lesbians or gay men to be foster carers or adopters. I 
have argued that lesbian and gay adoption and fostering remain currently so 
'unusual' that mere mention of the topic provokes strong reactions from all sides. 
If it were not such an 'unusual' topic, then perhaps this thesis would not even 
exist. I have further suggested that lesbian and gay carers are the exception not 
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the rule, and that their numbers are small. This is certainly because current social 
work practice continues to operate models of outright rejection, tacit acceptance 
or the last resort. Existing fostering and adoption law and guidance (DoH 1991; 
DoH et al. 1993) bolster all of these, and I have argued that this means that 
lesbians and gay men are always held to an existing heterosexual standard. 
 
This 'heterosexual standard' needs uncovering, and I have started to do this in 
the thesis. It is also being excavated within queer and feminist theories, but there 
is a long way to go. By this I mean that more work needs to be done on what is 
constituted by the concept of ‘heterosexuality’. Certainly it is a defining ‘norm’ in 
my view, but one which is rarely specified since, at its core, heterosexuality is 
nothing (Butler 1990; Richardson 1996b). Like all other sexuality categories, 
heterosexuality is only a particular social construction - nothing is inherently 
‘heterosexual’ - and yet it retains dominance as a political and institutional 
principle. As David Halperin argues, this dominance depends, however, upon the 
abjection of ‘homosexuality’: 
 
...homosexuality and heterosexuality do not represent a true pair, two 
mutually referential contraries, but a hierarchical opposition in which 
heterosexuality defines itself implicitly by constituting itself as the negation 
of homosexuality. Heterosexuality defines itself without problematising itself, 
it elevates itself as a privileged and unmarked term, by abjecting and 
problematising homosexuality. Heterosexuality, then, depends on 
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homosexuality to lend it substance - and to enable it to acquire by default 
its status as a default, as a lack of difference or an absence of 
abnormality.” (Halperin 1995:44). 
 
I have argued that this ‘absence of abnormality’ is constructed via 
heteronormative ideas about who makes the ‘good carer’ of children in adoption 
and fostering. I have also suggested that the ‘heterosexual standard’ is ever 
present in the familiar fears raised by the topic of lesbian and gay adoption and 
fostering, fears that revolve around supposed risks to children, threats to 
heterosexuality and men's powerful knowledges about the world as defining 
standards. These familiar fears, I have argued, are to do with current and 
prevalent discourses about lesbians and gay men, and these are very much 
present in social work 'discourse' (Rojek et al. 1988), including its practices and 
organisational effects. 
 
I have also made the case that the assessment of lesbian and gay applicants is a 
key site for the construction of the meanings of 'lesbian', 'gay', and indeed many 
other concepts, and it is therefore also a key place to research how social 
workers 'make sense' of such categories. I have specified why some of the 
claims of postmodernism, queer theory, (postmodern) and (black) feminisms are 
helpful for analysing this, and I have focused my own investigations upon 
material practices and representations which socially construct versions of 
'lesbian' and 'gay'. Indeed I suggest that these are interlinked within social work 
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assessment in a way that cannot be easily distinguished: 
 
assessment practices 
 
 
(textual) representations 
                    Figure 7.1 
 
Thus I have argued that social work assessments are textually mediated versions 
of the 'relations of ruling' (Smith 1987, 1990), or the ways that 'the social' is 
organised, and therefore 'lesbian', 'gay' and 'the good carer' are all forms of 
knowing, ways of carving up and making sense of experience: 
 
...in organisations concerned with processing people, characteristic 
forms of co-ordinating work processes focused on individuals are 
textual...Individuals are known as 'cases' under the interpretive 
aegis of their records. When decisions are to be made their 'current 
status' is located in the textual traces of their past contained 
therein. (Smith 1990:220). 
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A Summary of the Thesis 
 
In chapter two of the thesis I reviewed the few existing studies relating to lesbian 
and gay fostering and adoption. These argued for the right of entitlement of 
lesbian and gay applicants to be assessed, yet also noted a range of everyday 
'myths' which tended to disadvantage them. These included concerns about 
gender role models and the possible abuse of children. Lesbians and gay men 
who were successfully approved were likely to take 'hard to place' children. 
Existing studies argued for the need for further detailed research, and I 
suggested that my work would pay attention to the concepts of assessing 
lesbians and gay men 'on merit', to what constituted 'discrimination' in 
assessments, to the importance of gender and race in constructions of sexuality, 
and to social work discourses, or the 'relations of ruling', rather than 'attitudes 
and values'. 
 
In chapter three I made the case that textual devices are as important as 
methodological ones in persuading the reader of arguments. I suggested the 
'unreliable author' in order to point out that my research interviews and case 
study were not descriptions of 'fact', but interpretations. I explained why I used 
interviewing and the case study to generate narrative accounts of practice (Hall 
1997). This was so that I could deal with complexities, and investigate 'social 
work scripts', or 'ways of doing' assessments which constitute practice norms. 
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In chapter four, I argued that social work assessments are versions of 'lesbian' or 
'gay' constructed via talk and text, and that these serve regulatory purposes in 
policing the boundaries of what I have defined as 'the good carer'. Assessment, 
therefore, follows no standard practice but is a 'making sense' activity, and I 
proposed a continuum model (Figure 4.4) to show a range of approaches. I then 
argued that the 'on merit: prioritising child care' model dominated amongst the 
agencies in which I conducted my research, though quite clearly I am unable to 
say whether it dominates across all local authorities. I analysed a series of key 
themes, which I argued influenced the approach taken by agencies, and I then 
used the work of Dorothy Smith (1987) to examine a series of everyday 
'commonsense' arguments about supposed risks to children posed by lesbians 
and gay men. Here I examined arguments about the 'double burden', teasing, 
poor gender roles, corruption, and 'gay rights'. Problematising these everyday 
arguments allowed me to show how they are textually mediated versions of the 
heterosexual ‘relations of ruling’ that currently structure adoption and fostering 
practice.  
 
I went on to examine the notion of 'discriminatory' practices in assessment in two 
ways; first, I suggested that lesbians and gay men were always disadvantaged 
within a system that favours heterosexuals and I argued that sameness models 
of 'equality' and assessment were inadequate. Sameness tended to hold 
lesbians and gay men to a heterosexual standard, to avoid the specifics of their 
lives, to position them as the last resort and to locate sexuality as a private 
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matter. Difference models, however, could be both disadvantageous and 
advantageous I suggested, depending on whether lesbians and gay men were 
expected to 'jump through extra hoops' or whether social workers recognised that 
there were key areas of questioning and needs specific to lesbian and gay 
experiences. Second, I looked at those social workers that were attempting to be 
more ‘anti-discriminatory’ in their practices. Using the examples of, first, the 
notion of ‘matching’ social workers with applicants on the basis of sexuality and, 
second, the Lesbian and Gay Issues Working Party in the North Eastern Council, 
I showed how attempts at anti-discriminatory measures were merely ‘sticking-
plasters’, whilst movements for wider change can be 'organised out' by an 
unsupportive management and councillors. 
 
In chapter five, I analysed how 'lesbian' and 'gay' were understood through the 
dynamics of gender. Lesbians were questioned about attitudes towards men, 
gender role models, and gender preferences, and more challenging versions of 
'the lesbian' had to be organised out of assessments. Lesbians were understood 
as a 'threat' because they were women without men, yet they were also more 
palatable as the carers of children than gay men because they were women. 
Along the axis of sexuality, the lesbian was threatening, but along that of gender 
she was more acceptable. I proposed a model of 'the good lesbian carer' at 
Figure 5.1 who was 'not too lesbian' I suggested. 
 
'Gender anxiety' was also present in understandings of 'the gay man', and similar 
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questions about gender role models were raised. As men, gay men raised a 
discourse of suspicion for the social workers, but as gay then the construction of 
'the maternal man' made him more palatable. Corruption theory, the notion of the 
risk of sexual abuse, was far more prevalent when considering gay men than 
lesbians, and I found that the social workers were worried about the potential for 
allegations against gay carers.  
 
I also found that gay men were far more likely to be assessed for less permanent 
placements of older children, usually young men, sometimes disabled and 
sometimes gay. Rarely were gay men considered for adoption. Lesbians were 
often seen as more appropriate for younger children, more permanent forms of 
care (including adoption), and sometimes for girls who had survived child sexual 
abuse. In comparison with 'the good lesbian carer', I argued that the dominant 
version of 'gay' produced through assessments was one in which gay men were 
seen to have 'maternal' qualities but were also understood along heterosexually 
gendered lines.  
 
Here, then, is a key argument made within the thesis; that fostering and adoption 
assessments currently rest upon an assumed gendered heterosexuality (the idea 
of the heteronormative) in which it is women (all women) who are expected to 
protect children from men (all men). Where this way of working is challenged by 
lesbian and gay applicants, then the category ‘lesbian’ is understood as at once 
both unthreatening, because lesbians are seen as women, and also potentially 
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threatening to that conventionally gendered heterosexuality. Here lesbians are 
represented in non-threatening terms, I argued; as not too radical, not too 
lesbian. The category ‘gay men’ similarly was at once both unthreatening when 
represented in conventionally ‘female’ terms (the ‘maternal’ gay man) or in 
‘heterosexualised’ ways, but was also threatening in gendered terms because 
gay male households usually contain no women and this was a problem for the 
social workers. 
 
Chapter six presented my case study of Nita and Clare, and I used it to show 
how sexuality is also constructed in raced ways. I argued that their assessment 
as potential adopters relied upon the 'on merit: child care' model, and that this 
had a number of consequences; ignoring the specifics of lesbian adoption, being 
panel-driven, and imposing 'extra hoops'. I analysed the processes of 
'heterosexualisation' in action, and also concerns around gender, in order to 
exemplify my earlier arguments about versions of 'lesbian'. Here I showed how 
lesbian applicants were disadvantaged by the heteronormative expectations of 
who makes a 'good parent' (Figure 6.2). Nita and Clare were represented as 
having heterosexual influences, 'not too feminist' and as 'natural' lesbians.  
 
I then went on to argue that they were rejected as the potential carers of a sibling 
group of Asian girls by the Midlands Council solely because of their lesbianism. 
However, I showed that this decision was presented as an argument that 'the 
Hindu faith' did not support lesbianism. Once more I suggested that this was, in 
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fact, a particular version of 'Hindu' (Kumar 1993; Thadani 1996), and one that 
was and can be contested. Nevertheless I argued that the Midlands Council used 
fostering guidance (DoH 1991) to justify an anti-lesbian decision 'in the best 
interests of the children' (Reece 1995). 
 
The thesis has made an original contribution to social work research knowledge 
for a number of reasons; first, it has investigated a topic little researched and has 
generated data in an area that has never been examined before. Second, the 
thesis has questioned some of the existing ways of understanding lesbian and 
gay adoption and fostering; it has investigated what 'on merit' assessments 
actually entail for lesbians and gay men, it has questioned the approach which 
examines agency policies only, and it has looked at what would constitute 
'discrimination' in assessments. 
 
Finally, it has adopted an approach to the investigation of the topic that locates 
social work assessment as a 'making sense' activity, rather than a series of skills. 
This has entailed, then, an institutional ethnography (Smith 1987), in the sense 
that the thesis has examined everyday understandings and practices that 
constitute agency norms in how lesbians and gay men are assessed. This has 
been realised by paying close analytic attention to the social workers' talk and 
text, for it is through these that versions of the 'good enough lesbian or gay carer' 
are situationally achieved. 
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The research, like all research, suffers from some methodological weaknesses. 
Further comparison with other local authority practices, including those prepared 
to make public statements that they would reject all lesbian and gay applicants, 
would have been enriching of the data. The case study would have benefited 
from further interviews with social workers and/or managers from the Midlands 
Council but this was not possible. Relatedly, the social worker cohort would have 
been supplemented by comments from those who refused to speak with me, 
since I was and remain interested in what they had to say. 
 
The Need for Further Research 
 
I have already argued that this thesis cannot answer all questions about adoption 
and fostering by lesbians and gay men, and this is because it exists within a 
context of social work research which pays little attention to gay and lesbian 
issues, much less specifics like fostering and adoption. In order to generate a 
wider picture about this topic, I recommend that research in the following areas is 
needed: 
 
• studies, including longitudinal ones, of children placed with lesbian and gay 
adoptive and foster carers, 
• studies of the placement 'careers' of lesbian and gay carers, including those 
who never have children placed with them, and including placement 
breakdowns where they occur, 
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• studies of applications to be considered by lesbians and gay men, including 
those who are rejected by agencies, 
• studies of recruitment practices as they affect potential gay and lesbian 
applicants, 
• studies of the decisions made by adoption and fostering panels about lesbian 
and gay applicants, 
• cultural studies of media representations of lesbian and gay adopters and 
foster carers. 
 
Further research in these areas would contribute to a more sophisticated 
knowledge-base for debating and considering this topic, and would greatly 
enhance current understandings of both social work practices concerning, and 
the day-to-day issues involved in, lesbian and gay adoption and fostering. 
 
Familiar Fears? 
 
In this thesis I have used Dorothy Smith’s concept of the ‘relations of ruling’ 
(Smith 1987) to argue that fostering and adoption assessments favour the 
standard of the heterosexual couple via a dominant discourse, and that this 
includes talk, text and practices. Thus constructions of the categories ‘lesbian’ 
and ‘gay’ through verbal and written representations, as well as through 
particular forms of social working applied to them, have been critiqued herein 
especially via alternative versions of knowledge provided by queer theory, black 
 397 
writers and feminisms. 
 
I have argued that there are many versions of ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ and I have 
analysed how some are more favourable within fostering and adoption practice: 
the ‘good lesbian’ or the ‘maternal gay man’. Such versions retain dominance 
because they are ways of responding to the risks or threats that lesbians and gay 
men pose for the heterosexual ‘relations of ruling’. I have argued that these are 
constructed as risks or threats to children, to heterosexuality, to traditional forms 
of gender, to fixed racial categories, and indeed to singular identities as such. 
 
Heterosexuality continues to occupy a key institutional status within social work, 
and it is rarely questioned although it is panicked and has to be continually 
performed (Butler 1990). Therefore applications by lesbians or gay men to be 
considered for fostering or adoption challenge this heterosexuality, raising 
‘familiar fears’, and so I have argued that this heterosexuality has to be defended 
via discursive strategies including the repetition of certain social work practices 
for all applicants. 
 
I have also argued that it is impossible to investigate sexuality alone as it is 
always a raced and gendered concept. Indeed a focus solely on identity politics 
is dangerous, I argued, because this works with fixed identities (‘a Hindu is....’, ‘a 
lesbian is....’ and so on), rather than with categories of knowledge. Here feminist 
and queer theories have been important in locating such power/knowledge 
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dynamics. 
 
Certain versions of the ‘assessment’ also dominate, I have suggested, with the 
‘on merit’ model occupying a central place within my data. However I have 
argued that this works against lesbians and gay men in some ways and that it is 
poorly defined. Hence, for example, panics about whether lesbians and gay men 
should be asked ‘different’ questions. 
 
Purely ‘anti-discriminatory’ measures, such as the idea of ‘matching’ applicants 
with social workers, do not address the wider ‘anti-oppressive’ problem of the 
heterosexual relations of ruling. Making such small changes, I argue, does not 
address questions of knowledge and the central place that heteronormative ideas 
occupy. Thus small changes will not work in favour of lesbians and gay men, and 
I have argued that one of their consequences has been the ascendancy of 
certain acceptable, heterosexualised or ‘de-politicised’ versions of the categories 
lesbian or gay. Instead I have argued through the thesis for the excavation of the 
heteronormative within social work and within social relations. This is in favour of 
expecting lesbians and gay men to accept small changes within an otherwise 
static and hegemonic set of power dynamics. For as Audre Lorde has argued: 
 
What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to 
examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the 
most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable...For 
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the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They 
may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will 
never enable us to bring about genuine change. (Lorde 1984:111-
112). 
 
I have argued that this thesis is not a "how to guide" to the assessment of 
lesbians and gay men, and specifying a series of points on 'what to do' would be 
inappropriate not least because this would fix a standard version of 'lesbian' or 
'gay' to be followed by all. Such fixities I have argued against. I also believe that 
a 'how to' guide would prevent social workers from the active reflexivity about 
their practices which is needed. I have specified some interim measures in the 
thesis, such as rejection of sameness models of assessment in favour of those 
which address the specificity of lesbian and gay experiences, but I have also 
argued for a total bottom-to-top change of the existing social work discourses of 
sexuality. This involves shifting the 'relations of ruling', certainly no easy task, but 
I would like to outline an approach to this here which might be termed ‘multiple 
activisms’. 
 
Multiple activisms work to change knowledges, and in particular to question 
dominant discourses, but this can only be done on a series of different but linked 
levels. For example, changing social work assessment practices is necessary but 
certainly not enough. Where existing law, guidance and indeed panels remain 
liberal at best and homophobic at worst, then these need to be changed also. My 
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own approach has involved, or continues to involve: 
 
 
• working as a gay social worker, making alliances with other lesbian and gay 
social workers and supportive heterosexual social workers, in order to get 
lesbian and gay issues on the agenda, 
• contributing to a social work education which does address lesbian and gay 
issues and questions dominant discourses of sexuality, 
• arguing that 'lesbian' and 'gay' exist in different versions, and that these must 
be understood as also raced and gendered, 
• providing training on lesbian and gay adoption and fostering, 
• public speaking, research and writing about this topic, 
• a commitment to the need to support further research, 
• lesbian and gay community activism, including activism specifically concerned 
with adoption and fostering via support groups and campaigning groups, 
• arguing that the process of social work assessment should be considered 
from start to finish, and each stage examined for its implications for lesbians 
and gay men; equal opportunities statements, policies, recruitment, assessing 
social workers, panels and supervision of workers, 
• challenging homophobic decisions in law and guidance on fostering and 
adoption. 
 
All of these are interventions into 'knowledge' about lesbians and gay men, 
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comparable with similar struggles about the relevance of race and ethnicity in 
decisions about adoption and fostering (Barn 1993; Rhodes 1992). I have argued 
for an analysis of how such subjectivities are constituted within social work, for it 
is by such interventions that the power/knowledge nexus can be revealed: 
 
...the (gendered) subject is always differentiated within linguistic 
practices and institutional norms and [...] such structures represent 
hegemonic sites of contestation and are overdetermined by an 
unequal distribution of power. (Ahmed 1996:91). 
 
For it is only through a long-term praxis which aims to question dominant 
discourses of sexuality that the existing relations of ruling - the 'familiar fears' 
about lesbians and gay men as adopters and foster carers - can be shifted. Part 
of such a praxis is the need for research that can uncover the daily forms of 
social work-ing which constitute regulatory practices, and I hope that this thesis 
has made a contribution in this respect: 
 
The actual practices ordering the daily relations that regulate 
contemporary advanced capitalist society, however conceptualized, 
can be subject to empirical inquiry, to ethnographic exploration, 
once texts are recognized as integral and 'active' constituents. 
Uncovering texts as constituents of relations anchors research in 
the actual ways in which relations are organised and how they 
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operate. The enterprise is indeed grandiose; it is that of 
transforming our understanding of the nature of power when power 
is textually mediated. (Smith 1990:224).  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Interview Schedule: Prompts 
 
 
Basic Information 
 
Name 
Age 
Race/ethnicity/culture 
Disability 
 
How long have they been in social work? 
What team are they in? 
What does their team do? 
Full-time/part-time? 
 
‘Policy’ Issues 
 
Does their Local Authority have a policy on lesbians and gay men as foster or 
adoptive carers? 
Do they have an Equal Opportunities statement? 
Does the Local Authority have a ‘good’ reputation for approving lesbians/gay 
men? 
Does the team discuss lesbian/gay carers policy? 
What are the views of local councillors? 
Has there been any effect of Section 28? 
Do they believe policy has had any effect? 
What changes have there been due to policy? 
 
For agencies that participated in Skeates & Jabri (1988) study 
 
Read out the points made by the LA in that study: do the social workers 
recognise these? Did they ever happen? Do they have experience of them? 
 
Recruitment and Selection of Lesbian and Gay Applicants 
 
Is there any targeted recruitment? Advertising? Re. race as well as sexuality. 
 
What is their step-by-step recruitment and assessment process? i.e. what stages 
are there? At what stage would sexuality be dealt with? When might they talk to 
‘out’ applicants about sexuality? 
 
Do preparation groups cover sexuality? Would applicants be dismissed for 
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homophobia or racism? 
 
 
Social Worker Attitudes 
 
Have they had any training on lesbian/gay issues? What about social work 
course (CQSW, CSS, DipSW?) or post-qualification training? 
 
Does their unit have any lesbian or gay carers - where are they located? What 
placements do they have or get? 
 
Ask about the common arguments against lesbian/gay carers: 
• double surrogacy 
• teasing/peer groups 
• gender role models 
• sexual abuse 
• children will ‘become’ gay 
• birth parent objections 
 
What pressures are there on social workers/dept. about this issue? Is it different 
for lesbian/gay workers? 
 
How are initial inquiries handled? 
 
Assessing Lesbians and Gay Men 
 
What assessment format is used? (Form F?) 
 
Have they assessed anyone lesbian or gay? Or someone they thought was but 
didn’t come out? 
 
If they have a case example that they have assessed here, then talk about 
this in detail and find out how they assessed them 
 
Who gets lesbian/gay assts in the team? Is there a team ‘expert’? Have they 
used consultants? Is there ‘matching’ of gay worker with gay applicant or black 
with black etc? 
 
How would they prepare for a lesbian/gay asst? 
• knowledge/research 
• supervision/consultation 
• team support 
• feelings/support/isolation 
• p.c./getting it right or wrong 
 
What do they cover at initial visit? 
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Would they use specific questions about sexuality? If not, why not? If so, what 
and why? 
 
• gender role 
• coming out 
• relations with family 
• telling a child 
• schools/teasing 
• abuse 
• community 
• allegations 
 
 
How are gay couples assessed? 
Who should bring up sexuality? In all assts? How is it discussed? Has sexuality 
ever been ignored? 
 
Are lesbian/gay carers ever inappropriate? 
 
How are lesbian/gay carers represented in asst reports? Who gets through 
panel? Race and disability too. 
 
What is ‘different’ about assessing lesbians/gay men? c.f. heterosexuals, c.f. 
each other (i.e. gender differences). 
 
Any themes, stereotypes that emerged? 
 
When do people come out? When is best? 
 
Post-Assessment Issues 
 
Who is told carers are lesbian/gay? When?  
 
Is there conflict between teams, i.e. over placement? 
 
What about birth parents? Who tells the child and when? 
 
What placements have been made? 
Any patterns, e.g. disabled children? 
Delays? 
Which other Local Authorities have placed with them? 
Do they have more lesbians than gay men? 
Do lesbians get disabled kids, girls, sexually abused children, longer-term? 
Do gay man get boys, young gay men, short-term, disabled, no placements? 
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Are lesbians/gay men more scrutinised? 
 
What comes up at panels? What themes, rejections? What Qs? How do they 
prepare for panels? 
 
Any issues in supporting a placement with lesbians/gay men: 
 
• who to tell 
• allegations 
• couples that split 
• child becomes anti-gay 
• community 
• media 
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Appendix 2.a: Analysis of Social Worker Interview Data 
 
Analysis Within Data Sets (i.e. for each authority studied): 
 
1. Transcribe all interviews. Read each respondent interview and begin to 
develop key data themes. 
 
2. For each local authority, develop codes for overall data themes, e.g. ‘GENDER 
ROLE MODELS’. 
 
3. Re-read each interview, highlighting and numbering ‘chunks’ according to 
codes. 
 
4. Construct charts for each code, and then enter numbered data chunks from 
each respondent. This builds up evidence under each code. This also shows 
common codes within each authority, and idiosyncrasies. Scanning the codes 
also shows areas of most and least significance. 
 
5. Construct diagram of the assessment process stages for each authority (Figs. 
4.1 - 4.3 of the thesis, pp. 159-161). 
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Analysis Across Data Sets (i.e. across all authorities): 
 
1. Develop key themes across the whole data set, e.g. ‘TEAM POLICY’. 
Construct tables for each authority showing themes across the top and 
respondents down the side. Enter data into these tables (e.g. Fig. 4.5 of the 
thesis, p. 176). These tables allow analysis of key themes both within data sets 
(each authority) and across the data as a whole (comparing authorities). 
 
2. Compare the overall data codes developed for each authority across the whole 
data set, e.g. does ‘GENDER ROLE MODELS’ figure as a code across all 
authorities? Build up evidence across the whole data set under each code. 
 
3. Use these ‘chains of evidence’ under each code to structure writing up of the 
analysis. 
 
4. Analyse the social worker cohort according to each respondents race, 
ethnicity, age, class, disability, gender, sexuality, whether in fostering, adoption 
or management. 
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Appendix 2.b: Analysis of Case Study Data 
 
1. Transcribe interview tapes, and review documentary sources. This begins to 
raise data themes. 
 
2. Initial focus on ‘the story’ - isolate relevant sections of data from all sources 
and collect these in one file. 
 
3. Construct ‘the story’ in chronological order. After first attempt, the story is 
reviewed by respondents and other readers. Revised version produced based on 
their comments. 
 
4. Decision made about remainder of data to look at two overall areas: (i) the 
assessment, (ii) race, gender and sexuality.  
 
5. Construct a flow chart showing the assessment in stages (Fig. 6.1 of the 
thesis, p. 335). 
 
6. Read sources in depth. Highlight ‘chunks’ relevant to (i) the assessment or (ii) 
race, gender and sexuality.  
 
7. Develop a series of data codes from these ‘chunks’; e.g. ‘GENDER: role 
models’. Re-read data and code each highlighted section. 
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8. Produce a list of data codes: ‘ASSESSMENT APPROACH’, ‘DEPARTMENT 
POLICY’, ‘SEXUALITY:LESBIANISM’, ‘SEXUALITY:TEASING’, 
‘SEXUALITY:ABUSE’, ‘SEXUALITY:CHILD DEVELOPMENT’, 
‘GENDER:GIRLS’, ‘GENDER:ROLE MODELS’, ‘GENDER:MEN’, ‘RACE:ASIAN’, 
‘RACE:BLACK’, ‘RACE:CULTURE, RELIGION AND LANGUAGE’. 
 
9. Construct a chart showing data codes across top and data sources at side.  
 
10. Number the individual data chunks and enter these into the chart under 
relevant codes. Each number allows accurate retrieval of direct quotations from 
data. 
 
11. Read down each code column and note recurring sub-themes, e.g. under 
‘ASSESSMENT APPROACH’ “on merit” is a strong sub-theme. Produce list of 
sub-themes. 
 
12. Construct separate charts for each sub-theme. Enter evidence examples 
from the first chart under each sub-theme. This groups together evidence for 
each sub-theme. 
 
13. Use the data codes and their sub-themes to structure the writing up of the 
analysis.  
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14. Seek feedback on the analysis from respondents. Make changes based on 
their comments or include these as footnotes. 
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